Bankruptcy.
Costs incurred by the Trustee in maintaining the property prior to the abandonment of the interest by the secured creditor can be surcharged to the secured creditor absent evidence of direct benefit.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/14/14-41463-CV0.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Fourth Circuit: Joshua Rich v. US
Prisons, FTCA.
As the decision to separate certain prisoners from each other is discretionary, yet implicates considerations of public policy, suit against officials is barred under FTCA.
Claims of inadequate or omitted searches of assailants should be remanded for discovery, as they implicate claims outside of the discretionary exception.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/147204.P.pdf
As the decision to separate certain prisoners from each other is discretionary, yet implicates considerations of public policy, suit against officials is barred under FTCA.
Claims of inadequate or omitted searches of assailants should be remanded for discovery, as they implicate claims outside of the discretionary exception.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/147204.P.pdf
Third Circuit: Laurence Kaplan v. Saint Peter's Healthcare System
ERISA, Religion -- statutory construction.
While a church agency can maintain an exempt plan, only a church can establish one.
Plain meaning.
Surplussage, Expressio unius..., Remedial statute, Statutory context.
Other statements by same sources in legislative record undermine indications to the contrary.
IRS ruling was not a rulemaking, so only accorded persuasive deference. (Christiansen, not Skidmore)
In subsequent lawmaking that seemed to legislate against the background of a contrary interpretation, Congress never evinced a detailed knowledge of the statutory scheme.
First Amendment not implicated, as churches themselves are free to set up plans.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151172p.pdf
While a church agency can maintain an exempt plan, only a church can establish one.
Plain meaning.
Surplussage, Expressio unius..., Remedial statute, Statutory context.
Other statements by same sources in legislative record undermine indications to the contrary.
IRS ruling was not a rulemaking, so only accorded persuasive deference. (Christiansen, not Skidmore)
In subsequent lawmaking that seemed to legislate against the background of a contrary interpretation, Congress never evinced a detailed knowledge of the statutory scheme.
First Amendment not implicated, as churches themselves are free to set up plans.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151172p.pdf
Second Circuit: Mantena v. Johnson
Immigration, jurisdiction-stripping, standing.
The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions bar challenges to the substance of the decision, not procedural questions such as adequate notice.
When statute removes jurisdiction from a court, the correct procedure is to find subject matter jurisdiction and then determine that there is no judicially cognizable right.
When the notification of a third party is a prerequisite to the assertion of a right, a party has sufficient injury-in-fact for third-party standing upon the deprivation of notice.
Prudential standing is satisfied, as the party is asserting her own right.
Administrative definitions of standing do not touch Article III standing.
Subsequent statutory scheme altered the interest of parties, so prior administrative structure not a valid basis for deprivation of fair notice.
In the new "portability" scheme, providing notice to neither the petitioner nor the second employer violates the notice requirements.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/doc/14-2476_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/hilite/
The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions bar challenges to the substance of the decision, not procedural questions such as adequate notice.
When statute removes jurisdiction from a court, the correct procedure is to find subject matter jurisdiction and then determine that there is no judicially cognizable right.
When the notification of a third party is a prerequisite to the assertion of a right, a party has sufficient injury-in-fact for third-party standing upon the deprivation of notice.
Prudential standing is satisfied, as the party is asserting her own right.
Administrative definitions of standing do not touch Article III standing.
Subsequent statutory scheme altered the interest of parties, so prior administrative structure not a valid basis for deprivation of fair notice.
In the new "portability" scheme, providing notice to neither the petitioner nor the second employer violates the notice requirements.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/doc/14-2476_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/debf609a-5626-451b-b673-60ca2db5129b/1/hilite/
First Circuit: Buntin v. City of Boston
Discrimination.
There is no administrative exhaustion requirement for S1981 actions.
The statute of limitations began to run with the adverse personell actions, not the written warning, as the adverse etiology had yet to crystallize.
A name-clearing hearing is not constitutionally required where the speech is not broadcast to a larger public, there is no nexus with the end of employment, and the employee did not request one.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1667P-01A.pdf
There is no administrative exhaustion requirement for S1981 actions.
