First Amendment
Marketing agency has standing to challenge content-based restrictions on commercial speech, even if the speaker is determined to be the company selling the goods or the institution serving the goods.
Content-based restrictions on speech must withstand heightened scrutiny.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/07/13-56069.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Eighth Circuit: Boniface Makundi v. Loretta E. Lynch
Immigration
When an attorney effectively withdraws from a case by nonappearance a year prior to disbarment, an agency does not abuse its discretion by denying review of evidence that might have been gathered between the effective withdrawal and the disqualification.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143684P.pdf
When an attorney effectively withdraws from a case by nonappearance a year prior to disbarment, an agency does not abuse its discretion by denying review of evidence that might have been gathered between the effective withdrawal and the disqualification.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143684P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: McCaffree Financial Corp. v. Principal Life Insurace Co.
ERISA
As the terms of the mutual fund investment were negotiated at arms length prior to any fiduciary relationship between the parties, and a winnowing of investment options and subsequent advice had insufficient nexus to protected ERISA relationships, an assertion under ERISA of excessive fees doesn't state a claim.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151007P.pdf
As the terms of the mutual fund investment were negotiated at arms length prior to any fiduciary relationship between the parties, and a winnowing of investment options and subsequent advice had insufficient nexus to protected ERISA relationships, an assertion under ERISA of excessive fees doesn't state a claim.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151007P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Bria Daudinot
Sentencing / Crim
Where deft was told that accomplice was about to rob a bank and deft knew that accomplice had in the past been convicted for using a gun to rob a bank, sentence may be increased for the use of the firearm.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151063P.pdf
Where deft was told that accomplice was about to rob a bank and deft knew that accomplice had in the past been convicted for using a gun to rob a bank, sentence may be increased for the use of the firearm.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151063P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: John Dawkins v. USA
ACCA,
A conviction under state burglary statute that bars entry without authority is not a modified categorical predicate but a stated predicate, as precedent holds that any burglary statute barring unlawful entry qualifies.
Dissent - PF showing as to potential reliance on (career offender) residual portion of statute - review appropriate to see if the sentencing court considered it a modified categorical predicate.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-07/C:15-3667:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1683399:S:0
A conviction under state burglary statute that bars entry without authority is not a modified categorical predicate but a stated predicate, as precedent holds that any burglary statute barring unlawful entry qualifies.
Dissent - PF showing as to potential reliance on (career offender) residual portion of statute - review appropriate to see if the sentencing court considered it a modified categorical predicate.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-07/C:15-3667:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1683399:S:0
Fifth Circuit: Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of TX v. Chesapeake Energy
Class actions
Given the presumption in favor of Federal jurisdiction, where the pleadings state a claim that involves a larger class than the currently constituted class, the party contesting removal under the CAFA local controversy exception bears the burden of establishing that a sufficient percentage of the class vindicated by the claim is from a given state.
Dissent - No presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction; pleadings should be construed under state rules, which allow for a more liberal notice of claim, and therefore might conceivably limit the class to those presently involved.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10955-CV0.pdf
Given the presumption in favor of Federal jurisdiction, where the pleadings state a claim that involves a larger class than the currently constituted class, the party contesting removal under the CAFA local controversy exception bears the burden of establishing that a sufficient percentage of the class vindicated by the claim is from a given state.
Dissent - No presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction; pleadings should be construed under state rules, which allow for a more liberal notice of claim, and therefore might conceivably limit the class to those presently involved.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10955-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: USA v. C. Nagin
White Collar
Although honest services wire fraud requires a bribery element under Skilling, the transaction need not be an explicit quid pro quo.
Personal monetary judgments are a legitimate form of forfeiture.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-30841-CR0.pdf
Although honest services wire fraud requires a bribery element under Skilling, the transaction need not be an explicit quid pro quo.
Personal monetary judgments are a legitimate form of forfeiture.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-30841-CR0.pdf
Fourth Circuit: US v. William White
Crim - Extortion
Lack of subjective 'true threat' instruction ultimately harmless error.
Claim of right to the funds owed does not bar prosecution for communicating threats of physical harm, as the threats are themselves wrongful.
As the jury was told that it was being empaneled anonymously to prevent press communication, no error in anonymous empanelment.
Telephone notes admitted on direct as present-sense impressions might have been hearsay, but harmless error.
Sentence did not inappropriately consider deft's political views.
No error in not grouping counts.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/144375.P.pdf
Lack of subjective 'true threat' instruction ultimately harmless error.
Claim of right to the funds owed does not bar prosecution for communicating threats of physical harm, as the threats are themselves wrongful.
