Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Given the terms of the current statute, harboring an alien doesn't require specific intent; rather, it proscribes conduct that substantially facilitates remaining and avoiding detection, either knowingly or in reckless disregard of the risk. Circuit precedent on the term doesn't bind, as the changes to the underlying statute have been significant. Error would be harmless anyway, as the aliens being in plain view wouldn't exculpate. Instructions didn't invade 6A territory of the jury.
Absent a showing of bad faith or prejudice, discovery delay in producing dog training records and logs did not require the trial judge to grant a continuance, as there were other discovery materials that might have opened the door to a challenging of the canine evidence.
Evidence of a prior canine indication was more probative than prejudicial, since the switching of vehicles in the interval and the deft's awareness of the narcotics traffic spoke to a continuing plan or scheme and rebutted the claim that he had been an unwitting courier.
Law enforcement testimony as to the usual trafficking operation wasn't impermissible overview testimony, as it came at the end of the trial, the witness was insulated from the particular case, and didn't reference any particulars. Lay testimony of this nature gleaned from on-the-job experience is helpful to the finder of fact, and therefore permissible.
Court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to sentencing rather than considering competency; the determination had been made earlier,and nothing in the colloquy prior to sentencing indicated sufficient incapacity.
There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in collateral statutory discretionary release proceedings. Counsel engaged for proceedings in which the right to counsel attaches do not need to file an Anders brief before subsequently withdrawing from the representation.
Court did not clearly err in holding that involuntary antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate, given physician testimony. While it was possible that the illness is of a type that will not be affected in matters relating to the trial, the long-term benefits of the medication make it medically appropriate despite the risk of side effects.
Denial of severance in capital trial of two prisoners was not an abuse of discretion; jury presumably followed court's instructions, the extensive priors of one co-deft were not unduly prejudicial, and the co-deft's co-conspirator's admissions would have been considered anyway in a separate trial as a statement against interest.
Jury not unduly prejudiced by disclosure at trial that one co-deft had murdered another inmate by stomping on his head.
Since both defts were convicted of beating the victim to death, no plain error in finding that, even if one of them only abetted in the actual murder, the mental state would be sufficient for the death penalty.
No abuse of discretion in arguments about future dangerousness discussing other prisoners who had committed prison murders after commutation of death sentence.
No plain error in discussion of commutation of death sentence that might suggest to the jury that the ultimate responsibility for the sentence might be elsewhere.
No abuse of discretion in government's characterization of mitigation evidence as mitigation of the crime rather than penalty-phase considerations, as the government later appropriately characterized the role of mitigation evidence generally, and a curative instruction was given.
No plain error in government statements about doing justice and the deft's intent to kill.
No plain error in introduction of evidence from unmirandized psychotherapist sessions in rebuttal, since deft had placed his mental health in issue by raising past difficulties in mitigation.
No error in the Sixth Amendment deprivation of counsel during the psychotherapist's examination, as the deft did not establish that the interview was to assess future dangerousness.
Common law psychotherapist evidentiary privilege does not exist in the penalty phase of a capital trial; if it did exist, violations here would not be plain error. Potential circuit split flagged.
No plain error in government's mitigation phase rebuttal witness' straying into discussions of present events.
Exclusion of warden's statement describing victim's conduct that led to the murder was not an abuse of discretion, as the warden was a single deft in a civil suit, and not speaking for the Bureau.
No abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of plea deal in second murder that was introduced as an aggravating factor in the penalty phase.
No plain error in introduction of acquitted conduct in future dangerousness consideration.
No error in categorical analysis of priors as aggravating factors, since the alternate holding of non-statutory aggravators would not have been perceived as less convincing if the statutory factors had been excluded.
Given circuit precedent that Hobbs Act Robbery is a crime of violence, the conviction survives as an aggravator despite the recent Supreme Court holding on the method of identifying crimes of violence by means of a statute's residual clause; nonviolent Hobbs Act Robbery would be Hobbs Act Extortion.
