Error for sentencing court not to consider reduction due to the fact that the conspiracy hadn't gotten very far along, but since the error entitled the deft to a greater reduction for acceptance of responsibility and the court subsequently varied downwards to a level beneath the correct guidelines range, there was no prejudice. Harmless error.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0117p-06.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Sixth Circuit: United States v. Jamal Cooper
Wiretap Act does not require a different application for each authorization, but merely that each application conform to the Act.
No clear error in authorizing the tap where many of the alternatives were discounted prospectively.
No error in denial of Franks hearing where the challenged omissions on the affidavit might be construed from the contents of the affidavit.
Sealing and delivery of tapes four days after the end of the tap did not transgress the two-day limit, as the government needed to confirm that the deft was no longer using that line.
Where trial judge accepts govt contention at trial that the content of the recorded conversation establishes that the confidential informant consented to the taping, no clear error in the admission of the tapes.
Parolee confidential informers can validly consent to the taping of conversations.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0116p-06.pdf
No clear error in authorizing the tap where many of the alternatives were discounted prospectively.
No error in denial of Franks hearing where the challenged omissions on the affidavit might be construed from the contents of the affidavit.
Sealing and delivery of tapes four days after the end of the tap did not transgress the two-day limit, as the government needed to confirm that the deft was no longer using that line.
Where trial judge accepts govt contention at trial that the content of the recorded conversation establishes that the confidential informant consented to the taping, no clear error in the admission of the tapes.
Parolee confidential informers can validly consent to the taping of conversations.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0116p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Robert Furlough v. Lowell Cage
Owner of debtor corporation who was joined to a pendent civil suit does not have standing to challenge engagement of special counsel as veil-piercing expert in the bankruptcy suit on the basis that the appointee is affiliated with one of the creditors and would act in a manner adverse to the estate.
Standing is determined at the time of filing -- an after-acquired interest in the estate does not convert the plaintiff's interest to that of a creditor for purposes of standing.
[caveat -- quick work. as always, entertainment purposes only.]
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20603-CV0.pdf
Standing is determined at the time of filing -- an after-acquired interest in the estate does not convert the plaintiff's interest to that of a creditor for purposes of standing.
[caveat -- quick work. as always, entertainment purposes only.]
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20603-CV0.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Lois Davis v. Fort Bend County
Plain error where the deft's sentence was twice the correct amount after the court counted a state conviction for a crime that is more broadly defined than the generic federal version used in sentencing.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-41378-CR0.pdf
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-41378-CR0.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Lee Malvo v. Randall Mathena
Given the substantive right of a juvenile not to be sentenced to a mandatory life without parole sentence articulated by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review, petitioner's initial sentencing must be reviewed, as it was unclear at trial whether the judge could suspend part of the life sentence, and additionally, relief might be warranted outside of mandatory sentences in the strict sense.
As there was no finding of incorrigibility, the jury's vote for life without parole needs to be revisited. Additional sentences imposed under plea deal are not shielded from review by the appeals waiver, as collateral challenges of new rights and assertions of substantive constitutional violations weren't enforceably waived.
Interesting peroration.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/176746.P.pdf
As there was no finding of incorrigibility, the jury's vote for life without parole needs to be revisited. Additional sentences imposed under plea deal are not shielded from review by the appeals waiver, as collateral challenges of new rights and assertions of substantive constitutional violations weren't enforceably waived.
Interesting peroration.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/176746.P.pdf
Second Circuit: United States v. Olmeda
Where conduct relevant to the offense (here, grounds for a sentence enhancement) is the subject of a contemporaneous prosecution in state court, the federal sentencing court must consider the Guidelines instruction that the terms are to run concurrently; there is no requirement that the state prosecution be on the docket at the time of federal sentencing.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/1/doc/15-3449_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/1/hilite/
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/1/doc/15-3449_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/1/hilite/
Second Circuit: Copeland v. Vance
As plaintiffs seek relief holding the law void for vagueness as to an entire category of folding knives, the challenge is construed as a facial challenge; a past enforcement against one of the plaintiffs provided sufficient notice of the proscribed activity, establishing that it is possible to enforce the law constitutionally -- therefore not facially unconstitutional. While it is possible to enforce the law in a discriminatory manner, and there might be evidence of this discrimination in past enforcement, the law itself does not unduly invite such discrimination.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/2/doc/17-474_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/2/hilite/
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/2/doc/17-474_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/2/hilite/
Second Circuit: Villanueva v. United States of America
Given Supreme Court precedent relating to another statute, a state Assault statute is a valid violent crime predicate under modified categorical review.
