Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
The right of a student in a school setting to be free of an unlawful seizure at the behest of police consisting of a brief detention and interrogation was not clearly established in circuit precedent, set forth in a robust consensus, or obviously clear, at least as asserted against a deft with a minor and ministerial role in the seizure.
Permit scheme for city street fair staged by development commission is a content-neutral means of regulating competing use of the public forum; the permit allows for the permitted speech and allows the restriction of disruptions to the permitted speech.
Declared intent to, in the future, speak in public areas is insufficient to establish irreparable harm for an injunction affecting a specific street fair.
The statute is not a valid sentencing predicate, since it encompasses threats to property, and both the common law crime and the predicate option of extortion require threats against the person.
Since counsel had an obligation during plea negotiations to assess the potential sentence and communicate the potential sentence to the deft, impending challenges to sentencing practices, even if not generally being made at the time, can be sufficiently foreshadowed to require a hearing for a later Habeas petition for ineffective assistance.
Showing of prejudice not required, since the calculated sentence range serves as a lodestar for its subsequent modification.
Since a sentence was pronounced and the state court record indicates that the deft was credited for time served, rather than simply released, a challenge to the duration of sentence for purposes of subsequent sentencing factors is determined by the state court record of judgment, which can only be altered by a collateral challenge to the earlier conviction.
Since the dictionary definition quoted in an earlier holding to exemplify the plain meaning of a term isn't itself binding in its terms, the activity proscribed under the state statute that reached beyond the bounds of the federal law before the term in the federal law was interpreted to merely have the plain meaning is still within the plain meaning of federal law, despite possibly being outside the dictionary definition quoted.
Objection to the disclosure of the deft's past occupation was waived when deft raised it several times during the trial.
Deft affirmatively agreed to the admission of the draft email at trial, waiving any subsequent objection.
Appellant carries burden on plain error review to show why forfeited objection at trial meets the standard for plain error.
Sufficient evidence to establish that deft had the requisite intent to defraud and was an active and knowing participant, since deft knew that the funds were illicit, and continued to spend them.
Alteration of another person's tax forms and pay records in order to secure a lease is sufficient for the sophisticated means sentencing bump.
Considering the situation under the supervisory powers of the appellate court over the proceedings in the District Court, rather than under Due Process: the District Court did not evaluate the defendant's defense, make a finding as to the willfulness of the violation, or sufficiently explain the sentence in light of the parsimony principle and the sentencing statute.
Physical presence in the courtroom is sufficient to give a criminal court jurisdiction over a deft.
Habeas grounds not raised at trial or on direct appeal and then raised for the first time on a collateral challenge are subject to de novo review on matters of law if the government doesn't argue the procedural default at the District Court.
If the conduct relative to the statute's focus, the object of the statute's solicitude, occurred in the US, it is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even if related conduct occurred abroad. Since the protected victim was in the US while being coerced into the activity by means of the Internet, the present case is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even though the deft was abroad.
Under the statute, an agent of a foreign government operates under foreign direction and control in something more than a one-sided agreement, but one that doesn't necessarily rise to the level of control suggested by employment.
The exclusion of foreign legal transactions from the statute's reach is an affirmative defense, not an element. Affirmative defenses are not necessarily smaller in scope, and can be used to define the statute's scope.
Circumstantial evidence and rational inference may be used to establish that a person was acting as an agent of a foreign government.
Court erred in granting acquittal, since a rational juror might have determined that the organizational structure and contacts sufficiently established the possibility of foreign direction and control.
Court erred in granting acquittal on Conspiracy, given the agreements, intent to fly below the radar, and decision not to file a notification with the AG.
One-sentence explanation for the granting of a new trial due to the weight of the evidence was categorically insufficient.
Court abused its discretion in holding that the jurors would not honor the limiting instruction on hearsay materials, given the volume of the materials; the ability of the jury to respect their instructions is an almost invariable assumption of the law.
Restricting the reasons for granting a new trial to the ones recited in the motion, including noting the cumulative error, is a jurisdictional limit.
In an interlocutory appeal over an arbitration provision, the court to which the appeal is taken must only assure itself of the appellant's right to appeal and the fact that the court from which the appeal comes would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit arising from the conflict between the parties.
As answering the question of whether a non-customer plaintiff is equitably estopped from avoiding a mandatory arbitration clause within a terms of service necessary for the use of the service is neither necessary for nor inextricably interwined with the question of whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue, the latter can't be answered under pendent jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal as to whether the non-signatory is equitably bound to the agreement.
Since the plaintiff's are complaining of discrimination that keeps them from using the service, they are not equitably bound to agreement that they have neither embraced nor benefitted from.
Not providing timely and adequate medical services to detained individual prior to arraignment doesn't violate the disability act, since the disability requiring medication is the reason for the service, not the obstacle for which a reasonable accomodation would have to be provided. Plaintiff was not denied medical services because of the disability.
At summary judgment, the defendant was not required to provide a nondiscriminatory theory for not providing the medication.
Limiting the testimony rebutting a claim of pecuniary motivation to the social justice motivations for participating in the protest rather than allowing testimony about past work for social justice was not an abuse of discretion.
State law permits a police officer to use an objectively reasonable amount of justifiable force in any non-arrest situation; the contact does not in itself give rise to a claim for assault, and the justification is not limited to the circumstances enumerated in state law.
Since the question of objective reasonableness of force looks to the Fourth Amendment, it was error to instruct the jury that the subjective mental state was at issue; where subjective mental state was potentially dispositive, the error is not harmless.
