Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Given the differences in their designs, triangular atria alone are insufficient to establish the identity of total concept and feel necessary for copyright infringement; no reasonable minds could differ on whether there was a substantial similarity of expression in the designs.
Although the court erred in saying that attorneys fees awards were the rule rather than the excpetion, it did not abuse its discretion in the actual award of fees in this case.
Evidence as to where, how, and to whom allegedly false representations were made can state a claim under the statute for fraudulent claims against the government.
Evidence as to the who, what, where, when, and how can state a claim for fraudulent inducement in contractual negotiations; a relator who is not a party to the negotiations might be unable to provide details of the negotiations.
Implied false certification is a species of fraud, and therefore subject to heightened pleading.
Continuing to bill the set capitation after ending the subcontracting that provided enhanced services states a claim for implied false certification under the Act, since the services were a material term of the deal.
DISSENT (CJ)
Mere request for payment from the government while not materially complying with a contractual term is insufficient to state a claim under the Act, given the Act's extreme remedies, including treble damages.
Contract was a contract to provide beneficiaries with access to needed services, not needed services themselves.
These circumstances wouldn't state a claim, even absent heightened pleading. There was no express factual falsity; the omission was an implied falsity. Precedent requires that a request for payment also make specific representations in order to be actionable. Suggesting that noncompliance is material means that any noncompliance is material.
Given issues of material fact about whether plaintiff was surrendering to police or lunging for gun and whether plaintiff was an immediate threat to safety of officers or others, court has no jursdiction to decide either aspect of the issue of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal. The fact that the plaintiff wasn't combative or armed complicates the application of relevant precedent that asks if the right was clearly established
An appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence for the denial of quualified immunity can't be decided on interlocutory review.
DISSENT (CJ)
Some of the benefit of qualified immunity is lost if the case is allowed to go to trial; the question is conceptually separate from the underlying claim. The evidence establishes the historical facts of this situation, and the appellate courts can resolve the issues of law arising from those facts.
Claim arising from the destruction of arrestees' property after a set period sounds in 14A Due Process or 5A Takings, not under the Fourth Amendment.
While the property was taken under the police power rather than eminent domain, federal constitutional limits remain on the disposal of the items. In this context, a thirty day holding period with adequate notice suffices for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Screenshot with evidentiary foundation from the head of department suffices to establish that the website was functioning during the relevant period.
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they lacked access to the internet in order to discover the relevant notice requires that they establish why the specific procedures of mediated inmate internet reference access were insufficient.
Where a federal court dismisses without prejudice in order to allow exhausion of pending direct and Habeas claims in the state system while determining that there has been inordinate delay in those claims, the futility of either amendment or recourse to the state system can make the dismissal without prejudice sufficiently final for appellate jurisdiction.
Extreme delay in the state system can excuse the federal statutory requirement that state claims first be exhausted.
Ex Parte Young isn't available as an exception to the state university's sovereign immunity, as the university is not a state official, and administrators are being sued in their personal capacities here.
Absent statute or contract, there is no property interest in the appointment to department chair if that chair does not itself lead to a form of tenure.
A dismissed professor can have received adequate due process even if the reviewing committee declined to recommend dismissal.
Placement on paid leave prior to dismissal proceedings was not a deprivaiton of due process, given the evidence in the record and the sufficiency of the proceedings.
Plaintiff must have exhausted 14A liberty interest claim in reputation by requesting a name-clearign hearing; the university was under no obligation to provide for it in its procedures, its refusal to toll the statute of limitations for the present suit did not preclude a paralell proceeding, and the present suit is not a sufficient proxy.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0187p-06.pdf
Petitioner's omission of the manner in which he discovered that he was on a blacklist was not a minor or extraneous detail, and the nationalization of the persecution implied by the blacklist was central to the claim; the late disclosure cannot be excused by saying that the petitioner and witnesses considered it a minor detail.
