Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Treating nurse's opinion on re-cross about whether visible signs of the described prison beating would have been expected was, at worst, harmless error in allowing an expert conclusion; plaintiff had opened the door on cross by asking on redirect if painful injuries could be sustained without leaving a visible sign.
Given circuit precedent on stare decisis, a GVR citing a specific Supreme Court decision in which no opinion commands the support of a majority of the Court, the analysis of the cited plurality holding looks to the narrowest ground justifying the order. The controlling rule is either derived from the common ground shared by the rationale of the plurality and the concurrence(s) in the judgment or from a logical subset of non-contradictory reasons that the rationales can accommodate. The entirety of a single concurrence in the judgment does not control.
The concurrence cited here accords a previous decision stare decisis effect and disagrees with the plurality's distinguishing of the facts, so the narrowest ground is constituted by the balancing test within the prior holding.
Dissent: GVR with a named case implies a common ground in the holding. Concurrence explicitly warned about imposing a balancing test in the substantial obstacle determination. Controlling test is the substantial obstacle test from Casey.
At the pleadings stage, insurer did not have the duty to defend, since the natural reading of the specific conduct in the pleadings established that the complained-of conduct violated laws that were within the explicit policy exclusions, and allegations that might encompass conduct outside the exceptions were, under the state's laws, legal labels that were meaningless until defined by the facts at trial.
Zurich American Insurance Com v. Ocwen Financial Corporation
The tendency of undisclosed potential impeachment evidence to come into view years afterward isn't a structural flaw in statutory Habeas sufficient to justify an application under the traditional form; the statutory form clock restarts from the discovery of the evidence, and second or successive petitions merely limit the petitioner to a single claim.
Although there is not a one-year limit on the older statutory form of Habeas, in such a case, equitable principles restrict abuse of the Writ.
Although the private support obligation for stepchildren usually ends with divorce, in public entitlement contexts such as state inheritance tax laws and SSA, the status usually doesn't imply a benefit termination context at divorce. Since the agency hasn't offered a contrary interpretation, the step-child of the divorced abusive parent has a right to file for naturalization under the Act.
As the employee had expressly agreed to pay the union by authorizing the paycheck deduction, and the contract for representation was valid under the state law of the time, the First Amendment right recognized by the courts after the contract had begun did not require an explicit waiver at the time of contractual formation; even under the new standard, any employee who consents to pay can be bound to the contract.
State law defining a public sector bargaining unit and establishing an exclusive representative organization for the bargaining unit does not violate First Amendment associational rights; plaintiff is not compelled to affiliate with the representative organization, and employees are free to form advocacy groups.
Agency did not have to provide alien faced with removal proceedings notice in their native language; a notice in English sufficiently puts the recipient on notice that language assistance will need to be secured.
No authority to review IJ's refusal to sua sponte reopen prior proceeding that resulted in removal order in absentia.
Sufficient evidence for drug conspiracy, since, despite the fact that drugs were never mentioned between the the two, the structure and manner of the single transaction, combined with the amount of drugs involved, would allow a reasonable finder of fact to convict. Deft's version of events did not have to be disproven.
Given statutory mandatory minimums, sentencing instructions that looked to the whole conspiracy to establish drug quantities, rather than calculating the amount that each defendant was either responsible for or might reasonably have thought to be involved was harmless error, as there was only a single unit involved in the single transaction.
For the Obstruction of Justice sentencing bump, the court needed to make specific findings of the material hindrance to the investigation caused by deft's throwing the cell phone against the ground; although the sentence ultimately varied downward, remanded for reconsideration.
Sufficient grounds for the stop, since, at the border, a consented-to scan of the trailer had revealed it to be largely empty, but a safety seal was evident on the doors; additionally, the stop was within fifty miles of the border.
Being told that he would be free to leave after the canine unit had checked the trailer was insufficiently custodial to exclude the non-mirandized statements in the interval.
Roving stops by Immigration are justified whenever there is reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity.
Amended opinion from 3/11 -- slight change to the facts recited on page three.