The statute of limitations began to run with the adverse personell actions, not the written warning, as the adverse etiology had yet to crystallize.
A name-clearing hearing is not constitutionally required where the speech is not broadcast to a larger public, there is no nexus with the end of employment, and the employee did not request one.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/15-1667P-01A.pdf
First Circuit: Thompson v. Lynch
Immigration
A former common-law marriage does not establish a basis for naturalization, as the law requires custody at the time of legal separation, and the end of the marriage was not legally recognized.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1858P-01A.pdf
A former common-law marriage does not establish a basis for naturalization, as the law requires custody at the time of legal separation, and the end of the marriage was not legally recognized.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1858P-01A.pdf
Federal Circuit: Rogers v. US
Takings, Property conveyance
Where the language of the deed is clear, under Florida law, no statute, policy, or fact can operate to convert an interest in fee simple for the purpose of running a railway to an easement.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/13-5098.Opinion.12-22-2015.1.PDF
Where the language of the deed is clear, under Florida law, no statute, policy, or fact can operate to convert an interest in fee simple for the purpose of running a railway to an easement.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/13-5098.Opinion.12-22-2015.1.PDF
Federal Circuit: Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
Patent, Appellate Procedure
Retained on remand after Supreme Court review of the question whether belief of non-infringement operates as a bar to inducement liability, the Court finds no infringement - either direct or inducement - as the processes are not identical.
[Standard patent caveat: None of this is legal advice, but Patent is one of the areas in which it's not merely likely that we're wrong about this stuff, but it's almost certain that we're ludicrously off-base. -CB]
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/12-1042.Opinion.12-22-2015.1.PDF
Retained on remand after Supreme Court review of the question whether belief of non-infringement operates as a bar to inducement liability, the Court finds no infringement - either direct or inducement - as the processes are not identical.
[Standard patent caveat: None of this is legal advice, but Patent is one of the areas in which it's not merely likely that we're wrong about this stuff, but it's almost certain that we're ludicrously off-base. -CB]
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/12-1042.Opinion.12-22-2015.1.PDF
DC Circuit: Ayanna Blue v. District of Columbia
S1983, Title IX
A municipality's retention of an employee after an offense does not establish that the municipality is liable under S1983 for similar offenses.
Allegation of insufficient screening is not enough to state a claim for S1983.
As there was no actual notice of improper relationship during the pendency of the relationship, no Title IX violation.
School investigation is not an adequate substitute for notice of claim requirement that requires, at minimum, a written police report.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/A69B5A2CB744D2E485257F2A005480B2/$file/14-7189-1590902.pdf
A municipality's retention of an employee after an offense does not establish that the municipality is liable under S1983 for similar offenses.
Allegation of insufficient screening is not enough to state a claim for S1983.
As there was no actual notice of improper relationship during the pendency of the relationship, no Title IX violation.
School investigation is not an adequate substitute for notice of claim requirement that requires, at minimum, a written police report.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/A69B5A2CB744D2E485257F2A005480B2/$file/14-7189-1590902.pdf
DC Circuit: Penelope Minter v. DC
ADA
No merit to claim based on denial of accommodation, as the agency initially engaged in an interactive process and the bona fides of the claim weren't established at the time of eventual denial.
Ending of employment not a valid basis for claim of retaliation, as plaintiff has burden to prove actual connection, and not just temporal proximity.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/A307330F9F02514885257F2A0054809C/$file/14-7118-1590897.pdf
No merit to claim based on denial of accommodation, as the agency initially engaged in an interactive process and the bona fides of the claim weren't established at the time of eventual denial.
Ending of employment not a valid basis for claim of retaliation, as plaintiff has burden to prove actual connection, and not just temporal proximity.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/A307330F9F02514885257F2A0054809C/$file/14-7118-1590897.pdf
DC Circuit: Washington Regional Medicorp v. Sylvia Burwell
Chevron, Auer deference, rulemaking.
Where the stated intent of Congress is to implement a change, an inability to transition certain elements within the desired timeframe permits agencies to devise rules for the intersticial elements; these rules are not per se impermissible because they incorporate lapsed statutory elements of past systems.