As the jury was told that it was being empaneled anonymously to prevent press communication, no error in anonymous empanelment.
Telephone notes admitted on direct as present-sense impressions might have been hearsay, but harmless error.
Sentence did not inappropriately consider deft's political views.
No error in not grouping counts.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/144375.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: US v. Jeffrey Martinovich
FRE, Sentencing.
Although trial court's interventions in questioning of witnesses were imprudent, poorly conveyed, and went beyond the pale, they do not constitute plain error, as they were not ultimately dispositive of the verdict.
Where a judge says that since good reasons must be given for variances, the sentencing guidelines are effectively compulsory -- the sentence is therefore procedurally unreasonable; further inquiry into substantive unreasonableness is foreclosed.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/134828.P.pdf
Although trial court's interventions in questioning of witnesses were imprudent, poorly conveyed, and went beyond the pale, they do not constitute plain error, as they were not ultimately dispositive of the verdict.
Where a judge says that since good reasons must be given for variances, the sentencing guidelines are effectively compulsory -- the sentence is therefore procedurally unreasonable; further inquiry into substantive unreasonableness is foreclosed.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/134828.P.pdf
Federal Circuit: Ford Motor Company v. US
FRCP, Administrative Law, Deference
(Complex. Here's an especially guesslike guess.)
Where a statute implements a treaty but is not the sole implementation of a treaty, a court's subsequent shift in the basis for the decision does not violate the law of the case, as there are potentially several statutes at issue.
Where more than one statute enables a rulemaking, deference can be shown to an agency's interpretation of one regulation despite law of the case to the contrary with respect to the other statute.
The differences in the means of practical implementation can make contradictory agency decisions in substantially similar cases not arbitrary/capricious.
Dissent - The second statute doesn't independently implement the treaty, so there's no deference to agency on substantive matter of interpretation - the second statute is merely procedural. No Skidmore deference on present agency interpretations, as it's not persuasive. Procedural differences don't justify different handling of identical cases.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1581.Opinion.1-4-2016.1.PDF
(Complex. Here's an especially guesslike guess.)
Where a statute implements a treaty but is not the sole implementation of a treaty, a court's subsequent shift in the basis for the decision does not violate the law of the case, as there are potentially several statutes at issue.
Where more than one statute enables a rulemaking, deference can be shown to an agency's interpretation of one regulation despite law of the case to the contrary with respect to the other statute.
The differences in the means of practical implementation can make contradictory agency decisions in substantially similar cases not arbitrary/capricious.
Dissent - The second statute doesn't independently implement the treaty, so there's no deference to agency on substantive matter of interpretation - the second statute is merely procedural. No Skidmore deference on present agency interpretations, as it's not persuasive. Procedural differences don't justify different handling of identical cases.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-1581.Opinion.1-4-2016.1.PDF
Eleventh Circuit: Domineque Ray v. Alabama, DOC, et al.
Ineffective Assistance
Cursory mitigation investigation insufficiently outcome-determinative under Strickland to justify the Writ.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201315673.pdf
Cursory mitigation investigation insufficiently outcome-determinative under Strickland to justify the Writ.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201315673.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: In re: Kurt Timothy Franks
Johnson's retroactivity - ACCA
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague is not, by its terms, retroactive, and AEDPA bars a second or successive Habeas writ seeking relief based on the holding.
Dissent: Retroactive, AEDPA shouldn't bar the filing of the writ, insufficiently briefed, court should certify the question to the Supreme Court (!), divergent circuit holdings on the gatekeeper question are themselves a constitutional violation.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515456.ord.pdf
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague is not, by its terms, retroactive, and AEDPA bars a second or successive Habeas writ seeking relief based on the holding.
Dissent: Retroactive, AEDPA shouldn't bar the filing of the writ, insufficiently briefed, court should certify the question to the Supreme Court (!), divergent circuit holdings on the gatekeeper question are themselves a constitutional violation.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515456.ord.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Peter Kiewit Sons' v. Steven West
FRCP, Remedies
When the court has made adverse credibility findings in discovery phase, there is no error in denial of a postponement of hearing for medical reasons when no firm date for availability is offered.
Where the deft does not establish how much of the gains were devoted to expenses, no error in not reducing disgorgement for trademark violation to account for defts' expenses.
A remark in sentencing that the amount of award is enough to make plaintiff whole is not enough to establish that disgorgement was used as compensatory measure.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143461P.pdf
When the court has made adverse credibility findings in discovery phase, there is no error in denial of a postponement of hearing for medical reasons when no firm date for availability is offered.