Under the state's conflicts rules, since the defamation plaintiff is domiciled in a state other than the district containing the city in which the speech occurred and in which the employment damages were sustained, the state with the strongest interest in the litigation was instead a third forum, the state in which the national newspaper is domiciled, and from which it emanated.
Since the context and structure of the quoted litigation affidavit established that the language was taken from a judicial proceeding, the state's statutory absolute privilege for reports of judicial proceedings applies.
Sufficient jurisdiction under collateral order doctrine to review an unsealing of confidential supplier lists, as post-judgment review would be after the disclosure, and the question is important and distinct from the merits analysis, not merely a routine discovery matter.
No clear error in the unsealing of the claimed trade secret supplier lists, since, following the relevant state law on trade secrets, the party and the supplier do not have a relationship of confidence, and, additionally, the name of the supplier isn't actually a secret.
As the general statutory grant of jurisdiction to review decisions is modified by a specific provision making the refusal to institute IPR nonreviewable, courts have no jurisdiction over the Director's delegated decision not to institute proceedings. Since the APA does not in itself create jurisdiction, an administrative challenge is similarly unavailable.
Even though Mandamus challenging the proceeding only runs from the Federal Circuit, as the sole court with sufficient prospective jurisdiction, as there is neither a clear and undisputable right to relief nor a colorable constitutional claim, nor historical precedent sufficient to justify a Due Process claim, the writ is unavailable here.
Since the unauthorized pro se Rule 59 motion was timely filed, by the plain terms of the rules, the time to file an appeal ran from the time that the court disposed of the motion; no merits consideration was required in order to toll the time limit.
By agreeing to the introduction of the exhibit and referring to it several times during the trial, the plaintiff waived any challenge to admissibility.
No plain error in inappropriate remarks at trial, as they did not impair substantial rights.
No plain error in bench questioning the plaintiff during testimony.
Motion for mistrial was not properly made when court twice expressed dissatisfaction after being told that plaintiff had a motion to make.
When a plaintiff's representation agreement covers only the trial itself, a pro se motion made after the verdict is not in order if counsel has not yet formally withdrawn or the court ordered a substitution.
Substantial evidence for the agency's determination that women who refuse to be victimized by local gangs are not a cognizable social group, since they are not perceived by the society as a distinct group separate from the fact of their persecution.
Agency was not required to recite each of the IJ's factual findings in its opinion, where circumstances indicated that the record was comprehensively reviewed.
As the finding is not logically inconsistent, sufficient evidence for the finder of fact's credibility determination as to competing narratives at a bench trial; although the evidence to the contrary was not discussed in the opinion, it was raised as impeachment at trial.
Restitution order was not an abuse of discretion, since the causal relation to the harms incurred used to determine the level of restitution referred to harms that were foreseeable at the time of injury.
The apparent vagueness in the sentencing condition restricting the types of images the deft can possess is in fact sweeping breadth necessary to protect the public.
In making a discretionary sentence reduction, the petitioner is entitled to adequate notice and an adequate opportunity to present information to the court; neither Due Process nor the statute requires a hearing.
Resentencing explanation consisting of a citation to disciplinary records and the adoption of the government's rationale was not an abuse of discretion.
As acquittals are to be read for the least that they establish, not the most, the retrial on an attempted murder charge after an acquittal from a murder charge as to the second victim does not offend Double Jeopardy; logically there might have been reasons for the jury's decision other than the theory offered by the defendant.
In considering an Ineffective Assistance claim, it is the full course of representation that matters; the lack of impeachment on a specific point in the second trial was insufficient to, on its own, justify reversal.
Given the complexity of the investigation and the need to explain it to the jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the hearsay statements given to federal investigators under the "course of the investigation" exception.
Unwitnessed affidavit was properly authenticated by the details in the substance of the affidavit.
Financial threats, psychological threats, and threats to immigration status provided sufficient evidence for conviction under the statute.
The involuntary servitude sentencing factor was correctly added to the transportation charge. Sufficient fear was created in the commission of the offense to justify the relevant sentencing factor. Obstruction sentencing factor correctly applied for perjured affidavit.
Below-guidelines 360 month sentence was reasonable.