As the facts still in dispute bear on the objective reasonableness of the force used by the police officers to arrest the plaintiff, the appellate court has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory claim arising from a denial of qualified immunity,
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Darrick Vallodolid
In that the political beliefs expressed about immigration policy and discriminatory law enforcement were not exclusively rooted in the venirepersons' ethnicity, their removal from the pool of jurors wasn't constitutionally impermissible.
Given the small size of the sample, statistical analysis and disparate impact analysis alone is insufficient to establish discriminatory nature of the strikes.
As the eyewitness testimony was riddled with inconsistencies beyond the exculpatory ones, it was for the finder of fact to determine its credibility.
Sufficient evidence to find that the crime was gang-related, even absent formal affiliation with the gang, in that it furthered the activities of the former gang.
Sufficient evidence of the conspiracy to admit the statement of the co-conspirator. Statement indicating possession of drugs in the house admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish that the robbers believed there to be drugs there.
Sufficient evidence for conspiracy, given the customary procedures of the gangs and the defts' involvement with them. Sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish drug quantities.
Federal RICO proceeding wasn't required to incorporate state predicate offense's procedural requirement of bifurcated penalty phase.
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Singletary
Given that the deft conspired to supply firearms to drug dealers, the conspiracy among the drug dealers to sell drugs is distinct from the conspiracy to supply them with firearms, and therefore a valid predicate for the increased sentence.
The distinction between these conspiracies also serves to separate the two relevant sentencing factors, so that they're not double-counting the same offense.
Second Circuit: Kakar v. USCIS
Agency's ruling was arbitrary and capricious in that it didn't explain how petitioner's conduct would have been illegal in the United States, given that there is a genuine and reasonable dispute as to the context of the events, and also as to the affirmative defense of duress.
(Although petitioner had challenged for lack of substantial evidence, vacated and remanded to agency as arbitrary and capricious.)
First Circuit: Williams v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A.
Although the District Court excluded the expert testimony, a precise reading of the testimony establishes that the plaintiff hasn't met their burden on causation; the question is not if the fractured weld caused the accident, but whether the defect in the weld caused the accident.
First Circuit: Puerto Rico Farm Credit, ACA v. Eco-Parque del Tanama Corp.
Statute requires that the lender attempt a restructuring of the loan obligations only where the restructuring ultimately proves less costly than foreclosure; borrower's inability to demonstrate means for a satisfactory repayment removed the requirement.
Under the statute, a lender must consider the restructuring plan's credibility and viability, and need not accept a plan that the counterparty can't perform.
Putting forward a credible plan for restructuring is a threshold requirement for challenging the lender's estimated foreclosure costs.
Federal Circuit: Veteran Warriors v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Statutory term is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency, as it is silent as to whether certain services need to be delivered in person, as opposed to being provided remotely. Parallel statute distinguishing the two speaks to the ambiguity of the first statute.
Agency's position is justified by the need for a clear rule, and is a reasonable policy choice; prior silence on the question doesn't establish that this is a reversal by the agency.
Although the statutory context clarifies the definition of "serious injury," the statute is still sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the agency.
Although the agency's new definition was a change from prior interpretations, it was a reasoned change that accounted for settled expectations, and not the sort of sharp break with previous readings that would justify less deference to the agency's final interpretation.
Statute defining incapacity as being unable to accomplish certain daily tasks is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency's reading, since it doesn't distinguish occasional incapacity from total incapacity. Prior fee schedule implying a gradation of capacity doesn't make for a change in policy, since it refers to the amount of assistance provided, not the beneficiary's abilities unaided.
Agency erred in imposing a single definition of "in need of supervision" where the law describes two degrees of necessary supervision; additionally, the medical requirements read into the term are not logically dictated by the statute's mandate.
Law's requirement that the compensation levels be tied to geographic areas and creation of a program for assisting veterans abroad did not define the eligibility of extraterritorial caregivers; the agency's interpretation barring such caregivers is reasonable.
Agency's tying of caregiver compensation to federal civil service pay levels was a reasonable one; nothing in the act required that the compensation be linked to private sector salaries.
Agency's definition of the inability to sustain life in the community was a reasonable one; it incorporated the statutory factors.
DC Circuit: Jane Doe v. SEC
Although the list of examples in the statute isn't explicitly an exclusive one, deference to the authoritative, considered interpretation of the agency within its competency asserting the exclusivity of the list is warranted. Expressio unius would require an exclusive list.
CONCURRENCE:
When a statute lists three means for accomplishing something, there are three means of accomplishing something under the statute. Expressio unius applies.
DC Circuit: USA v. Nizar Trabelsi
Pretrial orders denying a double jeopardy claim arising from the circumstances of extradition are sufficiently final for the purposes of appeal.
By the terms of the treaty and the act of state doctrine, the courts should primarily defer to the actions of the foreign executive rather than the actions of the foreign judiciary.
Foreign court's determination of the limits of the foreign executive's power under the order did not interpret the executive's decision or say that he was compelled to follow the instructions of the order.
Foreign executive's transmission of letter outlining terms of the extradition was not an act of state where the transmission of the letter was mandated by the foreign judiciary, and the letter notes that it is not necessarily the position of the foreign state.
CONCURRENCE:
A private right arising from a treaty can be forfeited when not timely raised.
CONCURRENCE:
Although the plain text of the treaty imposes no double jeopardy obligations on the extraditing state, an earlier holding in the case established that it imposed reciprocal obligations as to its principles; making this determination should have been the first consideration, as it implicates US separation of powers, with the courts constrained from reading general principles of international law into the terms of a treaty.
Ninth Circuit: Craig Ross v. Ronald Davis
Felony murder constitutional challenge to sentence was appropriately exhausted in state habeas, since despite the state habeas holding to the contrary, petitioner's filings on direct appeal discussed the relevant standard and sought relief.
State jury instructions on aiding and abetting didn't preclude the subsequent capital sentence, because although they didn't require the specific intent necessary under federal law, the separate finding of special circumstances established the necessary intent.
Petitioner had sufficient involvement in the crimes and evinced sufficient reckless disregard of the risk of death.
State court's determinations on ineffective assistance of counsel were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the federal standard; defense counsel's limited investigation of mitigation evidence wasn't dispositive, as it related entirely to early childhood, and defense closing contained many mitigating inferences from the evidence; the latter are appropriately considered in a Strickland claim.
Ninth Circuit: Laidlaw's Harley Davidson Sales v. Commisioner
Law requiring initial determination of tax assessment to be approved by a supervisor prior to enforcement of the penalty doesn't preclude pre-approval notice to the taxpayer that the government will enforce the penalty; the supervisor's approval must occur before the actual enforcement, but sufficiently in advance that the supervisor still has the discretion to withhold approval.
