ACCA/ Johnson
Neither the Supreme Court holding that the residual clause of the ACCA was impermissibly vague nor the Supreme Court holding that a certain state offense was not a valid predicate (nor the two combined) were changes in the substantive law to be made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515493.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Eleventh Circuit: USA v. Harlan Salmona
Plea Agreements
District court has Mandamus jurisdiction, not FRCrimP jurisdiction, over motions to enforce a plea deal.
Where a plea agreement's term of rescission allows only the revocation of use immunity, a material breach of the agreement prevents a court's subsequent enforcement under Mandamus of other guarantees.
Concurrence: Material breach justifies total rescission.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512569.pdf
District court has Mandamus jurisdiction, not FRCrimP jurisdiction, over motions to enforce a plea deal.
Where a plea agreement's term of rescission allows only the revocation of use immunity, a material breach of the agreement prevents a court's subsequent enforcement under Mandamus of other guarantees.
Concurrence: Material breach justifies total rescission.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512569.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Yasmick Jeune v. U.S. Attorney General
Immigration
Generalized assertions of discrimination did not administratively exhaust specific claims of trauma.
As agency's classification of petitioner includes the present claim in addition to the earlier claim, both have been refuted.
Agency's consideration of internal relocation need not be geographically specific.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201311683.pdf
Generalized assertions of discrimination did not administratively exhaust specific claims of trauma.
As agency's classification of petitioner includes the present claim in addition to the earlier claim, both have been refuted.
Agency's consideration of internal relocation need not be geographically specific.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201311683.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Leslie Gladstone v. Bancorp
Bankruptcy
Although the surrender value of the life insurance policies was nil, a pre-petition viatical transfer for value created value that should have been disclosed in bankruptcy proceedings.
Trustee's avoidance attempt is timely, as fraud equitably tolled the statute of limitations.
Trustee should have been given leave to amend claim.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/08/13-55773.pdf
Although the surrender value of the life insurance policies was nil, a pre-petition viatical transfer for value created value that should have been disclosed in bankruptcy proceedings.
Trustee's avoidance attempt is timely, as fraud equitably tolled the statute of limitations.
Trustee should have been given leave to amend claim.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/08/13-55773.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Eden Place v. Sholem Perl
Bankruptcy / property
As the bankruptcy proceeding is final with respect to the property at issue, interlocutory appeal has jurisdiction.
A tenant's remaining within a premises during an a unlawful detainer action does not create an equitable interest in the property, as the court is ruling on the supervening question of better title.
Dissent: Insufficiently final for jurisdiction.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/08/14-60039.pdf
As the bankruptcy proceeding is final with respect to the property at issue, interlocutory appeal has jurisdiction.
A tenant's remaining within a premises during an a unlawful detainer action does not create an equitable interest in the property, as the court is ruling on the supervening question of better title.
Dissent: Insufficiently final for jurisdiction.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/08/14-60039.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Grasso Enterprises v. Express Scripts
ERISA / Injunctions
Issuance of a preliminary injunction mandating compliance with a plan interpretation is not a remedy available to plaintiffs under ERISA.
Pharmacies do not have direct standing under ERISA.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151578P.pdf
Issuance of a preliminary injunction mandating compliance with a plan interpretation is not a remedy available to plaintiffs under ERISA.
Pharmacies do not have direct standing under ERISA.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151578P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Aemonn Alexander
ACCA predicates
State attempted second degree assault s a valid predicate, as it requires a substantial step and intent to cause physical harm.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151210P.pdf
State attempted second degree assault s a valid predicate, as it requires a substantial step and intent to cause physical harm.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151210P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Tao Chen v. Loretta E. Lynch
Immigration.
Sufficient evidence for IJ's adverse credibility findings.
As petitioner was protesting the destruction of his property, his was an economic, not political protest, making him ineligible for asylum.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-08/C:15-1831:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:1684359:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Frederick Grede v. Bank of New York
Bankruptcy/fraud
Given the paucity of the banks assets, the creditor bank had sufficient inquiry notice of the fact that funds on deposit were being used for collateral and therefore cannot assert a secured claim against the Trustee's characterization of the transaction as pre-petition avoidable transfer.
As only the lien on the funds is retained, no impermissible double recovery by the Trustee, and no claim under the Code for assets transferred in good faith.
