Showing posts with label Standing (Art. III). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Standing (Art. III). Show all posts

Seventh Circuit: Chicago Joe's Tea Room, LLC v. Village of Broadview

Denial of equitable relief can suffice for interlocutory appeal despite pendent unresolved damages.

Sufficient standing for the owner where owner leases to a party who leases to another party for use barred by the action in question.

Claim arising from municipality's barring of the use is moot, as the lessee's planned use would always have violated governing law, so enforcement of the municipal regulation is not barred by the vested rights doctrine; an earlier finding of licit use does not bind under law of the case, as it is a subjective, discretionary consideration of jurisdiction, and there is no indication that the earlier finding considered the relevant statute. 

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-29/C:16-1989:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:2178625:S:0

Fourth Circuit: Ohio Valley Environmental v. Scott Pruitt

Plaintiffs have sufficient Article III standing to challenge EPA action affecting a state's rivers when they can establish concrete and particular harms arising from some subset of the rivers.

State's lack of filing is insufficiently clear and ambiguous to trigger the constructive submission of a refusal to file -- the question of agency obligation is therefore one for trial.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171430.P.pdf

DC Circuit: Electronic Privacy Information Center v. FAA

Drone organization doesn't have associational standing to challenge rulemaking, as the commercial concerns are largely outside the scope of the proposed rule, and the personal privacy concerns are speculative.

Also, no organizational standing, as bare assertion of not being able to inform its members is an insufficient showing.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/DA5DA28557555A8C852582B100518571/$file/16-1297-1736670.pdf


Fourth Circuit: Rhonda L. Hutton v. National Board of Examiners

Where the fraudulent opening of lines of credit in plaintiffs' name can be plausibly traced to the deft's data breach, plaintiffs have suffered, at minimum, sufficient concrete and particular imminent harm to state a claim. 

Ninth Circuit: April Bain v. California Teachers Ass'n

Where the original parties to the suit challenging union fees leave covered employment during the pendency of the appeal and can therefore no longer receive the sought equitable and injunctive relief, the case is moot; it cannot be converted into an action for damages, and an organizational plaintiff cannot be joined to preserve standing. 

The remedy is dismissal without a vacatur of the earlier decision on the merits.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/11/16-55768.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Kathy A. Netro v. GBMC



Portion of unpaid state court judgment that plaintiff would eventually have to reimburse to the federal government sufficed for Article III injury for the plaintiff.

Statute, although not formally a qui tam statute, effected a partial assignment of claim sufficient for standing.

Delay in payment of judgment not unreasonable, though.


http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171597.P.pdf




Eighth Circuit: Kent Bernbeck v. John Gale


Elections, Standing


Plaintiff has no standing to raise OPOV claim based on state law setting a minimum number of petition signatures from each geographical area, as the alleged inability to engage in future conduct is insufficiently imminent.

Plaintiff has not proved his own voter registration, so he has no basis for claim as a petition signer.

Dissent -- This issue wasn't briefed, and there is no such thing as a registered voter in this state.

Second Circuit: Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester


FRCP

So long as the relief sought and theory of the case are identical, a propsective intervenor of right in a pending action need not demonstrate separate Article III standing.  It is sufficient that they have a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest relating to the existing case/controversy.

Circuit split flagged.

 Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester

DC Circuit: State of West Virginia v. HHS



Standing, ACA

State doesn't suffer cognizable injury-in-fact when federal government declines to exercise a statutorily-compelled primary function, leaving the state to decide whether it should exercise its secondary function.

State of West Virginia v. HHS


Fifth Circuit: Jay Isaac Hollis v. Loretta Lynch, et al


Guns, Standing

Parallel state prohibition doesn't moot the claim when the argument is a constitutional one, since the state statute would presumably subsequently be found unconstitutional, and might separately legitimize the protected conduct.

As a trust holds property for the benefit of the beneficiaries, a gun owned by the trust would be considered to be possessed by the beneficiary.  Even where trust is considered to be in possession, a natural person might also considered to be in possession.

No Second Amendment protection for machine guns, as they are dangerous and unusual and therefore not in common use.

Equal Protection analysis subsumed in Second Amendment calculus.



 Jay Isaac Hollis v. Loretta Lynch, et al

DC Circuit: Sierra Club, et al v. FERC

Standing, Environment

Member living under a mile away gives associational standing to challenge increased constuction and output at natural gas port, given construction plans.

Environmental analysis was a substantial part of the export strategy, so not moot.

Intervening causation defeats challenge to export strategy by challenging port expansion.

