Second Circuit: Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo

For standing to challenge state firearms licensing scheme, plaintiffs must either apply for a license or demonstrate the futility of doing so.

11th Amendment bars claims against judges in their individual capacity when adjudicating firearms licensing applications, as the licenses issue under judicial order, although the refusals are communicated administratively.

As firearm licenses can be legitimately withheld for certain reasons, the statutory requirement of good moral character can be read to incorporate these reasons, and is therefore not unconstitutionally vague.

Licensing scheme doesn't offend Second Amendment, as there is a substantial relationship between the legitimate goals of the licensing scheme and the restrictions that it imposes.

Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo

Ninth Circuit: Michael Peirce v. Douglas Ducey

State citizen has insufficient concrete or personal harm to challenge state constitutional reallocation of assets held in trust by the state, claiming that the constitutional amendments violate the terms of the trust as defined in the federal enabling legislation.

The voluntary cessation to mootness would not apply in such a case if Congress were to ratify the change, since the alleged transgressor is the state, not the federal government.

Although there is insufficient basis for a private right of action under the federal statute, the bar is not necessarily a jurisdictional one.

Michael Peirce v. Douglas Ducey

Fourth Circuit: Eugene Baten v. Henry McMaster

Plaintiffs challenging state's allocation of Presidential Electors en bloc have Article III standing, as they allege sufficient injury and causation; although political gerrymandering is nonjusticeable, racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims are substantially different.

No vote dilution, as the state is a unit, and each vote within it is equally counted; this structure is baked into the Constitution, and reflected in the tiebreaking procedure in the House, where each state gets a single vote.

Freedom of Association right derives from the right to associate with the party of one's choice, not from the party's chances, or the expectation that the national party will pay much attention to you.

VRA S2 and Gingles challenge falls short, since there is not prospect of a minority majority district, the poll is for electors, not the ultimate candidates, and minority voters have equal opportunity to select candidates of their choice.

Eugene Baten v. Henry McMaster 

DC Circuit: American Hospital Association v. Alex Azar, II

Jurisdiction-strip statute circumscribed by ultra vires agency actions -- if actions were in excess of the statutory authority - even if not plainly and clearly so -  the jurisdiction strip doesn't apply.

Where the jurisdiction strip merges with merits, deference still applies, since otherwise there would be a wider scope of review, contrary to law's intent.

Implementation provisions referencing statute that the agency is interpreting doesn't preclude implementation rulemaking as to the latter, since the latter recites other implementation mechanisms.

Agency reading is reasonable, given text and statutory context, so jurisdiction strip applies.

Arguendo, even without a basis for Article III jurisdiction, under statutory jurisdiction, the rulemaking doesn't conflict with a law regulating such reimbursements.

American Hospital Association v. Alex Azar, II

Third Circuit: Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service

Where a party to a statutory arbitration agreement involving prospective equitable relief in which both parties have consented to judicial entry of the award seeks a summary proceeding in federal courts for entry of the award, there is sufficient a case or controversy for constitutional purposes.

Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service

Eleventh Circuit: Myra Corley, et al v. Long-Lewis, Inc., et al

As governing circuit precedent on the question is in conflict with earlier circuit precedent that it doesn't distinguish or overrule, the earlier precedent governs -- voluntary dismissal without prejudice is therefore a sufficiently final order for the purposes of appeal, since it removed the case from the court's consideration.

Interlocutory denial of motion to reconsider by the courts of another circuit that eventuates in a voluntary dismissal with prejudice within the circuit is considered only in the context of the appeal from the voluntary dismissal; the implied challenge to the other circuit's courts does not make the subsequent decisions within the circuit unreviewable.

Appellant is sufficiently adverse for purposes of standing to final decision below.  Although it resulted from appellant's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the decision contained merged elements of earlier adverse interlocutory decisions.

No abuse of discretion in denying motion to shift governing law to Admiralty when made in motion to reconsider.

Myra Corley, et al v. Long-Lewis, Inc., et al

Third Circuit: Frank Long v. SEPTA

Although Congress cannot designate an injury as specific and harmful enough for standing, the cause of action and damages for not providing a credit report established that Congress saw the harm as serious, and it was similar to rights recognized in the common law.  The requirement of FCRA notification, though, is a bare procedural violation with no actual harm, insufficient to establish injury in fact under Article III.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/171889p.pdf

Third Circuit: Mona Estrada v. Johnson & Johnson

A person who purchases a product later found to be unsafe but who suffers no harm from the use of the product and who did not forgo purchasing a cheaper version of the product does not suffer sufficient injury for Article III standing, as they have received the benefit of their bargain.

Dissent: Safety of the product is an element of the bargain.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172980p.pdf

First Circuit: Gustavsen v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.

Plaintiffs challenging design of medication container allege sufficient monetary loss for standing, given the possibility that the market will pass along some savings from a redesigned container to the consumer, and the fact that the present design operates as a surcharge.

Statute with a discrete list in the first subpoint and a list of qualitative factors in the second subpoint encompasses anything that corresponds to the qualitative factors, whether or not in the first subpoint. 

Where an agency's sporadic rulemaking or adjudication is in tension with clearly considered regulatory guidance, less deference is due to the former.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-2066P-01A.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Zach Hillesheim v. Holiday Stationstores, Inc.

Claim that placement of refuse can blocked entry to the store disabled persons' access to the store alleges a sufficiently concrete and particular injury for standing.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/173143P.pdf

First Circuit: Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively

Circuit courts do not have jurisdiction under the direct appeals statute to reform unflattering dicta in the opinion below.

Where diversity jurisdiction is pleaded but conceded during the proceedings to be a fiction, the court has the prudential right to invoke judicial estoppel against an attempt to shift the basis for jurisdiction to diversity of parties.

