First Circuit: Gibson Foundation, Inc. v. Norris

 As a reasonable finder of fact could determine that the agreement to keep the piano in the warehouse was a consensual agreement that ultimately benefitted both parties, and under state law, claims regarding bailments can be subject to either the contract-claim or tort-claim statute of limitations, there exists an issue for trial as to whether the shorter limitation term applies.

Possession is sufficient for rebuttable proof of ownership at the time of the creation of the bailment; ownership, and therefore the validity of the bailment, therefore presents a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

A reasonable juror could find that the acceptance of the piano created an enforceable contract, as the owner of the piano saved storage costs, making for sufficient consideration. The term of the contract need not have been definite; possessing it until it was requested by the owner would be sufficient.

Genuine issue for trial as to ownership, given corporate succession beforehand; employee's statement that the piano would be "all yours" if picked up states a claim for transfer of ownership.

 Gibson Foundation, Inc. v. Norris

Fourth Circuit: US v. Gregory Brantley

 

The time limit for appealing un-pronounced elements of the sentence is a mandatory claims-processing rule, and since the govt timely requested dismissal, equitable waiver is unavailable. Deft's analogy to appeal waivers inapposite, since in that case, imposition of sentence happens after (otherwise appealable) judgment is issued.  Terms of a judgment are presumptively binding, and deft was put on notice of them when judgment issued.

US v. Gregory Brantley

Fifth Circuit: Ledford v. Keen, et al

 

The claim that the directors of the rodeo corporation had run the corporation as a sham and therefore that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling when adding the directors to her claim adequately stated a claim for relief, but under governing state law, undercapitalization alone is insufficient to establish that the corporation was a liability shell subject to veil-piercing.

https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/20/20-50650-CV0.pdf

Sixth Circuit: Sharon Potter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

 

Denial of class certification that doesn't reach merits but instead is a case managment order associated with a stay pendng a related appeal doesn't end the tolling of statutes of limitation for absent class members, as their reliance on the class remedy and the representatives is still objectively reasonable.  

As the stay put the parties on notice of pending claims and continued reliance by absent class members was reasonable, the continued tolling serves the purpose of the statute of limitaitons and the economy of litigation.

Circuit split with Fourth flagged.

Once an uncertified class action is dismissed, tolling ceases.

Claim for equitable tolling forfeited for not being distinguished from tolling of right claim before the District Court.

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions/opinions.php

Sixth Circuit: Leslie Nolan v. Detroit Edison Co.

Claims were timely filed, as the statute of limitations did not start to run until, taking all favorable inferences,  the claimant had actual knowledge of the claim or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the claim.

Allegation that plan documents did not make the effects of annuity disbursement, changes in interest rates, and possible negative effects of switching plans sufficiently clear to the average plan participant states a claim.

Despite being insufficient notice under the statute, Plan documents were not in bad faith, since they attempted to explain, compare and caution, and were multi-modal in nature, making a sufficient good-faith effort to convey the information.

Leslie Nolan v. Detroit Edison Co.

Second Circuit: Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health

 

Since, although the right was established by an earlier statute, the plaintiff's claim is made possible by a change in the defendant's obligations that was enacted by a subsequent statute; the relevant statute of limitations is therefore the statutory limit enacted after the second law, and before the second.

Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health

Second Circuit: New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation et al. v. Fed. Energy Regul.

 

Given the tolling orders issued by the agency, the sixty-day period for seeking judicial review of agency action wasn't a jurisdictional limit that commenced by operation of law at the point at which agency inaction might have been construed as a denial; the permissive "may" allows the challenger to wait for final action by the agency.

Statute is a mandatory time period for agency action, since it both defines the action and specifies the result of inaction.  Since this time limit is designed to protect the regulatory structure rather than individual private applicants, the agency cannot contract or coordinate with the applicants to extend the time-frame.

Federal agency review might have reached the question of waiver sua sponte or on motion of a third party, so the fact that the party challenging the waiver had been a party to the waiver agreement did not estop the federal agency review from reaching the question.

Agency's policy allowing them to construe a request for expedited action as a request for a waiver determination was a reasonable construction of their statutory powers.

New York State Dep’t of Env’t Conservation et al. v. Fed. Energy Regul.

First Circuit: Marcano-Martinez v. Coop. de Seguros Multiples

 

Although prescription is an affirmative defense, once established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish an interruption; phone calls with no verification mechanism were insufficient to establish an extrajudicial claim on the insurance policy that might stop the clock.

Marcano-Martinez v. Coop. de Seguros Multiples

Seventh Circuit: Apostolos Xanthopoulos v. LABR

 

Board's determination that, since the latter reports were not seeking precisely the same statutory remedy, earlier reports filed with the regulator did not equitably toll the statute of limitations for the second remedy, was sound and supported by adequate evidence.  

Apostolos Xanthopoulos v.  LABR

Seventh Circuit: Vaun Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago

 

As a claim of discrimination under the federal statute is an attempt to remedy a personal injury to civil rights, the appropriate statute of limitations is taken from the appropriate state's personal injury tort law.

Vaun Monroe v.  Columbia College Chicago

Fifth Circuit: Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

 

Plain text of a federal statute permitting the transfer of an action where the court has a want of jurisdiction allows transfers for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or both.

The provisions of the statute are compulsory, so they apply whether or not the court cites it when transferring an action.

