Showing posts with label Statutory Construction. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Statutory Construction. Show all posts

Fourth Circuit: Raymond Benitez v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital

 

As it was established by the state, and has many powers that are typically characterized as government powers, such as eminent domain and bond sales, the hospital trust is within the local government antitrust immunity created by the statute.


Raymond Benitez v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital 

Second Circuit: Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health

 

Since, although the right was established by an earlier statute, the plaintiff's claim is made possible by a change in the defendant's obligations that was enacted by a subsequent statute; the relevant statute of limitations is therefore the statutory limit enacted after the second law, and before the second.

Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health

Fifth Circuit: Alejos-Perez v. Garland

 

The state drugs statute isn't divisible; where the state's double jeopadry caselaw ultimately looks to the factual differences between violations within the same statute, a holding that each item in a list is a separate violation doesn't answer the question of divisibility for immigration purposes.

State statute is broader than the generic definition; remand to agency to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the conduct outside the reach of the generic offense would be prosecuted, and to assess alternate grounds of removability.


Alejos-Perez v. Garland

Eighth Circuit: Brigido Lopez-Chavez v. Merrick B. Garland

 

Because the law asks whether the previous deportation was on the basis of a certain predicate crime, the court engages in the inquiry from the present time, and even where the non-retroactive determination that the crime was not a valid predicate came after the deportation, the inquiry, from the standpoint of the present time, properly determines that the earlier deportation was not on the basis of a valid predicate crime.


Brigido Lopez-Chavez  v.  Merrick B. Garland

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Antoine Wallace

 

Since a sentence was pronounced and the state court record indicates that the deft was credited for time served, rather than simply released, a challenge to the duration of sentence for purposes of subsequent sentencing factors is determined by the state court record of judgment, which can only be altered by a collateral challenge to the earlier conviction.

Since the dictionary definition quoted in an earlier holding to exemplify the plain meaning of a term isn't itself binding in its terms, the activity proscribed under the state statute that reached beyond the bounds of the federal law before the term in the federal law was interpreted to merely have the plain meaning is still within the plain meaning of federal law, despite possibly being outside the dictionary definition quoted.


USA v. Antoine Wallace

First Circuit: US v. Concepcion

 

Re-sentencing under the statute is not a plenary re-sentencing is not a plenary review of all intervening changes in the law, but an imposition of a sentence incorporating the specific changes mandated by the statute.  The judge is then free to weigh the intervening changes in the law in the subsequent discretionary resentencing.  Affording plenary sentencing would unfairly reward those who had been convicted of the predicate offense.

Tenfold, almost equally divided circuit split flagged.

DISSENT:

No need to bifurcate the process; once the court determines the eligibility for resentencing according to the law at the time of the original sentencing, before making the gating decision, the court is then free to consider subsequent legal and factual developments before deciding on whether to grant the motion to revisit the sentence. 


US v. Concepcion

Seventh Circuit: Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

 

Although the private support obligation for stepchildren usually ends with divorce, in public entitlement contexts such as state inheritance tax laws and SSA, the status usually doesn't imply a benefit termination context at divorce.  Since the agency hasn't offered a contrary interpretation, the step-child of the divorced abusive parent has a right to file for naturalization under the Act.


Jennifer Arguijo v. USCIS

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Masha

 

Statute on the misuse of passports can't be extended to counterfeit passports.

No plain error in lay identification of deft in photos, since the photos were from a time at which the witness knew the defendant.

No clear error in sentencing determination that all of the funds in the deft's account were proceeds of fraud.


USA v. Masha

Second Circuit: Cuthill v. Blinken

 

When a minor child of a newly naturalized alien takes their place in the visa queue, the legislative purpose of the statutory tolling of the child's age for the purpose of the pre-naturalization visa dictates that its tolled "statutory age" be applied within the statutory scheme for the post-naturalization visa.

The legislative intent is sufficiently clear to make Chevron deference inapplicable.


Cuthill v. Blinken

Second Circuit: Linza v. Saul

 

As Congress has explicitly recognized National Guard dual service technicians as civilian employees, a plain reading of the statute suggests that the employment does not fall within the military exception to the benefits limitation statute.

Circuit split flagged.

Linza v. Saul

Ninth Circuit: Arconic, Inc. v. APC Investment Co.

 

Where a statute creates a right to seek contribution to an environmental settlement or judgment but provides that such contribution must be sought within three years of the entry of judgment, seeking contributions from de minimis co-polluters that indemnify them against any future claims does not start the clock to seek other contributions within a prospective limitations period triggered by a subsequent claim against the same site.  A right to contribution can't arise until the judgment creating the liability is entered, and this division of eligible costs serves the purposes of the law

Judicial estoppel similarly does not preclude seeking a second round of contributions for a second judgment, as there's no inconsistency.


Arconic, Inc. v. APC Investment Co.

First Circuit: US v. Cotto-Flores

 

As Congress retains the power to legislate on police power matters in Puerto Rico, the amendment of the relevant statute to include commonwealths sufficiently indicated the intent of Congress that the law should apply to crimes committed entirely within the non-state commonwealth.

Sufficient evidence for conviction, as the impeachment of the witness didn't make the finder of fact's crediting of other evidence unreasonable.

Instructing the jury on the state predicate offense didn't confuse them about which offense they were weighing.

As live video testimony is only available in certain situations where the witness cannot reasonably communicate because of fear, allowing a witness to testify remotely where the fear was generalized to the situation and not specific to the deft, and the court accepted the witness' statement without adopting it as a reasoned finding, a retrial is an appropriate remedy.

