Showing posts with label Title VII. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Title VII. Show all posts

Fifth Circuit: Woods v. Cantrell

 A single use of a racial epithet in the workplace can state a claim under Title VII.

Woods v. Cantrell

Seventh Circuit: Robert Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Office

 

Court did not abuse discretion in quashing deposition of city sherriff, since the sherriff was not personally involved in the employment matters at issue, and the plaintiff did not describe the admissible evidence that might result from the deposition beyond the existence of a conversation at a political event.

Employment action was too attenuated from the employer's gaining knowledge of political activity to support a claim for political retaliation, and the nondiscriminatory bases offered by the employer for the action were insufficiently rebutted..  Claim of racial dicrimination doesn;t present a genine issue of material fact for trial, since there were decisionmakers outside of the protected class and the nondiscriminatory reasons for the action were insufficiently rebutted.


http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D08-17/C:20-2733:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2748733:S:0

Fifth Circuit: Newbury v. City of Windcrest

 

Plaintiff's clam that rudeness was gender-based is unsubstantiated by the record.  Two confrontations and a hostile encounter do not suffice for a constructive discharge claim under the statute.  A record reflecting resignation from the position precludes a sufficient showing for retaliatory discharge or gender discrimination.  While a work assignment might have sufficed for retaliation, sufficient causation wasn't established. 

Insufficient proof for Monell claim against municipality arising from police bodycam appearing to remotely activate when inside the plaintiff's house, given technical evidence and lack of showing that there's a general policy to surreptitiously record off-duty officers.


Newbury v. City of Windcrest

Ninth Circuit: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

 

High school coach's demonstrative religious actions at the center of the field immediately following the game were performed as a public employee in the course of performing the responsibilities of the job.  

The actions cannot be considered personal and private because of the coach's prior attempts to publicize them.  The collective nature of the activity on almost every occasion establishes that an objective observer would conclude that the practice, coupled with the exclusion of others who might seek access, was an endorsement of a particular religion.

Regulation of coach's conduct was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny, given the need to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.

School district had no obligation under Title VII  to rehire, given the violation of policies.  Plaintiff can't establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, as there were no comparators engaged in perceptible prayer.  As the coach's only request was public prayer at midfield after the game, school district was not compelled to accept it as a reasonable accommodation of a practice of bona fide religious belief conflicting with job responsibilities, and it was a sufficient basis for the adverse employment action.

CONCURRENCE:

Fact-driven holding.  (Analysis tracks majority opinion.)


Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

Ninth Circuit: Freyd v. University of Oregon

 As the comparison of duties between privately funded and federally funded research academics is fraught with judgment, not law, their equivalence is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

The standard under the state law is broader than the federal standard, reasoning from the greater, there is an issue for trial on the state claims as well.

As plaintiff in disparate impact claim wasn't challenging thempe practice of retention raises, but additionally suggesting that the salaries of the cohort be raised as well, it is an attack on a specific process, not general one.  The existence of an alternative undercuts the claim of business necessity.

Although statistics derived from small sample size have less probative value, disagreement among experts as to the validity of the numbers can suggests a triable issue.

As the plaintiff never engaged in retention raise negotiations, there is no issue for trial on state and federal disparate treatment claims or Title IX.  Insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination for state ERA claim.

DISSENT:

Equal Pay Act requires a case-specific examination of the actual job performance and content.

Full Professors are like professional athletes.  Significant differences in all of the jobs for the members of the plaintiff's department.

State claim only requires a common core of tasks, which presents an issue for trial.

Retention negotiations are elective -- each professor chooses to engage or not. Small sample size.  The practice is a business necessity.


Freyd v. University of Oregon

Fifth Circuit: Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners

 

Although the hospital had the authority to order the physicians' group to terminate the services of one of its employees providing services at the hospital, that single fact is insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the question of whether the two enterprises were sufficiently integrated to create liability under the act.

The two entities also, as a matter of law, were not joint employers of the plaintiff, as the hospital did not have the power to hire, the plaintiff set his own schedule, and the two enterprises were not economically integrated.

Plaintiff did not have a contractual relationship with the hospital sufficient for a S1981 claim, and the two entities were sufficiently distinct to establish that he wasn't a contractor of the hospital.



Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners

Seventh Circuit: Ron Morris v. BNSF Railway Company

 

Comparator evidence in Title VII claim was not legally insuffient for being descriptions of individual comparators rather than statistical analysis of the discovery data.

Manager who made the discriminatory adjudication decision need not have been involved in ending the employment of the plaintiff, or even the unwitting dupe of those who did.  The sole question is whether the plaintiff lost his job due to his race.

Business judgment jury instruction distinguishing discrimination from business judgment calls was not required as a matter of law.

District court's exclusion of witnesses on a late-amended list did not have to be analyzed in terms of the rule for information otherwise available to the other party; the relevant information was that they were to testify, and the court could rule that the notice was too late.

No error in back pay, given mitigation; no error in punitive damages, even given the existece of written policies against discrimination; no error in denial of reinstatiment given facts.


