Habeas
De novo/ non-AEDPA review, as no state court has considered the specific constitutional claim.
Where the jury is instructed on aiding and abetting, but instead votes to convict on actual murder, but with a special verdict supporting felony murder that is later vacated, a resentencing for aiding and abetting based on subsequent admissions by deft doesn't sufficiently violate 6A to justify Habeas relief, as the resentencing judge is relying on the earlier verdict.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/21/11-55247.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Eighth Circuit: O&S Trucking, Inc. v. Mercedes Benz Financial Serv.
Bankruptcy
While a person can appeal their own Chapter 11 amended bankruptcy plan if it incorporates adverse elements, there must be sufficient objection to the plan, and this isn't achieved by referring to an already-filed appeal and any subsequent appeals.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/152048P.pdf
While a person can appeal their own Chapter 11 amended bankruptcy plan if it incorporates adverse elements, there must be sufficient objection to the plan, and this isn't achieved by referring to an already-filed appeal and any subsequent appeals.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/152048P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Munna Godfrey v. Loretta E. Lynch
Immigration
Petitioner has burden to prove that checking a box indicating citizen/national reflected an intent to select the latter -- here, petitioners other representations to the contrary bar the claim.
Late introduction of the I9 in the immigration proceedings doesn't violate Due Process.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151027P.pdf
Petitioner has burden to prove that checking a box indicating citizen/national reflected an intent to select the latter -- here, petitioners other representations to the contrary bar the claim.
Late introduction of the I9 in the immigration proceedings doesn't violate Due Process.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151027P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Fidlar Technologies v. LPS Real Estate Data Solutions
Civil CFAA
Direct access to data layer by licensed party bypassing the web interface did not violate statutes barring unauthorized computer access.
Interfering with tracking doesn't violate statute / constitute trespass to chattels.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:15-1830:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690861:S:0
Direct access to data layer by licensed party bypassing the web interface did not violate statutes barring unauthorized computer access.
Interfering with tracking doesn't violate statute / constitute trespass to chattels.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:15-1830:J:Flaum:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690861:S:0
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Tyree Neal, Sr.
Sentencing
Deft can make substantive, but not procedural, challenges to sentencing conditions not challenged earlier on direct appeal.
Conditions here (warrantless entry) were reasonably related to legitimate goals.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-3473:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690666:S:0
Deft can make substantive, but not procedural, challenges to sentencing conditions not challenged earlier on direct appeal.
Conditions here (warrantless entry) were reasonably related to legitimate goals.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-3473:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690666:S:0
Seventh Circuit: VLM Food Trading International v. Illinois Trading Company
Contracts
Transnational contract was formed under Convention by agreement by the parties, and subsequent inclusion of attorney's fees by one party did not become a binding modification, as it was not mirrored or acknowledged in the return invoice or communications.
Attorney's statement that something had been admitted and was in the record isn't sufficient basis for waiver of claim.
Not raising issue of waiver until the reply brief waived the issue of prior default.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-2776:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690495:S:0
Transnational contract was formed under Convention by agreement by the parties, and subsequent inclusion of attorney's fees by one party did not become a binding modification, as it was not mirrored or acknowledged in the return invoice or communications.
Attorney's statement that something had been admitted and was in the record isn't sufficient basis for waiver of claim.
Not raising issue of waiver until the reply brief waived the issue of prior default.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-2776:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690495:S:0
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Michael Segal
Sentencing/restitution
No error in denial of extension ot purchase insurance policies, as the funds were held up elsewhere in in the settlement by deft's actions.
Although an offer to purchase an asset does not have to be capable of acceptance by simple affirmation in order to be considered commercially acceptable, the deft's right of first refusal gave him an equitable stake in the transaction, and his rights were impaired by having to match a third party's freely revocable offer.
Deft counsel can properly testify as to having seen or not seen the listing of an asset on a list of properties to be seized when the issue turns on a question of inadvertent omission that was not brought to the government's attention.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-3533:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690615:S:0
No error in denial of extension ot purchase insurance policies, as the funds were held up elsewhere in in the settlement by deft's actions.
Although an offer to purchase an asset does not have to be capable of acceptance by simple affirmation in order to be considered commercially acceptable, the deft's right of first refusal gave him an equitable stake in the transaction, and his rights were impaired by having to match a third party's freely revocable offer.
Deft counsel can properly testify as to having seen or not seen the listing of an asset on a list of properties to be seized when the issue turns on a question of inadvertent omission that was not brought to the government's attention.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-21/C:14-3533:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1690615:S:0
Sixth Circuit: Jose Zaldana Menijar v. Loretta Lynch
From December, but on today's list. Revised, perhaps.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0015p-06.pdf
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0015p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Hobert Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC
Contracts
Vesting of retirees in pension plan should follow normal rules of contractual interpretation, with only a thumb on the scales in favor of vesting. Remanded from Scotus, with a helpful list of such rules.
