Statutory term is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency, as it is silent as to whether certain services need to be delivered in person, as opposed to being provided remotely. Parallel statute distinguishing the two speaks to the ambiguity of the first statute.
Agency's position is justified by the need for a clear rule, and is a reasonable policy choice; prior silence on the question doesn't establish that this is a reversal by the agency.
Although the statutory context clarifies the definition of "serious injury," the statute is still sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the agency.
Although the agency's new definition was a change from prior interpretations, it was a reasoned change that accounted for settled expectations, and not the sort of sharp break with previous readings that would justify less deference to the agency's final interpretation.
Statute defining incapacity as being unable to accomplish certain daily tasks is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency's reading, since it doesn't distinguish occasional incapacity from total incapacity. Prior fee schedule implying a gradation of capacity doesn't make for a change in policy, since it refers to the amount of assistance provided, not the beneficiary's abilities unaided.
Agency erred in imposing a single definition of "in need of supervision" where the law describes two degrees of necessary supervision; additionally, the medical requirements read into the term are not logically dictated by the statute's mandate.
Law's requirement that the compensation levels be tied to geographic areas and creation of a program for assisting veterans abroad did not define the eligibility of extraterritorial caregivers; the agency's interpretation barring such caregivers is reasonable.
Agency's tying of caregiver compensation to federal civil service pay levels was a reasonable one; nothing in the act required that the compensation be linked to private sector salaries.
Agency's definition of the inability to sustain life in the community was a reasonable one; it incorporated the statutory factors.