Agency was under no obligation to continue the proceedings to discover corroborating evidence. Adverse credibility determination based on the belief that the detail was a fabrication is well supported by the record.
Insufficient evidence of country-wide persecution of people of petitioner's faith.
Pandemic disease does not transform aggregated minor health concerns into the extraordinary and compelling justificaiton for early release required by statute.
Actual diagnosis, rather than the presence of diagnostic markers indicating likelihood but not certainty, is required in a petition for early release on compassionate grounds.
While material interference by prison administration or stonewalling of medical testing can be the basis of a claim of extraordinary and compelling justification, the record here does not support such a claim.
District Court's averral that it was exercising its broad discretion in denying early release given the balance of the factors was sufficient; there was no need to mechanically review each of the sentencing factors.
Agencies can exercise discretion only in places of ambiguity or silence; they are unable to amend a clear statutory mandate that seems at odds with the purposes of the legislation. Agency did not err, and the rulemaking did not run afoul of the APA.
Agency's implementation according to statute did not offend Equal Protection; proof of discriminatory of intent would also be needed.
Mandate requiring extension of policy in the same manner and to the extent that it applies to existing facilities mans that the same methodology should be implemented to the same extent, not that the facilities should be funded to the same extent.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-1475P-01A.pdf
Proof that a company had certain knowledge prior to its employees' contrary statements is insufficient to state a fraud or fraud-adjacent claim under the state's heightened pleading rules.
Evidence that work stopped after a certain meeting can't speak to the mindset of statements made at that meeting. Evidence of a contrary financial interest is at most only a factor, as is the amount of work that it would have taken to accomplish the task.
Expert testimony on ambiguity of contract terms is inadmissible, as ambiguity is a legal conclusion.
Given testimony that the overruns were paid to preserve the business relationship, there was no question for trial on the reliance on the underlying representations. Under state law, the counterparty's expectations of the plaintiff's reliance are insufficient to establish the plaintiff's reliance.
Court did not clearly err in refusing to sanction a settlement under the statute due to the fact that the attorneys' fees had not been negotiated separately from the underlying claim, given the simultaneous negotiation in emails, calculation of fee on the basis of the the case proceeding without settlement, and implicit tying of the agreement on fees to the agreement on the underlying claim.
Award of de minimis attorneys' fees was an abuse of discretion, as the amount must be determined by determination of the lodestar value by multiplying the hours and the rate.
Given that the only rmaining matter is the calculation of attorneys' fees, no plain error sufficient to reassign on remand.
DISSENT:
Negotiating a wage claim simultaneously with the fees creates a significant conflict of interest. Plaintiffs counsel, in fee negotiations, said that deft was getting a "pretty sweet deal." Court below held that lodestar was inapplicable on this record.
When an administrative appeal is filed under the statute, and the petitioner maintains that the papers were filed on certain dates and in a certain order, but this is contradicted by the receipt stamps on the documents, the issue presents a question for trial; the date stamps are not dispositive.
Existence of a second statutory basis, based on the drug quantity determinations made during sentencing, for the life sentence imposed at original sentencing does not make the petitioner ineligible for relief under the statute. Since the statute looks to the offense of conviction and not the underlying facts, the sentence imposed for the offense of conviction should be modified.
DISSENT:
Given the findings, the petitioner would have been sentenced under the second statutory basis at the original sentencing, which makes him ineligible for relief.
Although a simple Google search would likely have revealed the impeachment evidence against the defense expert witness in a capital case, not investigating the witness beyond a reasoble reliance on the judgment of the professional commnity was not ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner wasn't prejudiced by lack of replacement psychologist's testimony, a witness who would have provided evidence on an aggravating factor on which the jury ended up not being able to reach a decision, since from a legal point of view the testimony would have been duplicative of the overwhelming evidence on this point; there was therefore not a substantial likelihood of a different result.
AEDPA deference to state habeas finding to the contrary offers an independent ground for overruling the district court ruling that petitioner was prejudiced by the lack of testimony.