Dissent: All the courts are doing it, but that doesn't make it right. Scotus specifically said it doesn't apply in this context; where the statute applies to non-forceful harm such as poison, it's an offensive touching, not a use of force.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/3/doc/16-2528_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/3/hilite/
Dissent: All the courts are doing it, but that doesn't make it right. Scotus specifically said it doesn't apply in this context; where the statute applies to non-forceful harm such as poison, it's an offensive touching, not a use of force.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/3/doc/16-2528_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/37d309e7-2938-46a7-887d-c286c9866ef7/3/hilite/
Federal Circuit: Royal Crown Company, Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Company, Inc.
A mark is generic if the public would understand that it referred to a key aspect of the genus, leading it to believe the mark is a generic term. This can be established from any competent source.
The inquiry into distinctiveness becomes more stringent as the mark grows more specific.
Association of the mark with the genus is not necessarily proof of the generic nature of the mark.
Ninth Circuit: Nu Image v. IATSE Local 720
The relevant statute only grants federal jurisdiction over claims of CBA violations; a suit alleging that the provision is void for lack of formation under state law therefore does not state a claim under the statute.
Dissent: It can be construed as a request for declaratory judgment as to the plaintiffs own alleged violation of that provision of the CBA.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-55451.pdf
Dissent: It can be construed as a request for declaratory judgment as to the plaintiffs own alleged violation of that provision of the CBA.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-55451.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Robert Stephens v. CoreLogic, Inc.
To establish contributory infringement under the statute, plaintiff needs to establish a likelihood of specific future infringement; specific allegations of the theory of infringement are necessary. While the software removes the metadata that aids in the detection of infringement, plaintiffs do not demonstrate how removal of this information alone will prompt a future infringement.
Discovery denials appropriate, as there was no specific statement of how the additional time and productions would show such future specific infringement.
Costs for testimony of employees of deft corporation can be taxed to opposing party.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-56089.pdf
Discovery denials appropriate, as there was no specific statement of how the additional time and productions would show such future specific infringement.
Costs for testimony of employees of deft corporation can be taxed to opposing party.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/20/16-56089.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nicholas Ryan Hemsher
Inconsistencies in self-interested witnesses' testimony were subject to cross, and do not establish lack of sufficient evidence.
Exclusion of prior inconsistent statement to police was harmless, as inconsistencies explored elsewhere, and no contemporaneous proffer; exclusion of exited utterances by police during search was proper, since police officers don't get excited--also harmless.
Sufficient evidence for sentence enhancement based on number of firearms. Enhancement for another felony found by a preponderance can apply to firearm trafficking and possession, so long as it's not the actual underlying crime charged. Texts from incarceration referencing "snitches" sufficed for obstruction enhancement. Disparities in co-conspirators' sentences not per se unreasonable.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172189P.pdf
Exclusion of prior inconsistent statement to police was harmless, as inconsistencies explored elsewhere, and no contemporaneous proffer; exclusion of exited utterances by police during search was proper, since police officers don't get excited--also harmless.
Sufficient evidence for sentence enhancement based on number of firearms. Enhancement for another felony found by a preponderance can apply to firearm trafficking and possession, so long as it's not the actual underlying crime charged. Texts from incarceration referencing "snitches" sufficed for obstruction enhancement. Disparities in co-conspirators' sentences not per se unreasonable.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172189P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Thomas Grace
A sentencing judge may properly consider offenses already incorporated in the guidelines calculations when deciding to vary upwards where the prior offenses strongly parallel the present crime. Argument that elements of state statute raised in sentencing were not met in present crime was waived since it was first raised in reply brief. Consideration of the statute not per se unreasonable.
