Eighth Circuit: Jose Gutierrez-Gutierrez v. Merrick B. Garland

 

Although the immigration removal order signed at the end of the earlier proceedings was signed by the prosecuting authority at the direction of the IJ, there is sufficient evidence of a proper removal order, since both that version and a version later signed by the judge are in the administrative record.

Proper inspection and a procedurally regular admission at the border did not establish a lawful entry, since the statute prohibited entry for ten years after the earlier removal.

Board's correctly determined that, given the phrasing of the current statute, there is no miscarriage of justice exception to the prohibition on reopening a reinstated removal order.

Jose Gutierrez-Gutierrez  v.  Merrick B. Garland

Seventh Circuit: Apostolos Xanthopoulos v. LABR

 

Board's determination that, since the latter reports were not seeking precisely the same statutory remedy, earlier reports filed with the regulator did not equitably toll the statute of limitations for the second remedy, was sound and supported by adequate evidence.  

Apostolos Xanthopoulos v.  LABR

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Vladimir Manso-Zamora

 

There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in collateral statutory discretionary release proceedings.  Counsel engaged for proceedings in which the right to counsel attaches do not need to file an Anders brief before subsequently withdrawing from the representation.

United States v. Vladimir Manso-Zamora

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Kieffer, et al

 

Testimony of co-conspirator is sufficient evidence for conviction, unless the testimony is incredible or insubstantial on its face; it is for the finder of fact to weigh the credibility of the testimony.  De novo review, as both counsel recited the form of the motion for acquittal.

Proof of a phone call between the two at that time is sufficient evidence for having made a false material statement denying knowledge of a person's whereabouts.

Stipulation to felony status at trial is sufficient to establish contemporary knowledge of that status at the time of firearm possession.

Despite the fact that a large number of juror questions was allowed, deft has not identified, and the court has not found, any that indicate prejudice.

CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT:

The appeal of the felon in possession count shouldn't have been de novo, even arguendo.

USA v. Kieffer, et al

Fourth Circuit: US v. Hassan Ali

 

As the plain text of the witness sequestration rule only references exclusion from the courtroom, its presumption of prejudice does not extend to rulings that reach beyond that exclusion, where courts have more discretion.  Since deft's counsel could have consented to an alternate arrangement, and appropriate curative questioning was allowed, the fact that the codeft witnesses were in the same cells during the trial was not an abuse of discretion.

Denial of motion for new trial is not reviewed de novo when given without explanation where the grounds are apparent in the record.  Denial was appropriate where only new evidence was an affidavit from another prisoner that constitutes, at most, impeachment evidence.  Deft's own affidavit is not considered new evidence where it is duplicative of testimony at trial.

Aiding and abetting under the federal robbery statute is a valid predicate crime of violence due to the use of force.  It was error to instruct on an alternate theory of culpability, though, as conspiracy under the same statute is not a predicate crime of violence.  When one of two prongs might have served as the basis for conviction, the inquiry on appeal is a case-specific and fact-intensive one.

US v. Hassan Ali 

Third Circuit: Desmond Conboy v. SBA

 

As the appellant's brief was largely cut and pasted from a trial court filing,  appellee awarded damages under the Rules.  Award against client, but counsel ordered to pay.

Sanctions for making a frivolous argument at the District Court do not preclude sanctions for filing the same arguments on appeal.  Response to appellate sanctions motion needed to be more than a cut and paste from the trial level sanctions filing.

Desmond Conboy v. SBA

Second Circuit: Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

 

Under state's collateral preclusion principles, since the mental condition of the parents was sufficiently considered in the removal proceedings, the standard-specific question of sufficient accommodation can't be relitigated in federal court under the disabilities statute.

Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

Second Circuit: Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

 

Forging of clients' signatures on immigration petitions without the knowledge of the clients constitutes sufficient unauthorized use of their personal information under the aggravated identity theft statute.

Material falsity of the filing is sufficiently independent from the use of the forged signature to justify the independent sentencing increase.

Sufficient evidence for the relevant hundred-document threshold by a preponderance where it was established that 100 basically identical petitions of factual clams were filed.

CONCURRENCE:

While lawful, the indictment's additional charge of identity theft was possibly an unfair use of prosecutorial discretion.

Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

First Circuit: US v. Concepcion

 

Corrigendum.

 US v. Concepcion

First Circuit; Lopez-Rosario v. Programa Seasonal Head Start

 

Emendation.

Lopez-Rosario v. Programa Seasonal Head Start

First Circuit: Thile v. Garland

 

Agency's decision that petitioner had not established state of citizenship was supported by substantial evidence, given the small amount produced after continuance, and lack of explanation for the limited amount of proof.

IJ did not have to make a formal adverse credibility finding to justify rejection of the petitioner's claim as to country of citizenship and requirement of additional evidence.

Under firm resettlement principle, claim against deportation is heard based on the country from which the petitioner came to the US, and from which he held a valid passport, which, since logically possible, creates an inference of sufficient opportunity for permanent residence.

Thile v. Garland

First Circuit: US v. Ayala

 

Since the sentencing judge indicated that the eventual sentence was the correct sentence irrespective of the dispute over which sentencing guidelines should apply, the eventual application of the higher range was, at most, harmless error.

Sentencing judge's remark to witness was, at most, ill-advised attempt to put them at ease, insufficient for a determination of judicial bias.

US v. Ayala

DC Circuit: Gerald Hawkins v. Debra Haaland

 

Concurrent procedural regulation of waters reserved to the Tribe in a treaty with the Federal Government isn't an unlawful delegation constituting a procedural injury to those holding inferior rights to take the water, since the Tribe's treaty right to ensure sufficient water levels requires no concurrence from the Federal Government.  Even absent the concurrent regulation procedures, the Tribe's right to the water would remain, leaving the plaintiffs without a possibility for redress sufficient to justify Article III standing.

Gerald Hawkins v. Debra Haaland

DC Circuit: Christiana Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc.

 

Although the district has recently clarified that the special motion to dismiss statute imposes a burden equivalent to summary judgment in the federal courts, the statute can't be applied in federal court, because the movant under the statute has no burden to make any showing on the merits and the statute limits the discovery process.

Nothing in the denials by the targets of the investigative reporting constituted readily verifiable evidence needed to support a plausible case that the publisher had a degree of awareness of probable falsity sufficient to establish reckless disregard for the truth.

DISSENT:

Even absent contradictory evidence, a story might be inherently implausible, and a publisher has an affirmative duty to reasonably dispel their own doubts.  First consider the inherent plausibility, then consider counterarguments.

The concession that there was no evidence that the counterparty to the transaction alleged to be the motive for the bribery knew of the payments, and the lack of motive for self-dealing bribery in the bonuses awarded make the story sufficiently inherently improbable.

The facts cited in the denials were sufficient to cast doubt on the story.

Circuit split suggested.

