FOIA does not create a cause of action against individual employees.
No error in magistrate's case managment order setting a summary judgment motion prior to discovery.
Agency's search and redactions were proper; plaintiff did not challenge specific exemptions.
No clear error in agency exemptions for attorney/client privilege, trade secret, and personnel reasons.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-1750:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171542:S:0
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Seventh Circuit: Eli Lilly v. Arla Foods, Inc.
Preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act appropriately issued where a single supplier ends use of the product; causation can be inferred from the demonization of the product, and no hard evidence of consumer confusion is necessary at the stage of preliminary injunction.
Injunction was not overbroad in barring a wide variety of cartoon ogres and substantially similar messages.
Concurring in part, concurring in j: District court findings on actual confusion weren't raised in the interlocutory appeal.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-2252:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171872:S:0
Injunction was not overbroad in barring a wide variety of cartoon ogres and substantially similar messages.
Concurring in part, concurring in j: District court findings on actual confusion weren't raised in the interlocutory appeal.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-2252:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171872:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Part-time Faculty Association v. Columbia College Chicago
Where a Board representation decision partially grounded in an interpretation of the terms of the CBA conflicts with a subsequent artbitrator's ruling on the question of representation, the latter is unenforceable as to the representation, as the parties in the second proceeding are bargaining for the arbitrator's opinion, not the Board's interpretation of the Act.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-3492:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171484:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-3492:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171484:S:0
Fourth Circuit: Rhonda L. Hutton v. National Board of Examiners
Where the fraudulent opening of lines of credit in plaintiffs' name can be plausibly traced to the deft's data breach, plaintiffs have suffered, at minimum, sufficient concrete and particular imminent harm to state a claim.
Fourth Circuit: Plaintiffs Appealing CMO 100 v. Pfizer
No error in exclusion of expert testimony under Daubert where statistician performed a wide range of analyses to verify the legitimacy of the analysis, but excluded the other tests from testimony, and further impermissibly used an indicator for the medical condition as evidence of the medical condition.
No error in exclusion of second expert where stepped dosage conclusions were impermissibly based on conclusions as to lowest dosage that were based on a statistically insignificant association, since this manner of analysis is not generally accepted.
No error in exclusion of third expert, as differential diagnosis methodology did not sufficiently account for alternative causation.
Deft admissions almost never sufficient basis to survive summary judgment, where the claim is too complex for the average juror.
Summary judgment grant across the MDL was an appropriate use of judicial resources.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171140.P.pdf
No error in exclusion of second expert where stepped dosage conclusions were impermissibly based on conclusions as to lowest dosage that were based on a statistically insignificant association, since this manner of analysis is not generally accepted.
No error in exclusion of third expert, as differential diagnosis methodology did not sufficiently account for alternative causation.
Deft admissions almost never sufficient basis to survive summary judgment, where the claim is too complex for the average juror.
Summary judgment grant across the MDL was an appropriate use of judicial resources.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171140.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Shari Renee Lauflett v. Commissioner
Jurisdiction grant inside parentheticals in a prefatory part of the statute makes appeals time limit jurisdictional; in addition to plain language, the fact that collections actions can't be enjoined absent a timely filing, and agency can't collect until after the cutoff establish the reading.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171986.P.pdf
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171986.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: US v. Darra Lee Shephard
No error in sentencing determination that vulnerable victims were targeted by telemarketing scheme and deft was aware of theiir vulnerability, as scheme targeted those who had already fallen for it once.
No error in loss calculation that incorporated uncharged wire transfers, as they were clear from the face of the indictment.
No error in sentencing finding that deft was culpable for conspiracy until 2015, despite ending work there in 2012, as deft stipulated to involvement in the facts incorporated in the plea, and, in the alternative, exit wasn't strong enough to end conspiracy liability.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174148.P.pdf
No error in loss calculation that incorporated uncharged wire transfers, as they were clear from the face of the indictment.