Where pendent state law claims raise sensitive and undeveloped questions of state law, the court does not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplementary jurisdiction and dismissing the pendent claims without prejudice.

Initial motion to dismiss did not ripen into grounds for the judgment, and is therefore unreviewable.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1593P-01A.pdf

Sixth Circuit: Robert Davis v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Cmty. Dist.

Refusal to place ballot issue is not sufficiently concrete or particularized for standing. Placing tax decisions in the hands of the electorate means that redressibility for tax harms is uncertain.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0164p-06.pdf

Fifth Circuit: Patrick Collins, et al v. Steven Mnuchin, Secretary

Minority shareholders have standing to challenge the structure of the federal agency empowered to wind-down or place in conservatorship financial institutions when those voting shareholders lose economic rights due to the agency's policies.

The single-director structure of the agency, combined with the lack of a bipartisanship requirement and a funding procedure outside normal appropriations, unconstitutionally insulates the agency from Presidential control, as the President is unable to ensure the execution of the laws.

Most prudent remedy is the removal of the requirement that removal of the agency head only be for cause.

Dissent: Executive has a voice, Congress has oversight hearings.

Dissent (@judgewillett)   Valid delegation of Congressional power; obligations legally imposed on a conservator are the best protection for the economic rights of the shareholders

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-20364-CV0.pdf

Ninth Circuit: Dutta v. State Farm

Plaintiff does not have a sufficiently concrete injury from the violation of the statute, since the declaration included in the Summary Judgment reply brief established that the violations were ultimately harmless, and plaintiff did not object or request a sur-reply.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/13/16-17216.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Nicholas Knopick v. Jayco, Inc.

If courts do have a prudential power to discern real parties in interest, such a power would be inapposite here, as the plaintiff who used an LLC to purchase a vehicle, and the LLC assigned the right of action to the plaintiff after the commencement of suit.

Absent an equitable "lemon law" showing to the contrary, repairs on a vehicle owned by an LLC and therefore excluded from warrantied repairs did not effect an intentional relinquishment of a known right by the manufacturer that would allow a subsequent claim against the warranty by the LLC.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-11/C:17-2285:J:Hamilton:autcon:T:fnOp:N:2184815:S:0

Fifth Circuit: Raquel Hinojosa v. Petra Horn, et al

Since onetime-citizens who are abroad who have their passports revoked have a right under the statute to petition the Secretary of State for permission to present themselves at a port of entry, they do not have a right to challenge the revocation directly as an administrative action.

This petition process must be exhausted prior to seeking habeas relief; although it does not directly remedy the question of the passport, it allows the grounds for the revocation of the passport to be challenged.

Plaintiff at port of entry cannot seek relief under the statute by declaratory judgment, as statute limits that relief to those inside the US.

Plaintiff who claims to be a citizen, but is denied entry on the grounds that he or she is not a citizen, does not have standing to facially challenge a law requiring all citizens to carry a passport when entering or leaving the country, as it doesn't presently apply to them.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-40077-CV0.pdf

DC Circuit: American Rivers, et al v. FERC, et al

Association's members' desire to observe the diversity of the river is sufficient injury for standing.  Future deterioration is redressible.

A claim that omits to specifically challenge certain regulations can be read to challenge them, given the context, the motion to consolidate, and the discussion of issues; additionally, no prejudice.

Agency opinion arbitrarily disregarded the degree to which degraded baseline conditions imperiled existing species.

A perfunctory provision authorizing subsequent reconsideration if the fishing take exceeded 100% of a given species was an unlawfully vague trigger point.

Agency hard look didn't sufficiently consider present and cumulative harms.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/8CE28752AC62F25A852582C200528B2B/$file/16-1195.pdf

DC Circuit: Sierra Club, et al v. EPA, et al

Agency finding that it was established that a certain emission was not a carcinogen was not based on substantial evidence, as the agency merely searched the literature for proof that it was carcinogenic.

Agency use without a safety margin of a "low confidence" metric beneath comparable state regulations presents an issue for trial.

Petitioners were not required to demonstrate that any given adjustment of the data was unreasonable; the agency needed to explain its rationale for the adjustments.

Agency discretion in setting pollution levels for each category can't be given to the manufacturer by defining several levels for each category; the statute requires the agency to set the levels.

Agency use of a synthetic area source to set the allowable levels for the category wasn't contrary to statute, as the source is within the category as defined.

As industry didn't sufficiently explain why some sources performed surprisingly well, agency's exclusion of some sources wasn't arbitrary or capricious.

Substantial evidence for agency finding that coming innovations will allow industry to meet standard without raw material substitutions.

Tile-making organization does not have sufficient Article III standing to intervene in judicial review of smokestack rulemaking absent some showing that its members will be harmed by the pending rule.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/B42E4D7405452F66852582C200525ACE/$file/15-1487.pdf

Eighth Circuit: Ken Ross, Jr. v. Special Administrative Board

Third party intervenors have Article III standing in an action centered on a consent decree where the intervenor claims that a likely improper enforcement of the consent decree will have adverse consequences for the funding of the schools that their children attend.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/07/163437P.pdf

Ninth Circuit: Fleshman v. Volkswagen AG

Statute grants absolute right of intervention only to citizens who are barred from filing their own suit to enforce the law due tot he government's attempt to enforce that specific law.

As the government filed suit under the law regulating the devices, citizen suits seeking to enforce clean air laws are not barred, and the potential plaintiffs have no absolute right to intervene.

The present request to intervene seeks relief that is distinct from the government's relief; absent Article III standing (which can't be manufactured by simply seeking absolute compliance with the Act), the potential intervenor does not have an intervention of right.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/03/16-17060.pdf