Remanded to District Court to consider relevance and weight of writings outside the corners of the agreement.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0014p-06.pdf
Vesting of retirees in pension plan should follow normal rules of contractual interpretation, with only a thumb on the scales in favor of vesting. Remanded from Scotus, with a helpful list of such rules.
Remanded to District Court to consider relevance and weight of writings outside the corners of the agreement.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0014p-06.pdf
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Larry Thompson
Offender registration
Statute is not an unconstitutional regulation of purely intrastate commerce.
Statute requires timely registration when present in an area - acquisition of a domicile or extended habitation is not necessary.
Conversation in which US Marshall explained the registration requirement was not testimonial in nature, and therefore was not subject to Miranda.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-40370-CR0.pdf
Statute is not an unconstitutional regulation of purely intrastate commerce.
Statute requires timely registration when present in an area - acquisition of a domicile or extended habitation is not necessary.
Conversation in which US Marshall explained the registration requirement was not testimonial in nature, and therefore was not subject to Miranda.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-40370-CR0.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Knox Creek Coal Corporation v. Secretary of Labor
Administrative
Commission review of ALJ's decisions did not overreach by reversing on the basis that the ALJ had only considered a snapshot view of the circumstance, and that the ALJ had improperly weighed the possibility disaster actually occurring from the violation of the rules. Findings of fact were not contradicted in the reversal.
Where commission adopts factual findings of ALJ but reverses, review is for substantial error.
Litigating decisions (adjudications?) of the Secretary are not subject to Chevron deference. (!)
As the gravity of events resulting from a violation are considered in another prong of the rule, the gravity of the prong under consideration refers to the degree of the material violation itself.
Contemplated - but not implemented - improvements are not mitigations.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/142313.P.pdf
Commission review of ALJ's decisions did not overreach by reversing on the basis that the ALJ had only considered a snapshot view of the circumstance, and that the ALJ had improperly weighed the possibility disaster actually occurring from the violation of the rules. Findings of fact were not contradicted in the reversal.
Where commission adopts factual findings of ALJ but reverses, review is for substantial error.
Litigating decisions (adjudications?) of the Secretary are not subject to Chevron deference. (!)
As the gravity of events resulting from a violation are considered in another prong of the rule, the gravity of the prong under consideration refers to the degree of the material violation itself.
Contemplated - but not implemented - improvements are not mitigations.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/142313.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Colon Health Centers v. Bill Hazel
Commerce clause
State medical facility licensing statute does not facially violate dormant commerce clause, as there is no demonstrable statistical proof of discrimination in favor of in-state providers.
State of incorporation is a valid, testable criterion.
Bias in favor of incumbent businesses is not a proxy for discrimination against out of state businesses.
Sufficient policy benefits to justify policy in a balancing test against de facto dormant commerce clause challenge.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/142283.P.pdf
State medical facility licensing statute does not facially violate dormant commerce clause, as there is no demonstrable statistical proof of discrimination in favor of in-state providers.
State of incorporation is a valid, testable criterion.
Bias in favor of incumbent businesses is not a proxy for discrimination against out of state businesses.
Sufficient policy benefits to justify policy in a balancing test against de facto dormant commerce clause challenge.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/142283.P.pdf
Third Circuit: Elnor Whitehead v. Pullman Group LLC
Arbitration
Arbitrator's likely application of statute precluding testimony about unrecorded transactions with deceased party was not an error sufficient to vacate the arbitration.
As the arbitrator likely filtered out barred testimony, opposing party's use of spoken parole evidence to the contrary didn't open the door to use by plaintff.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151627p.pdf
Arbitrator's likely application of statute precluding testimony about unrecorded transactions with deceased party was not an error sufficient to vacate the arbitration.
As the arbitrator likely filtered out barred testimony, opposing party's use of spoken parole evidence to the contrary didn't open the door to use by plaintff.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151627p.pdf
Second Circuit: Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, et al.
ERISA
Denial of en banc, with dissent from denial.
ERISA annuity/lump sum benefits / posthumous domestic orders. Or something like that.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/78742b70-321c-4ada-8a3a-2b2b4f09d6b8/1/doc/13-4725comb_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/78742b70-321c-4ada-8a3a-2b2b4f09d6b8/1/hilite/
Denial of en banc, with dissent from denial.
ERISA annuity/lump sum benefits / posthumous domestic orders. Or something like that.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/78742b70-321c-4ada-8a3a-2b2b4f09d6b8/1/doc/13-4725comb_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/78742b70-321c-4ada-8a3a-2b2b4f09d6b8/1/hilite/
Eleventh Circuit: USA v. Harvey Zitron
Tax, FrCrimP
No error in joining tax crimes with fraud crimes in the indictment, as prejudice was speculative.
Comment elicited on cross about hypothetical silence of deft didn't violate 5A, shift burdens.
Where deft has in the past opened credit accounts for family, doing so with unlawful intent suffices for statutory bar on knowingly opening the account with unlawful authority.
No plain error in court's determining amount of fraud based on scope of fraud versus funds deposited by deft.
Leadership enhancement upheld.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201410009.pdf
No error in joining tax crimes with fraud crimes in the indictment, as prejudice was speculative.