In a Habeas class action seeking relief for immigration detainees in the current pandemic, supervisory Mandamus doesn't run because the lower court has not palpably erred; it has reduced the detainee population significantly. Advisory Mandamus doesn't run, since the determination of pandemic severity is a factual question, not a legal question, and since the population has been lowered, the balance between extraordinary circumstances and likely success doesn't need to be corrected.
Court did not clearly err in holding that involuntary antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate, given physician testimony. While it was possible that the illness is of a type that will not be affected in matters relating to the trial, the long-term benefits of the medication make it medically appropriate despite the risk of side effects.
Jury's award of punitive damages without compensatory damages in a suit seeking return of a 400K investment necessarily found that while there had been an injury, no compensatory damages were warranted. A lack of compensatory damages when awarding punitive damages does not offend the state's law, as establishment of damages is different than award of damages. Additur in this situation would be unconstitutional.
Criminal fines for correlative conduct cannot be used to establish disproportionality of award.
Court did not abuse discretion in holding that the claim at law precluded equitable redress for the lost funds.
Court's reduction of requested fees was valid under governing state law; similar reduction in costs was valid under governing federal law.
Court erred by applying federal law to claim preclusion; the appropriate law is the law of the forum in which the first decision was made.
Economic loss doctrine, under the law of the state, would not bar claims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation.
The airline deregulation act preempts the state's restriction on air-ambulance billing, and the law is not saved under the insurance statute, as it does not have the effect of assigning or transferring risk, and the air ambulance subscription plan does not guarantee treatment or act as an intermediary.
In assessing the credibility and reliability of the tip of illegal activity in the apartment parking lot, the tipster's familiarity with the physical environs was insufficient validation; as the tip wasn't contemporaneous with an emergency situation, it is held to a higher standard. The tip was sufficiently specific in its physical description of the suspect.
Given the lack of corroboration, the police had no reasonable suspicion that the criminal activity was afoot. The search was conducted after verification of entirely innocent information.
The tip's claim of ongoing drug sales meant that the search at the end of the day wasn't on stale information.
DISSENT:
This means that police must personally witness a crime.
Tipster's assertion of being employed by the apartment complex and subsequent specific description of the details corroborated the information sufficiently for reasonable suspicion. Would suffice for probable cause under Gates.
Navarette wasn't based on emergency situations, but rather stands for the proposition that a tipster who tells the truth about innocent details will tend to tell the truth when asserting criminality.
Circuit split flagged.
S1983 False arrest claim was immunized by an intervening indictment from the grand jury and the lack of a specific claim that the officers involved had deliberately or recklessly provided false information to the magistrate or the grand jury.
Circuit precedent does not recognize a freestanding malicious prosecution complaint under S1983.
Equal protection claim dismissed for lack of comparators or discriminatory intent.
A claim against the municipality for inadequate training that relies on a single incident must demonstrate the complete lack of training.
No abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend the fourth amended complaint.
Sua sponte dismissal of claims upheld, since magistrate had recommended it and plaintiff briefed the issue -- so long as the plaintiff has a fair opportunity to plead their best case.
Since the debt collection letter said that calling the company would cause collection efforts to stop, and not that it would legally compel the collection efforts to stop, under the least sophisticated debtor standard, the letter was not misleading.
Proximity to the legally required information about how to question the claim by mail would not cause undue confusion about which mechanism to use to preserve their rights against the claim.
Federal equal credit law's prohibition on discrimination according to marital status doesn't preempt the state's common law doctrine of necessities, which holds a medical bill to be valid against a spouse; the medical debt is an incidental credit, distant from the traditional credit-provision intent of the law.
Spouse's action against the medical entity for not fulfilling the common law requirement of demand doesn't state a claim, even in the absence of the facility's having made a demand on the estate of the patient, since public records indicate the lack of an estate.
Court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend, since there was no showing of claims falling outside the entitlement under the doctrine of necessities.
Employer's contract claim against potential trustee of employee stock benefit plan is remote from the usual ERISA concerns, and therefore not preempted by the statute.
Implied spoken promise subsequent to execution of written contract can be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.
Integration clause refers only to the time of formation -- when subsequent parties to the contract were substituted in, the integration clause still looked back to the time of initial formation.
A lie about a side issue in the course of a contractual breach is separately actionable as fraud where the lie implicates a broader social duty owed to all individuals.
By conceding valid substitution into the contract for the purposes of the breach claim, the plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the indemnification agreement compelling the payment of legal fees doesn't apply to the defendant. Plain meaning of indemnify encompasses first party claims. Under state law, it wouldn't be specific enough to cover any damages award.
The notice of appeal properly identified the party taking the appeal, the orders that were the subject of the appeal, and the court to which the appeal was being taken; the jurisdictional element of the rules of appeal were satisfied, and since notice was given of intent to appeal all orders, the description of the appellant in the caption as successor in interest to an entity that only accounted for some of the claims was excusable.
As assignment of claim doesn't undo an injury, the claim filed by an entity that had already assigned the interest had sufficient Article III standing; assignment of claim is distinct from grant of power of attorney, which would trigger a prudential limitation on standing.
While choice of law for corporations usually looks to the location of the business, choice of law for partnerships looks to the law of the forum. Questions of state law can be dispositive in the federal standing inquiry.
Although legal capacity of parties isn't a jurisdictional element in standing, existence of the entity is, and since the jurisdiction provided for no wind-up time, the non-existent parties did not have standing at the time the suit was filed.
A suit filed by a non-existent entity is not a nullity; so long as there is a real party in interest willing to join the suit at the time the suit is filed and the real party in interest ratifies, is substituted, or is joined within a reasonable time, there is sufficient subject matter jurisdiction for the action at the time of filing. Since procedural reforms have allowed for nominal parties, this doesn't offend the Constitution. Court retains the right under the rules to deny joinder for equitable reasons. Circuit split flagged on the nullity doctrine.