NYT v. Sullivan should be overruled.

Christiana Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, Inc.

Ninth Circuit: James O'Doan v. Joshua Sanford

 

Office entitled to qualified immunity for tripping body-throw maneuver used on naked gentleman making threatening gestures.

Given the ordinary and reasonable inference that people know what they are doing, the police offices had sufficient probable cause for the arrest, given the illegal conduct that they had witnessed, despite the claim by others at the scene that the plaintiff was experiencing a medical episode; the probable cause was not dissipated by the time the plaintiff was released from the hospital, since from the police officers' perspective, the conduct seems inconsistent with the asserted condition.

While the explanation for the plaintiff's actions was ambiguous, this did not mean that it was obvious that the story offered by the plaintiff and others at the scene.

Omission of claimed medical condition from report's supporting affidavit wasn't a deliberate fabrication, as precedent requires that the officer either knew or had cause to know of actual innocence, or used coercive and abusive investigatory techniques.

DISSENT:

Given the exculpatory asserted medical condition, the determination of probable cause required an assessment of the credibility of the varying claims, and reconstructing and judging the reasonableness of these determinations is a matter for the jury.  

(Samples of questions that the plaintiff's lawyer might ask on cross.)

James O'Doan v. Joshua Sanford 

Ninth Circuit: Rodney Green, Sr. v. Mercy Housing Inc.

 

Plaintiff bringing suit under the statute should not be assessed fees or costs unless the court makes a specific finding that the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

Rodney Green, Sr. v. Mercy Housing Inc. 

Eighth Circuit: United States v. John Fortenberry

 

Statute's description of judgment on the merits looks to actual adjudication of the substantive issues of the claim rather than looking to the procedural rules' definition of judgment on the merits.  A dismissal of a claim against an agent due to a limitations period does not require the dismissal of the claim against the alleged principal under the statute, or under normal principles of vicarious liability.

Abuse of discretion to admit evidence of past bad acts that were time-barred from the suit, as they were more prejudicial than probative.  As it became a theme of the case, limiting instruction was insufficient.

Evidence of retaliation and harassment by non-defendant agents of the municipality was also more prejudicial than probative, as it translated into the theme that the municipality was a bad actor.

Implying that the municipality had indemnified the defendant officers for punitive damages when in fact only compensatory damages were to be covered was an abuse of discretion.

Cumulative evidentiary errors and misleading jury instructions suffice for vacatur and new trial.

United States  v.  John Fortenberry

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Jay Gifford

 

420 Month below-guidelines sentence not unreasonable.  Seriousness of the offense outweighed the mitigating factors.

Absent a showing of reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different otherwise, no plain error in imposition of lifetime supervised release despite three year limit in statute, given imposition of lifetime supervised release under separate count.

United States  v.  Jay Gifford

Seventh Circuit: Vaun Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago

 

As a claim of discrimination under the federal statute is an attempt to remedy a personal injury to civil rights, the appropriate statute of limitations is taken from the appropriate state's personal injury tort law.

Vaun Monroe v.  Columbia College Chicago

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Lazelle Maxwell

 

Court did not abuse its discretion in revisiting the petitioner's sentence under the statute by first deciding that the petitioner was eligible; second calculating the revised sentencing range using only the changes described in the statute; third, calculating the new sentencing range accounting for all intervening changes in the law; and fourth, considering the facts of the offense and equitable factors from conduct while incarcerated.

United States v. Lazelle Maxwell 

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Jeffery Wills

 

Where the statute allows for resentencing for extraordinary and compelling reasons, the court has discretion to consider each case individually, rather than considering the manner in which other courts have handled similar petitions.

United States v. Jeffery Wills

Fifth Circuit: Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

 

Plain text of a federal statute permitting the transfer of an action where the court has a want of jurisdiction allows transfers for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or both.

The provisions of the statute are compulsory, so they apply whether or not the court cites it when transferring an action.

State statute prescribing any suit after one year from the accrual of the claim but tolled by either filing a claim in a court of sufficient jurisdiction and venue or service looks to the federal courts to determine the date of filing of suit, so the federal law relating back the transferred suit to the date of filing in the first venue.  The state statute looks to the federal relation-back because the Rules of Decision Act privileges federal statutes over state laws, so the Erie analysis looks first to the federal statutory law.  The federal statute controls under the Supremacy Clause; the case is within the statute, and Congress had sufficient authority to pass the statute to regulate the federal courts.

DISSENT:

Federal statute wasn't intended to regulate state statutes of limitations.  State law is an integrated regulation of statute of limitations and service of process.  Majority's view leads to unequal results between state and federal court, and in federal courts handling transferred claims and federal courts serving as the initial forum

Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

Third Circuit: In re: Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.

 

Under the Code, sufficient mutuality for offset of pre-petition monies mutually owed cannot be created by contract in a triangular offset; the claim on the funds is a personal one, and one tied to the identity of the claimant.

The second party also can't transform the contract into a claim.

(Perhaps.  We don't know many things, but we especially don't know Patent and Bankruptcy.  Entertainment value only, folks.)

In re: Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.

First Circuit: US v. McCullock

 

Contemporaneous objection to the substance of a sentence condition does not preserve a procedural objection against the explanation of the sentence, which is then reviewed for plain error.

On plain error review, deft carries the burden to establish that the error was dispositive.

Court did not commit plain error in imposing a release condition broadly banning types of obscene content, given the history and characteristics of the offenses, including uncharged acts.

US v. McCullock

First Circuit: US v. De Jesus-Gomez

 

In a civil forfeiture proceeding in Admiralty, discovery sanctions are slightly more severe than in the civil analogue.  The Court must weigh severity, repetition, and deliberateness of the violation must be considered.  No prejudice need be shown.  The court did not abuse its discretion in striking the late response and issuing default judgment against a vessel whose claimants asserted a Fifth Amendment exception to civil interrogatories, having previously asserted the exception in a motion to stay that was denied without prejudice.  Although one of the claimants was being held in solitary confinement during the discovery period, the other claimant was not so encumbered.

US v. De Jesus-Gomez

Eleventh Circuit: Wendy St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., et al

 

Three to five phone calls per week to out of state customers and vendors establishes sufficient interstate commerce for the jurisdiction of the federal labor standards statute, since the statute explicitly includes communication within its definition of commerce.

Wendy St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., et al

Eleventh Circuit: PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas, LLC, et al

 

Assume without deciding that the District Court erred in holding that the document was not sufficiently authenticated in liminal proceedings because three of the signatures were not authenticated.

Foreign state's law treats champerty as an affirmative defense to formation; since the champerty claim implicated the merits determination, summary judgment standard would likely be appropriate, even in the context of a motion to dismiss.  

Appeal of champerty finding that doesn't mention the procedural posture of the determination below forfeits any challenge to the standard of review.  