DISSENT:
By the plain language, the initial determination must be approved before it becomes the basis for agency action.
Fifth Circuit: La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris Cty Repub.
As the motion was timely and the impaired interest might not be sufficiently protected by the state's defense of the law, partisan political committees had a right to intervene in litigation challenging an election reform law.
First Circuit: OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion to dismiss well after the scheduled close of discovery, given the absence of supplementary filings from the non-movant.
OK Resorts of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Charles Taylor Consulting Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
First Circuit: US v. Agramonte-Quezada
Absent a showing of bad faith or prejudice, discovery delay in producing dog training records and logs did not require the trial judge to grant a continuance, as there were other discovery materials that might have opened the door to a challenging of the canine evidence.
Evidence of a prior canine indication was more probative than prejudicial, since the switching of vehicles in the interval and the deft's awareness of the narcotics traffic spoke to a continuing plan or scheme and rebutted the claim that he had been an unwitting courier.
Law enforcement testimony as to the usual trafficking operation wasn't impermissible overview testimony, as it came at the end of the trial, the witness was insulated from the particular case, and didn't reference any particulars. Lay testimony of this nature gleaned from on-the-job experience is helpful to the finder of fact, and therefore permissible.
Court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to sentencing rather than considering competency; the determination had been made earlier,and nothing in the colloquy prior to sentencing indicated sufficient incapacity.
First Circuit: Cushing v. Packard
For claims arising from either of the federal statutes at issue, a suit against an officer of a state legislature in their official capacity, and in which the state is not named in the action, is against the legislator personally in their legislative capacity and doesn't implicate state sovereign immunity.
If Congress can abrogate conduct-based legislative immunity, as opposed to status-based sovereign immunity, a clear statement to that effect in the law is required.
State legislature did not waive its officers' legislative immunity from disability related discrimination claims by accepting federal funds for the legislative session costs pursuant to a federal statute with an antidiscrimination clause.
Legislative immunity bars a suit against a state officer where the injunctive remedy would effect a change in the rules that was more than merely casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs.
Legislative immunity under the Speech and Debate clause can't be limited by the state's adoption of a less expansive standard in its own law.
Extraordinary exceptions to legislative immunity aren't available, since, among other reasons, the legislature was following independent procedural rules, rather than changing them.
DISSENT:
Purpose of the immunity is to prevent the disenfranchisement of the people. Effective ouster and disenfranchisement of some can't therefore be immunized in the interests of protecting others. Only immunizing conduct that isn't facially discriminatory opens the door to facially neutral but discriminatory rulemaking.
Patent Cases in the Federal Circuit
Sometimes I take a swing at these, but the time is running short today.
https://cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/20-2163.OPINION.3-24-2022_1926100.pdf
https://cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/21-1725.OPINION.3-24-2022_1926111.pdf
-CB
Eleventh Circuit: Fuad Fares Fuad Said v. U.S. Attorney General
Given the plain language of the proscription, and the fact that the wider prohibition encompasses actual (as opposed to hypothetical) substances, the state crime isn't a valid immigration predicate, as the divergence is significant enough to constitute, as a matter of law, a reasonable probability of prosecution under the state law for acts that would exceed the reach of the federal law.
Eleventh Circuit: John Doe v. Samford University, et al.
Errors in university investigation could be attributed to ineptitude, inexperience, and pro-complainant bias, and therefore don't raise a plausible inference sufficient to state a claim of discrimination on the basis of gender.
CONCURRENCE:
When resolving a motion to dismiss, a court must draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.
Ninth Circuit: Estate of Clemente N. Aguirre v. County of Riverside
Issue of qualified immunity for a police officer is for trial, since the use of deadly force against an armed individual in a volatile situation is unconstitutional absent proof of threat to others.
Ninth Circuit: USA v. Edwin Mendez
Given the statutory right not to be tried as an adult for crimes committed as a juvenile, denial of the dismissal of a post-majority superseding indictment charging the deft with a different set of crimes is sufficiently final to be the basis of an interlocutory appeal.
Deft's post-majority acts of conspiracy ratified their juvenile acts, enabling them to be charged as an adult, despite the fact that the acts had already been the subject of juvenile proceedings. The ratification both removed the statutory protections against the transfer to adult proceedings and converted the pre-majority conspiracy to a crime rather than an act of delinquency.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gary Smith
Discussion of rehabilitative treatment duration during sentencing doesn't justify an inference that the sentence was increased for that purpose, since other factors were recited at sentencing.
Sentence not substantively unreasonable given incorrigible behavior.
Eighth Circuit: Colby Beal v. Outfield Brew House
Telephonic communications device that stores a predefined list of numbers and then randomly or in a defined manner selects and dials certain numbers doesn't come within the statutory proscription of random dialing machines.
CONCURRENCE IN PART:
Footnote that recites Supreme Court GVR's and denials of certiorari is error, as they're not precedential.
Seventh Circuit: K.F.C. v. Snap Inc.
As, under state law, the voidable aspect of an infant's contract is a defense against performance, not a bar to formation, the arbitration waiver within the contract is therefore valid, and questions of whether enforcement would be against public policy is within the scope of arbitration.
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Arthur Robinson
Since the state statute prohibiting the discharge of a firearm towards persons, occupied structures, and occupied vehicles requires a higher mens rea than recklessness, its status as a sentencing predicate wasn't changed by a Supreme Court holding that recklessness was an insufficient basis for a conviction involving the threatened or actual use of force against another person.
Issue was forfeited, not waived, when not raised on first appeal.
Seventh Circuit: Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness Inc.
Court did not err in denying certification of a class based on a statutory claim of sending unsolicited facsimile advertisements; although the unsolicited nature of the communications is an affirmative defense to be established by the defendant, the predominance inquiry looks to the actual management of the claim, and certification risked a multiplicity of mini-trials on the issue.
Court's handling of the implied consent issue was appropriate to the certification stage, as defendant's claim wan't speculative, vague, or unsupported.
Consent provided to third parties isn't considered transferred consent where the original consent included messages from affiliates and vendors.
Sixth Circuit: Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.
For pretrial detainees, a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim requires something like objective reckless indifference rather than the subjective possession of sufficient knowledge to infer a risk of harm.
DISSENT:
Circuit precedent compels a subjective element; civil law negligence standard is categorically beneath the threshold of a constitutional due process claim; requiring an intentional action begs the question of sufficient knowledge; these facts would satisfy even the majority's novel test.
Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Henderson
Supervised release condition delegating to the parole officer the discretion to determine in which cases a certain condition applied wasn't plain error.
Fifth Circuit: Woods v. Cantrell
A single use of a racial epithet in the workplace can state a claim under Title VII.
Fifth Circuit: Trafigura Trading v. USA
As the fees assessed on the exported oil don't accrue any benefit to the exporters, but are rather directed to things generally useful to society, the assessment is an unconstitutional tax, rather than a permissible user fee.
DISSENT:
There are issues for trial, since the assessments aren't tied to the value of each barrel, and there is no explicit requirement in the precedent that the exporter be the sole beneficiary of the fees assessed.
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Mesquias
Where testimony objectively establishes fraudulent medical billing practices, there is no categorical requirement to establish actual falsity of diagnosis in particular cases.
When appealing a denial of a chance to speak at sentencing, the appellant must cite a basis for reversal or remand, or make a proffer of evidence that would have been offered.
Sufficient evidence of pervasive fraud to shift the burden of proof on the calculation of damages.
First Circuit: St. Paul's Foundation v. Ives
Monastery's Free Exercise rights were not impermissibly burdened by regulation of building construction; in seeking to reinstate the earlier approval while recharacterizing the use of the space in a manner that would eventually require the installation of additional facilities, enough doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the reinstatement that there is no issue for trial as to whether the withholding of reinstatement was arbitrary and capricious.
First Circuit: Valentin-Marrero v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
As the relief sought exceeds the bounds of the earlier favorable ruling by the ALJ, plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief for alleged noncompliance with the earlier ruling.
Ninth Circuit: Weston Family Partnership LLLP v. Twitter, Inc.
Although the appeal was untimely since the district court had dismissed with leave to amend, the subsequent final order in the case cured the defect.
Absent earlier specific or unqualified statements about the ongoing project, the company had no duty to disclose the setbacks to investors.
Usual timeline between discovery of bug and disclosure of repair insufficient to establish that the company's statements on the matter were false. Forward-looking statements would in any event be subject to the safe-harbor, as they were appropriately qualified.
Control-person liability is derivative of the claim against the company; these facts are insufficient to support such a claim.
Sixth Circuit: Laborers' Int'l Union of N.A. v. Terease Neff
The court whose employees have joined a union is a state, not county, entity for purposes of sovereign immunity, given its constitutional and statutory designation within the state. The fact that the state has mandated that the county fund the operations of the court and that the county has discretion in setting the salary levels of the employees supports this, as the mandate is from the state. As the elected state judge exercises ultimate authority in discharging and retaining employees and sets salaries in the first instance, the employment functions of the court are a state matter.
The Contracts Clause is an insufficient basis for S1983 claims.
A Takings Clause injunction would require that there was no remedy sounding in contract; mere breach of contract doesn't state a claim for damages under the Clause.
CBA term in preamble holding that it remains in force until union is decertified or another agreement is reached insufficient to defeat as a matter of law a specific end date in the terms.
Sixth Circuit: Frank Fisher v. Michelle Perron
Where a state intermediate appellate holding gives a statute a certain construction, the reading is determinative for a federal court attempting to ascertain the views of the state courts, absent persuasive data to the contrary.
State tort of disclosure of private information requires disclosures to be materially highly offensive.
Wiretap Act exemption to one-party consent requires that the interception or recording be for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; facts here insufficient to establish that.
Fifth Circuit: Arnone v. County of Dallas
A prosecutor elected within a county and acting within a county is, however, a state officer as opposed to a county officer when deciding questions of or setting policy relevant to the revocation of deferred adjudication in individual cases.
Fifth Circuit: Vitol v. USA
When a fuel is correctly categorized as taxable under the statute, it is ineligible also to be categorized as an alternative fuel, since the latter statute excludes fuels encompassed by the definition of taxable fuels. The statutory scheme is clear enough to defeat a plain meaning argument to the contrary. Any partial categorization of a blend as partially alternative would require a clear statement in the statute.
DISSENT:
The provision making the two categories mutually exclusive is in the excise tax portion of the Code, so the tax credit language in another area isn't bound by it, given plain meaning to the contrary. The excise provisions define the wide swath of the tax categories, and the credit provisions define particular instances. Ordinary meaning is the Star of Bethlehem.
Fourth Circuit: US v. Lenair Moses
SUPPORTING DENIAL OF EN BANC:
The question of whether a Supreme Court precedent has been overruled requires a clear statement from the Court.
A panel decision validating the new standard isn't in irreconcilable conflict with a contemporaneous (yet subsequent) panel holding that the earlier (conflicting) precedent still controls to a degree.
DISSENTING FROM DENIAL OF EN BANC; VOTING FOR EN BANC:
First panel holding controls; this risks stoking confusion.
VOTING FOR EN BANC:
If the statements in the subsequent holding were dicta, the court would have said that clearly; public and Congressional confusion over the state of the circuit law on the question.
Fourth Circuit: Evens Julmice v. Merrick Garland
Silence of the immigration statute as to whether the citizen whose child is seeking to immigrate needs to be alive at the time of application isn't sufficient to justify deference to the agency's interpretation imposing the requirement.
Second Circuit: Washington v. Napolitano
Police officers swearing to arrest warrant affidavit and effecting arrest were not performing functions closely tied to the judicial process in allegedly acting at the prosecutor's explicit instructions; a prosecutor providing testimony in support of a warrant would similarly not be shielded by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Omission from affidavit testimony of factual details critical to the authorizing magistrate's assessment creates an issue for trial as to whether the totality of the omissions were material.
DISSENT:
Arguable probable cause; officers' subjective belief in innocence would be immaterial.
Second Circuit: JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC
Force majeure clause could be invoked to cancel the contract; there was no obligation to reschedule or change the manner of performance.
The catch-all term of the force majeure clause justified the cancellation, even under strict construction; eusdem generis reading of the enumerated grounds implies that any societal disruption not due to fault or negligence and beyond the parties' control qualified.
Discretionary postponement of performance according to state advisory guidance was a de minimis breach, if at all, since by the time of scheduled performance, the state had issued compulsory guidance.
Absent explicit language of condition, courts can't look beyond integrated agreements to infer that one is conditional upon performance of the other.
Violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing doesn't state a claim where it is based on the same theory and facts as the breach claim.
Tenth Circuit: Animal Legal Defense Fund, et al. v. Kelly, et al.
Since the Act prohibits making false statements in an attemp to gain consent to the control of property with the intent to damage the interests of the facility, its viewpoint discrimination requires strict scrutiny.