Seventh Circuit: Henry Fiorentini v. Paul Revere Life Insurance
As a claimant has the burden to establish a covered condition, a CEO who has returned to work and exercises control over the corporation cannot establish a claim for disability based on the inability to perform another management task (sales) that he deems essential for the corporation to succeed.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-21/C:17-3137:J:Barrett:aut:T:fnOp:N:2174099:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-21/C:17-3137:J:Barrett:aut:T:fnOp:N:2174099:S:0
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Donald S. Harden
Sufficient evidence to establish death from the drugs sold where timeline suggests proximate consumption, despite statements in the record to the contrary regarding the substance's toxicity.
Sentencing enhancement for death requires merely actual causation, not proof of proximate cause; conspiracy provision does not imply reasonable forseeability.
Court's exclusion of testimony about another source for drugs was harmless error and not an abuse of discretion, as it might have tended to confuse.
Giving a timestamped convenience store surveillance photograph of the deft to the jury during deliberations did not warrant a mistrial.
Prosecution statements in closing and rebuttal closing (saying that the deft knew the present batch of heroin to be fatal, as opposed to the previous batch; saying that deft furnished drugs on both days as opposed to just one) don't warrant reversal, sufficiently cured ("if what the lawyers said is different than the evidence that you remember, the evidence is what counts.")
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1270:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173545:S:0
Sentencing enhancement for death requires merely actual causation, not proof of proximate cause; conspiracy provision does not imply reasonable forseeability.
Court's exclusion of testimony about another source for drugs was harmless error and not an abuse of discretion, as it might have tended to confuse.
Giving a timestamped convenience store surveillance photograph of the deft to the jury during deliberations did not warrant a mistrial.
Prosecution statements in closing and rebuttal closing (saying that the deft knew the present batch of heroin to be fatal, as opposed to the previous batch; saying that deft furnished drugs on both days as opposed to just one) don't warrant reversal, sufficiently cured ("if what the lawyers said is different than the evidence that you remember, the evidence is what counts.")
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1270:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173545:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Pain Center of SE Indiana, LLC v. Origin Healthcare Solutions LLC
Anonymous parties to case are sufficiently de minimis for diversity purposes, so there's jurisdiction.
Actively supported software license is, under state "predominant thrust" test, a contract for services, rather than goods, making the UCC inapplicable.
State tort claims are time-barred, as the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm during the continuing contract.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1276:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173943:S:0
Actively supported software license is, under state "predominant thrust" test, a contract for services, rather than goods, making the UCC inapplicable.
State tort claims are time-barred, as the plaintiff had knowledge of the harm during the continuing contract.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-1276:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173943:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Comsys Incorporated v. Frank Pacetti
While the restrictions on freedom of speech while in the employ of the government apply to contracted corporations and their employees, where the line between protected and unprotected speech is ambiguous, qualified immunity protects the government from claims of unlawful retaliation.
As the Fourth Amendment only protects against invasion by public actors, accessing of email records by employee of contracted corporation did not violate; the question of direction by state actors is ambiguous enough to warrant qualified immunity.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2053:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173897:S:0
As the Fourth Amendment only protects against invasion by public actors, accessing of email records by employee of contracted corporation did not violate; the question of direction by state actors is ambiguous enough to warrant qualified immunity.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2053:J:Easterbrook:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173897:S:0
Seventh Circuit: Anthony Simpkins v. DuPage Housing Authority
In considering whether a worker is an employee for the purposes of the FSLA, questions of fact are reviewed for clear error, while questions of law are reviewed de novo; at summary judgment, though, since the court makes no findings of fact, the question of genuine issue of material fact is reviewed de novo.
Here, sufficient question for trial.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2685:J:Bauer:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173923:S:0
Here, sufficient question for trial.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2685:J:Bauer:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173923:S:0
Seventh Circuit: US v. Larry Norton
Where conflicting testimony at trial suggests that deft was zero to five mph over the speed limit, no clear error in holding that traffic stop at prompting of drug task force didn't violate the Fourth Amendment.
Admission of informant's statements on recording, if hearsay, was harmless error, as they merely provided useful context for others statements.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2898:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173776:S:0
Admission of informant's statements on recording, if hearsay, was harmless error, as they merely provided useful context for others statements.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2898:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173776:S:0
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