To trigger equitable subordination, the creditor must have known of the fraud, which is a higher bar than inquiry notice -- remand.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-08/C:15-1039:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1684393:S:0
Given the paucity of the banks assets, the creditor bank had sufficient inquiry notice of the fact that funds on deposit were being used for collateral and therefore cannot assert a secured claim against the Trustee's characterization of the transaction as pre-petition avoidable transfer.
As only the lien on the funds is retained, no impermissible double recovery by the Trustee, and no claim under the Code for assets transferred in good faith.
To trigger equitable subordination, the creditor must have known of the fraud, which is a higher bar than inquiry notice -- remand.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-08/C:15-1039:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1684393:S:0
Fourth Circuit: Route 231, LLC, John Carr v. Commissioner of IRS
Tax.
Fixed terms of sale and value received preclude a court from dispelling the presumption that the transfer of development tax credits to partnership was a sale.
Original factual representation of relevant tax year cannot be arbitrarily changed after recateogorization of transfer.
Year of transfer correctly determined.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/141983.P.pdf
Fixed terms of sale and value received preclude a court from dispelling the presumption that the transfer of development tax credits to partnership was a sale.
Original factual representation of relevant tax year cannot be arbitrarily changed after recateogorization of transfer.
Year of transfer correctly determined.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/141983.P.pdf
First Circuit: US v. Madsen
Trial practice, sentencing.
Prosecutor's close didn't misquote, comment on silence, shift burdens.
Sentencing variances sufficiently explained.
Sentence not substantively unreasonable in the totality of things, as deft planned to resell the weapons as opposed to simply serving as a straw buyer.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1353P-01A.pdf
Prosecutor's close didn't misquote, comment on silence, shift burdens.
Sentencing variances sufficiently explained.
Sentence not substantively unreasonable in the totality of things, as deft planned to resell the weapons as opposed to simply serving as a straw buyer.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1353P-01A.pdf
First Circuit: Global Tower Assets LLC v. Town of Rome
Administrative law
As planning agency's decision is subject to mandatory statutory review before another panel, the agency's decision is insufficiently final for judicial review under the relevant Federal statute.
For purposes of pleading, finality is distinct from exhaustion, which as an affirmative defense, doesn't have to be pleaded.
No procedural due process claim, as there were state avenues to challenge.
Procedure too run-of-the-mill for a procedural due process challenge.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1140P-01A.pdf
As planning agency's decision is subject to mandatory statutory review before another panel, the agency's decision is insufficiently final for judicial review under the relevant Federal statute.
For purposes of pleading, finality is distinct from exhaustion, which as an affirmative defense, doesn't have to be pleaded.
No procedural due process claim, as there were state avenues to challenge.
Procedure too run-of-the-mill for a procedural due process challenge.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1140P-01A.pdf
First Circuit: US v. Rivera-Gonzalez
Sentencing.
Sentence above the minimum for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony was a variance, not a departure.
While the court during sentencing described the sentence was concurrent, the written sentence was silent in this regard, so no violation of the rule that the sentence must be consecutive.
Substantive error challenge construed as procedural plain error challenge; court's imposition of sentence while saying that it would be unjust if served concurrently was plain error - remand for explanation/resentencing.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1402P-01A.pdf
Sentence above the minimum for use of a firearm in the commission of a felony was a variance, not a departure.
While the court during sentencing described the sentence was concurrent, the written sentence was silent in this regard, so no violation of the rule that the sentence must be consecutive.
Substantive error challenge construed as procedural plain error challenge; court's imposition of sentence while saying that it would be unjust if served concurrently was plain error - remand for explanation/resentencing.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1402P-01A.pdf
Federal Circuit: Cogburn v. McDonald
Veterans/ claims
Implicit denial rule can apply to separately-filed claims, both formal and informal.
This does not violate statutory due process protections.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-7130.Opinion.1-5-2016.1.PDF
Implicit denial rule can apply to separately-filed claims, both formal and informal.
This does not violate statutory due process protections.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-7130.Opinion.1-5-2016.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: Wi-LAN Inc. v. Apple, Inc.
Patent.
Construction of claim did not bar defense that the order of operations was changed, as the construction implied the prior sequence.
De minimis differences in the two devices do not compel a finding of equivalence, as the changes should be considered relative to the portion of the device devoted to the function.