Not all attempts to damage the enterprise of an animal-processing facility are harms that would merit decreased First Amendment protections.
Under circuit precedent, the photographing of animals or taking notes about habitat is creating speech; the law's criminalization of this when done for the purpose of injuring the enterprise is similarly viewpoint discriminatory. The state can't limit the scope of its prohiitions due to the favor or disfavor of the message.
The same holds for trespassing with the intent to harm the enterprise. Although there is no right to trespass, false speech is an element of the offense through the requirement of effective consent.
DISSENT
Better remedy would be severence of deception from the intent requirement.
Regulating false statements of fact that cause harm is constitutional.
Right to choose who enters one's property is fundamental.
The law merely distinguishes harmful trespass from trespass without the intent to harm.
The actual speech here isn't implicated, but rather the intent behind the speech.
Private landowners generally have the right to restrict photography on their premises.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110563866.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Ford v. Peery
DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF REHEARING EN BANC
Panel inappropriately hypothetically considered the law as misstated by the prosecutor under AEDPA deference, rather than considering the state court's judgment of the prejudice caused by the statement.
Dicta on questions that are germane to the case and resolved after reasoned determination in a published opinion are binding in the circuit. This has proved problematic and some have said that it's in tension with Article III.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/18/18-15498.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Marroquin v. Garland
Given the identical punishments, the structure of the statute tends to suggest that the two proscribed acts are two means of committing the same offense, rather than two distinct offenses, and no caselaw or charging documents in the present case indicate a certainty to the contrary. Intervening higher authority allows the present panel to overrule a circuit decision to the contrary that was based entirely on the statute's phasing in the disjunctive. As the offense is more broad than the generic crime, the law is not a valid immigration predicate aggravated felony.
DISSENT:
Under the state's law, principals and accessories after the fact are mutually exclusive roles that inherently require different elements of proof. Charging document establishes that petitioner was convicted as a principal.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/18/18-72922.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Stiudent A v. San Francisco Unified School District
Although the plaintiffs claim to be pursuing a systemic claim addressing widespread shortcomings, they aren't challenging a policy or practice of general applicability, but rather pointing out several instances in which the system didn't work correctly; administrative exhaustion is therefore required in order to develop the administrative record and give the state a chance to remedy the situation.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/18/20-15386.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Sura v. Garland
Evn absent evidence of their credibility, an Interpol Red Notice and a foreign arrest warrant for a serious nonpolitical crime can, in the light of concessions made by the petitioner, constitute serious reason to believe that the petitioner committed the crimes referenced, and therefore a basis for shifting the presumption when applying for cancellation of immigration removal.
Even absent a formal adverse ccredibility decision, the suspicious timing of the petitioner's departure from El Salvador, and the IJ's determination of lack of specificity is sufficient evidence to establish that the petitioner did not prove by a preponderance that there wasn't serious reason to believe that he had committed the crimes.
Withholding of removal under the torture convention also sufficiently supported, given the unlikeliness of the foreign government's consent or acquiescence in any future torture.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/20-71839.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Herring Networks v. Maddow
As precedent compels that the state-law right to preemptive dismissal of spurious defamation claims be treated as a dismissal for not stating a claim if made on a matter of law and as a summary judgment if made on a fact-dependent determination, the court was powerless to look beyond the pleadings to the additional evidence provided by the non-movant when adjudicating it as a motion for preemptive dismissal on a matter of law.
A reasonable viewer would discern from the tenor of the show that the only fact being reported by the television host was the content of the news story being discussed, and that the rest was opinon and commentary. By disclosing the specific factual basis of the statment, the host reveals the rest to be commentary and hyperbole.
No abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, since it was never requested, and would have proved futile anyway.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/20-55579.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Allison v. Tinder
(Rakoff of SDNY, J.)
The court's assessment of the plaintiffs' case deprecated a holding in which the plaintiff class members were also putative members, and in which the holding favorable to their interests was law of the case, in which they would release their claims by the present settlement.
Given this diminishment of the plaintiffs' claim, the fact that the value of the injunctive relief to the class was unsupported, the fact that many class members were no longer site members or might not seek relief, the existence of a clear-sailing provision and the substantial amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees meant that the court abused its discretion in approving the settlement.
The approval of the attorneys fees was an independent abuse of discretion, since it was calculated as a percentage of the sum of the value of injunctive relief that should have formed no part of the calculation and an estimated cash payment that assumed a full claim of the award.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/19-55807.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Sharma v. Garland
As there was only one session of physical beatings, the single detention was only 18-19 hours, the threats were relatively few, and the instruction by the local police to his customers that they shouldn't repay their loans was offset by the fact that the petitioner wasn't killed and was free to seek other employment, there was substantial evidence for the Bureau's determination that past persecution was not proved.
Similarly, the Bureau's determination of insufficient evidence to show a reasonable fear of future persecution is supported by the decades since petitioner left the country, his family's continued residence there, and petitioner's past international travel after which he was able safely to return to his home country.
The determination that past harms didn't rise to the level of persecution necessarily entails the premise that the past harms didn't amount to torture.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/20-70238.pdf
Ninth Circuit: USA v. Amauje Jason Ferguson
Magistrate Judge's omission of query about compulsion from the plea acceptance colloqouy was insufficient plain error for reversal, since, absent a claim that compliance with the rule would have resulted in a different plea, there was no effect on substantial rights, and the text of the rule deems errors that don't affect substantial rights to be harmless.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/19-10228.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Leroy Leftwich v. County of Dakota
Absent a showing of delioberate indifference or subjective awareness of risk to the detained arrestee, there is no issue for trial on the S1983 claim.
Absent a policy of mental health screening, using personal assessment to answer the mental health questions on the intake form was a discretionary act, rather than ministerial in nature, as was the staff's personal meeting with the arrestee. County's decision to have a formal mental health assessment 72 hours later was policymaking, not operational, and therefore incurred statutory public entity immunity.
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying aleave to amend to a party who did not notice the depositions witnesses who could provide the information that ws the basis of the motion to amend prior to the last date to amend the claim.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/201821P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Designworks Homes, Inc. v. Thomson Sailors Homes, L.L.C
Given the differences in their designs, triangular atria alone are insufficient to establish the identity of total concept and feel necessary for copyright infringement; no reasonable minds could differ on whether there was a substantial similarity of expression in the designs.
Although the court erred in saying that attorneys fees awards were the rule rather than the excpetion, it did not abuse its discretion in the actual award of fees in this case.
Seventh Circuit: Thomas Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois,
Evidence as to where, how, and to whom allegedly false representations were made can state a claim under the statute for fraudulent claims against the government.