Since the litigation trust created by the injured party as both grantor and beneficiary and to which the claim was assigned in an exchange for value would retain a fixed percentage of any recovery, the agreement was void for champerty under the state's law, and the litigation trust therefore did not have sufficient Article III standing.

PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas, LLC, et al

Ninth Circuit: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

 

High school coach's demonstrative religious actions at the center of the field immediately following the game were performed as a public employee in the course of performing the responsibilities of the job.  

The actions cannot be considered personal and private because of the coach's prior attempts to publicize them.  The collective nature of the activity on almost every occasion establishes that an objective observer would conclude that the practice, coupled with the exclusion of others who might seek access, was an endorsement of a particular religion.

Regulation of coach's conduct was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny, given the need to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.

School district had no obligation under Title VII  to rehire, given the violation of policies.  Plaintiff can't establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, as there were no comparators engaged in perceptible prayer.  As the coach's only request was public prayer at midfield after the game, school district was not compelled to accept it as a reasonable accommodation of a practice of bona fide religious belief conflicting with job responsibilities, and it was a sufficient basis for the adverse employment action.

CONCURRENCE:

Fact-driven holding.  (Analysis tracks majority opinion.)

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

Eighth Circuit: L.G. v. Keisha Edwards

 

The right of a student in a school setting to be free of an unlawful seizure at the behest of police consisting of a brief detention and interrogation was not clearly established in circuit precedent, set forth in a robust consensus, or obviously clear, at least as asserted against a deft with a minor and ministerial role in the seizure.

L.G.  v.  Keisha Edwards

Eighth Circuit: Cory Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa

 

Permit scheme for city street fair staged by development commission is a content-neutral means of regulating competing use of the public forum; the permit allows for the permitted speech and allows the restriction of disruptions to the permitted speech.

Declared intent to, in the future, speak in public areas is insufficient to establish irreparable harm for an injunction affecting a specific street fair.

Cory Sessler  v.  City of Davenport, Iowa

Seventh Circuit: Jeffery Bridges v. USA

 

The statute is not a valid sentencing predicate, since it encompasses threats to property, and both the common law crime and the predicate option of extortion require threats against the person.

Since counsel had an obligation during plea negotiations to assess the potential sentence and communicate the potential sentence to the deft, impending challenges to sentencing practices, even if not generally being made at the time, can be sufficiently foreshadowed to require a hearing for a later Habeas petition for ineffective assistance.

Showing of prejudice not required, since the calculated sentence range serves as a lodestar for its subsequent modification.

Jeffery Bridges v.  USA

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Antoine Wallace

 

Since a sentence was pronounced and the state court record indicates that the deft was credited for time served, rather than simply released, a challenge to the duration of sentence for purposes of subsequent sentencing factors is determined by the state court record of judgment, which can only be altered by a collateral challenge to the earlier conviction.

Since the dictionary definition quoted in an earlier holding to exemplify the plain meaning of a term isn't itself binding in its terms, the activity proscribed under the state statute that reached beyond the bounds of the federal law before the term in the federal law was interpreted to merely have the plain meaning is still within the plain meaning of federal law, despite possibly being outside the dictionary definition quoted.

USA v. Antoine Wallace

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Crystal Lundberg

 

Objection to the disclosure of the deft's past occupation was waived when deft raised it several times during the trial.

Deft affirmatively agreed to the admission of the draft email at trial, waiving any subsequent objection.

Appellant carries burden on plain error review to show why forfeited objection at trial meets the standard for plain error.

Sufficient evidence to establish that deft had the requisite intent to defraud and was an active and knowing participant, since deft knew that the funds were illicit, and continued to spend them.

Alteration of another person's tax forms and pay records in order to secure a lease is sufficient for the sophisticated means sentencing bump.

USA v. Crystal Lundberg

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Anthony Jordan

 

Considering the situation under the supervisory powers of the appellate court over the proceedings in the District Court, rather than under Due Process: the District Court did not evaluate the defendant's defense, make a finding as to the willfulness of the violation, or sufficiently explain the sentence in light of the parsimony principle and the sentencing statute.

USA v. Anthony Jordan

Fourth Circuit: US v. Daniel Harris

 

Physical presence in the courtroom is sufficient to give a criminal court jurisdiction over a deft.

Habeas grounds not raised at trial or on direct appeal and then raised for the first time on a collateral challenge are subject to de novo review on matters of law if the government doesn't argue the procedural default at the District Court.

If the conduct relative to the statute's focus, the object of the statute's solicitude, occurred in the US, it is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even if related conduct occurred abroad.  Since the protected victim was in the US while being coerced into the activity by means of the Internet, the present case is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even though the deft was abroad.

US v. Daniel Harris

Fourth Circuit: US v. Bijan Rafiekian

 

Under the statute, an agent of a foreign government operates under foreign direction and control in something more than a one-sided agreement, but one that doesn't necessarily rise to the level of control suggested by employment.

The exclusion of foreign legal transactions from the statute's reach is an affirmative defense, not an element.  Affirmative defenses are not necessarily smaller in scope, and can be used to define the statute's scope.

Circumstantial evidence and rational inference may be used to establish that a person was acting as an agent of a foreign government.

Court erred in granting acquittal, since a rational juror might have determined that the organizational structure and contacts sufficiently established the possibility of foreign direction and control.

Court erred in granting acquittal on Conspiracy, given the agreements, intent to fly below the radar, and decision not to file a notification with the AG.

One-sentence explanation for the granting of a new trial due to the weight of the evidence was categorically insufficient.

Court abused its discretion in holding that the jurors would not honor the limiting instruction on hearsay materials, given the volume of the materials; the ability of the jury to respect their instructions is an almost invariable assumption of the law.

Restricting the reasons for granting a new trial to the ones recited in the motion, including noting the cumulative error, is a jurisdictional limit.

US v. Bijan Rafiekian 

Third Circuit: Paul O'Hanlon v. Uber Technologies Inc

 

In an interlocutory appeal over an arbitration provision, the court to which the appeal is taken must only assure itself of the appellant's right to appeal and the fact that the court from which the appeal comes would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit arising from the conflict between the parties.

As answering the question of whether a non-customer plaintiff is equitably estopped from avoiding a mandatory arbitration clause within a terms of service necessary for the use of the service is neither necessary for nor inextricably interwined with the question of whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue, the latter can't be answered under pendent jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal as to whether the non-signatory is equitably bound to the agreement.

Since the plaintiff's are complaining of discrimination that keeps them from using the service, they are not equitably bound to agreement that they have neither embraced nor benefitted from.

Paul O'Hanlon v. Uber Technologies Inc

Second Circuit: Tardif v. City of New York

 

Not providing timely and adequate medical services to detained individual prior to arraignment doesn't violate the disability act, since the disability requiring medication is the reason for the service, not the obstacle for which a reasonable accomodation would have to be provided.  Plaintiff was not denied medical services because of the disability.