Ron Morris v. BNSF Railway Company

Fourth Circuit: Colette Wilcox v. Nathan Lyons

 

Generic claim of retaliation actionable as gender discrimination under Title VII does not sound as a cause of action under S1983; Section VII explicitly includes retaliation as an actionable harm, and this would be surplussage if inherent in the right.

Circuit split flagged.

Colette Wilcox v. Nathan Lyons

Tenth Circuit: Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk



Mixed claims sounding in both gender and age are cognizable under Title VII.

Clam sufficiently states the age and gender claim by reciting the gender of the plaintiffs and that they are older than 40.

~96% chance of firings being non-random across age and gender suffices to create a plausible inference of discrimination.

Even given the statistical possibility of discrimination, no facts raising an inference of discrimination on the basis of gender were pleaded, so the non-random employment actions are susceptible of other explanations.

Given statistical analysis of terminations and the demographics of the new employees hired, the suit states a claim for disparate impact under the ADEA.

Median ages of terminated and new employees suffice to state a claim for disparate treatment under the ADEA, but employer met the burden of producing a nondiscriminatory basis.  Sufficient issue for trial on whether these post-hoc rationales were pretextual.


Sixth Circuit: John George v. Youngstown State Univ.


Where the alleged retaliation under Title VII does not immediately follow the protected conduct, but there is a logical reason for the delay, a genuine issue of material fact can arise for trial.

Two contrasting theories of budgetary circumstances can offer a genuine issue for trial as to pretext for the adverse employment action.

Sufficient evidence in the record for trial on non-rehiring claim; other party's waiver of administrative exhaustion in arguing merits becomes law of the case for appeals.

Dissent: Only relevant temporal factor in stating a case for retaliation is the date the employer learns of the protected conduct; facts don't state a case for retaliation generally.

Seventh Circuit: Scott McCray v. Robert Wilkie


Employer's refusal to replace vehicle in a timely manner states a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.

Claim originating in assignment of offices not pellucid enough, will be developed on remand.

Conduct potentially violating Title VII raised in employer's motion to dismiss insulated employer from Title VII claim when plaintiff didn't make the argument in the reply brief.

DC Circuit: Timothy Jeffries v. William Barr


Summary judgment appropriately granted for deft prior to discovery in Title VII suit, given facts in evidence, but abuse of discretion to deny non-movant's challenge as to one claim, as employer's apparent non-compliance with its policy on priority candidates might reveal facts that substantiate the claim.

Fifth Circuit: Angela Roberson-King v. State of LA Workforce Cmsn

State law claim must be brought under the law granting the specific cause of action, as opposed to the more procedurally lenient general tort recovery statute.

Discrimination claim under the federal statute does not present an issue for trial when the candidate who actually got the promotion and the plaintiff are equally qualified; the business judgment of the employer is a sufficiently non-pretextual race-neutral justification.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-30899-CV0.pdf

First Circuit: Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM, Inc.

In establishing similarly-situated comparators for a disparate treatment claim based in misbehavior, the misbehavior of the comparators must be proved.

Retribution claim must be proven beyond proximity in time.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1512P-01A.pdf

Fifth Circuit: John Stroy v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Mere proximity to a filing's cutoff date is not a sufficient basis for equitable relief; a reason for relief must be articulated.

Convening of a physician review panel is an insufficiently adverse employment action to present an issue for trial as to retaliation.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-30373-CV0.pdf

Sixth Circuit: Heidi Hostettler v. College of Wooster

There is an issue for trial when a plaintiff claiming disability or gender discrimination claims that she can perform all required work within a shorter amount of time; absent a showing to the contrary, the task is not necessarily defined by the number of hours required.

Employer can be estopped from claiming that the amount of leave taken exceeds that protected by the Act when the employee relies to her detriment on an assertion to the contrary, presenting an issue for trial.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0140p-06.pdf




First Circuit: Tang v. Citizens Bank

Counsel's response of "okay, fair enough" after overrule of objection withdrew the objection, and there was sufficient evidence to establish that the jury might reasonably have rejected the "quid pro quo" theory of harassment.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1365U-01A.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Felicia Strothers v. City of Laurel, Maryland

Executive's statement that supervisor wanted to hire someone of a different race, combined with disparate treatment, suffices to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee's subsequent complaint was motivated by perceived racial discrimination and therefore protected activity.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171237.P.pdf

DC Circuit: Ashbourne v. Hansberry

As both the earlier administrative proceeding and the earlier Article III proceeding permitted joinder of the EEOC claim to the civil suit, Title VII claim rooted in the same nucleus of facts is barred under res judicata.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/A7A90C4B0D21BC8A852582BB0050FB8F/$file/17-5136.pdf

Fifth Circuit: Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C.

In a Title VII action for hostile work environment, when an employer becomes aware of harassing or violent conduct by a thord party, it has an obligation to attempt a remedy.

A wrongful termination action under the same statute presents an issue for trial where the protected activity is a refusal to deal with the harassing third party and there is a showing of direct evidence associating the refusal with the firing.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-60072-CV0.pdf