No error in sentencing finding that deft was culpable for conspiracy until 2015, despite ending work there in 2012, as deft stipulated to involvement in the facts incorporated in the plea, and, in the alternative, exit wasn't strong enough to end conspiracy liability.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174148.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Maricela Martinez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III
As no jury unanimity as to the theory of the offense is required, statute is not susceptible to modified categorical review.
Assuming that the 'substantial erosion' of property rights required for the agency standard of theft convictions is valid and applies here, since the law sweeps beyond that to incorporate things like joyriding, the agency erred in holding the state conviction to be a crime of moral turpitude justifying refusal of withholding of removal.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171301.P.pdf
Assuming that the 'substantial erosion' of property rights required for the agency standard of theft convictions is valid and applies here, since the law sweeps beyond that to incorporate things like joyriding, the agency erred in holding the state conviction to be a crime of moral turpitude justifying refusal of withholding of removal.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171301.P.pdf
Third Circuit: USA v. Juan Ramos
Statute is divisible for purposes of modified categorical review despite the fact that governing precedent allows indictment and conviction without requiring the finder of fact to agree on the theory of the crime; i.e., a jury could split between the elements.
State statute categorically a crime of violence, as it is inconceivable that someone could try to injure another with a deadly weapon without using force.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172720p.pdf
State statute categorically a crime of violence, as it is inconceivable that someone could try to injure another with a deadly weapon without using force.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172720p.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: David Dwayne Cassady v. Steven D. Hall, et al
Post-judgment motion to District Court seeking garnishment of funds due state inmate from a state employee is construed as a suit for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment when it makes some claim, demand, or request against the state.
State did not waive immunity by authorizing garnishment for funds due state employees or officials as a result of services performed, and under the Rules Enablement Act, Rule 69 cannot serve as a modification or abridgment of any substantive rights.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201810667.pdf
State did not waive immunity by authorizing garnishment for funds due state employees or officials as a result of services performed, and under the Rules Enablement Act, Rule 69 cannot serve as a modification or abridgment of any substantive rights.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201810667.pdf
Federal Circuit: Sunpreme, Inc. v. US
The residual clause of the Trade Court's jurisdictional statute cannot be invoked if there is a practicable alternative basis for jurisdiction elsewhere in the statute; the court therefore did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction during the pendency of an agency scope determination, the completion of which could then be challenged under the statute.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1338.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1338.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
Federal Circuit: Land of Lincoln Mutual Health v. US
No contract-based Takings claim, as there was no contract.
Legislative enactment does not create a property interest cognizable under the Takings Clause.
Dissent: Contract.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1224.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
Legislative enactment does not create a property interest cognizable under the Takings Clause.
Dissent: Contract.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1224.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
Federal Circuit: Moda Health Plan v. US
Where a statute commits to the government's disbursal of funds from a single program according to a certain formula, subsequent budgetary riders need not place a categorical ban on payment from other sources when limiting the payouts from that program in order to function as a sufficiently clear implied repeal of the initial commitment.
Absent the trappings of a contractual agreement or some sign of intent to enter into a contract, government legislation and subsequent agency rulemaking and conduct does not indicate an intention to enter into a binding contract.
Dissent: Insufficiently clear statement of repeal, explicit attempts at repeal did not pass, insurers had completed their part of the deal, judgment fund is available, contract existed.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1994.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
Absent the trappings of a contractual agreement or some sign of intent to enter into a contract, government legislation and subsequent agency rulemaking and conduct does not indicate an intention to enter into a binding contract.
Dissent: Insufficiently clear statement of repeal, explicit attempts at repeal did not pass, insurers had completed their part of the deal, judgment fund is available, contract existed.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1994.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Driscoll
When determining the timeliness of a Habeas petition, the critical element is the right asserted; the question of whether an ambiguous conviction is or is not contradicted by the new rule is a matter for merits consideration.
As the petitioner was convicted under a statute broader than the generic offense, it is more likely than not that they were convicted under the unconstitutional residual clause, justifying the granting of the writ.