Evidence as to the who, what, where, when, and how can state a claim for fraudulent inducement in contractual negotiations; a relator who is not a party to the negotiations might be unable to provide details of the negotiations.
Implied false certification is a species of fraud, and therefore subject to heightened pleading.
Continuing to bill the set capitation after ending the subcontracting that provided enhanced services states a claim for implied false certification under the Act, since the services were a material term of the deal.
DISSENT (CJ)
Mere request for payment from the government while not materially complying with a contractual term is insufficient to state a claim under the Act, given the Act's extreme remedies, including treble damages.
Contract was a contract to provide beneficiaries with access to needed services, not needed services themselves.
These circumstances wouldn't state a claim, even absent heightened pleading. There was no express factual falsity; the omission was an implied falsity. Precedent requires that a request for payment also make specific representations in order to be actionable. Suggesting that noncompliance is material means that any noncompliance is material.
Seventh Circuit: Jerry Smith, Jr. v. Melvin Finkley
Given issues of material fact about whether plaintiff was surrendering to police or lunging for gun and whether plaintiff was an immediate threat to safety of officers or others, court has no jursdiction to decide either aspect of the issue of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal. The fact that the plaintiff wasn't combative or armed complicates the application of relevant precedent that asks if the right was clearly established
An appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence for the denial of quualified immunity can't be decided on interlocutory review.
DISSENT (CJ)
Some of the benefit of qualified immunity is lost if the case is allowed to go to trial; the question is conceptually separate from the underlying claim. The evidence establishes the historical facts of this situation, and the appellate courts can resolve the issues of law arising from those facts.
Seventh Circuit: Blake Conyers v. City of Chicago
Claim arising from the destruction of arrestees' property after a set period sounds in 14A Due Process or 5A Takings, not under the Fourth Amendment.
While the property was taken under the police power rather than eminent domain, federal constitutional limits remain on the disposal of the items. In this context, a thirty day holding period with adequate notice suffices for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Screenshot with evidentiary foundation from the head of department suffices to establish that the website was functioning during the relevant period.
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they lacked access to the internet in order to discover the relevant notice requires that they establish why the specific procedures of mediated inmate internet reference access were insufficient.
Seventh Circuit: Marvin Carter v. Chris Buesgen
Where a federal court dismisses without prejudice in order to allow exhausion of pending direct and Habeas claims in the state system while determining that there has been inordinate delay in those claims, the futility of either amendment or recourse to the state system can make the dismissal without prejudice sufficiently final for appellate jurisdiction.
Extreme delay in the state system can excuse the federal statutory requirement that state claims first be exhausted.
Sixth Circuit: Henry Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville
Ex Parte Young isn't available as an exception to the state university's sovereign immunity, as the university is not a state official, and administrators are being sued in their personal capacities here.
Absent statute or contract, there is no property interest in the appointment to department chair if that chair does not itself lead to a form of tenure.
A dismissed professor can have received adequate due process even if the reviewing committee declined to recommend dismissal.
Placement on paid leave prior to dismissal proceedings was not a deprivaiton of due process, given the evidence in the record and the sufficiency of the proceedings.
Plaintiff must have exhausted 14A liberty interest claim in reputation by requesting a name-clearign hearing; the university was under no obligation to provide for it in its procedures, its refusal to toll the statute of limitations for the present suit did not preclude a paralell proceeding, and the present suit is not a sufficient proxy.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0187p-06.pdf
Second Circuit: Jian Liang v. Garland
Petitioner's omission of the manner in which he discovered that he was on a blacklist was not a minor or extraneous detail, and the nationalization of the persecution implied by the blacklist was central to the claim; the late disclosure cannot be excused by saying that the petitioner and witnesses considered it a minor detail.
Agency was under no obligation to continue the proceedings to discover corroborating evidence. Adverse credibility determination based on the belief that the detail was a fabrication is well supported by the record.
Insufficient evidence of country-wide persecution of people of petitioner's faith.
First Circuit: US v. Saccoccia
Pandemic disease does not transform aggregated minor health concerns into the extraordinary and compelling justificaiton for early release required by statute.
Actual diagnosis, rather than the presence of diagnostic markers indicating likelihood but not certainty, is required in a petition for early release on compassionate grounds.
While material interference by prison administration or stonewalling of medical testing can be the basis of a claim of extraordinary and compelling justification, the record here does not support such a claim.
District Court's averral that it was exercising its broad discretion in denying early release given the balance of the factors was sufficient; there was no need to mechanically review each of the sentencing factors.
First Circuit: Ass'n Hosp. del Maestro, Inc. v. Becerra
Agencies can exercise discretion only in places of ambiguity or silence; they are unable to amend a clear statutory mandate that seems at odds with the purposes of the legislation. Agency did not err, and the rulemaking did not run afoul of the APA.
Agency's implementation according to statute did not offend Equal Protection; proof of discriminatory of intent would also be needed.
Mandate requiring extension of policy in the same manner and to the extent that it applies to existing facilities mans that the same methodology should be implemented to the same extent, not that the facilities should be funded to the same extent.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-1475P-01A.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Ascente Business Consulting v. DR myCommerce
Proof that a company had certain knowledge prior to its employees' contrary statements is insufficient to state a fraud or fraud-adjacent claim under the state's heightened pleading rules.
Evidence that work stopped after a certain meeting can't speak to the mindset of statements made at that meeting. Evidence of a contrary financial interest is at most only a factor, as is the amount of work that it would have taken to accomplish the task.
Expert testimony on ambiguity of contract terms is inadmissible, as ambiguity is a legal conclusion.
Given testimony that the overruns were paid to preserve the business relationship, there was no question for trial on the reliance on the underlying representations. Under state law, the counterparty's expectations of the plaintiff's reliance are insufficient to establish the plaintiff's reliance.
Eighth Circuit: Anthony Vines v. Welspun Pipes Inc.
Court did not clearly err in refusing to sanction a settlement under the statute due to the fact that the attorneys' fees had not been negotiated separately from the underlying claim, given the simultaneous negotiation in emails, calculation of fee on the basis of the the case proceeding without settlement, and implicit tying of the agreement on fees to the agreement on the underlying claim.
Award of de minimis attorneys' fees was an abuse of discretion, as the amount must be determined by determination of the lodestar value by multiplying the hours and the rate.
Given that the only rmaining matter is the calculation of attorneys' fees, no plain error sufficient to reassign on remand.
DISSENT:
Negotiating a wage claim simultaneously with the fees creates a significant conflict of interest. Plaintiffs counsel, in fee negotiations, said that deft was getting a "pretty sweet deal." Court below held that lodestar was inapplicable on this record.
