First Circuit: Cushing v. Packard

For claims arising from either of the federal statutes at issue, a suit against an officer of a state legislature in their official capacity, and in which the state is not named in the action, is against the legislator personally in their legislative capacity and doesn't implicate state sovereign immunity.

If Congress can abrogate conduct-based legislative immunity, as opposed to status-based sovereign immunity, a clear statement to that effect in the law is required.

State legislature did not waive its officers' legislative immunity from disability related discrimination  claims by accepting federal funds for the legislative session costs pursuant to a federal statute with an antidiscrimination clause.

Legislative immunity bars a suit against a state officer where the injunctive remedy would effect a change in the rules that was more than merely casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs.

Legislative immunity under the Speech and Debate clause can't be limited by the state's adoption of a less expansive standard in its own law.

Extraordinary exceptions to legislative immunity aren't available, since, among other reasons, the legislature was following independent procedural rules, rather than changing them.

DISSENT:

Purpose of the immunity is to prevent the disenfranchisement of the people.  Effective ouster and disenfranchisement of some can't therefore be immunized in the interests of protecting others. Only immunizing conduct that isn't facially discriminatory opens the door to facially neutral but discriminatory rulemaking.

Cushing v. Packard

Sixth Circuit: Laborers' Int'l Union of N.A. v. Terease Neff

 The court whose employees have joined a union is a state, not county, entity for purposes of sovereign immunity, given its constitutional and statutory designation within the state.  The fact that the state has mandated that the county fund the operations of the court and that the county has discretion in setting the salary levels of the employees supports this, as the mandate is from the state.  As the elected state judge exercises ultimate authority in discharging and retaining employees and sets salaries in the first instance, the employment functions of the court are a state matter.  

The Contracts Clause is an insufficient basis for S1983 claims.  

A Takings Clause injunction would require that there was no remedy sounding in contract; mere breach of contract doesn't state a claim for damages under the Clause.  

CBA term in preamble holding that it remains in force until union is decertified or another agreement is reached insufficient to defeat as a matter of law a specific end date in the terms.

Laborers' Int'l Union of N.A. v. Terease Neff

Fifth Circuit: Arnone v. County of Dallas

 A prosecutor elected within a county and acting within a county is, however, a state officer as opposed to a county officer when deciding questions of or setting policy relevant to the revocation of deferred adjudication in individual cases.  

Arnone v. County of Dallas

Ninth Circuit: Perez v. USA

 

Alleged violation of a jus cogens norm doesn't waive federal soveriegn immunity for purposes of a claim under the Alien Tort Statute under a theory of extra-constitutional wrongdoing.

Equitable tolling not available for second cause of action, which under the law at time of filing would bar recovery under any other cause of action, since this judgment bar would prohibit subsequent recoveries, but did not address claims filed in the same suit, either one of which might have prevailed.

Extension of Bivvens unavailable, as an action against the agency head would be an inappropriate attempt to change government policy, and the claim against the agent who actually shot the Mexican citizen on the border fence has national security implications.

CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL CONCURRENCE

No need to reach sovereign immunity, as the elements of the ATS claim aren't met.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/17-56610.pdf

Fifth Circuit: TX Education Agency v. US Dept. of Education

 

The investigation and fee award from the federal whistleblower retaliation proceeding invoked by the complainant are prohibited by sovereign immunity.  The statute associating the receipt of federal funds with the liability is invoked by the complaint, not by the US, and it doesn't specifically mention the waiver of sovereign immunity; the explicit waiver must be in the statute, not the implementing regulation, so not to infringe the spending power of Congress.

TX Education Agency v. US Dept. of Education

Fourth Circuit: Douglas Fauconier v. Harold Clarke

Prisoner ADA complaint appropriately equitably tolled during exhaustion of administrative remedies required by federal statute.

Prison officials' reliance on a medical classification in the stated denial of all prospects of work states a claim under the ADA.

Prisoner pro se complaint asserting unequal treatment of comparators and lack of administrative explanation for informal denying the chance to work based on a medical classification states an Equal Protection claim.

Eleventh Amendment bars Equal Protection action for damages against prison administrators, but not the ADA action for damages, as an actual violation of the 14th amendment is alleged.

Claims against individuals barred under Qualified Immunity, since a clearly established right would be plain to every reasonable official, and such is not the case here.

Inmate transfer moots all claims for equitable relief except those against Director of agency.

Douglas Fauconier v. Harold Clarke 

Ninth Circuit: Daniel Farrell v. Boeing Employees Credit Union

As the Federal Government's waiver of sovereign immunity makes it subject to process in each state, a creditor seeking garnishment against a party in another state can seek to enforce its judgment in the forum state of the judgment.

Daniel Farrell v. Boeing Employees Credit Union

First Circuit: Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RI Dep't of Transportation

Sovereign immunity bars claim arising from highway construction, as the private right of action in the Act exists only to enforce the Act, not to challenge the program-based decisions of the agency.

Federal court does not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract suit against a state unless the claim states a disputed and substantial federal issue, and prudential factors are favorable.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1951P-01A.pdf

First Circuit: Hajdusek v. US

Although made at the operational level, the Marine training program instructor's decision to work a recruit to the point of permanent physical injury was a discretionary balancing of policy goals, and therefore not within the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Act.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-2137P-01A.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Kevin Carmody v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

If a university official provides incorrect information to investigators, it doesn't, standing alone, present a due process issue for trial, as it doesn't affect the notice and fair hearing protections of due process.

University administrators and officers who would have no reason to doubt the proceeding are not liable for a pre-firing due process claim.

Absent specific waiver, claims against the Board of Trustees of a state university are barred by the state's sovereign immunity.

Denial of summary judgment cannot be challenged on appeal, as the matter of law was fact-bound, and the questions went to trial.

Defts did not waive privilege on inadvertently disclosed document, as production was reasonably diligent, and request for claw-back was timely.

Although plaintiff had no obligation to renew objection to in limine ruling excluding certain evidence, there was insufficient proffer beforehand to preserve the issue for appeal.  ("Deft construes?")

Although appeal was converted to interlocutory status on remand, and the court was therefore free to consider new documents, where these challenged the appellate holding, they needed to surmount the law of the case doctrine and the mandate doctrine.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-19/C:16-1335:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:2172829:S:0

 

Eleventh Circuit: David Dwayne Cassady v. Steven D. Hall, et al

Post-judgment motion to District Court seeking garnishment of funds due state inmate from a state employee is construed as a suit for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment when it makes some claim, demand, or request against the state.

State did not waive immunity by authorizing garnishment for funds due state employees or officials as a result of services performed, and under the Rules Enablement Act, Rule 69 cannot serve as a modification or abridgment of any substantive rights.

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201810667.pdf

Ninth Circuit: John Doe v. Regents

State writ of administrative mandamus is a substantive state proceeding, not merely a mechanism, and as such, is not subject to the Ex Parte Young exception to state immunity for federal remedies.

State claim that plaintiff had not exhausted judicial remedies by seeking administrative mandamus did not operate as a sufficiently unambiguous waiver of state immunity.

Denial of motion to dismiss is on exhaustion grounds can be appealed as a pendent matter.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/06/17-56110.pdf

Eleventh Circuit:Ernest Edgar Black, et al. Jeff Wigington, et al

S1983

Qualified immunity on trespass, as no actual malice established.

Exclusionary rule does not bar use of illegally obtained evidence to establish probable cause in a civil suit. (!)

No sovereign immunity for Sheriff in ADA claim.

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201510848.pdf