Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Under the statute, a citizen suit claiming that an agency is not following regulations can't look at documents not having legal force to supply missing terms in the regulations and standards.
Court appropriately held that, given existing remediation, there was insufficient imminent and substantial endangerment to the town for the citizen suit to prevail under the statute.
Plaintiff does not have standing under the statute to challenge the lack of sufficient identification of the debt collector, which resulted in the sending of correspondence to the wrong company, since the error does not bear a close relationship to traditional harms, and confusion is insufficient concrete injury.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0182p-06.pdf
Denial of class certification that doesn't reach merits but instead is a case managment order associated with a stay pendng a related appeal doesn't end the tolling of statutes of limitation for absent class members, as their reliance on the class remedy and the representatives is still objectively reasonable.
As the stay put the parties on notice of pending claims and continued reliance by absent class members was reasonable, the continued tolling serves the purpose of the statute of limitaitons and the economy of litigation.
Circuit split with Fourth flagged.
Once an uncertified class action is dismissed, tolling ceases.
Claim for equitable tolling forfeited for not being distinguished from tolling of right claim before the District Court.
As employer never made working on leave a condition of employment or threatened employee with adverse consequences, lack of assignment of the employees duties to another in the interim did not interfere with the exercise of the statutorily guaranteed leave.
The distinction between actual due dates and horatory due dates presents a genuine issue for trial on the claim of pretextual basis for retaliatory action.
State law whistleblower claim would require an actual violation of state law, not merely discusion of an illegal practice.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-30289-CV0.pdf
The Township's proposed regulations on the firearms practice ground trigger stricter scrutiny, since although restricting the areas for firearm practice dates to the Founding, the town's specific regulations on firearm type and nonprofit ownership of the club are novel, and merit closer scrutiny.
As the regulations steer clear of the core of the Amendment, intermediate scrutiny applies. The limitation on firearm type is only conjectural in its claim to reduce the intensity of practice, and the nonprofit ownership rule is similarly conjectural in its claim to reduce commercial intensity. As the Township bears the burden to establish the reasonableness of the remedy, the challenge to the regulations states a claim
At 11: "The sockdolager here..."
Deft can't be denied the safe harbor of the sentencing reduction for lack of participation by mere evidence of accompanying others on supply trips; mere presence at prohibited transactions is insufficient.
Contemporaneous objection to the length of the sentence imposed preserves only a claim of substantive error, not one of procedural error.
Plain procedural error in sentencing for the court to base an upward variance upon the conditions in the city of the offense without associating the particular circumstances of the deft within this context.
Court adequately recited mitigations, but did not sufficiently explain its upward variance. As the relevant conduct is explicitly included in the guidelines calculation, court needed to specifically distinguish the deft's situation.
Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence -- the deft has the burden to establish that the comparators who received disparate sentences were sufficiently similar.
Three in the DC Circuit from Friday, but too much multitasking today. Perhaps tomorrow. Cheers.
CB
Board's decision that the rehiring interviews by the allegedly successor organization were unduly coercive was insufficiently reasoned, as the legal standard wasn't identified and the relevant factors weren't reviewed. Where both the Board and the ALJ issue unsupported decisions, but the facts are apparent in the record, the issues can be addressed on appellate review. As the questions were answered truthfully, there was no systematic attempt to inquire as to union membership, and no interviewee suggested coercion, the second employer did not unduly coerce during rehiring.
Second employer's statement that they might have to close the facility if it were to become unionized wasn't in itself a threat, and it was insufficient to demonstrate animus relevant to the refussal to hire members of the union. (The statement was also too attenuated in time and after the fact.)
Anumus of a lower-level supervisor can't be attributed to the decisionmakers who declined to hire the union members.
Absent the discriminatory hiring claim, the second business wan't a successor organization, as a moajority of its employees were not former employees of the first business.
https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201911615.pdf
Motion to amend the judgment mailed prior to the formal entry of judgment, and that challenged the judgment under rule 59(e) tolled the time for appeal, making the appeal filing here timely.
