Court, acting as a fiduciary for the class, didn't err in accepting a settlement of a class action as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Plaintiffs couldn't substantiate number of affected customers who were categorically ineligible under the settlement. Order sufficiently reasoned, terms could have been acceptable to reasonable counsel.
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Ninth Circuit: Brandon Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., et al.
No specific jurisdiction over web payment service operator, as the harm doesn't arise out of conduct expressly aimed at the state; the company is a broadly accessible web platform indifferent to the location of its customers and the consumers affected.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Michael Goforth
Given another circuit's on-point precedent (with a novel definition of the generic crime), a state kidnapping statute is a valid predicate, as the state court decision that expanded the bounds of the statute beyond those of the generic crime did so in dicta, after first determining that the conduct satisfied the state statute.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Aaron Broussard
Plain error review, as deft's pro se pretrial motion to exclude was denied with an invitation to object at trial, and later standby counsel didn't object or preserve the claim. Introduction of photographs of victims of mail-order pharmacy wasn't plain error.
Seventh Circuit: Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield
Plaintiff's 8A claim appropriately preserved when 1A claim was screened out, as the screening operated as an interlocutory order, and the underlying facts of the claim established the 8A claim.
A Bivens remedy for not protecting a prisoner is unavailable, as the only Supreme Court precedent recognizing the claim was sub silento; it's therefore a novel claim, and the existing statutory and administrative scheme suffices to establish that Congress might think itself best placed to resolve the procedures.
DISSENT:
Sub silento Supreme Court holding suffices, given the facts of the case and lower courts' recognition of it. Even absent that, it's not a new context, and no special factors counsel against recognition of the judicial remedy. Bivens grounded in constitutional necessity.
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Yun Zheng
Given the terms of the current statute, harboring an alien doesn't require specific intent; rather, it proscribes conduct that substantially facilitates remaining and avoiding detection, either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the risk. Circuit precedent on the term doesn't bind, as the changes to the underlying statute have been significant. Error would be harmless anyway, as the aliens being in plain view wouldn't exculpate. Instructions didn't invade 6A territory of the jury.
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Clarence Goodwin
No procedural error in review of sentence, as the retroactive element of the law only reduced the minimum term, not the guidelines range, and the court adequately recited that it had considered the petitioner's arguments. The reliance on the career-offender sentencing consideration to reach the guidelines range under the new calculation didn't offend Due Process.
Substantively, bootstrapping a challenge to the career-offender calculations to the retroactive changes would be unfair to those who were sentenced only under the former.
DISSENT:
Career-offender guidelines are tied to the maximum sentence, which, although not made retroactive here, would be different under the new statute; court's explanations did not demonstrate that it understood the complexity of the deft's claims.
Fourth Circuit: In re: Caryn Strickland
Mandamus for trial scheduling neither justified nor prudent, as the statute only establishes that the court need give priority to the claim, and the court's offer of a trial prior to full discovery, as well as the petitioner's agreement to defer proceedings for arbitration, suffice to establish that the claim was being promptly addressed.
(Entire circuit recused, panel from outside.)
Fourth Circuit: US v. Gregory Brantley
The time limit for appealing un-pronounced elements of the sentence is a mandatory claims-processing rule, and since the govt timely requested dismissal, equitable waiver is unavailable. Deft's analogy to appeal waivers inapposite, since in that case, imposition of sentence happens after (otherwise appealable) judgment is issued. Terms of a judgment are presumptively binding, and deft was put on notice of them when judgment issued.
Second Circuit: United States v. Calk
Bank officer's approval of loans in hopes of a Presidential appointment was illegal, as, for purposes of the statute, corrupt conduct need only be motivated at least in part by improper motives, and commercial decisions that might offer legitimate benefits are not insulated from the inquiry. The thing of value at issue need not have pecuniary value. The value of the intangible thing at issue can be determined to exceed the statutory minimum by establishing its value to the deft.
The grand jury subpoena of a third party wasn't improper; although the suspicious timing was enough to shift the burden, the subsequent superseding indictment, among other things, established its legitimacy.
Second Circuit: United States ex rel. Weiner et al. v. Siemens AG et al.
As the qui tam statute references both the unsealing of the complaint and the court's direction to serve the defendant, the clock for serving the defendant did not begin to run until the court ordered service.
First Circuit: Ciarametaro v. City of Gloucester
As city officials might reasonably have concluded that the value of the harbormaster's expert testimony was outweighed by the city's interests, the right to testify in the matter was not clearly established, and the officials are entitled to qualified immunity.