Concur: 

Constitutional status of Puerto Rico is still that of an unincorporated territory, as the law creating the Commonwealth changed governance procedures rather than constitutional status, and was not a compact.

 US v. Cotto-Flores

Ninth Circuit: Gonzalo Dominguez v. William Barr


State drug statute criminalizing manufacture and delivery is divisible, as the two are different elements, not different means.

Under modified categorical review, the statute is a valid predicates, since the state's inclusion of "conversion" in the definition of drug manufacture overlaps the federal definition of "production."

Board's adjudication took sufficient consideration of the particulars of the case.

Issue of defective notice, promptly remedies, was not jurisdictional.



Fifth Circuit: USA v. Herman Sanders, et al


Rivals might have been appropriately joined, as they were involved in the same acts or transactions, but no actual prejudice, given curative instruction and the fact that the potentially prejudicial testimony was a small part of the total.

Required scienter encompasses all of the elements -- "knowingly" implies that the deft knew that the victims were minors.  Lack of proof of this at trial made for a constructive amendment to the indictment.


Second Circuit: United States v. Atilla


Statute that prohibited evading or avoiding economic sanctions on a foreign nation referred only to evading existing sanctions, not the attempt to avoid the imposition of subsequent sanctions.

Elements of bank fraud and bank fraud conspiracy would necessarily mean that existing sanctions were violated, so harmless error.

Sufficient evidence for prohibited use of US banks, since US dollars were desired, and court heard testimony that there was a high likelihood that the process would pass through a US entity at some point, something that the conspirators were likely well aware of.

Statute prohibiting fraud against the government goes beyond the common-law definition of fraud to encompass any impairment of government functions.

Statute does not trespass on executive conduct of foreign affairs, since DOJ is an executive agency, and they decide to prosecute.

If the refusal to allow a transcript and tape of jail telephone call in for impeachment after gov't witness' claim that he had not said that in America, people have to admit to things they haven't done in order to get free was error, it was harmless error, as the jury was aware that the witness was hoping to receive leniency for his cooperation.


First Circuit: Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc.


Intra-state delivery drivers routinely carrying interstate parcels for a company engaged in interstate commerce are sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce to qualify for the exception to the Arbitration Act, given the interpretation of a parallel statute -- the narrow reading of arbitration exceptions and legislative history to the contrary are both answered within the precedent.

Where the express choice of a certain law for the arbitration provisions in a contract is severed in judicial review according to the severability provisions of the contract, the law identified in he general choice of law provision of the contract instead controls the arbitration provisions.

Although class claim waivers in agreements covered by the Arbitration Act cannot be waived due to the state's public policy, where, as here, the agreement is within an exception to the Act, state public policy can make the waiver of class claims unenforceable.

As the conflicts rules of the forum state would oust the foreign law where it contradicted state public policy, the conflicts rules of the forum state that has identified the policy interest control.

DC Circuit: Grace v. William Barr


District court had sufficient statutory jurisdiction to review policy document addressing substantive law invoked by the procedural law subject to judicial review; challenge in individual cases would prove impractical.

Policy change announced in agency adjudication not insulated from review by the bar on review of individual cases; separate jurisdiction strip statute evaded in this case, as the policy affects both the matter covered by the jurisdiction strip and other matters.

Administrative standard adopted under Chevron logic is arbitrary and capricious, as it is inherently bifurcated, and could result in different outcomes in identical situations based on which standard was used.

New choice of law policy arbitrary and capricious, not sufficiently distinguished as a change from prior practice, and the justifications advanced are not in the rulemaking itself.

Policy guidance appropriately states the rule on circularity of harm developed in agency adjudications.

Language in guidance document suggesting prospective application appropriately qualified by statements of generality, and therefore not a new rule.

Jurisdiction strip referred to the operation of the statute, not rulemaking found to be inconsistent with the statute.  (Perhaps.  This is quick work.  Don't ever rely.)

Dissent:

Jurisdiction strip statutes apply, allowing review of law and application of law to fact would undercut the purposes of the bars to review.  


DC Circuit: Imapizza, LLC v. At Pizza Limited


Conditional request for leave to amend in memorandum in opposition didn't satisfy local rules for motion for leave to amend.

Downloading images from plaintiff's US website is not sufficient for domestic copyright infringement, as fixation happens when the image is reproduced for the foreign viewer.

Taking photographs of US restaurants in support of a scheme of actual copying abroad doesn't infringe, as the act of taking photos of these buildings didn't infringe.

Generally, the predicate act test requires an act of domestic infringement.

Tourist confusion as harm would impermissibly broaden the effects-based extraterritorial scope of the Lanham Act.

Visit for the purpose of infringement was not Trespass.

No abuse of discretion in denial of surreply, as party had two opportunities to weigh in on the issue.

Second Circuit: United States v. Jones


Pace the Ninth Circuit, the relevant statute's proscription of "false and fictitious" documents includes false versions of legitimate documents, not just novel types of instruments.

Ninth Circuit: Andrea Schmitt v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan


Statute's nondiscrimination provision's reference to other civil rights laws implicates, but does not guarantee, the protections in those laws.

Prior caselaw as to previous statutes indicating that they don't cover health plan design are superseded by the reference in the present Act.

State enactment of plan's legislation cannot abrogate federal nondiscrimination provisions.

Specific protections don't imply that they are exhaustive -- no expressio unius.

Blanket exclusion of all treatments except one for a particular condition does not state a claim for discrimination.

Allegedly discriminatory conduct towards those with a certain condition is not proxy discrimination towards those with the associated disability.