Bankruptcy Court had statutory jurisdiction to resolve discrimination claims against debtor as a matter of law, as plaintiff consented to jurisdiction, and the statutory carve-out that would usually move personal-injury tort claims to the District Court is not a jurisdictional provision.
Implicit consent to jurisdiction suffices for a Bankruptcy Court to resolve the claim; by filing and seeking judgment from the court, Plaintiff consented to jurisdiction as to constitutional concerns. Constitutional challenges to the court's jurisdiction might have been lodged during the proceedings or in a motion challenging the denial of claim, making the present challenge untimely.
As plaintiff received notice and opportunity to be heard, there were no Due Process violations inherent in the Bankruptcy forum; consent to forum waived the jury trial right; challenge to local counsel rule waived for not being raised below.
Post-discharge, a tort liability claim that was incorporated in the bankruptcy settlement cannot be transferred or remanded.
Given absence of incidents in employee's file, employer not liable for racial animus under respondeat superior.
Employee's termination for fighting during the incident of alleged racial animus had a sufficiently non-discriminatory rationale.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172449p.pdf
Third Circuit: William Lee v. Sixth Mt Zion Baptist Church
Claims of minister whose contract with his church was terminated for cause due to lack of spiritual leadership do not present an issue for trial, as the question would impermissibly entangle the court in religious matters, and the church has a freestanding First Amendment right to select its ministers.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173086p.pdf
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173086p.pdf
End of Day
Working much more slowly at these than before for some reason. This should have been a 100% coverage day. For the nonce, chalking it up to putting the task at the end of a long day. Or perhaps the Trollope over dinner. Reading rhythms.
More:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0196p-06.pdf
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0197p-06.pdf
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D09-04/C:17-2890:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2212102:S:0
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/171374P.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/17-30084.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-50326.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-35684.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-15588.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/15-35845.pdf
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512130.pdf
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C5C55E88E352419C852582FE004E7052/$file/16-5298.pdf
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C43C5F8C1F01517F852582FE004E4BCA/$file/17-1151.pdf
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-2434.Opinion.9-4-2018.pdf
-CB
More:
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0196p-06.pdf
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0197p-06.pdf
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D09-04/C:17-2890:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2212102:S:0
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/171374P.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/17-30084.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-50326.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-35684.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/16-15588.pdf
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/09/04/15-35845.pdf
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201512130.pdf
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C5C55E88E352419C852582FE004E7052/$file/16-5298.pdf
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C43C5F8C1F01517F852582FE004E4BCA/$file/17-1151.pdf
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-2434.Opinion.9-4-2018.pdf
-CB
Fifth Circuit: In Re: Alfred Bourgeois
Second or successive habeas petitions from prisoners in federal custody must meet the same statutory thresholds as do those from state prisoners.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-40270-CV0.pdf
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-40270-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Thomas Martone v. Walter Robb, III, et al
Plaintiff need not sell stock to establish loss causation for standing -- purchase at inflated price and holding at reduced value suffices for particular injury.
Where there was no alternative that would have avoided the fall in stock price, the allegedly harmful timing of the disclosure might have been a legitimate business decision. ANy hedging strategy would, as a matter of law, have required disclosure. Additionally, the board could no have been certain that the employee stock plan would be a net purchaser during the period under consideration.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-50702-CV0.pdf
Where there was no alternative that would have avoided the fall in stock price, the allegedly harmful timing of the disclosure might have been a legitimate business decision. ANy hedging strategy would, as a matter of law, have required disclosure. Additionally, the board could no have been certain that the employee stock plan would be a net purchaser during the period under consideration.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-50702-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Norman Bloom v. Aftermath Pub Adjusters, Inc., et
Absent state precedent to the contrary, in a federal forum, state procedural rules on tolling of claim are limited to the class of persons explicitly identified in the state precedent or statute. Federal forum cannot equitably modify, as it is a question of law.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-41087-CV0.pdf
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-41087-CV0.pdf
Third Circuit: Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Sec PA Dept Env Protection
Given the strong presumption of administrative unreviewability until final administrative action, the statute's silence eon the question, combined with a jurisdictional grant over state actions create an inference of unreviwability until after final administrative decision.
As the agency decision takes effect prior to administrative appeal and the administrative appeal happens within an entirely separate proceeding, the agency decision is sufficiently final for statutory exclusive jurisdiction.
Rulemaking notice was sufficient; there is no requirement that notice requirements be set forth in a regulation; notice allowed interested parties to participate meaningfully in a process that was actually pending.
Agency approval conditioned on subsequent permit grant was not intrinsically arbitrary and capricious.
Whether or not a Takings Clause claim can arise under the statute, there is sufficient remedy in the existing appeals process.
Statute and APA allow court to consider pendent claims arising from the state constitution.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/162211p.pdf
As the agency decision takes effect prior to administrative appeal and the administrative appeal happens within an entirely separate proceeding, the agency decision is sufficiently final for statutory exclusive jurisdiction.