State statute prescribing any suit after one year from the accrual of the claim but tolled by either filing a claim in a court of sufficient jurisdiction and venue or service looks to the federal courts to determine the date of filing of suit, so the federal law relating back the transferred suit to the date of filing in the first venue.  The state statute looks to the federal relation-back because the Rules of Decision Act privileges federal statutes over state laws, so the Erie analysis looks first to the federal statutory law.  The federal statute controls under the Supremacy Clause; the case is within the statute, and Congress had sufficient authority to pass the statute to regulate the federal courts.

DISSENT:

Federal statute wasn't intended to regulate state statutes of limitations.  State law is an integrated regulation of statute of limitations and service of process.  Majority's view leads to unequal results between state and federal court, and in federal courts handling transferred claims and federal courts serving as the initial forum

Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

Ninth Circuit: Michael Kaiser v. Cascade Capital

 

Even if made in a good faith belief in the validity of the claim, lawsuits and communications made to collect time-barred debts (and that do not acknowledge the lapsed time limit) are both unfair and misleading, and incur strict liability under the federal debt collection law.  A mistake about the state law statute of limitations underlying the claim is a mistake of fact that might qualify as an exculpatory bona fide error under the federal law.

Michael Kaiser v. Cascade Capital

Second Circuit: DeSuze et al. v. Ammon et al.

 

Statutory notice and comment provision in affordable housing rent increase procedures that places local approval prior to federal consideration do not create a procedural interest under the APA where a subsequent rulemaking reverses that order.

Statute of limitations begins to run, at a minimum, when a reasonably prudent person would have been able to determine the nature of the claim, not when the precise mechanism is explicitly  identified. (Here, apparently, when one of two APA claims became apparent.)

Relevant statutory statute of limitations is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar; the court can therefore consider a claim for equitable tolling.

As the agency actions were discrete instances, the continuing action doctrine does not save the claim against the S1983 statute of limitations.

DeSuze et al. v. Ammon et al.

Seventh Circuit: P.W. v. USA

 

Although a traumatic birth is insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, the circumstances around the birth were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice of the possibility of an actionable claim.

Federal tort claim act requires actual dismissal of intervening claim to trigger the statutory exception to the statute of limitations.

Statute of limitations not estopped by clinic's lack of explicit designation as a federally funded facility.

Equitable tolling unavailable, given publicly available database of federal health care providers.s

P.W. v.  USA

Sixth Circuit: Todd Courser v. Keith Allard

 

Court appropriately dismissed S1983 & S1985 claims, as the constitutional interests were not pleaded with particularity.

Court appropriately did the same to state constitutional claims, as those are limited to official-capacity claims.

Alleged CFAA violations resulted in no harm, and there is no civil c/a to enforce the criminal elements of the statute.

Defamation claim was time-barred under state SOL.

To state a claim for civil conspiracy, the underlying tort harm needs to be established -- the defts can't be implicated in a tort that requires them to be the tortfeasors by a claim of conspiracy.

Other tort and RICO claims legally or factually insufficient.

Wiretap Act time-barred.

Court appropriately set aside default judgment against one deft on equitable grounds.

Todd Courser v. Keith Allard

Fourth Circuit: US v. Daryl Bank

Explicit waiver of Double Jeopardy rights in agency civil proceeding does not bar current challenge, since agreement did not reference future or criminal proceedings, and agency's equitable remedy was not yet considered a criminal punishment.

Although disgorgement is meant as a punitive measure for behaviour that violates the public law, the determination that the criminal statutes of limitations apply is an insufficiently clear rule to establish that the penalty is sufficiently criminal in nature to justify a double jeopardy claim, in that the legislature clearly intended a civil equitable remedy when it empowered the agency to seek it.

US v. Daryl Bank

Third Circuit: Craig Geness v. Jason Cox

An argument for equitable tolling must be raised in the opening appellate brief; otherwise, it's waived.

When inquiring as to whether a nolle prosequi was a favorable determination, a court must look beyond the four corners of the order.

Given an affidavit to the contrary and absent any deposition testimony, speculation that exculpatory evidence was known at the time was insufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact.

Claim of discrimination under federal law is a new and separate claim not barred by Rooker-Feldman after earlier state court adjudication relating to the events.

Motion to amend at summary judgment stage within a year of filing is presumptively timely.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172073p.pdf

First Circuit: Harry, Jr. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Fraud that voids a transaction ab initio does not toll or waive the relevant statute of limitations for actions to claiming fraud that voids a transaction ab initio.

Tolling a statute of limitations due to fraudulent concealment requires a threshold showing of due diligence by the movant, which can be disproved by delays in filing.

Acceleration of a mortgage note does not affect the time limits under state law on the right to foreclose.

Mortgagor does not have a private right of action against mortgagee under state mortgage licensing law.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2380P-01A.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Sierra Club v. National Park Service

As claim arises under 2005 amendment, state statute of limitations isn't borrowed; general four-year federal rule applies.

Agency cannot claim lack of time as a basis for holding that numerical take limits are impractical.

Vague and unenforceable take limits were arbitrary and capricious.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/181082.P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Thomas J. Litterer v. Rushmore Loan Management

Given answer to question certified, namely: equitable modification under the state's rules of procedure is unavailable where the term is defined by statute and the modification would alter substantive rights, filing of a lis pendens outside the statutory period is insufficient to overwhelm the conclusive presumption of compliance.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/163060P.pdf