At summary judgment, the defendant was not required to provide a nondiscriminatory theory for not providing the medication.

Limiting the testimony rebutting a claim of pecuniary motivation to the social justice motivations for participating in the protest rather than allowing testimony about past work for social justice was not an abuse of discretion.

State law permits a police officer to use an objectively reasonable amount of justifiable force in any non-arrest situation; the contact does not in itself give rise to a claim for assault, and the justification is not limited to the circumstances enumerated in state law.

Since the question of objective reasonableness of force looks to the Fourth Amendment, it was error to instruct the jury that the subjective mental state was at issue; where subjective mental state was potentially dispositive, the error is not harmless.

Tardif v. City of New York

First Circuit: In Re: Da Graca

 

In a Habeas class action seeking relief for immigration detainees in the current pandemic, supervisory Mandamus doesn't run because the lower court has not palpably erred; it has reduced the detainee population significantly.  Advisory Mandamus doesn't run, since the determination of pandemic severity is a factual question, not a legal question, and since the population has been lowered, the balance between extraordinary circumstances and likely success doesn't need to be corrected.

 In Re: Da Graca

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Matthew Coy

 

Court did not clearly err in holding that involuntary antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate, given physician testimony.  While it was possible that the illness is of a type that will not be affected in matters relating to the trial, the long-term benefits of the medication make it medically appropriate despite the risk of side effects. 

United States  v.  Matthew Coy

Eighth Circuit: Tom Dunne, Jr. v. Resource Converting, LLC

 

Jury's award of punitive damages without compensatory damages in a suit seeking return of a 400K investment necessarily found that while there had been an injury, no compensatory damages were warranted.  A lack of compensatory damages when awarding punitive damages does not offend the state's law, as establishment of damages is different than award of damages.  Additur in this situation would be unconstitutional.

Criminal fines for correlative conduct cannot be used to establish disproportionality of award.

Court did not abuse discretion in holding that the claim at law precluded equitable redress for the lost funds.

Court's reduction of requested fees was valid under governing state law; similar reduction in costs was valid under governing federal law.

Court erred by applying federal law to claim preclusion; the appropriate law is the law of the forum in which the first decision was made.

Economic loss doctrine, under the law of the state, would not bar claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. 

Tom Dunne, Jr.  v.  Resource Converting, LLC

Eighth Circuit: Guardian Flight LLC v. Jon Godfread

 

The airline deregulation act preempts the state's restriction on air-ambulance billing, and the law is not saved under the insurance statute, as it does not have the effect of assigning or transferring risk, and the air ambulance subscription plan does not guarantee treatment or act as an intermediary.

Guardian Flight LLC  v.  Jon Godfread

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Norbert

 

In assessing the credibility and reliability of the tip of illegal activity in the apartment parking lot, the tipster's familiarity with the physical environs was insufficient validation; as the tip wasn't contemporaneous with an emergency situation, it is held to a higher standard.  The tip was sufficiently specific in its physical description of the suspect. 

Given the lack of corroboration, the police had no reasonable suspicion that the criminal activity was afoot.  The search was conducted after verification of entirely innocent information.

The tip's claim of ongoing drug sales meant that the search at the end of the day wasn't on stale information.

DISSENT:

This means that police must personally witness a crime.

Tipster's assertion of being employed by the apartment complex and subsequent specific description of the details corroborated the information sufficiently for reasonable suspicion.  Would suffice for probable cause under Gates.

Navarette wasn't based on emergency situations, but rather stands for the proposition that a tipster who tells the truth about innocent details will tend to tell the truth when asserting criminality.

Circuit split flagged.

USA v. Norbert

Fifth Circuit: Anokwuru v. City of Houston

 

S1983 False arrest claim was immunized by an intervening indictment from the grand jury and the lack of a specific claim that the officers involved had deliberately or recklessly provided false information to the magistrate or the grand jury.

Circuit precedent does not recognize a freestanding malicious prosecution complaint under S1983.

Equal protection claim dismissed for lack of comparators or discriminatory intent.

A claim against the municipality for inadequate training that relies on a single incident must demonstrate the complete lack of training.

No abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the fourth amended complaint.

Sua sponte dismissal of claims upheld, since magistrate had recommended it and plaintiff briefed the issue -- so long as the plaintiff has a fair opportunity to plead their best case.

Anokwuru v. City of Houston

Third Circuit: Candace Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix

 

Since the debt collection letter said that calling the company would cause collection efforts to stop, and not that it would legally compel the collection efforts to stop, under the least sophisticated debtor standard, the letter was not misleading.

Proximity to the legally required information about how to question the claim by mail would not cause undue confusion about which mechanism to use to preserve their rights against the claim.

Candace Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix

Third Circuit: Terry Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer and Wale

 

Federal equal credit law's prohibition on discrimination according to marital status  doesn't preempt the state's common law doctrine of necessities, which holds a medical bill to be valid against a spouse; the medical debt is an incidental credit, distant from the traditional credit-provision intent of the law.

Spouse's action against the medical entity for not fulfilling the common law requirement of demand doesn't state a claim, even in the absence of the facility's having made a demand on the estate of the patient, since public records indicate the lack of an estate.

Court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend, since there was no showing of claims falling outside the entitlement under the doctrine of necessities.

Terry Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer and Wale

Third Circuit: Dansko Holdings Inc v. Benefit Trust Co

 

Employer's contract claim against potential trustee of employee stock benefit plan is remote from the usual ERISA concerns, and therefore not preempted by the statute.

Implied spoken promise subsequent to execution of written contract can be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.

Integration clause refers only to the time of formation -- when subsequent parties to the contract were substituted in, the integration clause still looked back to the time of initial formation.

A lie about a side issue in the course of a contractual breach is separately actionable as fraud where the lie implicates a broader social duty owed to all individuals.

By conceding valid substitution into the contract for the purposes of the breach claim, the plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the indemnification agreement compelling the payment of legal fees doesn't apply to the defendant.  Plain meaning of indemnify encompasses first party claims.  Under state law, it wouldn't be specific enough to cover any damages award.

Dansko Holdings Inc v. Benefit Trust Co

Second Circuit: Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of America Corp.

 

The notice of appeal properly identified the party taking the appeal, the orders that were the subject of the appeal, and the court to which the appeal was being taken; the jurisdictional element of the rules of appeal were satisfied, and since notice was given of intent to appeal all orders, the description of the appellant in the caption as successor in interest to an entity that only accounted for some of the claims was excusable.

As assignment of claim doesn't undo an injury, the claim filed by an entity that had already assigned the interest had sufficient Article III standing; assignment of claim is distinct from grant of power of attorney, which would trigger a prudential limitation on standing.

While choice of law for corporations usually looks to the location of the business, choice of law for partnerships looks to the law of the forum.  Questions of state law can be dispositive in the federal standing inquiry.