JMOL finding of no invalidity rested on an improper late construction of the claim.
(Or something like, or utterly unlike, that.)
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1437.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Construction of claim did not bar defense that the order of operations was changed, as the construction implied the prior sequence.
De minimis differences in the two devices do not compel a finding of equivalence, as the changes should be considered relative to the portion of the device devoted to the function.
JMOL finding of no invalidity rested on an improper late construction of the claim.
(Or something like, or utterly unlike, that.)
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1437.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: Reddick v. FDIC
Employment/ Administrative
An accepted offer to extend a term of employment became valid only upon the end of the previous employment, and subsequent questionable behavior by the employee therefore permitted the employer to decline to extend employment.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-3188.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
An accepted offer to extend a term of employment became valid only upon the end of the previous employment, and subsequent questionable behavior by the employee therefore permitted the employer to decline to extend employment.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-3188.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: Guardian Angels Med Serv. v. US
Administrative law
A contracting officer's agreement to obtain and evaluate evidence bearing on the manner of the ending of a contract makes the earlier decision non-final, and the period to challenge the decision runs from the officer's subsequent final judgment.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-5058.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
A contracting officer's agreement to obtain and evaluate evidence bearing on the manner of the ending of a contract makes the earlier decision non-final, and the period to challenge the decision runs from the officer's subsequent final judgment.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-5058.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: Haggart v. US
Class actions, fees, estoppel
Where the government is the deft in a class action under a statutory cause of action that shifts fees, it has standing to contest the fee award.
As there is a policy interest in government candor, the government is not estopped from challenging fees that it now claims to have mistakenly not opposed an an earlier proceeding.
As the government's objection was to the mechanics of the disbursement, previous acquiescence to the plan does not judicially estop it from challenging it later. (In a footnote, a note that estoppel probably doesn't apply to FG.)
Abuse of discretion for lower court to approve settlement that relied on valuations of unassessed property without any disclosure of methodology of valuation.
Uncertainty as to the precise valuations of individual claims does not bar application of the common fund doctrine.
Opt-in classes can be subject to the common fund doctrine, and as there is no statutory requirement that the class members pay fees, a fee agreement is subject to equitable challenge.
Where equitable a fee-shifting statute displaces allocation of fees under the common fund doctrine. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-5106.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Where the government is the deft in a class action under a statutory cause of action that shifts fees, it has standing to contest the fee award.
As there is a policy interest in government candor, the government is not estopped from challenging fees that it now claims to have mistakenly not opposed an an earlier proceeding.
As the government's objection was to the mechanics of the disbursement, previous acquiescence to the plan does not judicially estop it from challenging it later. (In a footnote, a note that estoppel probably doesn't apply to FG.)
Abuse of discretion for lower court to approve settlement that relied on valuations of unassessed property without any disclosure of methodology of valuation.
Uncertainty as to the precise valuations of individual claims does not bar application of the common fund doctrine.
Opt-in classes can be subject to the common fund doctrine, and as there is no statutory requirement that the class members pay fees, a fee agreement is subject to equitable challenge.
Where equitable a fee-shifting statute displaces allocation of fees under the common fund doctrine. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-5106.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: In re Urbanski
Patent.
A method of hydrating fibers (or something like that) doesn't teach away from a subsequent process -- a user wanting a different composition would simply vary the hydration.
Or something like (or utterly unlike) that.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1272.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
A method of hydrating fibers (or something like that) doesn't teach away from a subsequent process -- a user wanting a different composition would simply vary the hydration.
Or something like (or utterly unlike) that.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1272.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
DC Circuit: In re: Sealed Case
Sentencing
Where one justification for a sentence condition is alleged to have been made at trial, but the condition is omitted from the written sentence, a court may offer an alternate justification for the condition in a subsequent resentencing in the same proceeding.
No abuse of discretion in ordering incarceration for violations of sentencing conditions.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CEAD7C3CAC7B86DF85257F3400539427/$file/14-3058-1592438.pdf
Where one justification for a sentence condition is alleged to have been made at trial, but the condition is omitted from the written sentence, a court may offer an alternate justification for the condition in a subsequent resentencing in the same proceeding.
No abuse of discretion in ordering incarceration for violations of sentencing conditions.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/CEAD7C3CAC7B86DF85257F3400539427/$file/14-3058-1592438.pdf
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