Equitable tolling is available for new plaintiffs joined to existing class actions.
Statutory collateral attack on a past adjudication under the auspices of Clear and Unmistakable Error looks to the law of the time and asks whether the error was undebatable and would manifestly have changed the outcome at the time.
Novel judicial constructions of statutes generally are law for all cases pending on direct review.
No standing for a minority percentage owner of a television station seeking to undo multiple sales of the business, because even if every administrative decision was reversed and every deal unwound, the business would be back in the hands of the majority percentage owner who would then have the power to sell the station again.
Even absent testimony from cooperating witnesses that the deft had entered into the trade secret conspiracy, there was sufficient substantial evidence for the finder of fact to conclude from the circumstances that such a tacit conspiracy existed, and that the deft had agreed to join it.
Sufficient evidence to indicate that at least two conspirators believed that the appropriated information contained trade secrets.
CONCURRENCE:
The government didn't misrepresent the evidence.
CONCURRENCE:
The government misrepresented the evidence.
Agreement on taxation of ceded land is subject to the court's plain meaning reading; the member of the tribe that is party to the accord has no power to define a contrary reasonable reading.
Casino revenues did not arise from the land in question.
In the absence of a formal lease, the tax court determination that the lands were not leased by the tribe is supported by substantial evidence. Tribe has not identified any statutory basis for the claimed exemption for profits from leased lands.
The required return of federal funds was not a penalty or a disgorgement, and therefore was not subject to the statutes of limitations on sanctions by the agency and administrative penalties generally. Instead, the funds were monies due the United States under the federal debt collection act, since the improper use had been discovered by an audit by the agency's inspector general, a predicate of the debt collection act.
Although the regulations were complex, there was sufficient notice of the regulation for due process purposes, given the common understanding of the relevant group -- here the specialized knowledge of a telecommunications carrier.
Although the hearing must be held at a time when the deprivation can be prevented, that does not necessarily mean that it must happen before the agency has reached its decision to deprive. Agency collection proceedings during the pendency of the litigation did not raise constitutional concerns.
Agency's interpretations of the regulations were not arbitrary and capricious.
Incomplete record provided in the current litigation did not prejudice the plaintiff, and the incomplete record offers sufficient grounds for the agency's decision.
The proposed social group of people who might testify against certain criminal organizations is, unlike in some other countries, not independently socially recognizable and distinct.
As the IJ referred to the irregular evidence offered in support of the argument suggesting future torture, the exhibit was admitted by judicial notice, and the Board needed to account for its claims in their decision.
DISSENT:
The irregular evidence isn't in the appellate record, so the Board can't account for it on remand, and the evidence itself is mixed as to the claim.
Agency did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen an immigration proceeding on the basis of changed country conditions, as the petitioner did not produce evidence of a material change in the conditions within the country; while a change in personal circumstances can make the changed conditions more relevant to the petition, even such a hybrid claim would require a showing of changed conditions to reopen the proceeding.
As the comparison of duties between privately funded and federally funded research academics is fraught with judgment, not law, their equivalence is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
The standard under the state law is broader than the federal standard, reasoning from the greater, there is an issue for trial on the state claims as well.
As plaintiff in disparate impact claim wasn't challenging thempe practice of retention raises, but additionally suggesting that the salaries of the cohort be raised as well, it is an attack on a specific process, not general one. The existence of an alternative undercuts the claim of business necessity.
Although statistics derived from small sample size have less probative value, disagreement among experts as to the validity of the numbers can suggests a triable issue.
As the plaintiff never engaged in retention raise negotiations, there is no issue for trial on state and federal disparate treatment claims or Title IX. Insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination for state ERA claim.
DISSENT:
Equal Pay Act requires a case-specific examination of the actual job performance and content.
Full Professors are like professional athletes. Significant differences in all of the jobs for the members of the plaintiff's department.
State claim only requires a common core of tasks, which presents an issue for trial.
Retention negotiations are elective -- each professor chooses to engage or not. Small sample size. The practice is a business necessity.
Notice and a hearing on the landowners' applications for variances from a zoning regulation sufficed for procedural due process. The zoning regulation requiring a right of way wasn't irrational, given the public interest in road construction. Claim of unfair exaction improperly attempts to recast a takings claim as a procedural due process claim.
No plain error in sentencing court's omission of the finding that the possession of the firearm facilitated the possession of the drugs, since the court determined that the firearm was used for protection during drug-related activity, rather than simply assuming a connection from physical proximity.
Refusal to vary downward not unsupported by the record; within-Guidelines sentence not unreasonable.
Substantial evidence for Board finding that neither policies nor the CBA established a progressive system of employee discipline; the supervisors' actions were appropriately characterized as reports without any inherent enforcement power. The reports also are considered insufficiently authoritative to be considered recommendations. A one-time distribution of gift cards was insufficient to establish manager status. Although employees could temporarily remove other employees from driving, their efficacy at this was determined by their own performance, not the employee's performance, as precedent compels for a finding of manager status.
Commonsense argument that there must be a significant proportion of managers among the employee would inappropriately mix the lay standard with the legal standard required by statute and precedent.
Vocational expert was present during recitals of sufficient evidence to support their later findings, and the determinations were reached by appropriate hypothetical questions from the ALJ made without contemporaneous objection.
As the writings found in the defendant's car supported the theory of the crime and established a potential future danger to the community, consideration in sentencing was not a violation of the First Amendment.
As the deft requested the change late in the trial, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct due to the use of gender-specific pronouns was waived; alternatively, pronouns are not dispositive. Misgendering is insufficient basis for a claim of judicial bias; no error in denial of motion to recuse.