In considering whether a pleading states a claim of conspiracy under S1983, only the content of the amended complaint should be considered.
Notice sent to the town's mayor wasn't sufficient according to the terms of the state notice act; actual notice is insufficient under the act.
Requesting default judgment from the appellate court is insufficient to challenge a denial of default judgment below.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110560714.pdf
Sufficient evidence for agency's determination that expert affidavit describing changed country conditions did not adequately set out a basis for the threat to a child of an ethically and religiously diverse family -- the affidavit seperately described the threat faced by each group, but not the threat to the child of such a family.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110560738.pdf
Statutory Habeas is unavailable where an intial challenge to the conviction was made in the court of conviction according to statute, but there was a subsequent change in the law regarding the predicate offense that cannot be relitigated under AEDPA, since it would be second or successive. The inital collateral challenge was adequate and effective.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110561337.pdf
Statute proibits Article III challenges to the removal of a foreign citizen even where that removal happens in advance of statutorily guaranteed motion to reopen the case, since that remedy can be pursued abroad; this is true even where there is a showing of risk to the petitioner from removal.
Habeas jurisdiciton is similarly foreclosed, as petitioner is not seeking relief from executive detention, and as an alien in the process of being removed, has no proceedural rights other than those guaranteed by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/13/21-16062.pdf
Finder of fact could rationally have decided that a request for a case to be assigned to another judge, and that contained a threat against that first judge was in fact addressed to the first judge even though the note was addressed to the courthouse.
Although the jury instruction didn't adequately convey the element of subjective intent to threaten, the error was harmless, since the deft's only argument against subjective intent was that the note had not been addressed to the judge, and the note, read plainly, was a true threat.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/13/20-30019.pdf
Since the roadmaps were created under a state statute and designed, at least in part, to give owners in property notice of extant interests in their property, the road map is a public record for the purposes of the title insurance contract, and the insurers had a duty to defend the landowner against the otherwise unrecorded state road easement and right of way.
Policy exclusion for claims arising from public interests in roads applies to bar the claim, since the state is asserting such an interest, and the policy owner is opposing it.
One deft to pay the plaintiff's costs, and the plaintiff to pay the prevailing deft's costs.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/13/20-35336.pdf
As those possessing abuse images tend to hoard them, the uploading of an image was sufficient probable cause for a search of the deft's electronic devices seven months later.
Under-guidelines sentence not substantively unreasonable.
As the officer removed the package containing contraband from where the delivery company had placed it in their facility, but in a manner consistent with the procedure agreed with the delivery company, the officer was working at the direction of the company in carrying it to the dog sniffing area, and the package was not seized until the dog's reaction had established reasonable suspicion.
The dog's reaction, combined with the suspicious appearance of the box, and the deft's demonstrated familiarity with the object provided sufficient probable cause for the arrest.
Scope of the search justified as a protective sweep exceeded Fourth Amendment bounds, since the sweep is permitted in order to determine whether there are othre people in the house, and the officers looked in cabinets and trash cans and opened a shoebox.
Remand to determine whether a waarant would have been sought anyway and the evidence admitted by means of an independent source
While state law generally governs witness competency in a civil case, federal law controls on questions relating to the qualification of expert witnesses; harmless, as the exclusion was correct under federal law and the testimony cumulative.
A finding of good cause for the substitution of an expert witness after discovery does not compel the admission of substantively different testimony form the second expert.
Referring state prison imate to medical services for special shoes was not deliberate indifference on the part of the warden.
Doctor's lack of recognition of the need for orthopedic shoes, an omission that eventually resulted in an amputaition, did not rise the level criminal recklessness needed to present an issue of deliberate indifference. Other employees similarly would not have had the requisite disregard.
CONCURRENCE/DISSENT
Nurse's testimony on the negligence of the doctor was admissible expert testimony, given her credentials and the need for a flexible, fact-specific inquiry. Given the warden's habitual follow-up inquiry with medical services, the warden had sufficient knowledge to present a genuine issue of deliberate indifference. Physician's and administrator's conduct presented a genuine issue for trial.