Although legal capacity of parties isn't a jurisdictional element in standing, existence of the entity is, and since the jurisdiction provided for no wind-up time, the non-existent parties did not have standing at the time the suit was filed.

A suit filed by a non-existent entity is not a nullity; so long as there is a real party in interest willing to join the suit at the time the suit is filed and the real party in interest ratifies, is substituted, or is joined within a reasonable time, there is sufficient subject matter jurisdiction for the action at the time of filing.  Since procedural reforms have allowed for nominal parties, this doesn't offend the Constitution.  Court retains the right under the rules to deny joinder for equitable reasons. Circuit split flagged on the nullity doctrine.

Equitable tolling is available for new plaintiffs joined to existing class actions.

Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of America Corp.

Federal Circuit: George v. McDonough

 

Statutory collateral attack on a past adjudication under the auspices of Clear and Unmistakable Error looks to the law of the time and asks whether the error was undebatable and would manifestly have changed the outcome at the time.

Novel judicial constructions of statutes generally are law for all cases pending on direct review.

George v. McDonough

DC Circuit: Nalini Kapur v. FCC

 

No standing for a minority percentage owner of a television station seeking to undo multiple sales of the business, because even if every administrative decision was reversed and every deal unwound, the business would be back in the hands of the majority percentage owner who would then have the power to sell the station again.

Nalini Kapur v. FCC

DC Circuit: USA v. Shan Shi

 

Even absent testimony from cooperating witnesses that the deft had entered into the trade secret conspiracy, there was sufficient substantial evidence for the finder of fact to conclude from the circumstances that such a tacit conspiracy existed, and that the deft had agreed to join it.

Sufficient evidence to indicate that at least two conspirators believed that the appropriated information contained trade secrets.

CONCURRENCE:

The government didn't misrepresent the evidence.

CONCURRENCE:

The government misrepresented the evidence.

USA v. Shan Shi

Eleventh Circuit: James Clay, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

 

Agreement on taxation of ceded land is subject to the court's plain meaning reading; the member of the tribe that is party to the accord has no power to define a contrary reasonable reading.

Casino revenues did not arise from the land in question.

In the absence of a formal lease, the tax court determination that the lands were not leased by the tribe is supported by substantial evidence.  Tribe has not identified any statutory basis for the claimed exemption for profits from leased lands.

James Clay, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Tenth Circuit: Blanca Telephone Company v. FCC

 

The required return of federal funds was not a penalty or a disgorgement, and therefore was not subject to the statutes of limitations on sanctions by the agency and administrative penalties generally.  Instead, the funds were monies due the United States under the federal debt collection act, since the improper use had been discovered by an audit by the agency's inspector general, a predicate of the debt collection act.

Although the regulations were complex, there was sufficient notice of the regulation for due process purposes, given the common understanding of the relevant group -- here the specialized knowledge of a telecommunications carrier.

Although the hearing must be held at a time when the deprivation can be prevented, that does not necessarily mean that it must happen before the agency has reached its decision to deprive.  Agency collection proceedings during the pendency of the litigation did not raise constitutional concerns.

Agency's interpretations of the regulations were not arbitrary and capricious.

Incomplete record provided in the current litigation did not prejudice the plaintiff, and the incomplete record offers sufficient grounds for the agency's decision.

Blanca Telephone Company v. FCC

Ninth Circuit: Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland

 

The proposed social group of people who might testify against certain criminal organizations is, unlike in some other countries, not independently socially recognizable and distinct.

As the IJ referred to the irregular evidence offered in support of the argument suggesting future torture, the exhibit was admitted by judicial notice, and the Board needed to account for its claims in their decision.

DISSENT:

The irregular evidence isn't in the appellate record, so the Board can't account for it on remand, and the evidence itself is mixed as to the claim.

Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland

Ninth Circuit: Rodriguez v. Garland

 

Agency did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen an immigration proceeding on the basis of changed country conditions, as the petitioner did not produce evidence of a material change in the conditions within the country; while a change in personal circumstances can make the changed conditions more relevant to the petition, even such a hybrid claim would require a showing of changed conditions to reopen the proceeding.

Rodriguez v. Garland

Ninth Circuit: Freyd v. University of Oregon

 As the comparison of duties between privately funded and federally funded research academics is fraught with judgment, not law, their equivalence is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

The standard under the state law is broader than the federal standard, reasoning from the greater, there is an issue for trial on the state claims as well.

As plaintiff in disparate impact claim wasn't challenging thempe practice of retention raises, but additionally suggesting that the salaries of the cohort be raised as well, it is an attack on a specific process, not general one.  The existence of an alternative undercuts the claim of business necessity.

Although statistics derived from small sample size have less probative value, disagreement among experts as to the validity of the numbers can suggests a triable issue.

As the plaintiff never engaged in retention raise negotiations, there is no issue for trial on state and federal disparate treatment claims or Title IX.  Insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination for state ERA claim.

DISSENT:

Equal Pay Act requires a case-specific examination of the actual job performance and content.

Full Professors are like professional athletes.  Significant differences in all of the jobs for the members of the plaintiff's department.

State claim only requires a common core of tasks, which presents an issue for trial.

Retention negotiations are elective -- each professor chooses to engage or not. Small sample size.  The practice is a business necessity.

Freyd v. University of Oregon

Eighth Circuit: John Pietsch v. Ward County

 

Notice and a hearing on the landowners' applications for variances from a zoning regulation sufficed for procedural due process. The zoning regulation requiring a right of way wasn't irrational, given the public interest in road construction.  Claim of unfair exaction improperly attempts to recast a takings claim as a procedural due process claim.

John Pietsch  v.  Ward County

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Eric Jones

 

No plain error in sentencing court's omission of the finding that the possession of the firearm facilitated the possession of the drugs, since the court determined that the firearm was used for protection during drug-related activity, rather than simply assuming a connection from physical proximity.

Refusal to vary downward not unsupported  by the record; within-Guidelines sentence not unreasonable.

United States  v.  Eric Jones

Eighth Circuit: Transdev Services, Inc. v. NLRB

 

Substantial evidence for Board finding that neither policies nor the CBA established a progressive system of employee discipline; the supervisors' actions were appropriately characterized as reports without any inherent enforcement power.  The reports also are considered insufficiently authoritative to be considered recommendations.  A one-time distribution of gift cards was insufficient to establish manager status.  Although employees could temporarily remove other employees from driving, their efficacy at this was determined by their own performance, not the employee's performance, as precedent compels for a finding of manager status.

Commonsense argument that there must be a significant proportion of managers among the employee would inappropriately mix the lay standard with the legal standard required by statute and precedent.

Transdev Services, Inc.  v.  NLRB

Eighth Circuit: Kathy Swedberg v. Andrew Saul

 

Vocational expert was present during recitals of sufficient evidence to support their later findings, and the determinations were reached by appropriate hypothetical questions from the ALJ made without contemporaneous objection.