Plea deal identifying one act as applicable for restitution did not preclude the seeking or award of restitution under an additional act.
Interstate stalking statute does not unconstitutionally co-opt state authorities.
State law provides the rule of decision on some S1983 substantive legal questions related to the defense raised, so the assertion of the state statutory evidentiary privilege defense, although defeated by the federal rule on the privilege in question, doesn't mean that all substantive defenses have been presently waived.
Lack of notes from a deceased physician and a delay in the referral to a specialist deft present an issue for trial, as they might show either not receiving a prisoner's claim or a deliberate indifference to the claim.
An institution-level medical director within a larger corporation is not a unilateral setter of standards for purposes of Monell liability.
Sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement that had incorrectly calculated the mandatory fees payable by the deft but in practice imposed the higher fee required by law was insufficient plain error to revisit the sentence, despite the deft's inability to withdraw from the agreement at sentencing.
Federal collateral review can look past individual state court opinion to determine if the state judicial proceedings were consistent with the federal standard.
Judge's disqualification of criminal counsel unknowingly appointed to defend another defendant charged for the same occurrence, given deft's refusal to waive conflicts was a reasonable application of the Supreme Court's caselaw requiring a serious risk of conflict. The subsequent appearance of the other defendant on the trial's witness list was independently sufficient, regardless of the probability that the witness would actually be called.
Consent decree that provides for the award of fees if there has been a violation of the agreement by one party does not require an ongoing violation to trigger the possibility of an award.
Courts order that the state party to the agreement ensures treatment of the incarcerated parties to the agreement within a certain timeframe was not a reasonable inference of the parties' agreement, which called for the incarcerated parties to be referred for treatment within that timeframe.
Manifest disregard of the law is not a freestanding grounds for vacatur of an arbitration decision under the federal statute.
Sufficient jurisdiction to review a denial of legislature members' immunity under the collateral order doctrine, since otherwise the legislators would have to participate in pretrial and discovery matters, and the question is one purely of law.
State legislators' common law federal immunity and immunity from state claims under the state constitution protect actions and speech regardless of subjective discriminatory intent.
Unlike municipal legislators who have both administrative and legislative functions, the actions of a state legislator that are legislative in nature do not have to be proven to be substantively legislative in intent and effect. Correspondence and telephone calls relating to legislation are protected as factfinding.
Qualified immunity for political errands not within the scope of legislative immunity, as there was not any clear teaching of the courts that the allegedly discriminatory campaigning in the community was against the law.
Post-petition missed merger states a subsequent claim by the missed bidder for administrative expenses under the Code, despite the fact that the missed bidder filed multiple post-attempt judicial challenges, forcing the estate initially to pay the agreed penalty for the missed transaction.
Benefit to the estate should be considered broadly, and the missed bidder's due diligence in setting up the deal, clarifying the issues and setting a roadmap for the subsequent lesser bid plausibly conferred sufficient benefit on the estate to justify statutory priority for the administrative expenses claim. Finder of fact will need to determine if this benefit was offset by the costs that were forced by prolonging the missed deal.
Holding a substantive RICO conviction -- in which the underlying offense ple(a)d(ed) to or proven involved as an element the use of force -- to be a crime of violence is, under de facto modified categorical review, not plain error. Prior circuit precedent requiring two of the three underlying offenses to involve the use of force is dicta as to convictions with only one offense involving the use of force.
Sentence was not substantively unreasonable.
When imposing sanctions under the courts inherent powers, the court must first consider not the actual disruptive effect in the proceedings, but the intent of the offending party; a single filing offers sufficient grounds for sanctions.
Since the only record of the telephone interview was the investigator's notes, although the report of the investigator is entitled to a presumption of regularity, the discrepancies between the conversation as recorded in the notes and the other interviews of the petitioner do not offer sufficient evidence for the agency's determination.
Re-sentencing under the statute is not a plenary re-sentencing is not a plenary review of all intervening changes in the law, but an imposition of a sentence incorporating the specific changes mandated by the statute. The judge is then free to weigh the intervening changes in the law in the subsequent discretionary resentencing. Affording plenary sentencing would unfairly reward those who had been convicted of the predicate offense.
Tenfold, almost equally divided circuit split flagged.
DISSENT:
No need to bifurcate the process; once the court determines the eligibility for resentencing according to the law at the time of the original sentencing, before making the gating decision, the court is then free to consider subsequent legal and factual developments before deciding on whether to grant the motion to revisit the sentence.
The appropriate test in this context for work under the statute is whether there are either substantial duties or a substantial amount of time and effort controlled or required by the employer and primarily for the benefit of the company, rather than whether there is complete relief from duty.
Legal conclusions given in deposition testimony on employment conditions are presumptively not binding on the deponent entity.
Since citizenship for purposes of the local controversy exception and discretionary exception to the class-action statute is based on current domicile, court clearly erred in using demographic data of past residence in a care facility as sufficient proof of citizenship. Commonsense inference that locals tend to enter nearby homes and that few of those over 65 move out of Florida are insufficient.
Plaintiff satisfied the "significant defendant" standard even absent a showing of means, since the statute requires a party against whom significant relief may be sought, not a party against whom a significant judgment may be recovered.
A corporation liable through vicarious liability can be a primary defendant for purpose of the CAFA discretionary exception.class
As the state supreme court, in affirming a denial of severance on direct review, held in the alternative that the evidence of the crimes would be cross-admissible, and this ground wan't challenged on grounds of federal law during state post-conviction proceedings, the omission of the challenge from the federal Habeas petition to the District Court waived the claim.
State court determinations that post-identification police disclosures to witnesses at photo lineup that they had arrested the suspect was not contrary to clear federal law on the question.