Since the ineffective assistance claim wasn't substantial, petitioner can't raise it in federal habeas after defaulting in state habeas, since excuse of default requires a substantial claim.
While jury instructions can't require that a jury be unanimous on any one mitigating factor, they can require that the jury be unanimous in its decision that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors.
District Court erred in holding that the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances was a finding of fact upon which the legislature had conditioned an increased punishment and that therefore must be performed by the jury, since the supreme court of the state has held in this case that the same precedent referenced by the district court was inapplicable.
CONCURRENCE:
Although the investigation of the expert witness was insufficient, there was no prejudice, given the other evidence offered.
State supreme court has held that only the existence of a single mitigating factor need be found by the jury under the statutue, as it constitutes eligibility for the increased sentence.
Innocent Spouse relief unavailable when the spouse in question is represented by counsel in a formal proceeding (even if that counsel is their spouse), attends the entire proceeding, and is highly educated.
When assessing standard of living when determining if the spouse had a duty to inquire about the questionable tax filings, the relevant consideration is whether there was a substantial increase in the standard of living, not whether it was generally high.
A legally sophisticated party's affidavit claiming that there was no conflict in being represented by their spouse in a tax case involving a jointly filed return waives a subsequent right to a new trial based on evidence that their counsel allegedly didn't call witnesses that would support the legally sophisticated party's claim to Innocent Spouse relief.
Since the defts didn't move for summary judgment on the False Arrest claim along with the plaintiff in the S1983 claim, summary judgment for the plaintiff isn't reviewable at the interlocutory stage, since it doesn't relate to the assertion of qualified immunity. Pendent jurisdiction would be inapporpriate, as the False Arrest claim isn't logically subsumed in the related claim being decided in the present appeal.
Claim arising from nighttime warrantless entry under exigent circumstances presents a genuine issue for the finder of fact, since the tip leading to the entry was anonymous, not specific as to location, and was only superficially corroborated. Warrantless entry without reaonable belief of exigent circumstances violates clearly established law.
A claim arising from excessive force asks whether the level of force used was gratuitous, not at the level of injury that the plaintiff sustained. The right to be free of excessive force used in an unconstitutional warrantless forced entry is clearly established.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0184p-06.pdf
As the statute doesn't limit the post-sentencing review of restitution interest charges, and the most logical reading of the circumstance is that a petition arising from changed circumstances is unlikely to happen at sentencing, the court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to modify an interest obligation after sentencing.
Extensive review of statute's structure and history.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0185p-06.pdf
As the statute makes no provision for nationwide service of process, Due Process requires that the statutory joinder of out of state parties to a statutory collective action prove sufficient minimum contacts of the original deft within each forum state of the out of state parties.
DISSENT
The addition of new plaintiffs doesn't change the singularity of the lawsuit, within which the court has already acquired its specific jurisdiction. Alternatively, the deft's conduct towards the out of state plaintiffs relates to its conduct within the original forum state.
As it's a national statute, interests of particular states aren't implicated in the same way.
The statute's designation of added plaintiffs as parties is merely to distinguish their status from that of representatives without a personal interest.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0186p-06.pdf
As none of the comparators had records as bad as that of the plaintiff, and all of the other plaintiffs derived their interest from the plaintiff's claim, the issue of pretextual justification doesn't present a question for trial.
Equal Protection claim on behalf of the association to which plaintiff belonged is precluded by Supreme Court precedent as a class-of-one claim given the context of discretionary public employment.
Mere assertion that state officers granted immunity by the district court were acting outside the scope of their duties and not in good faith constitutes a forfeiture of the issue on appeal due to lack of argument.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50501-CV0.pdf
The claim that the directors of the rodeo corporation had run the corporation as a sham and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when adding the directors to her claim adequately stated a claim for relief, but under governing state law, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish that the corporation was a liability shell subject to veil-piercing.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50650-CV0.pdf