Rules that derive from the previous statutory mandate, however, may be modified at the discretion of the agency.
A rule establishing that a value be derived from a certain other value does not require the two to be equal (or vary equally).
A rulemaking is sometimes not retroactive when the organic statute of the superseded rule has lapsed.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/28EC0B9175C966AF85257F2A00548088/$file/14-5330-1590892.pdf
Where the stated intent of Congress is to implement a change, an inability to transition certain elements within the desired timeframe permits agencies to devise rules for the intersticial elements; these rules are not per se impermissible because they incorporate lapsed statutory elements of past systems.
Rules that derive from the previous statutory mandate, however, may be modified at the discretion of the agency.
A rule establishing that a value be derived from a certain other value does not require the two to be equal (or vary equally).
A rulemaking is sometimes not retroactive when the organic statute of the superseded rule has lapsed.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/28EC0B9175C966AF85257F2A00548088/$file/14-5330-1590892.pdf
DC Circuit: Walter Jackson, Jr. v. Raymond Mabus, Jr.
Denial of amendment to military record was not arbitrary & capricious; although the written decision was perfunctory, there was sufficient basis in the record for the decision.
Denial of reconsideration reasonable.
No Due Process violation.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/EBB3DC0B4C7630ED85257F2A00548069/$file/14-5224-1590906.pdf
Denial of reconsideration reasonable.
No Due Process violation.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/EBB3DC0B4C7630ED85257F2A00548069/$file/14-5224-1590906.pdf
Tenth Circuit: Henderson v. Glanz
S1983 - prisons.
Appellate court cannot re-evaluate sufficiency of evidence on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity - where the court's finding is not contradicted in the record, it is presumed to be adequate.
Undisputed facts in the record that blatantly contradict the factual findings of the court on qualified immunity can be reviewed on interlocutory appeal.
As prison employee had no knowledge of the unlocked door before leaving to attend to another emergency, no denial of clearly established right.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5077.pdf
Appellate court cannot re-evaluate sufficiency of evidence on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity - where the court's finding is not contradicted in the record, it is presumed to be adequate.
Undisputed facts in the record that blatantly contradict the factual findings of the court on qualified immunity can be reviewed on interlocutory appeal.
As prison employee had no knowledge of the unlocked door before leaving to attend to another emergency, no denial of clearly established right.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5077.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Levon Dean, Jr.
Hobbs Act robbery.
Where a statute has an express nexus to interstate commerce, the actual connection can be small; in this case, it suffices that the robbery affected the victim's ability to participate in interstate drug purchases.
Sufficient connection between the crimes for a common conspiracy, but harmless error, as participants were principals in both actions.
Because victim was hit rather hard on the head, there was sufficient bodily injury for the carjacking statute - injury need not be in or near the car.
As codeft had a distinctive walk while carrying a gun, sufficient evidence for knowledge of the gun.
Intent to affect interstate drug commerce not a necessary jury instruction for conspiracy count.
Constructive possession / vehicle instruction upheld.
Hearsay evidence properly considered in sentencing.
Sentencing court's denial of de minimis sentence for counts not subject to mandatory minimums was proper, despite the fact that the court stated that it did not have the power to impose a de minimis sentence.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151263P.pdf
Where a statute has an express nexus to interstate commerce, the actual connection can be small; in this case, it suffices that the robbery affected the victim's ability to participate in interstate drug purchases.
Sufficient connection between the crimes for a common conspiracy, but harmless error, as participants were principals in both actions.
Because victim was hit rather hard on the head, there was sufficient bodily injury for the carjacking statute - injury need not be in or near the car.
As codeft had a distinctive walk while carrying a gun, sufficient evidence for knowledge of the gun.
Intent to affect interstate drug commerce not a necessary jury instruction for conspiracy count.
Constructive possession / vehicle instruction upheld.
Hearsay evidence properly considered in sentencing.
Sentencing court's denial of de minimis sentence for counts not subject to mandatory minimums was proper, despite the fact that the court stated that it did not have the power to impose a de minimis sentence.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151263P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Bonnie Hasenwinkel v. Mosaic
FMLA.