State court reasonably declined to infer improper suggestion when photo lineup witness identified one candidate, and the police then momentarily turned off the recording device before the witness identified the defendant.
Since the state's highest court conducted an independent review of mitigation, a federal Habeas claim against the state trial court's holding of insufficient nexus needed to identify the constitutional error in the higher court's analysis.
District court properly denied amendment of federal Habeas ineffective assistance claims subsequent to independent exhaustion in state post-conviction review after federal Habeas had commenced, since the claims did not relate to the same transactions and occurrences; no plain error in the denial of equitable tolling.
State court's determination that admission of crime scene photos was not unduly prejudicial was not an unreasonable application of federal law, since contemporaneous circuit precedent held that there was no circumstance in which admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence could justify the writ. Offered stipulation was not sufficient, since nothing in the Due Process Clause holds that the government can't introduce relevant evidence on an uncontested point.
As both the state crime of aiding and abetting and the federal application of the generic offense require intentionality but contemplate presence as a means of establishing intention, the state statute is a crime of violence under the Guidelines and ACCA.
Municipal ordinance authorizing the inspection of a property and reciting that the inspector may seek a warrant if consent cannot be obtained doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing warrantless entry, since under the state's rules of statutory construction, the permissive power to seek a warrant would be exercised prior to any search without consent.
As there is sufficient specificity and adequate provisions for notice and appeal, the enforcement provision is not unconstitutionally vague.
Judicial consent decree explicitly allowed for changes in the municipal code, so the procedures aren't an unlawful amendment of it.
Allegation of discrimination under federal housing law doesn't plead an intensity of discrimination sufficient to state a claim.
As the motion for compassionate release arises from a statute that does not require an evidentiary hearing and is discretionary in nature, there is no possible showing of entitlement to relief that could require an evidentiary hearing on the question.
Court's evaluation of the current level of care accorded the prisoner was sufficient consideration of any extraordinary and compelling justification for release, as described in the statute.
Treating nurse's opinion on re-cross about whether visible signs of the described prison beating would have been expected was, at worst, harmless error in allowing an expert conclusion; plaintiff had opened the door on cross by asking on redirect if painful injuries could be sustained without leaving a visible sign.
Given circuit precedent on stare decisis, a GVR citing a specific Supreme Court decision in which no opinion commands the support of a majority of the Court, the analysis of the cited plurality holding looks to the narrowest ground justifying the order. The controlling rule is either derived from the common ground shared by the rationale of the plurality and the concurrence(s) in the judgment or from a logical subset of non-contradictory reasons that the rationales can accommodate. The entirety of a single concurrence in the judgment does not control.
The concurrence cited here accords a previous decision stare decisis effect and disagrees with the plurality's distinguishing of the facts, so the narrowest ground is constituted by the balancing test within the prior holding.
Dissent: GVR with a named case implies a common ground in the holding. Concurrence explicitly warned about imposing a balancing test in the substantial obstacle determination. Controlling test is the substantial obstacle test from Casey.
At the pleadings stage, insurer did not have the duty to defend, since the natural reading of the specific conduct in the pleadings established that the complained-of conduct violated laws that were within the explicit policy exclusions, and allegations that might encompass conduct outside the exceptions were, under the state's laws, legal labels that were meaningless until defined by the facts at trial.
Zurich American Insurance Com v. Ocwen Financial Corporation
The tendency of undisclosed potential impeachment evidence to come into view years afterward isn't a structural flaw in statutory Habeas sufficient to justify an application under the traditional form; the statutory form clock restarts from the discovery of the evidence, and second or successive petitions merely limit the petitioner to a single claim.
Although there is not a one-year limit on the older statutory form of Habeas, in such a case, equitable principles restrict abuse of the Writ.
Although the private support obligation for stepchildren usually ends with divorce, in public entitlement contexts such as state inheritance tax laws and SSA, the status usually doesn't imply a benefit termination context at divorce. Since the agency hasn't offered a contrary interpretation, the step-child of the divorced abusive parent has a right to file for naturalization under the Act.
As the employee had expressly agreed to pay the union by authorizing the paycheck deduction, and the contract for representation was valid under the state law of the time, the First Amendment right recognized by the courts after the contract had begun did not require an explicit waiver at the time of contractual formation; even under the new standard, any employee who consents to pay can be bound to the contract.
State law defining a public sector bargaining unit and establishing an exclusive representative organization for the bargaining unit does not violate First Amendment associational rights; plaintiff is not compelled to affiliate with the representative organization, and employees are free to form advocacy groups.
Agency did not have to provide alien faced with removal proceedings notice in their native language; a notice in English sufficiently puts the recipient on notice that language assistance will need to be secured.
No authority to review IJ's refusal to sua sponte reopen prior proceeding that resulted in removal order in absentia.
Sufficient evidence for drug conspiracy, since, despite the fact that drugs were never mentioned between the the two, the structure and manner of the single transaction, combined with the amount of drugs involved, would allow a reasonable finder of fact to convict. Deft's version of events did not have to be disproven.
Given statutory mandatory minimums, sentencing instructions that looked to the whole conspiracy to establish drug quantities, rather than calculating the amount that each defendant was either responsible for or might reasonably have thought to be involved was harmless error, as there was only a single unit involved in the single transaction.
For the Obstruction of Justice sentencing bump, the court needed to make specific findings of the material hindrance to the investigation caused by deft's throwing the cell phone against the ground; although the sentence ultimately varied downward, remanded for reconsideration.
Sufficient grounds for the stop, since, at the border, a consented-to scan of the trailer had revealed it to be largely empty, but a safety seal was evident on the doors; additionally, the stop was within fifty miles of the border.