Eighth Circuit: Ka'Torah Prowse v. Walter Washington
When an administrative appeal is filed under the statute, and the petitioner maintains that the papers were filed on certain dates and in a certain order, but this is contradicted by the receipt stamps on the documents, the issue presents a question for trial; the date stamps are not dispositive.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Clarence Robinson
Existence of a second statutory basis, based on the drug quantity determinations made during sentencing, for the life sentence imposed at original sentencing does not make the petitioner ineligible for relief under the statute. Since the statute looks to the offense of conviction and not the underlying facts, the sentence imposed for the offense of conviction should be modified.
DISSENT:
Given the findings, the petitioner would have been sentenced under the second statutory basis at the original sentencing, which makes him ineligible for relief.
Eighth Circuit: Scott McLaughlin v. Anne Precythe
Although a simple Google search would likely have revealed the impeachment evidence against the defense expert witness in a capital case, not investigating the witness beyond a reasoble reliance on the judgment of the professional commnity was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner wasn't prejudiced by lack of replacement psychologist's testimony, a witness who would have provided evidence on an aggravating factor on which the jury ended up not being able to reach a decision, since from a legal point of view the testimony would have been duplicative of the overwhelming evidence on this point; there was therefore not a substantial likelihood of a different result.
AEDPA deference to state habeas finding to the contrary offers an independent ground for overruling the district court ruling that petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of testimony.
Since the ineffective assistance claim wasn't substantial, petitioner can't raise it in federal habeas after defaulting in state habeas, since excuse of default requires a substantial claim.
While jury instructions can't require that a jury be unanimous on any one mitigating factor, they can require that the jury be unanimous in its decision that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors.
District Court erred in holding that the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances was a finding of fact upon which the legislature had conditioned an increased punishment and that therefore must be performed by the jury, since the supreme court of the state has held in this case that the same precedent referenced by the district court was inapplicable.
CONCURRENCE:
Although the investigation of the expert witness was insufficient, there was no prejudice, given the other evidence offered.
State supreme court has held that only the existence of a single mitigating factor need be found by the jury under the statutue, as it constitutes eligibility for the increased sentence.
Seventh Circuit: Frances Rogers v. CIR
Innocent Spouse relief unavailable when the spouse in question is represented by counsel in a formal proceeding (even if that counsel is their spouse), attends the entire proceeding, and is highly educated.
When assessing standard of living when determining if the spouse had a duty to inquire about the questionable tax filings, the relevant consideration is whether there was a substantial increase in the standard of living, not whether it was generally high.
A legally sophisticated party's affidavit claiming that there was no conflict in being represented by their spouse in a tax case involving a jointly filed return waives a subsequent right to a new trial based on evidence that their counsel allegedly didn't call witnesses that would support the legally sophisticated party's claim to Innocent Spouse relief.
Sixth Circuit: James Williams v. Brian Maurer
Since the defts didn't move for summary judgment on the False Arrest claim along with the plaintiff in the S1983 claim, summary judgment for the plaintiff isn't reviewable at the interlocutory stage, since it doesn't relate to the assertion of qualified immunity. Pendent jurisdiction would be inapporpriate, as the False Arrest claim isn't logically subsumed in the related claim being decided in the present appeal.
Claim arising from nighttime warrantless entry under exigent circumstances presents a genuine issue for the finder of fact, since the tip leading to the entry was anonymous, not specific as to location, and was only superficially corroborated. Warrantless entry without reaonable belief of exigent circumstances violates clearly established law.
A claim arising from excessive force asks whether the level of force used was gratuitous, not at the level of injury that the plaintiff sustained. The right to be free of excessive force used in an unconstitutional warrantless forced entry is clearly established.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0184p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Edmund Phillips
As the statute doesn't limit the post-sentencing review of restitution interest charges, and the most logical reading of the circumstance is that a petition arising from changed circumstances is unlikely to happen at sentencing, the court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to modify an interest obligation after sentencing.
Extensive review of statute's structure and history.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0185p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Laura Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc.
As the statute makes no provision for nationwide service of process, Due Process requires that the statutory joinder of out of state parties to a statutory collective action prove sufficient minimum contacts of the original deft within each forum state of the out of state parties.
DISSENT
The addition of new plaintiffs doesn't change the singularity of the lawsuit, within which the court has already acquired its specific jurisdiction. Alternatively, the deft's conduct towards the out of state plaintiffs relates to its conduct within the original forum state.
As it's a national statute, interests of particular states aren't implicated in the same way.
The statute's designation of added plaintiffs as parties is merely to distinguish their status from that of representatives without a personal interest.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0186p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit: United Steel, Paper and Forest v. Anderson
As none of the comparators had records as bad as that of the plaintiff, and all of the other plaintiffs derived their interest from the plaintiff's claim, the issue of pretextual justification doesn't present a question for trial.
Equal Protection claim on behalf of the association to which plaintiff belonged is precluded by Supreme Court precedent as a class-of-one claim given the context of discretionary public employment.
Mere assertion that state officers granted immunity by the district court were acting outside the scope of their duties and not in good faith constitutes a forfeiture of the issue on appeal due to lack of argument.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50501-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Ledford v. Keen, et al
The claim that the directors of the rodeo corporation had run the corporation as a sham and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when adding the directors to her claim adequately stated a claim for relief, but under governing state law, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish that the corporation was a liability shell subject to veil-piercing.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50650-CV0.pdf
Third Circuit: Dianoias Eatery LLC v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co
The existence of unfiled potential legal claims arising from the same circumstances does not mean that a court lacks statutory jurisdiction to issue a requested declaratory judgment; under the statute, such claims aren't waived by seeking declaratory judgment as to the allocation of rights and responsibilities, and can be raised in a subsequent action.
Circuit precedent requiring the court to consider the redress from a federal court judgment doesn't implicate the effect of federal rulings on state law, but looks to the ability of a court to accord final relief to the parties.
Circuit precedent requiring the consideration of the litigation of identical issues in state court assumes identity of parties as well.
Even within the context of the pandemic, the issues raised here are generic issues of contract and policy exclusion interpretation, making a prudential remand on the ground of undetermined state law unjustified.
Since the state courts have no legislative priority in matters of public health, balancing policy exclusions against state public policy interests is not peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the state courts.
DISSENT
Factors relevant to prudential abstention aren't exhaustive; states need to fashion a comprehensive plan to recover from the pandemic; federal speculation on state law risks undue delay.