Foreseeable and proximte effects on national markets required for cumulative analysis.

Shift in metrics not raised in agency proceedings


Sierra Club, et al v. FERC

DC Circuit: Sierra Club v. FERC

Standing, Environment

Organization meets causation and redressibility requirements for associational standing in challenge to an increase in natural gas production levels due to member who fishes in the area, given the presumptive increase in tanker traffic.

On merits, claim that increasing production at this port will lead to exports, causing domestic harms is flawed, because it relies on an intervening act - a decision to increase exports.

Agency hard look did not have to take a hard look at other projects occurring outside the jurisdiction which might have had a cumulative effect.


Sierra Club v. FERC

Fifth Circuit: State of Texas v. EEOC, et al

Standing, Discrimination, Administrative

State has Article III standing to challenge EEOC employment guidance, as it would have to either change its hiring policies or incur costs. 

Since the agency, although it has no enforcement authority, can make policy changes that cause injuries sufficient for Article III harms, lack of enforcement power is not a per se bar to the action being sufficiently final under the APA.

Safe harbors and definitions for key terms speak to finality.

An agency can alter rights without issuing guidance that courts are legally bound to defer to.

Dissent.  Nope, and not ripe, either.


State of Texas v. EEOC, et al

Third Circuit: In Re: Nickleodeon Consumer Pr


Standing, ECPA, Preemption, Torts

Disclosure of online user data sufficiently particular & concrete for Article III standing.

One-party consent under the wiretap act & corresponding state statute has no implicit age restriction.

 PCs are not protected computing facilities under SCA
.
 State statute requires something beyond access to data - must establish use.

Search engine not covered by video privacy statute; that statute requires something more than an identifying number, since an observer must be able to associate a person with specific content.  This holding cannot be reduced to a single sentence.

As claim derives from the expectation of privacy on the website, state intrusion on privacy tort not preempted by federal data statute.  

Third party cookies on site don't present a cause of action under the tort, but standard tracking might, if duplicitous.



 In Re: Nickleodeon Consumer Pr

Seventh Circuit: John Otrompke v. Bradley Skolnik


Posner, Free Speech, Standing


Candidate for admission to the state Bar has no standing to preemptively challenge a an allegedly unconstitutional provision of the rules, since the Bar might decide not to unconstitutionally enforce it.


John Otrompke v.   Bradley Skolnik

Eleventh Circuit: Brandon Jones v. Commissioner, GA DOC, et al. (2)

S1983, Due Process
Due process claim against state secrecy statute doesn't state a claim under S1983.

Eighth amendment claim not appealed, insufficient, as no better method has been established.

Insufficient injury for standing resulting from state secrecy statute.

Lateness of appeal argues against equities of stay.

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610277.ord.pdf

[CB editorial: The death penalty is morally unjustifiable.]

Sixth Circuit: Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown, Ohio

Municipality does not have Article III standing to challenge a second municipality's use of a very large pipe to build a second sewer nearby, since, although the large pipe might someday be used to offer a competing sewer option to a factory in the first municipality, there is insufficient showing that it would happen within the timeframe of the federal noncompete statute.

Dissent: Standing, since judicial resolution would provide present financial certainty. (But would deny on merits.)

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/16a0022p-06.pdf

DC Circuit: Douglas Huron v. Beth F. Cobert

Standing, Administrative

Absent a showing of an extraordinary circumstance, a plaintiff cannot assert Article III Standing at trial and Statutory/Procedural Standing on appeal.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/933D62CF9FD20DA485257F3F0052C5F1/$file/14-5042-1594112.pdf

Third Circuit: Josh Finkelman v. National Football League

Standing.

No Article III standing for challenge to NFL ticket prices, as no ticket was purchased, and the plaintiff didn't show that a more democratic ticketing system would have allowed him to go to the Super Bowl.

Second plaintiff who purchased ticket has no Article III standing, as he didn't attempt the lottery in additional to the premium ticket purchase, and can't therefore challenge the lottery practices, and the harm sustained by a secondary market purchase isn't the difference from face, but the unknowable difference from a ticket purchased in another version of the market.

Analogy to Twombly - facts consistent with a thing versus the thing itself.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151435p.pdf

Tenth Circuit: Hagos v. Raemisch

Habeas - case/controversy, standing.

A Federal habeas petition presents a valid case or controversy with a valid means of redress when the collateral proceeding seeks to challenge one of two concurrent life sentences, where the second conviction is also subject to challenge, as the reversal of the conviction might affect the second collateral challenge.

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-1497.pdf