Being told that he would be free to leave after the canine unit had checked the trailer was insufficiently custodial to exclude the non-mirandized statements in the interval.
Roving stops by Immigration are justified whenever there is reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.
Amended opinion from 3/11 -- slight change to the facts recited on page three.
Under the state's conflicts rules, since the defamation plaintiff is domiciled in a state other than the district containing the city in which the speech occurred and in which the employment damages were sustained, the state with the strongest interest in the litigation was instead a third forum, the state in which the national newspaper is domiciled, and from which it emanated.
Since the context and structure of the quoted litigation affidavit established that the language was taken from a judicial proceeding, the state's statutory absolute privilege for reports of judicial proceedings applies.
Sufficient jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine to review an unsealing of confidential supplier lists, as post-judgment review would be after the disclosure, and the question is important and distinct from the merits analysis, not merely a routine discovery matter.
No clear error in the unsealing of the claimed trade secret supplier lists, since, following the relevant state law on trade secrets, the party and the supplier do not have a relationship of confidence, and, additionally, the name of the supplier isn't actually a secret.
As the general statutory grant of jurisdiction to review decisions is modified by a specific provision making the refusal to institute IPR nonreviewable, courts have no jurisdiction over the Director's delegated decision not to institute proceedings. Since the APA does not in itself create jurisdiction, an administrative challenge is similarly unavailable.
Even though Mandamus challenging the proceeding only runs from the Federal Circuit, as the sole court with sufficient prospective jurisdiction, as there is neither a clear and undisputable right to relief nor a colorable constitutional claim, nor historical precedent sufficient to justify a Due Process claim, the writ is unavailable here.
Since the unauthorized pro se Rule 59 motion was timely filed, by the plain terms of the rules, the time to file an appeal ran from the time that the court disposed of the motion; no merits consideration was required in order to toll the time limit.
By agreeing to the introduction of the exhibit and referring to it several times during the trial, the plaintiff waived any challenge to admissibility.
No plain error in inappropriate remarks at trial, as they did not impair substantial rights.
No plain error in bench questioning the plaintiff during testimony.
Motion for mistrial was not properly made when court twice expressed dissatisfaction after being told that plaintiff had a motion to make.
When a plaintiff's representation agreement covers only the trial itself, a pro se motion made after the verdict is not in order if counsel has not yet formally withdrawn or the court ordered a substitution.
Substantial evidence for the agency's determination that women who refuse to be victimized by local gangs are not a cognizable social group, since they are not perceived by the society as a distinct group separate from the fact of their persecution.
Agency was not required to recite each of the IJ's factual findings in its opinion, where circumstances indicated that the record was comprehensively reviewed.
As the finding is not logically inconsistent, sufficient evidence for the finder of fact's credibility determination as to competing narratives at a bench trial; although the evidence to the contrary was not discussed in the opinion, it was raised as impeachment at trial.
Restitution order was not an abuse of discretion, since the causal relation to the harms incurred used to determine the level of restitution referred to harms that were foreseeable at the time of injury.
The apparent vagueness in the sentencing condition restricting the types of images the deft can possess is in fact sweeping breadth necessary to protect the public.
In making a discretionary sentence reduction, the petitioner is entitled to adequate notice and an adequate opportunity to present information to the court; neither Due Process nor the statute requires a hearing.
Resentencing explanation consisting of a citation to disciplinary records and the adoption of the government's rationale was not an abuse of discretion.
As acquittals are to be read for the least that they establish, not the most, the retrial on an attempted murder charge after an acquittal from a murder charge as to the second victim does not offend Double Jeopardy; logically there might have been reasons for the jury's decision other than the theory offered by the defendant.
In considering an Ineffective Assistance claim, it is the full course of representation that matters; the lack of impeachment on a specific point in the second trial was insufficient to, on its own, justify reversal.
Given the complexity of the investigation and the need to explain it to the jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the hearsay statements given to federal investigators under the "course of the investigation" exception.
Unwitnessed affidavit was properly authenticated by the details in the substance of the affidavit.
Financial threats, psychological threats, and threats to immigration status provided sufficient evidence for conviction under the statute.
The involuntary servitude sentencing factor was correctly added to the transportation charge. Sufficient fear was created in the commission of the offense to justify the relevant sentencing factor. Obstruction sentencing factor correctly applied for perjured affidavit.
Below-guidelines 360 month sentence was reasonable.
A S1983 claim arising from pretrial detention derives from Fourth Amendment rights, not the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Given the factual circumstances, a reasonable finder of fact could have found that the detention was not justified by probable cause.
State workers compensation award calculated based on the percentage of disability and awarded as a lump sum, minus attorneys fees, with payments then disbursed as pro rata as monthly payments is a state award that statutorily offsets the subsequent federal indemnification of the federal award against the bankrupt employer where the pro rata state award weeks are within the federal benefit period.
Stress and confusion caused by the receipt of dunning letter is insufficient Article III injury for standing to sue under the debt collection statute.
Given actual knowledge by counsel, a class action opt-out terms letter sent by regular mail sufficed for notice, given the finding that the letter was not returned by the post office, and the testimony of the plaintiff that the letter was addressed correctly.
Given counsel's actual knowledge, court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting a late opt-out.
Since the opt-out procedure was specified in excruciating detail, and courts have an interest in uniform mechanical procedures, continuing a lawsuit on the same claim in a different forum was not a reasonable indication of a desire to opt-out.
As the side effects of the medications are relevant to the administrative hearing only to the degree that they affect performance of work, absent a showing that the work was actually affected, the ALJ was not required to make findings on the effects of the medications.