Third Circuit: Insurance Co of the State of Pennsylvania v. Alfred T. Giuliano
The suretyship for the construction contract was not discharged at tender letter, occupancy, or final completion nof the structure, but by the final payments to the completion contractor; the obligee therefore held the superior interest to the assets of the defaulting party, and could waive its claim to the defaulting party's tax refund.
Settlement order explicitly referencing the tax refund and holding that nothing in the settlement could limit any interest of the surety in the refund preserved no interest, as the suretyship had not acquired its priority interest prior to the settlement agreement.
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/203057p.pdf
Second Circuit: Connecticut Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker et al.
An advocacy organization seeking organizational standing to challenge a government action can't merely rely on its expenditure of funds in opposition to the measure, even at the request of its members; it must establish an injury in fact by showing an involuntary material burden on its established core activities.
Claim for expenditures against the measure needs to be supported by proof that existing activies were hindered, and that the expenditures were material.
Second Circuit: United States of America v. Sinmyah Amera Ceasar
Trial court abused its discretion by considering the need for healthcare and rehabilitation nearly to the exclusion of other sentencing factors, and without considerig the disparity between the deft's sentence and those of defts with similar backgrounds who committed similar crimes. The deft's situation is distinguished from that of other individuals with disproportionately lenient sentences by deft's lack of cooperation and violations of pre-sentence release.
Second Circuit: Revitalizing Auto Cmtys. Env’t Response Tr. v. Nat’l Grid USA
Under the FRCP, an entity (such as a trust) might be the real party in interest, but lack legal capacity to sue.
Under the state's law, the trust has no capacity to sue, since it is viewed as a fiduciary relationship rather than a distinct entity. Additionally, the trust's organic docments vest legal capacity in the trustee.
Upon determination that the party lacks legal capacity, it is possible to remand with that finding on the expectation that the complaint will be amended.
A claim for both past and prospective costs incurred is prudentially ripe if the past costs are enough to sustain the claim, even though a ruling might bind the parties as to future costs incurred.
Contribution claim under a different section of the law was dismissed pendant to the dismissal of the earlier claim, and therefore unreasoned in light of the plaintiff prevailing on appeal; the case is remanded with both the contribution and recovery claims, and the District Court has the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any re-filed state law claims.
DC Circuit: Selvin Solis Meza v. Tracy Renaud
Since the plaintiff is seeking to relitigate a question decided adversely in a removal hearing, the question arises from the removal action or proceeding; Article III review is therefore limited by statute to narrow areas, including timely challenge to final order of removal.
DC Circuit: Gunay Miriyeva v. USCIS
Statutory judicial review mechanism for denied naturalization applications implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction due to the fairly discernible intent of the comprehensive and interrelated statutory scheme, the fact that the exclusive remedy would not foreclose meaningful review, and the fact that the requested relief -- a change in agency policy that would be dispositive for the plaintiff's case -- is not wholly collteral to the statute's provisions.
Tenth Circuit: Lupia v. Medicredit
Although insufficient harm under common law, the improper phone call from a debt collection agency was of the same kind of harm recognized at common law as intrusion upon seclusion, and Congress addressed this type of harm in the creation of the statute.
Summary judgment for the nonmovant wasn't on novel grounds of which the movant had insufficient notice; the nonmovant is entitled to point out that the motion for summary jusgment is unsupported by the evidence.
Bona fide error defense unavailable as a matter of law, since no reasonable jury could find that the policies were designed to avoid the making of unauthorized calls.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010110562706.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Guerier v. Garland
Since the due process rights of aliens who have not effected an entry into the US are coextensive with the statutory scheme and mechanisms for redress within that scheme devised by Congress, when Congress excludes that form of redress, Article III courts have no jurisdiction to hear even a colorable constitutional claim of deprivation of the due process accorded by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-70115.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Decker Coal v. Pehringer
ALJ decisions on motions for reconsideration or modification of award under the statute are reviewed for abuse of discretion, since the statute grants the ALJ broad discretion, and judgments on motions to reopen and reconsider in other areas of law receive similar deference.
As the ALJ's have no policymaking role and are employed in the implementation of the statute at the discretion of the Executive, the protections against removal of ALJ's so employed do not violate Article II powers of the Executive.
ALJ's are judges who make decisions that are subject to vacatur by people without tenure protection. Properly appointed ALJ's don't trammel on the President's executive power.
Finding of inproper removal protections would not imperil the decisions of a lawfully appointed ALJ that have been susbsequently ratified by the Secretary.
Given the specific procedure in the statute, ALJ did not abuse discretion in denying motion to reconsider and modify; the statute empowers the agency to administratively modify the finding, and specifically forbids the initiation of a reconsideration before an ALJ. Given the interest in finality, no abuse of discretion in denying motion to reopen.
Once the presumption arising from fifteen years of work in similar considtion arises, the burden shifts to the employer to disprove total disability due to pneumoconiosis.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-71449.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Flores-Rodruigez v. Garland
Alien facing deportation was not sufficiently put on notice that his past claim of having been born in the US was to be the main issue in the final heaing on the merits, on a motion to sua sponte reconsider the earlier determination of time, place and manner into the country. When a person is charged with a crime or charged with allegations waranting removal from the country, that person is fairly entitled to notice of the claims against him and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-70177.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Perez v. USA
Alleged violation of a jus cogens norm doesn't waive federal soveriegn immunity for purposes of a claim under the Alien Tort Statute under a theory of extra-constitutional wrongdoing.
Equitable tolling not available for second cause of action, which under the law at time of filing would bar recovery under any other cause of action, since this judgment bar would prohibit subsequent recoveries, but did not address claims filed in the same suit, either one of which might have prevailed.
Extension of Bivvens unavailable, as an action against the agency head would be an inappropriate attempt to change government policy, and the claim against the agent who actually shot the Mexican citizen on the border fence has national security implications.
CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL CONCURRENCE
No need to reach sovereign immunity, as the elements of the ATS claim aren't met.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/17-56610.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Michael Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Case was not made moot by agency's withdrawal of an enforcement order, where the underlying determination of jurisdiction remained, since it was not absolutely clear that the agency would not seek to reinstate the order.
Although the government enjoys a presumption of good faith in voluntary cessation, it must demonstrate that its change is entrenched or permanent.
Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting memo postdating the relevant decision, since the memo summarizes the same information that the agency relied upon, rather than being a post hoc justification.
Under Supreme Court precedent, EPA jurisdiction over wetlands requires a significant nexus with navigable waters, rather than the freer standard set out by the plurality in that case, since the first standard is a logical subset of the plurality's rule.
