Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
The claim that the directors of the rodeo corporation had run the corporation as a sham and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when adding the directors to her claim adequately stated a claim for relief, but under governing state law, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish that the corporation was a liability shell subject to veil-piercing.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50650-CV0.pdf
The existence of unfiled potential legal claims arising from the same circumstances does not mean that a court lacks statutory jurisdiction to issue a requested declaratory judgment; under the statute, such claims aren't waived by seeking declaratory judgment as to the allocation of rights and responsibilities, and can be raised in a subsequent action.
Circuit precedent requiring the court to consider the redress from a federal court judgment doesn't implicate the effect of federal rulings on state law, but looks to the ability of a court to accord final relief to the parties.
Circuit precedent requiring the consideration of the litigation of identical issues in state court assumes identity of parties as well.
Even within the context of the pandemic, the issues raised here are generic issues of contract and policy exclusion interpretation, making a prudential remand on the ground of undetermined state law unjustified.
Since the state courts have no legislative priority in matters of public health, balancing policy exclusions against state public policy interests is not peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
DISSENT
Factors relevant to prudential abstention aren't exhaustive; states need to fashion a comprehensive plan to recover from the pandemic; federal speculation on state law risks undue delay.
The suretyship for the construction contract was not discharged at tender letter, occupancy, or final completion nof the structure, but by the final payments to the completion contractor; the obligee therefore held the superior interest to the assets of the defaulting party, and could waive its claim to the defaulting party's tax refund.
Settlement order explicitly referencing the tax refund and holding that nothing in the settlement could limit any interest of the surety in the refund preserved no interest, as the suretyship had not acquired its priority interest prior to the settlement agreement.
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/203057p.pdf
An advocacy organization seeking organizational standing to challenge a government action can't merely rely on its expenditure of funds in opposition to the measure, even at the request of its members; it must establish an injury in fact by showing an involuntary material burden on its established core activities.
Claim for expenditures against the measure needs to be supported by proof that existing activies were hindered, and that the expenditures were material.
Trial court abused its discretion by considering the need for healthcare and rehabilitation nearly to the exclusion of other sentencing factors, and without considerig the disparity between the deft's sentence and those of defts with similar backgrounds who committed similar crimes. The deft's situation is distinguished from that of other individuals with disproportionately lenient sentences by deft's lack of cooperation and violations of pre-sentence release.
Under the FRCP, an entity (such as a trust) might be the real party in interest, but lack legal capacity to sue.
Under the state's law, the trust has no capacity to sue, since it is viewed as a fiduciary relationship rather than a distinct entity. Additionally, the trust's organic docments vest legal capacity in the trustee.
Upon determination that the party lacks legal capacity, it is possible to remand with that finding on the expectation that the complaint will be amended.
A claim for both past and prospective costs incurred is prudentially ripe if the past costs are enough to sustain the claim, even though a ruling might bind the parties as to future costs incurred.
Contribution claim under a different section of the law was dismissed pendant to the dismissal of the earlier claim, and therefore unreasoned in light of the plaintiff prevailing on appeal; the case is remanded with both the contribution and recovery claims, and the District Court has the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any re-filed state law claims.
Since the plaintiff is seeking to relitigate a question decided adversely in a removal hearing, the question arises from the removal action or proceeding; Article III review is therefore limited by statute to narrow areas, including timely challenge to final order of removal.
Statutory judicial review mechanism for denied naturalization applications implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction due to the fairly discernible intent of the comprehensive and interrelated statutory scheme, the fact that the exclusive remedy would not foreclose meaningful review, and the fact that the requested relief -- a change in agency policy that would be dispositive for the plaintiff's case -- is not wholly collteral to the statute's provisions.
Although insufficient harm under common law, the improper phone call from a debt collection agency was of the same kind of harm recognized at common law as intrusion upon seclusion, and Congress addressed this type of harm in the creation of the statute.
Summary judgment for the nonmovant wasn't on novel grounds of which the movant had insufficient notice; the nonmovant is entitled to point out that the motion for summary jusgment is unsupported by the evidence.
Bona fide error defense unavailable as a matter of law, since no reasonable jury could find that the policies were designed to avoid the making of unauthorized calls.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110562706.pdf
Since the due process rights of aliens who have not effected an entry into the US are coextensive with the statutory scheme and mechanisms for redress within that scheme devised by Congress, when Congress excludes that form of redress, Article III courts have no jurisdiction to hear even a colorable constitutional claim of deprivation of the due process accorded by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-70115.pdf
ALJ decisions on motions for reconsideration or modification of award under the statute are reviewed for abuse of discretion, since the statute grants the ALJ broad discretion, and judgments on motions to reopen and reconsider in other areas of law receive similar deference.
As the ALJ's have no policymaking role and are employed in the implementation of the statute at the discretion of the Executive, the protections against removal of ALJ's so employed do not violate Article II powers of the Executive.
ALJ's are judges who make decisions that are subject to vacatur by people without tenure protection. Properly appointed ALJ's don't trammel on the President's executive power.
Finding of inproper removal protections would not imperil the decisions of a lawfully appointed ALJ that have been susbsequently ratified by the Secretary.