Denial of severance in capital trial of two prisoners was not an abuse of discretion; jury presumably followed court's instructions, the extensive priors of one co-deft were not unduly prejudicial, and the co-deft's co-conspirator's admissions would have been considered anyway in a separate trial as a statement against interest.
Jury not unduly prejudiced by disclosure at trial that one co-deft had murdered another inmate by stomping on his head.
Since both defts were convicted of beating the victim to death, no plain error in finding that, even if one of them only abetted in the actual murder, the mental state would be sufficient for the death penalty.
No abuse of discretion in arguments about future dangerousness discussing other prisoners who had committed prison murders after commutation of death sentence.
No plain error in discussion of commutation of death sentence that might suggest to the jury that the ultimate responsibility for the sentence might be elsewhere.
No abuse of discretion in government's characterization of mitigation evidence as mitigation of the crime rather than penalty-phase considerations, as the government later appropriately characterized the role of mitigation evidence generally, and a curative instruction was given.
No plain error in government statements about doing justice and the deft's intent to kill.
No plain error in introduction of evidence from unmirandized psychotherapist sessions in rebuttal, since deft had placed his mental health in issue by raising past difficulties in mitigation.
No error in the Sixth Amendment deprivation of counsel during the psychotherapist's examination, as the deft did not establish that the interview was to assess future dangerousness.
Common law psychotherapist evidentiary privilege does not exist in the penalty phase of a capital trial; if it did exist, violations here would not be plain error. Potential circuit split flagged.
No plain error in government's mitigation phase rebuttal witness' straying into discussions of present events.
Exclusion of warden's statement describing victim's conduct that led to the murder was not an abuse of discretion, as the warden was a single deft in a civil suit, and not speaking for the Bureau.
No abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of plea deal in second murder that was introduced as an aggravating factor in the penalty phase.
No plain error in introduction of acquitted conduct in future dangerousness consideration.
No error in categorical analysis of priors as aggravating factors, since the alternate holding of non-statutory aggravators would not have been perceived as less convincing if the statutory factors had been excluded.
Given circuit precedent that Hobbs Act Robbery is a crime of violence, the conviction survives as an aggravator despite the recent Supreme Court holding on the method of identifying crimes of violence by means of a statute's residual clause; nonviolent Hobbs Act Robbery would be Hobbs Act Extortion.
Jury form that requires juror to first determine the existence of a factual situation before deciding that it is mitigating does not offend the statute that says that a finding of the existence of the fact establishes the grounds of mitigation.
Court's instructions on future dangerousness did not improperly marshal the evidence for the government.
Denial of non-unanimity instruction was not an abuse of discretion; refusing to answer a jury deliberations question about non-unanimity was not error.
Conferences allegedly missing from record do not justify reversal; the conferences were neither a hearing or trial nor a judicial proceeding.
Cumulative error unavailable, since no errors were found.
State environmental approval rulemaking wan't arbitrary and capricious; the standards are set out in a parallel section of the Code dealing with reservoir protection, and the delay of the approval for the challenged section until the central pipeline had attained the necessary approvals was akin to moving a pipeline to avoid a stream -- a temporal rather than spatial accommodation.
As the state's clean water laws flow from the federal laws, state agency's consideration of function and use did not displace federal review.
Explanation that didn't cite the relevant standard sufficed, because it tracked the language of the relevant standard.
On remand, state must explain incongruities in finding and why the department opted for a temporary denial rather than a provisional approval.
As the information in the government database is open to the public by the terms of the relevant statute, the unavailability of portions of it is an injury sufficient for Article III standing.
When an agency removed all internal hearing records from public access after the discovery of personally identifiable information contrary to statute, the decision was not a final agency determination of rights and obligations susceptible to APA challenge; the present challenge is a programmatic attack on the pace of record restoration.
Deft's unmirandized statements were made in an apparent situation that, if taken as true, would have been considered sufficiently custodial. Absent any evidence in the record of counsel's strategic considerations in not attempting to suppress the confession, an evidentiary hearing is warranted for the collateral challenge, especially since the deft was, as a matter of law, prejudiced by the admission.
Disaster support agreement between federal agency and state was an enforceable contract, not a gratuitous provision of resources.
Nonfrivolous assertion of contractual breach by the government sufficed for Claims Court jurisdiction.
Request for assistance and project worksheets did not constitute an express contract; as there was no mutual intent to contract, there was not an implied in fact contract.
As a component of local government, hospital's claim to be a third party beneficiary of a contract between the state and the federal agency is sufficient to state a claim, since the contract named the locality.
As the funds were provided to the hospital contingently, and subject to express conditions, the recoupment of the funds was not an illegal exaction.
Although the requested recovery of funds is equitable it is materially indistinguishable from a claim for reimbursement, and the claim is essentially contractual in nature, giving clear jurisdiction to the Claims Court, an adequate non-APA judicial remedy preferred by statute.
Claims are patent ineligible mathematical algorithms, basic processes fully disclosed in prior art, and with no real mechanical or computing architecture correlative.
Agency had an obligation to establish by substantial evidence that the employee's performance was subpar both after the notice of potential dismissal and before the notice of potential dismissal. Upon sufficient showing, the burden would then shift to the employee to establish discriminatory motive.
When the employee asserted that the performance report was due to protected military service commitments, administrative review had an obligation to assess the relevant factors, rather than just saying that the case hadn't been made.
In considering whether a reasonable person would have thought that they could have walked away from an allegedly consensual encounter with the police, the race of the suspect is not a relevant factor. This consideration would be insufficiently universal to be objective, and offends Equal protection.
Concurrence in J:
Ideally, the law would be that the police must affirmatively clarify whether a suspect is free to leave an allegedly consensual but inherently coercive encounter. Offends Equal Protection.