Kathy Swedberg  v.  Andrew Saul

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Shawn Thomason

 

As the writings found in the defendant's car supported the theory of the crime and established a potential future danger to the community, consideration in sentencing was not a violation of the First Amendment.

As the deft requested the change late in the trial, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct due to the use of gender-specific pronouns was waived; alternatively, pronouns are not dispositive.  Misgendering is insufficient basis for a claim of judicial bias; no error in denial of motion to recuse.

Plea deal identifying one act as applicable for restitution did not preclude the seeking or award of restitution under an additional act.

Interstate stalking statute does not unconstitutionally co-opt state authorities.

United States  v.  Shawn Thomason

Seventh Circuit: Michael Thomas v. Aline Martija

 

State law provides the rule of decision on some S1983 substantive legal questions related to the defense raised, so the assertion of the state statutory evidentiary privilege defense, although defeated by the federal rule on the privilege in question, doesn't mean that all substantive defenses have been presently waived.

Lack of notes from a deceased physician and a delay in the referral to a specialist deft present an issue for trial, as they might show either not receiving a prisoner's claim or  a deliberate indifference to the claim.

An institution-level medical director within a larger corporation is not a unilateral setter of standards for purposes of Monell liability.

Michael Thomas v.   Aline Martija

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Korrtel Filzen

 

Sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement that had incorrectly calculated the mandatory fees payable by the deft but in practice imposed the higher fee required by law was insufficient plain error to revisit the sentence, despite the deft's inability to withdraw from the agreement at sentencing.

USA v.  Korrtel Filzen

Seventh Circuit: Ademus Saechao v. Cheryl Eplett

 

Federal collateral review can look past individual state court opinion to determine if the state judicial proceedings were consistent with the federal standard.

Judge's disqualification of criminal counsel unknowingly appointed to defend another defendant charged for the same occurrence, given deft's refusal to waive conflicts was a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's caselaw requiring a serious risk of conflict.  The subsequent appearance of the other defendant on the trial's witness list was independently sufficient, regardless of the probability that the witness would actually be called.

Ademus Saechao v. Cheryl Eplett

Seventh Circuit: Ralph Holmes v. Salvador Godinez

 

Consent decree that provides for the award of fees if there has been a violation of the agreement by one party does not require an ongoing violation to trigger the possibility of an award.

Courts order that the state party to the agreement ensures treatment of the incarcerated parties to the agreement within a certain timeframe was not a reasonable inference of the parties' agreement, which called for the incarcerated parties to be referred for treatment within that timeframe.

Ralph Holmes v. Salvador Godinez

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Dubin

 

Vacated and going to en banc.

USA v. Dubin

Fifth Circuit: Jones v. Michaels Stores

 

Manifest disregard of the law is not a freestanding grounds for vacatur of an arbitration decision under the federal statute.

Jones v. Michaels Stores

Third Circuit: HIRA Educational Services Nort v. Frank Augustine

 

Sufficient jurisdiction to review a denial of legislature members' immunity under the collateral order doctrine, since otherwise the legislators would have to participate in pretrial and discovery matters, and the question is one purely of law.

State legislators' common law federal immunity and immunity from state claims under the state constitution protect actions and speech regardless of subjective discriminatory intent.

Unlike municipal legislators who have both administrative and legislative functions, the actions of a state legislator that are legislative in nature do not have to be proven to be substantively legislative in intent and effect.  Correspondence and telephone calls relating to legislation are protected as factfinding.

Qualified immunity for political errands not within the scope of legislative immunity, as there was not any clear teaching of the courts that the allegedly discriminatory campaigning in the community was against the law.

HIRA Educational Services Nort v. Frank Augustine

Third Circuit: In re: Energy Future Holdings Corp.

 

Post-petition missed merger states a subsequent claim by the missed bidder for administrative expenses under the Code, despite the fact that the missed bidder filed multiple post-attempt judicial challenges, forcing the estate initially to pay the agreed penalty for the missed transaction.  

Benefit to the estate should be considered broadly, and the missed bidder's due diligence in setting up the deal, clarifying the issues and setting a roadmap for the subsequent lesser bid plausibly conferred sufficient benefit on the estate to justify statutory priority for the administrative expenses claim.  Finder of fact will need to determine if this benefit was offset by the costs that were forced by prolonging the missed deal.

In re: Energy Future Holdings Corp. 

Second Circuit: United States of America v. Martinez

 

Holding a substantive RICO conviction -- in which the underlying offense ple(a)d(ed) to or proven involved as an element the use of force -- to be a crime of violence is, under de facto modified categorical review, not plain error.  Prior circuit precedent requiring two of the three underlying offenses to involve the use of force is dicta as to convictions with only one offense involving the use of force.

Sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

United States of America v. Martinez

Second Circuit: Int’l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Verint Sys., Ltd.

 

When imposing sanctions under the courts inherent powers, the court must first consider not the actual disruptive effect in the proceedings, but the intent of the offending party; a single filing offers sufficient grounds for sanctions.

Int’l Techs. Mktg., Inc. v. Verint Sys., Ltd.

First Circuit: Cuesta-Rojas v. Garland

 

Since the only record of the telephone interview was the investigator's notes, although the report of the investigator is entitled to a presumption of regularity, the discrepancies between the conversation as recorded in the notes and the other interviews of the petitioner do not offer sufficient evidence for the agency's determination.

Cuesta-Rojas v. Garland

First Circuit: US v. Concepcion

 

Re-sentencing under the statute is not a plenary re-sentencing is not a plenary review of all intervening changes in the law, but an imposition of a sentence incorporating the specific changes mandated by the statute.  The judge is then free to weigh the intervening changes in the law in the subsequent discretionary resentencing.  Affording plenary sentencing would unfairly reward those who had been convicted of the predicate offense.

Tenfold, almost equally divided circuit split flagged.

DISSENT:

No need to bifurcate the process; once the court determines the eligibility for resentencing according to the law at the time of the original sentencing, before making the gating decision, the court is then free to consider subsequent legal and factual developments before deciding on whether to grant the motion to revisit the sentence. 

US v. Concepcion

Federal Circuit: Akpeneye v. US

 

The appropriate test in this context for work under the statute is whether there are either substantial duties or a substantial amount of time and effort controlled or required by the employer and primarily for the benefit of the company, rather than whether there is complete relief from duty.

Legal conclusions given in deposition testimony on employment conditions are presumptively not binding on the deponent entity.

While standby duties can rise to the level of actual work, here, since duty posts were covered, breaks could be taken away from public access, and there was a system for compensating employees if both break times during the day were interrupted, the standby duties didn't justify a clam for overtime.