Where the deft does not establish how much of the gains were devoted to expenses, no error in not reducing disgorgement for trademark violation to account for defts' expenses.
A remark in sentencing that the amount of award is enough to make plaintiff whole is not enough to establish that disgorgement was used as compensatory measure.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143461P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: John Gohagan v. The Cincinnati Insurance Co.
Contracts
Where anti-stacking provisions of insurance contracts fix an aggregate limit without making a distinction between general liability and per-event liability, there is no per se ambiguity in the contracts.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143454P.pdf
Where anti-stacking provisions of insurance contracts fix an aggregate limit without making a distinction between general liability and per-event liability, there is no per se ambiguity in the contracts.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/143454P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Holli Hammarquist v. United Continental Holdings
Contracts
Where a frequent flier contract allows unilateral modification of benefits, and those fliers qualifying for a frequent traveler benefit are told that the rewards will change from year to year, the airline does not breach the contract by precipitately reducing benefits.
Concurrence: There are some grounds for acceptance of unilateral offer to modify the base agreement by flying a set number of miles.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-06/C:15-1845:J:Manion:aut:T:fnOp:N:1683060:S:0
Where a frequent flier contract allows unilateral modification of benefits, and those fliers qualifying for a frequent traveler benefit are told that the rewards will change from year to year, the airline does not breach the contract by precipitately reducing benefits.
Concurrence: There are some grounds for acceptance of unilateral offer to modify the base agreement by flying a set number of miles.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-06/C:15-1845:J:Manion:aut:T:fnOp:N:1683060:S:0
Sixth Circuit: Larry Askins v. Ohio Department of Agriculture
Administrative/environment
There is no right of action under the CWA for private citizens to challenge administrative noncompliance of state regulators.
While the CWA does require that authority be withdrawn from a noncompliant regulator after a hearing, as there is no explicit requirement for a hearing, there is no right of action premised on the delay in holding a hearing.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0005p-06.pdf
There is no right of action under the CWA for private citizens to challenge administrative noncompliance of state regulators.
While the CWA does require that authority be withdrawn from a noncompliant regulator after a hearing, as there is no explicit requirement for a hearing, there is no right of action premised on the delay in holding a hearing.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0005p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Nancy Marouf v. Loretta Lynch
Immigration
IJ's adverse credibility findings not supported by substantial evidence and flawed by lack of consideration of issues in translation.
C in J : No power to do de novo, though, and no mandate of asylum.
C in J : No mandate of asylum
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0004p-06.pdf
IJ's adverse credibility findings not supported by substantial evidence and flawed by lack of consideration of issues in translation.
C in J : No power to do de novo, though, and no mandate of asylum.
C in J : No mandate of asylum
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0004p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Michael Kent v. County of Oakland
S1983 - use of force
When a first responder uses a Taser against a verbally hostile citizen in his own home with his hands held in the air and his back against the wall, denial of qualified immunity is appropriate.
Also upheld against another first responder who didn't intervene.
Community caretaker exception to 4A generally overbroad.
S1983 denial precludes governmental immunity from state statute.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0003p-06.pdf
When a first responder uses a Taser against a verbally hostile citizen in his own home with his hands held in the air and his back against the wall, denial of qualified immunity is appropriate.
Also upheld against another first responder who didn't intervene.
Community caretaker exception to 4A generally overbroad.
S1983 denial precludes governmental immunity from state statute.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0003p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Rickey Benns
Restitution/Fraud
As the fraudulent mortgage application wasn't sufficiently proximate to the foreclosure loss suffered by the government lender, restitution order was inappropriate.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-51207-CR0.pdf
As the fraudulent mortgage application wasn't sufficiently proximate to the foreclosure loss suffered by the government lender, restitution order was inappropriate.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-51207-CR0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Anh Le v. Loretta Lynch
Immigration
Although the government holds the general burden to prove that an offense is of the type that would bar relief from removal, the petitioner has the burden to establish that a legal ambiguity in the definition of the offense disqualifies it as a predicate. Split with 9 flagged.
Petitioner did not establish offense of conviction in reply.
No error in denial of reconsideration.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/13/13-60664-CV0.pdf
Although the government holds the general burden to prove that an offense is of the type that would bar relief from removal, the petitioner has the burden to establish that a legal ambiguity in the definition of the offense disqualifies it as a predicate. Split with 9 flagged.
Petitioner did not establish offense of conviction in reply.
No error in denial of reconsideration.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/13/13-60664-CV0.pdf
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