Bankruptcy court's removal of the debtor-in-possession in favor of a trustee prompted a loss of authority over the estate that constituted sufficient injury for Article III standing to challenge the removal.
In denying the motion for reconsideration made by newly retained counsel, the court merely noted that the pro se petitioner had not advanced any arguments supporting the claim. Denying the motion to reconsider without considering any of the arguments raised by the parties precludes meaningful appellate review, and constitutes insufficiently reasoned judicial decisionmaking.
Since, after the accident, the device manufacturer was merged into the injured employee's employer, the manufacturer can't presently be considered a third party tortfeasor, even the the person of the employer as successor in interest.
The law of the state disfavors the dual capacity exception to exclusive liability.
Dissent: The state's courts have recognized an exception where there is a distinct, separate legal persona.
Evidence of witness' subsequent admission that she was under the influence of narcotics while testifying that she was not a drug user is not new evidence sufficient to revisit the conviction, since the disclosures do not rise to the level of addressing basic competency to testify, and would at most be in for impeachment.
Government concealment of witness' mental state would not rise to the level of a Brady claim.
No abuse of discretion in refusal to grant downward variance from sentencing guidelines.
Concur in J:
The disclosures about the witness are new evidence, but aren't material.
Statutory Habeas is not available to challenge convictions for which a discrete sentence was imposed when that sentence runs consecutively with multiple terms of life imprisonment that are set to run concurrently and that would not change absent some extraordinary and unexpected change in the law, as the challenged conviction would be harmless error.
The website statement preexisting the nondisparagement agreement that applied to prospective communication, statements, and conduct did not breach the agreement, since the statement was published to the website before the agreement.
Litigation affidavit enjoyed absolute immunity from the nondisparagement terms, since it was relevant and pertinent to the matter before the court.
Statements made to plaintiff's agents posing as prospective employers did not implicate the nondisparagement agreement's limitations on communications with potential employers.
Court's order prohibiting a released detainee's subsequent detention, since it was enforcing an earlier magistrate's holding that the detainee be released, is not within the general immigration removal of jurisdiction.
The bail reform statute does not preclude the pre-removal detention of an alien subsequent to the alien's release under the statute.
Administrative regulations prohibiting a criminal defendant from leaving the country refer to voluntary departures.
The detention does not violate the separation of powers.
Court below did not make formal findings about how the distance that lawyers had to travel related to the Sixth Amendment rights of the deft.
Although the hospital had the authority to order the physicians' group to terminate the services of one of its employees providing services at the hospital, that single fact is insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the question of whether the two enterprises were sufficiently integrated to create liability under the act.
The two entities also, as a matter of law, were not joint employers of the plaintiff, as the hospital did not have the power to hire, the plaintiff set his own schedule, and the two enterprises were not economically integrated.
Plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the hospital sufficient for a S1981 claim, and the two entities were sufficiently distinct to establish that he wasn't a contractor of the hospital.
Since the parties agreed to remove the provision of the standard form insurance contract relating to the priority of ex ante mechanics liens, the related-back ex ante mechanics liens are not covered by the general provisions of the form contract that protect claim priority generally.
Showing of costs and limited participation in negotiations insufficient to establish loss from dual representation under duty-to-defend.
Species mortality limit was not arbitrary and capricious, since the additional discussions mentioned in the agreement are superfluous to the hard take limits.
Agency's determination of the several effects of other projects and the cumulative effects of all projects in the designated region was not arbitrary and capricious.
Bivvens remedy not available for a prisoner's grievance retaliation claim under the First Amendment.
The class claim is sufficiently predominant, since all of the customers--even those who benefited--paid the fee; determining individual statute of limitations issues would be merely ministerial; defendant's general concealment underlay each instance of fraudulent inducement; appraisal variance would be merely ministerial; and the statutory damages are uniform.
Although the agreement's reference to a timely appraisal was insufficient guarantee to create a contract, the taking of a security deposit for the purposes of verifying identity and credit formed a binding contract.
Under the state's law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is relevant only to the analysis of actual breach of contract.
Concealment of potential improper contact with appraisers was sufficiently proximate to the formation of the agreement with the homeowners to qualify as unconscionable inducement under the state's statute.
Dissent:
Practice was customary in the industry; no actual inducement; communications with the appraiser did not breach the agreement to provide an appraisal.
Actual conditions of prisoner's solitary confinement present a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
State statute imposing conditions for the incarceration of prisoners whose death sentences have been commuted, passed after the legislative elimination of the death penalty and prior to the judicial determination that those already sentenced to death should have their sentences commuted, was an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, imposing specific punishments on implicitly designated specific persons without the benefit of trial.
Classification of prisoner as a higher security threat than others similarly situated had no rational basis, and violated Equal Protection.
Concurrence:
Eighth Amendment claims of mistreatment of prisoners require an element of subjective intent.
Since the named members of a putative class didn't individually join the appeal, they can't participate in any action subsequent to the disposition of the appeal; they were not included in their capacity as others similarly situated, although they might have been included if the appeal had been filed by a putative representative et al.
Since the defendant added subsequent to the appeal was in privity with the original defendants and the cause of action arose from the same transaction or occurrence, res judicata prevents the named non-appellants from pursuing their claims against the new party.
Court did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.
Since the video streaming service's removal of the Plaintiff's account was a good faith effort to enforce an internal policy that was aimed at removing objectionable content, the federal statutory safe-harbor applies, preempting state antidiscrimination laws and state public forum content-neutrality laws.
Docketing of hand-written documentation of pretrial conference report and stipulations prior to its being typed up meant that revisions other than the typing would require the modification of the order into which the report and stipulations were incorporated.
Plaintiff did not make sufficient showing of undue hardship to justify discharge of the statutorily protected debt.