Rulemaking notice was sufficient; there is no requirement that notice requirements be set forth in a regulation; notice allowed interested parties to participate meaningfully in a process that was actually pending.
Agency approval conditioned on subsequent permit grant was not intrinsically arbitrary and capricious.
Whether or not a Takings Clause claim can arise under the statute, there is sufficient remedy in the existing appeals process.
Statute and APA allow court to consider pendent claims arising from the state constitution.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/162211p.pdf
Third Circuit: Marc Silver v. Omnicare Inc
Although the statute does not permit a relator to pursue a qui tam action where the fraud is public knowledge, where the relator uses privately available information to make sense of the public information and the public information, standing alone, would not reasonably or plausibly supported an inference of fraud under the heightened pleading requirements for the claim.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164418p.pdf
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164418p.pdf
Third Circuit: Alex Taksir v. Vanguard Group
State action for breach of contract in reference to undisclosed transaction fees is not barred by the terms of the securities act, as the misrepresentation is not in connection to the sale of the security, and would not be material to the transaction. As the misrepresentation is outside of the act's scope, a fraud claim is similarly not forbidden.
Tenth Circuit: Grissom v. Carpenter
Trial counsel's arguments in mitigation phase at capital trial largely covered the ground that a closer examination of petitioner's undiagnosed brain damage would have led to, so state habeas ruling that representation was not constitutionally ineffective was not an unreasonable one.
Defense counsel's concession of the elements of the crime made instruction on lesser-included offenses redundant, and was apparently a legitimate strategic decision to focus the jury's attention on mitigation. As defendants cannot withdraw a defense, apparently stipulating to the elements shouldn't waive the instruction. Voluntary intoxication instruction was not prejudicial, given the high standard for relief under state law, and exists as a complete defense, not a mitigation. State habeas denial was therefore not unreasonable.
State habeas denial for cumulative error, presumably referencing ineffective assistance for the lack of lesser-included instruction and mitigation, was not unreasonable and contrary to law; de novo review of the total record in federal habeas can establish this.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6271.pdf
Defense counsel's concession of the elements of the crime made instruction on lesser-included offenses redundant, and was apparently a legitimate strategic decision to focus the jury's attention on mitigation. As defendants cannot withdraw a defense, apparently stipulating to the elements shouldn't waive the instruction. Voluntary intoxication instruction was not prejudicial, given the high standard for relief under state law, and exists as a complete defense, not a mitigation. State habeas denial was therefore not unreasonable.
State habeas denial for cumulative error, presumably referencing ineffective assistance for the lack of lesser-included instruction and mitigation, was not unreasonable and contrary to law; de novo review of the total record in federal habeas can establish this.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6271.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Lucero v. Holland
Apparently incriminating gang writings insufficiently testimonial to trigger Confrontation Clause protections when introduced against a nontestifying codefendant.
Expert testimony that gang member was to have access to a weapon at all times and proximity to assault with a puncturing weapon insufficient to establish possession of a weapon.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/15-16111.pdf
Expert testimony that gang member was to have access to a weapon at all times and proximity to assault with a puncturing weapon insufficient to establish possession of a weapon.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/15-16111.pdf
Ninth Circuit: US v. Raygoza-Garcia
The vehicle's innocent conduct created sufficiently particularized and objective reasonable suspicion for the stop, given the experience of the officers.
Special Concur: True according to precedent, but problematic to use innocent conduct as basis for border stops.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/16-50490.pdf
Special Concur: True according to precedent, but problematic to use innocent conduct as basis for border stops.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/16-50490.pdf
Ninth Circuit: McCray v. Marriott
Where a labor right arises from a statute but is waived by a CBA, a challenge to the waiver is construed as a challenge to the statute, not to the CBA, making preemption removal inapposite and depriving the federal court of jurisdiction over the question of state law.
Dissent: It's about the CBA.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/17-15767.pdf
Dissent: It's about the CBA.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/08/31/17-15767.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Matthew Dickson v. Gospel for ASIA, Inc.
Arbitration agreement had sufficient mutuality in the counter-party's agreement to be bound.
Dissent: State law requires that, in order to create an enforceable agreement, both parties to an arbitration agreement must agree to arbitrate claims.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/171191P.pdf
Dissent: State law requires that, in order to create an enforceable agreement, both parties to an arbitration agreement must agree to arbitrate claims.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/171191P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Estate of Derek Williams, Jr. v. Jeffrey Cline
Remand of interlocutory review of denial of qualified immunity in order for the court below to make factual findings as to the defts' specific conduct.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-31/C:17-2603:J:Ripple:dis:T:fnOp:N:2211195:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-31/C:17-2603:J:Ripple:dis:T:fnOp:N:2211195:S:0
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Napoleon Foster
A conviction for using a firearm in the course of a robbery precludes increasing the underlying sentence for the robbery itself for explosive or weapons threats, even when those threats are unconnected to the firearm used in the robbery.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-31/C:17-3236:J:Scudder:aut:T:fnOp:N:2211361:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-31/C:17-3236:J:Scudder:aut:T:fnOp:N:2211361:S:0
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