Restriction that the employees had to remain in uniform and on the premises did not cause their breaks to primarily benefit the employer.flsa

Akpeneye v. US

Eleventh Circuit: Betty M. Smith, et al v. Michael Bokor

 

Since citizenship for purposes of the local controversy exception and discretionary exception to the class-action statute is based on current domicile, court clearly erred in using demographic data of past residence in a care facility as sufficient proof of citizenship. Commonsense inference that locals tend to enter nearby homes and that few of those over 65 move out of Florida are insufficient.

Plaintiff satisfied the "significant defendant" standard even absent a showing of means, since the statute requires a party against whom significant relief may be sought, not a party against whom a significant judgment may be recovered. 

A corporation liable through vicarious liability can be a primary defendant for purpose of the CAFA discretionary exception.class

Betty M. Smith, et al v. Michael Bokor

Ninth Circuit: Walden v. Shinn

 

As the state supreme court, in affirming a denial of severance on direct review, held in the alternative that the evidence of the crimes would be cross-admissible, and this ground wan't challenged on grounds of federal law during state post-conviction proceedings, the omission of the challenge from the federal Habeas petition to the District Court waived the claim.

State court determinations that post-identification police disclosures to witnesses at photo lineup that they had arrested the suspect was not contrary to clear federal law on the question.

State court reasonably declined to infer improper suggestion when photo lineup witness identified one candidate, and the police then momentarily turned off the recording device before the witness identified the defendant.

Since the state's highest court conducted an independent review of mitigation, a federal Habeas claim against the state trial court's holding of insufficient nexus needed to identify the constitutional error in the higher court's analysis.

District court properly denied amendment of federal Habeas ineffective assistance claims subsequent to independent exhaustion in state post-conviction review after federal Habeas had commenced, since the claims did not relate to the same transactions and occurrences; no plain error in the denial of equitable tolling.

State court's determination that admission of crime scene photos was not unduly prejudicial was not an unreasonable application of federal law, since contemporaneous circuit precedent held that there was no circumstance in which admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence could justify the writ.  Offered stipulation was not sufficient, since nothing in the Due Process Clause holds that the government can't introduce relevant evidence on an uncontested point. 

Walden v. Shinn

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Benjamin Yackel

 

As both the state crime of aiding and abetting and the federal application of the generic offense require intentionality but contemplate presence as a means of establishing intention, the state statute is a crime of violence under the Guidelines and ACCA.

United States  v.  Benjamin Yackel

Eighth Circuit: Metropolitan Omaha Property v. City of Omaha, Nebraska

 

Municipal ordinance authorizing the inspection of a property and reciting that the inspector may seek a warrant if consent cannot be obtained doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing warrantless entry, since under the state's rules of statutory construction, the permissive power to seek a warrant would be exercised prior to any search without consent.

As there is sufficient specificity and adequate provisions for notice and appeal, the enforcement provision is not unconstitutionally vague.

Judicial consent decree explicitly allowed for changes in the municipal code, so the procedures aren't an unlawful amendment of it.

Allegation of discrimination under federal housing law doesn't plead an intensity of discrimination sufficient to state a claim.

Metropolitan Omaha Property  v.  City of Omaha, Nebraska

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nkajlo Vangh

 

As the motion for compassionate release arises from a statute that does not require an evidentiary hearing and is discretionary in nature, there is no possible showing of entitlement to relief that could require an evidentiary hearing on the question.

Court's evaluation of the current level of care accorded the prisoner was sufficient consideration of any extraordinary and compelling justification for release, as described in the statute.

United States  v.  Nkajlo Vangh

Seventh Circuit: Shawn Patterson v. Matt Baker

 

Treating nurse's opinion on re-cross about whether visible signs of the described prison beating would have been expected was, at worst, harmless error in allowing an expert conclusion; plaintiff had opened the door on cross by asking on redirect if painful injuries could be sustained without leaving a visible sign.

Shawn Patterson v.   Matt Baker

Seventh Circuit: Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Kristina Box

 

Given circuit precedent on stare decisis,  a GVR citing a specific Supreme Court decision in which no opinion commands the support of a majority of the Court, the analysis of the cited plurality holding looks to the narrowest ground justifying the order.  The controlling rule is either derived from the common ground shared by the rationale of the plurality and the concurrence(s) in the judgment or from a logical subset of non-contradictory reasons that the rationales can accommodate.  The entirety of a single concurrence in the judgment does not control.

The concurrence cited here accords a previous decision stare decisis effect and disagrees with the plurality's distinguishing of the facts, so the narrowest ground is constituted by the balancing test within the prior holding.

Dissent: GVR with a named case implies a common ground in the holding.  Concurrence explicitly warned about imposing a balancing test in the substantial obstacle determination.  Controlling test is the substantial obstacle test from Casey.

Planned Parenthood of Indiana v.  Kristina Box

Seventh Circuit: Zurich American Insurance Com v. Ocwen Financial Corporation

 

At the pleadings stage, insurer did not have the duty to defend, since the natural reading of the specific conduct in the pleadings established that the complained-of conduct violated laws that were within the explicit policy exclusions, and allegations that might encompass conduct outside the exceptions were, under the state's laws, legal labels that were meaningless until defined by the facts at trial.

Zurich American Insurance Com v.  Ocwen Financial Corporation

Seventh Circuit: John Mandacina v. Frederick Entzel

 

The tendency of undisclosed potential impeachment evidence to come into view years afterward isn't a structural flaw in statutory Habeas sufficient to justify an application under the traditional form; the statutory form clock restarts from the discovery of the evidence, and second or successive petitions merely limit the petitioner to a single claim.

Although there is not a one-year limit on the older statutory form of Habeas, in such a case, equitable principles restrict abuse of the Writ.

John Mandacina v.  Frederick Entzel

Seventh Circuit: Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

 

Although the private support obligation for stepchildren usually ends with divorce, in public entitlement contexts such as state inheritance tax laws and SSA, the status usually doesn't imply a benefit termination context at divorce.  Since the agency hasn't offered a contrary interpretation, the step-child of the divorced abusive parent has a right to file for naturalization under the Act.

Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

Seventh Circuit: Susan Bennett v. Council 31

 

As the employee had expressly agreed to pay the union by authorizing the paycheck deduction, and the contract for representation was valid under the state law of the time, the First Amendment right recognized by the courts after the contract had begun did not require an explicit waiver at the time of contractual formation; even under the new standard, any employee who consents to pay can be bound to the contract.

State law defining a public sector bargaining unit and establishing an exclusive representative organization for the bargaining unit does not violate First Amendment associational rights; plaintiff is not compelled to affiliate with the representative organization, and employees are free to form advocacy groups.

Susan Bennett v. Council 31

Sixth Circuit: Vitalina Lucas Lopez v. Merrick B. Garland

 

Agency did not have to provide alien faced with removal proceedings notice in their native language; a notice in English sufficiently puts the recipient on notice that language assistance will need to be secured.

No authority to review IJ's refusal to sua sponte reopen prior proceeding that resulted in removal order in absentia.