Agency's conculsion that painiffs' wetlands have a sufficient nexus to navigable waters wasn't arbitrary, and was supported by the record.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-35469.pdf
Ninth Circuit: United States of America v. Steven Ray Prigan
As it criminalizes violence or the threat of violence against property as well as persons, Hobbs Act Robbery is categorically not a crime of violence under the sentencing guideleines. Similarly, the generic crime of Robbery enumerated elsewhere in the guidelines is narrower than Hobbs Act Robbery, since federal Robbery requires imminent danger to the person; the generic crime of Extortion is also narrower, as caselaw requires threats to be directed against the person.
Not harmless error, as the court didn't explain a basis for variance that would account for the resulting variance.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/18-30238.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Louis Gareis v. 3M Company
Plaintiff suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence of knowledge of risks and effective alternatives on the part of the device manufacturer, since none of the evidence excluded addressed causation, an element of the claim.
If the admission of expert testimony on operating room airflow was error, it was harmless, given the many other avenues established for the bacteria to have entered the wound.
As causation is an element of a lack of warning claim under state law, if the court erred in holding that the deft had actual or constructive knowledge, the error was harmless, since causation was never established.
Seventh Circuit: Robert Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office
Court did not abuse discretion in quashing deposition of city sherriff, since the sherriff was not personally involved in the employment matters at issue, and the plaintiff did not describe the admissible evidence that might result from the deposition beyond the existence of a conversation at a political event.
Employment action was too attenuated from the employer's gaining knowledge of political activity to support a claim for political retaliation, and the nondiscriminatory bases offered by the employer for the action were insufficiently rebutted.. Claim of racial dicrimination doesn;t present a genine issue of material fact for trial, since there were decisionmakers outside of the protected class and the nondiscriminatory reasons for the action were insufficiently rebutted.
Seventh Circuit: Brian Hope v. Commissioner
Unequal treatment of a state's residents under the 14th Amendment right to domestic travel only occurs when a law expressly differentiates between residents based on their length or timing of residency.
Absent a violation of the right to travel, the equal protection claim should be assessed under rational basis review.
State's offender registration law is insufficiently punitive to base an ex post facto claim upon it; the stated purpose of the legislature was civil and regulatory. In practice, it's sufficiently different from parole, as the status can't be revoked; its restraints and disabilities aren't sufficiently severe to make the law punitive; residency restrictions do not serve punitive aims, and there is sufficient connection to nonpunitive purposes; and the law is not excessive in relation to its aims.
CONCURRENCE:
The registration law is permissibly retroactive; it imposes obligations beyond those prescribed at the time of the offense.
CONCURRENCE/DISSENT:
Requiring registration of residents who are subject to registration in their prior state of residence puts those residents on unequal terms with residents of their present state who are shielded from registration requirments by a decision of the state's supreme court holding the registration requirment to be sufficiently punitive to trigger ex post facto scrutiny.
A resident of the instant state who then travelled to another state where they were subject to registration requirements would then have to register in the instant state upon their return, burdening the travel right.
Seventh Circuit: Stanley Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine
A federal court has sufficient independent jurisdiction over a claim to enforce an earlier federal judgment against a putative alter ego of the original deft when jurisdiction over the putative alter ego would arise under the statute that conferred the jurisdiction over the original action. The question of whether the second organization is in fact an alter ego of the first is a merits question, not a jurisdictional threshold.
The ERISA framework is not compulsory when assessing alter ego under the antiterrorism laws.
Seventh Circuit: Ronald Schmucker v. Johnson Controls, Incorporated
Under the statute, a citizen suit claiming that an agency is not following regulations can't look at documents not having legal force to supply missing terms in the regulations and standards.
Court appropriately held that, given existing remediation, there was insufficient imminent and substantial endangerment to the town for the citizen suit to prevail under the statute.
Sixth Circuit: Carl Ward v. Nat'l Patient Account Servs
Plaintiff does not have standing under the statute to challenge the lack of sufficient identification of the debt collector, which resulted in the sending of correspondence to the wrong company, since the error does not bear a close relationship to traditional harms, and confusion is insufficient concrete injury.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0182p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Sharon Potter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Denial of class certification that doesn't reach merits but instead is a case managment order associated with a stay pendng a related appeal doesn't end the tolling of statutes of limitation for absent class members, as their reliance on the class remedy and the representatives is still objectively reasonable.
As the stay put the parties on notice of pending claims and continued reliance by absent class members was reasonable, the continued tolling serves the purpose of the statute of limitaitons and the economy of litigation.
Circuit split with Fourth flagged.
Once an uncertified class action is dismissed, tolling ceases.
Claim for equitable tolling forfeited for not being distinguished from tolling of right claim before the District Court.
Fifth Circuit: Lindsey v. Bio-Medical Applications
As employer never made working on leave a condition of employment or threatened employee with adverse consequences, lack of assignment of the employees duties to another in the interim did not interfere with the exercise of the statutorily guaranteed leave.
The distinction between actual due dates and horatory due dates presents a genuine issue for trial on the claim of pretextual basis for retaliatory action.
State law whistleblower claim would require an actual violation of state law, not merely discusion of an illegal practice.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-30289-CV0.pdf
Third Circuit: William Drummond v. Robinson Township
The Township's proposed regulations on the firearms practice ground trigger stricter scrutiny, since although restricting the areas for firearm practice dates to the Founding, the town's specific regulations on firearm type and nonprofit ownership of the club are novel, and merit closer scrutiny.
As the regulations steer clear of the core of the Amendment, intermediate scrutiny applies. The limitation on firearm type is only conjectural in its claim to reduce the intensity of practice, and the nonprofit ownership rule is similarly conjectural in its claim to reduce commercial intensity. As the Township bears the burden to establish the reasonableness of the remedy, the challenge to the regulations states a claim
First Circuit: US v. Patch
At 11: "The sockdolager here..."
Deft can't be denied the safe harbor of the sentencing reduction for lack of participation by mere evidence of accompanying others on supply trips; mere presence at prohibited transactions is insufficient.
First Circuit: US v. Carrasquillo-Sanchez
Contemporaneous objection to the length of the sentence imposed preserves only a claim of substantive error, not one of procedural error.
Plain procedural error in sentencing for the court to base an upward variance upon the conditions in the city of the offense without associating the particular circumstances of the deft within this context.
First Circuit: US v. Garcia-Perez
Court adequately recited mitigations, but did not sufficiently explain its upward variance. As the relevant conduct is explicitly included in the guidelines calculation, court needed to specifically distinguish the deft's situation.
Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence -- the deft has the burden to establish that the comparators who received disparate sentences were sufficiently similar.
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