Claim for denial of leave properly dismissed, as the maximum period of leave under the statute had already been exhausted.
As employee was incapable of returning to work, no basis for challenging ending of employment.
Although a suspension with later backpay can be the basis for an FMLA claim, plaintiff did not allege any monetary harm from the act, and it was therefore properly dismissed as a matter of law.
No material adverse action in workplace generally.
A federal statute with an express right of action cannot serve as the "public policy" basis for a state tort claim of wrongful discharge.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/143786P.pdf
Claim for denial of leave properly dismissed, as the maximum period of leave under the statute had already been exhausted.
As employee was incapable of returning to work, no basis for challenging ending of employment.
Although a suspension with later backpay can be the basis for an FMLA claim, plaintiff did not allege any monetary harm from the act, and it was therefore properly dismissed as a matter of law.
No material adverse action in workplace generally.
A federal statute with an express right of action cannot serve as the "public policy" basis for a state tort claim of wrongful discharge.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/143786P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: John Tate v. SCR Medical Transportation Inc
Pleading.
Court erred in dismissing a pro se complaint alleging discrimination because of gender and disability (that did not specify the disability in question) within the period of time in which a plaintiff can unilaterally amend the claim.
Court should have instructed plaintiff to amend claim.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D12-28/C:15-1447:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1677902:S:0
Court erred in dismissing a pro se complaint alleging discrimination because of gender and disability (that did not specify the disability in question) within the period of time in which a plaintiff can unilaterally amend the claim.
Court should have instructed plaintiff to amend claim.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D12-28/C:15-1447:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1677902:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Joshua Howard v. William Pollard
Prison overcrowding - class certification.
Denial of class certification and appointment of counsel upheld. Although presence of counsel would make the class representative a more adequate plaintiff, denial of counsel does not prejudice the consideration of class certification, as counsel is provided to prosecute the claim, not ensure the adequacy of the representative.
Per curiam.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D12-29/C:15-8025:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1678422:S:0
Denial of class certification and appointment of counsel upheld. Although presence of counsel would make the class representative a more adequate plaintiff, denial of counsel does not prejudice the consideration of class certification, as counsel is provided to prosecute the claim, not ensure the adequacy of the representative.
Per curiam.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D12-29/C:15-8025:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:1678422:S:0
Fifth Circuit: Machete Productions, L.L.C. v. Heather Page, et al
S1983 - State film incentives program / First Amendment
Although removal from state to federal forum operated as a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity, monetary damages against a state don't lie under S1983, and as the film franchise has no plans for another project, there is no basis for injunctive relief.
Qualified immunity - by requiring films to depict the state in a positive manner in order to qualify for funding, the state violated no clearly established constitutional law.
No due process violation, as the filmmaker did not have a right to the discretionary grants.
No prior restraint of speech under the Texas Constitution.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-50120-CV0.pdf
Although removal from state to federal forum operated as a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity, monetary damages against a state don't lie under S1983, and as the film franchise has no plans for another project, there is no basis for injunctive relief.
Qualified immunity - by requiring films to depict the state in a positive manner in order to qualify for funding, the state violated no clearly established constitutional law.
No due process violation, as the filmmaker did not have a right to the discretionary grants.
No prior restraint of speech under the Texas Constitution.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-50120-CV0.pdf
Second Circuit: In Re: Coudert Bros. LLP
Appellate procedure, choice of law.
Where a court of appeals instructs that a lower court should apply a specific law on remand and does not mention alternative bases for judgment, the lower court is necessarily foreclosed from deciding the case on an alternative basis that makes the choice of law not dispositive.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/9e364f88-21ef-41ef-9e67-557990941445/1/doc/14-3688_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/9e364f88-21ef-41ef-9e67-557990941445/1/hilite/
Where a court of appeals instructs that a lower court should apply a specific law on remand and does not mention alternative bases for judgment, the lower court is necessarily foreclosed from deciding the case on an alternative basis that makes the choice of law not dispositive.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/9e364f88-21ef-41ef-9e67-557990941445/1/doc/14-3688_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/9e364f88-21ef-41ef-9e67-557990941445/1/hilite/
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