On merits, granted as not harmless error.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-8118.pdf
As the petitioner was convicted under a statute broader than the generic offense, it is more likely than not that they were convicted under the unconstitutional residual clause, justifying the granting of the writ.
On merits, granted as not harmless error.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-8118.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Thaddeus Jones v. Michelle Qualkinbush
The right to vote on policy questions in a referendum is a creature of state, not federal, law, and the referendum process is not a public forum under the First Amendment, so a state entity might legitimately dominate the process if there is a reasonable basis for it to do so.
A politician disadvantaged by the state's manipulation of the referendum process is a class of one for Equal Protection purposes, and where the conduct is valid as a general matter, the question is not justiciable. (This last bit is clearly implied, but not explicitly stated in those terms.)
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-14/C:17-1227:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:2170958:S:0
A politician disadvantaged by the state's manipulation of the referendum process is a class of one for Equal Protection purposes, and where the conduct is valid as a general matter, the question is not justiciable. (This last bit is clearly implied, but not explicitly stated in those terms.)
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-14/C:17-1227:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:2170958:S:0
Sixth Circuit: Sazerac Brands, LLC v. Peristyle, LLC
Where a company acquires a historic manufacturing site, a plaintiff claiming infringement of the trademarked name must, to state claim, establish that the mark associated with the site was not used merely in a good-faith descriptive or geographical sense.
(Though it says that unfair use is part of the necessary claim, the interlocutory order here affects a partial summary judgment.)
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0113p-06.pdf
(Though it says that unfair use is part of the necessary claim, the interlocutory order here affects a partial summary judgment.)
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0113p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Franchise Svc of North America v. United States Trustee
As shareholder rights under the corporate charter are a matter of state law and the power of a corporation to invoke bankruptcy protection arises from local law, the federal public policy interest in assuring the bankruptcy proceeding does not preclude a shareholder from blocking the bankruptcy filing where that shareholder is also a creditor, so long as there is no evidence of bad faith in the acquisition of the blocking shareholder rights.
Whether the acquisition of such rights under the charter violates state law is not before the court, as the parties don't raise it here.
Simple acquisition of a controlling interest in a stock class is insufficient proof of corporate control for purposes of judging breach of fiduciary duty; blocking the filing is not per se proof of such control.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-60093-CV0.pdf
Whether the acquisition of such rights under the charter violates state law is not before the court, as the parties don't raise it here.
Simple acquisition of a controlling interest in a stock class is insufficient proof of corporate control for purposes of judging breach of fiduciary duty; blocking the filing is not per se proof of such control.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-60093-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Gail McClendon v. USA
Regardless of the ultimate burden at trial, a deft's reasonably supported assertion that less than the full amount of taxes due was available for use in the company's accounts presents a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20174-CV0.pdf
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20174-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Ronald Ary
Under both state and federal law, a state deferred adjudication for this type of crime qualifies as a valid predicate conviction for sentencing purposes.
An indictment that omits this element of the offense does not offend Due Process, since Apprendi and its progeny specifically except prior convictions.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-10082-CR0.pdf
An indictment that omits this element of the offense does not offend Due Process, since Apprendi and its progeny specifically except prior convictions.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-10082-CR0.pdf
Third Circuit: USA v. Christopher Welshans
Where deft stipulated to the prohibited content, error to admit prejudicial videos and refer to them in closing, but no Due Process violation given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Deft's deletion of files upon learning that the police were on the way was sufficiently contemporaneous with arrest to qualify for the Obstruction sentencing enhancement, but as the files were simply moved to the recycle file, there was no material hindrance.
Concur/Dissent: Actions upon learning of investigation are not sufficiently contemporaneous with arrest.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164106p.pdf
Deft's deletion of files upon learning that the police were on the way was sufficiently contemporaneous with arrest to qualify for the Obstruction sentencing enhancement, but as the files were simply moved to the recycle file, there was no material hindrance.
Concur/Dissent: Actions upon learning of investigation are not sufficiently contemporaneous with arrest.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/164106p.pdf
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