Comment elicited on cross about hypothetical silence of deft didn't violate 5A, shift burdens.
Where deft has in the past opened credit accounts for family, doing so with unlawful intent suffices for statutory bar on knowingly opening the account with unlawful authority.
No plain error in court's determining amount of fraud based on scope of fraud versus funds deposited by deft.
Leadership enhancement upheld.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201410009.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: In re: Anthony Johnson
Habeas, AEDPA
30 Day limit for consideration of second or successive petitions is advisory, not jurisdictional.
Johnson retroactivity: petition held in abeyance pending S.Ct. ruling.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610011.order.pdf
30 Day limit for consideration of second or successive petitions is advisory, not jurisdictional.
Johnson retroactivity: petition held in abeyance pending S.Ct. ruling.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610011.order.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Dan Carmichael McCarthan v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium
Habeas
S. Ct. holding that state escape statute is not categorically a violent crime for purposes of the ACCA predicate conviction is a substantive change in the law to be made retroactively available on collateral review.
Circuit precedent that escape was a violent crime for purposes of one statute had a preclusive effect on whether it was a crime of violence with reference to another statute.
Very complex - here's our best guess: Access to S2241 Habeas depends on there being no effective remedy by a Habeas claim on motion. Where a deft has multiple potential predicates in the PSR and the indictment only lists three, but neither the sentencing court nor the PSR identifies the ones to be used in the ACCA enhancement, all potentially valid predicates are counted against the deft in considering jurisdiction for a S2241 writ unless petitioner can affirmatively establish that prior Habeas on motion would have been ineffective against the uncharged predicates. The argument that a challenge to a predicate was waived for procedural default, however, is a an affirmative defense on the merits - the relevant jurisdictional question for the S2241 writ is whether the writ on motion would have been an effective challenge.
[Again, don't rely on any of this for anything.]
Concurrence: No access to writ, as alternate bases for the enhancement establish that sentencing court did not rely on the challenged offense.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201214989.pdf
S. Ct. holding that state escape statute is not categorically a violent crime for purposes of the ACCA predicate conviction is a substantive change in the law to be made retroactively available on collateral review.
Circuit precedent that escape was a violent crime for purposes of one statute had a preclusive effect on whether it was a crime of violence with reference to another statute.
Very complex - here's our best guess: Access to S2241 Habeas depends on there being no effective remedy by a Habeas claim on motion. Where a deft has multiple potential predicates in the PSR and the indictment only lists three, but neither the sentencing court nor the PSR identifies the ones to be used in the ACCA enhancement, all potentially valid predicates are counted against the deft in considering jurisdiction for a S2241 writ unless petitioner can affirmatively establish that prior Habeas on motion would have been ineffective against the uncharged predicates. The argument that a challenge to a predicate was waived for procedural default, however, is a an affirmative defense on the merits - the relevant jurisdictional question for the S2241 writ is whether the writ on motion would have been an effective challenge.
[Again, don't rely on any of this for anything.]
Concurrence: No access to writ, as alternate bases for the enhancement establish that sentencing court did not rely on the challenged offense.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201214989.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Joshua Welch
Fourth Amendment
30 Day time period for notification of warrant ran from execution of warrant, not identification of the subject.
No clear error in holding the error harmless, given good faith and lack of prejudice.
Barring use of prior affidavit on cross was harmless error, if error.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151993P.pdf
30 Day time period for notification of warrant ran from execution of warrant, not identification of the subject.
No clear error in holding the error harmless, given good faith and lack of prejudice.
Barring use of prior affidavit on cross was harmless error, if error.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/151993P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: National Parks Conservation v. EPA
Administrative, environment
Circuit has statutory jurisdiction over challenge to local component of national plan.
Offsets plan upheld as not arbitrary and capricious.
Rational basis for agency modification of statutory goals.
Concur in J: No circuit jurisdiction over national plan.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/122910P.pdf
Circuit has statutory jurisdiction over challenge to local component of national plan.
Offsets plan upheld as not arbitrary and capricious.
Rational basis for agency modification of statutory goals.
Concur in J: No circuit jurisdiction over national plan.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/16/01/122910P.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Larry Nelson v. City of Chicago
FRE
Admission of plaintiff's prior arrests on the theory that they spoke to his good law-abiding citizenship was error; also not probative of damages mitigation on 4A claim
Admission of plaintiff's prior lawsuits against the city error, as it didn't contradict testimony at trial; also not cured by limiting instruction.
Admission of police officer's extended hypothetical as to reasons for drawing a weapon in a traffic stop was error.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-20/C:12-3401:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:1689820:S:0
Admission of plaintiff's prior arrests on the theory that they spoke to his good law-abiding citizenship was error; also not probative of damages mitigation on 4A claim
Admission of plaintiff's prior lawsuits against the city error, as it didn't contradict testimony at trial; also not cured by limiting instruction.
Admission of police officer's extended hypothetical as to reasons for drawing a weapon in a traffic stop was error.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-20/C:12-3401:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:1689820:S:0
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