Eleventh Circuit: Joan Simring v. GreenSky, LLC
District court remand to state court under the local controversy exception to the class action statute is reviewable despite the ouster clause of the statute, since the remand is neither for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction nor due to a procedural defect. The appeal didn't require an authorization of permissive appeal, as the remand order is sufficiently final.
Despite the stipulated limit to the damages by the lead plaintiff, the deft's estimate of relief across the class prevails, since the lead plaintiff has no authority to bind the relief granted the class; the relief therefore exceeds the limit for the local controversy exception.
For purposes of determining residency of class members, only the explicit definition of the class can limit the class to a certain state, and the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the required fraction of in-state class members.
Eleventh Circuit: Southern Coal Corporation, et al v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc.
District court properly considered industry usage in determining whether a certain term was ambiguous, ultimately basing its judgment upon finding both the specific referent and the industry benchmark to be reasonable readings.
Agreement not susceptible of reformation, since the claimed error was the mutual mistake of sophisticated parties, so there's no basis for saying that the present agreement doesn't reflect the original intentions of the agreement.
District court abused its discretion in denying fees, as the movant prevailed on their central claim.
Counter-party's refusal to proceed under an industry benchmark once the specific rate-setting mechanism ceased to exist wasn't an anticipatory repudiation, since they were still performing their unaffected obligations under the contract. Since the dispute went to pricing and not the special purpose of the contract, neither was it a material breach of the contract.
CONCURRING IN PART, CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT:
The question on fees isn't whether a party was a prevailing party, but whether, under the contract, a party was a defaulting party.
Southern Coal Corporation, et al v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc.
Ninth Circuit: USA v. Volodymyr Kvashuk
Proof that an IP associated with the house was used to access relevant email and crypto-coin sites, combined with affidavit statement that financial and personal records are often kept at the home, was sufficient probable cause for a search of the house in an online fraud investigation. The fact that the fraudulent transactions were committed before moving there isn't dispositive of whether there was likely to be evidence at the house.
A 15-20 month gap between the thefts and the affidavit didn't make the affidavit claims stale, given the nature of computer memory.
Discrepancy in URL TLD on the warrant affidavit was inconsequential.
Personally issued website development test accounts sufficiently identify their authorized users to be the basis for a charge of aggravated identity theft.
Deft's immigration status wasn't critical to establishing a defense for the use of crypto-coin; court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.
Juror's work with the same large corporate division was insufficient for a claim of implied bias, since the fact patterns at issue in the trial weren't similar to the events of their employment.
Eighth Circuit: Barry Segal v. Metropolitan Council
Although a violation of the transit agency's regulations might not suffice to establish a claim under the discrimination statute, the violations here presented a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Eighth Circuit: Scott Gustafson v. Bi-State Development Agency
Concession at the motion for judgment on the pleadings that the plaintiff wasn't seeking to enforce a private right of action under the statute judicially estops plaintiff from making such a claim at the motion for summary judgment.
Frustrating but isolated incidents of inability to access services don't support a discrimination claim under the statute.
Earlier denial of motion to amend the complaint isn't automatically raised in an appeal of subsequent denial of summary judgment.
Seventh Circuit: Indigo Old Corp., Inc. v. Thomas Guido
Since the guarantor's obligation was part of an obligation subordinated to a second debt, the lender can't proceed against the guarantor until the second debt is retired and the subordinated obligation comes due. Under state law, the fact that the debt was subordinated by a contemporaneous instrument means that the subordination didn't count as a modification of the guaranteed obligation that would trigger the guarantor's obligation.
Seventh Circuit: Alhadji Bayon v. Marshall Berkebile
As the facts still in dispute bear on the objective reasonableness of the force used by the police officers to arrest the plaintiff, the appellate court has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory claim arising from a denial of qualified immunity,
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Darrick Vallodolid
In that the political beliefs expressed about immigration policy and discriminatory law enforcement were not exclusively rooted in the venirepersons' ethnicity, their removal from the pool of jurors wasn't constitutionally impermissible.
Given the small size of the sample, statistical analysis and disparate impact analysis alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory nature of the strikes.
As the eyewitness testimony was riddled with inconsistencies beyond the exculpatory ones, it was for the finder of fact to determine its credibility.
Sufficient evidence to find that the crime was gang-related, even absent formal affiliation with the gang, in that it furthered the activities of the former gang.
Sufficient evidence of the conspiracy to admit the statement of the co-conspirator. Statement indicating possession of drugs in the house admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish that the robbers believed there to be drugs there.
Sufficient evidence for conspiracy, given the customary procedures of the gangs and the defts' involvement with them. Sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish drug quantities.
Federal RICO proceeding wasn't required to incorporate state predicate offense's procedural requirement of bifurcated penalty phase.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)