Given the specific procedure in the statute, ALJ did not abuse discretion in denying motion to reconsider and modify; the statute empowers the agency to administratively modify the finding, and specifically forbids the initiation of a reconsideration before an ALJ. Given the interest in finality, no abuse of discretion in denying motion to reopen.
Once the presumption arising from fifteen years of work in similar considtion arises, the burden shifts to the employer to disprove total disability due to pneumoconiosis.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-71449.pdf
Alien facing deportation was not sufficiently put on notice that his past claim of having been born in the US was to be the main issue in the final heaing on the merits, on a motion to sua sponte reconsider the earlier determination of time, place and manner into the country. When a person is charged with a crime or charged with allegations waranting removal from the country, that person is fairly entitled to notice of the claims against him and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-70177.pdf
Alleged violation of a jus cogens norm doesn't waive federal soveriegn immunity for purposes of a claim under the Alien Tort Statute under a theory of extra-constitutional wrongdoing.
Equitable tolling not available for second cause of action, which under the law at time of filing would bar recovery under any other cause of action, since this judgment bar would prohibit subsequent recoveries, but did not address claims filed in the same suit, either one of which might have prevailed.
Extension of Bivvens unavailable, as an action against the agency head would be an inappropriate attempt to change government policy, and the claim against the agent who actually shot the Mexican citizen on the border fence has national security implications.
CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL CONCURRENCE
No need to reach sovereign immunity, as the elements of the ATS claim aren't met.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/17-56610.pdf
Case was not made moot by agency's withdrawal of an enforcement order, where the underlying determination of jurisdiction remained, since it was not absolutely clear that the agency would not seek to reinstate the order.
Although the government enjoys a presumption of good faith in voluntary cessation, it must demonstrate that its change is entrenched or permanent.
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting memo postdating the relevant decision, since the memo summarizes the same information that the agency relied upon, rather than being a post hoc justification.
Under Supreme Court precedent, EPA jurisdiction over wetlands requires a significant nexus with navigable waters, rather than the freer standard set out by the plurality in that case, since the first standard is a logical subset of the plurality's rule.
Agency's conculsion that painiffs' wetlands have a sufficient nexus to navigable waters wasn't arbitrary, and was supported by the record.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-35469.pdf
As it criminalizes violence or the threat of violence against property as well as persons, Hobbs Act Robbery is categorically not a crime of violence under the sentencing guideleines. Similarly, the generic crime of Robbery enumerated elsewhere in the guidelines is narrower than Hobbs Act Robbery, since federal Robbery requires imminent danger to the person; the generic crime of Extortion is also narrower, as caselaw requires threats to be directed against the person.
Not harmless error, as the court didn't explain a basis for variance that would account for the resulting variance.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/18-30238.pdf
Plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence of knowledge of risks and effective alternatives on the part of the device manufacturer, since none of the evidence excluded addressed causation, an element of the claim.
If the admission of expert testimony on operating room airflow was error, it was harmless, given the many other avenues established for the bacteria to have entered the wound.
As causation is an element of a lack of warning claim under state law, if the court erred in holding that the deft had actual or constructive knowledge, the error was harmless, since causation was never established.
Court did not abuse discretion in quashing deposition of city sherriff, since the sherriff was not personally involved in the employment matters at issue, and the plaintiff did not describe the admissible evidence that might result from the deposition beyond the existence of a conversation at a political event.
Employment action was too attenuated from the employer's gaining knowledge of political activity to support a claim for political retaliation, and the nondiscriminatory bases offered by the employer for the action were insufficiently rebutted.. Claim of racial dicrimination doesn;t present a genine issue of material fact for trial, since there were decisionmakers outside of the protected class and the nondiscriminatory reasons for the action were insufficiently rebutted.
Unequal treatment of a state's residents under the 14th Amendment right to domestic travel only occurs when a law expressly differentiates between residents based on their length or timing of residency.
Absent a violation of the right to travel, the equal protection claim should be assessed under rational basis review.
State's offender registration law is insufficiently punitive to base an ex post facto claim upon it; the stated purpose of the legislature was civil and regulatory. In practice, it's sufficiently different from parole, as the status can't be revoked; its restraints and disabilities aren't sufficiently severe to make the law punitive; residency restrictions do not serve punitive aims, and there is sufficient connection to nonpunitive purposes; and the law is not excessive in relation to its aims.
CONCURRENCE:
The registration law is permissibly retroactive; it imposes obligations beyond those prescribed at the time of the offense.
CONCURRENCE/DISSENT:
Requiring registration of residents who are subject to registration in their prior state of residence puts those residents on unequal terms with residents of their present state who are shielded from registration requirments by a decision of the state's supreme court holding the registration requirment to be sufficiently punitive to trigger ex post facto scrutiny.
A resident of the instant state who then travelled to another state where they were subject to registration requirements would then have to register in the instant state upon their return, burdening the travel right.
A federal court has sufficient independent jurisdiction over a claim to enforce an earlier federal judgment against a putative alter ego of the original deft when jurisdiction over the putative alter ego would arise under the statute that conferred the jurisdiction over the original action. The question of whether the second organization is in fact an alter ego of the first is a merits question, not a jurisdictional threshold.
The ERISA framework is not compulsory when assessing alter ego under the antiterrorism laws.