Vitalina Lucas Lopez v. Merrick B. Garland 

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Jason Rosales

 

Sufficient evidence for drug conspiracy, since, despite the fact that drugs were never mentioned between the the two, the structure and manner of the single transaction, combined with the amount of drugs involved, would allow a reasonable finder of fact to convict.  Deft's version of events did not have to be disproven.

Given statutory mandatory minimums, sentencing instructions that looked to the whole conspiracy to establish drug quantities, rather than calculating the amount that each defendant was either responsible for or might reasonably have thought to be involved was harmless error, as there was only a single unit involved in the single transaction.

For the Obstruction of Justice sentencing bump, the court needed to make specific findings of the material hindrance to the investigation caused by deft's throwing the cell phone against the ground; although the sentence ultimately varied downward, remanded for reconsideration.

United States v. Jason Rosales

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Nelson

 

Sufficient grounds for the stop, since, at the border, a consented-to scan of the trailer had revealed it to be largely empty, but a safety seal was evident on the doors; additionally, the stop was within fifty miles of the border.

Being told that he would be free to leave after the canine unit had checked the trailer was insufficiently custodial to exclude the non-mirandized statements in the interval.

Roving stops by Immigration are justified whenever there is reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.

USA v. Nelson

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Fackrell, et al

 Amended opinion from 3/11 -- slight change to the facts recited on page three.

USA v. Fackrell, et al

Second Circuit: Kinsey v. New York Times Co.

 

Under the state's conflicts rules, since the defamation plaintiff is domiciled in a state other than the district containing the city in which the speech occurred and in which the employment damages were sustained, the state with the strongest interest in the litigation was instead a third forum, the state in which the national newspaper is domiciled, and from which it emanated.

Since the context and structure of the quoted litigation affidavit established that the language was taken from a judicial proceeding, the state's statutory absolute privilege for reports of judicial proceedings applies.

Kinsey v. New York Times Co.

Federal Circuit: Depuy Synthes Products v. Veterinary Orthopedic

 

Sufficient jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine to review an unsealing of confidential supplier lists, as post-judgment review would be after the disclosure, and the question is important and distinct from the merits analysis, not merely a routine discovery matter.

No clear error in the unsealing of the claimed trade secret supplier lists, since, following the relevant state law on trade secrets, the party and the supplier do not have a relationship of confidence, and, additionally, the name of the supplier isn't actually a secret.

Depuy Synthes Products v. Veterinary Orthopedic

Federal Circuit: Mylan v. Janssen

 

As the general statutory grant of jurisdiction to review decisions is modified by a specific provision making the refusal to institute IPR nonreviewable, courts have no jurisdiction over the Director's delegated decision not to institute proceedings.  Since the APA does not in itself create jurisdiction, an administrative challenge is similarly unavailable.

Even though Mandamus challenging the proceeding only runs from the Federal Circuit, as the sole court with sufficient prospective jurisdiction, as there is neither a clear and undisputable right to relief nor a colorable constitutional claim, nor historical precedent sufficient to justify a Due Process claim, the writ is unavailable here.

Mylan v. Janssen

Eleventh Circuit: Alberto Ruiz v. Officer Jennifer Wing, et al.

 

Since the unauthorized pro se Rule 59 motion was timely filed, by the plain terms of the rules, the time to file an appeal ran from the time that the court disposed of the motion; no merits consideration was required in order to toll the time limit.

By agreeing to the introduction of the exhibit and referring to it several times during the trial, the plaintiff waived any challenge to admissibility.  

No plain error in inappropriate remarks at trial, as they did not impair substantial rights.

No plain error in bench questioning the plaintiff during testimony.

Motion for mistrial was not properly made when court twice expressed dissatisfaction after being told that plaintiff had a motion to make.

When a plaintiff's representation agreement covers only the trial itself, a pro se motion made after the verdict is not in order if counsel has not yet formally withdrawn or the court ordered a substitution.

Alberto Ruiz v. Officer Jennifer Wing, et al.

Ninth Circuit: Villegas Sanchez v. Garland

 

Substantial evidence for the agency's determination that women who refuse to be victimized by local gangs are not a cognizable social group, since they are not perceived by the society as a distinct group separate from the fact of their persecution.

Agency was not required to recite each of the IJ's factual findings in its opinion, where circumstances indicated that the record was comprehensively reviewed.

Villegas Sanchez v. Garland

Eghth Circuit: Cameron Zahn v. Bonnie Nygaard

As the finding is not logically inconsistent, sufficient evidence for the finder of fact's credibility determination as to competing narratives at a bench trial; although the evidence to the contrary was not discussed in the opinion, it was raised as impeachment at trial.

Cameron Zahn  v.  Bonnie Nygaard 

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Derek Clemens

 

Restitution order was not an abuse of discretion, since the causal relation to the harms incurred used to determine the level of restitution referred to harms that were foreseeable at the time of injury.

The apparent vagueness in the sentencing condition restricting the types of images the deft can possess is in fact sweeping breadth necessary to protect the public.

United States  v.  Derek Clemens

EIghth Circuit: United States v. Jorge Beltran-Estrada

 

In making a discretionary sentence reduction, the petitioner is entitled to adequate notice and an adequate opportunity to present information to the court; neither Due Process nor the statute requires a hearing.

Resentencing explanation consisting of a citation to disciplinary records and the adoption of the government's rationale was not an abuse of discretion.

United States  v.  Jorge Beltran-Estrada

Seventh Circuit: Tyrus Coleman v. Ron Neal

 

As acquittals are to be read for the least that they establish, not the most, the retrial on an attempted murder charge after an acquittal from a murder charge as to the second victim does not offend Double Jeopardy; logically there might have been reasons for the jury's decision other than the theory offered by the defendant.

In considering an Ineffective Assistance claim, it is the full course of representation that matters; the lack of impeachment on a specific point in the second trial was insufficient to, on its own, justify reversal.

Tyrus Coleman v. Ron Neal

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Rita Law

 

Given the complexity of the investigation and the need to explain it to the jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the hearsay statements given to federal investigators under the "course of the investigation" exception.

Unwitnessed affidavit was properly authenticated by the details in the substance of the affidavit.

Financial threats, psychological threats, and threats to immigration status provided sufficient evidence for conviction under the statute.

The involuntary servitude sentencing factor was correctly added to the transportation charge.  Sufficient fear was created in the commission of the offense to justify the relevant sentencing factor.  Obstruction sentencing factor correctly applied for perjured affidavit. 

Below-guidelines 360 month sentence was reasonable.

USA v. Rita Law

Seventh Circuit: Anthony Kuri v. City of Chicago

 

A S1983 claim arising from pretrial detention derives from Fourth Amendment rights, not the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

Given the factual circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could have found that the detention was not justified by probable cause.

Anthony Kuri v. City of Chicago