Jury form that requires juror to first determine the existence of a factual situation before deciding that it is mitigating does not offend the statute that says that a finding of the existence of the fact establishes the grounds of mitigation.
Court's instructions on future dangerousness did not improperly marshal the evidence for the government.
Denial of non-unanimity instruction was not an abuse of discretion; refusing to answer a jury deliberations question about non-unanimity was not error.
Conferences allegedly missing from record do not justify reversal; the conferences were neither a hearing or trial nor a judicial proceeding.
Cumulative error unavailable, since no errors were found.
Court's order prohibiting a released detainee's subsequent detention, since it was enforcing an earlier magistrate's holding that the detainee be released, is not within the general immigration removal of jurisdiction.
The bail reform statute does not preclude the pre-removal detention of an alien subsequent to the alien's release under the statute.
Administrative regulations prohibiting a criminal defendant from leaving the country refer to voluntary departures.
The detention does not violate the separation of powers.
Court below did not make formal findings about how the distance that lawyers had to travel related to the Sixth Amendment rights of the deft.
The statute regulating time from indictment to trial cannot be tolled for general court congestion, even when the Judicial Conference has declared an emergency in that district. Remand to decide whether dismissal is with prejudice.
Anxiety is insufficient prejudice upon which to base a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.
Concurrence: Delay was due to counsel's last minute disclosures, not general congestion.
As there was no contemporaneous objection to the exclusion from statutory calculations, review should be for plain error.
(Not labelled a concurrence in judgment, but begins by explicitly agreeing with the relief and then setting forth different reasoning.)
A federal court should abstain from determining whether minors are categorically entitled to counsel in child-removal proceedings -- rather, denials in specific cases are subject to first review by the state's courts.
Historical cell site information obtained without a warrant appropriately considered under the good faith exception.
Where the underlying data was also admitted, testimony by only one of several collaborating investigators did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Investigator's testimony that the technical evidence was consistent with the physical investigation was not improper vouching or bolstering.
As Hobbs Act Robbery is simply the common law felony in an interstate commerce and a non-physical threat therefore wouldn't fall within its scope, the completed crime is categorically a crime of violence.
As the attempt presumes the full offense, the US Code generally defines attempts specific to each offense, and the intent of the legislature was to prevent violent crime, attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is categorically a crime of violence.
Jury instructions sufficiently identified the robbery, and not the conspiracy as the predicate for convictions under the Hobbs Act.
Where deft counsel approves plan of insulating confession of codefendant from incriminating the deft, review is for plain error; in this case, no error plain or otherwise when incriminating conclusion could only be reached by inference.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a protective order prohibiting leaving cooperating witnesses' statements with the deft, as there was sufficient showing of good cause, the Jencks Act statutory right to the materials was adequately preserved, and deft's courtroom misbehavior justified the limitation on the 6A right to the materials.
Court adequately ensured sufficient Jencks Act access to agents' notes by questioning testifying agent as to scope of note-taking and accepting their answer.
Limiting instruction delivered standing-up after deft's courtroom outburst appropriately preserved the proceedings against mistrial.
Prosecutor's recital of plea condition that cooperating witness must tell the truth was not improper vouching, neither was the court's reference to "a cooperating witness of the United States of America."
No plain error in instruction on deft's testimony indicating an interest in the case, as it didn't belabor the fact; lack of limiting instruction against codeft's outburst wasn't plain error given other evidence of guilt.
Identification and withdrawal of claim of sentencing error during proceeding waives the claim in direct review.
No abuse of discretion in not considering mandatory minimums for other counts.
Court appropriately refused to consider elements of competency report as hearsay, as they lacked required indicia of credibility.
Plausible rationale makes 228 month bank robbery sentence not substantively unreasonable.
Deft claim that money could be cleaned from the damage done by anti-theft devices is speculative; FDIC coverage of stolen funds should not be considered in restitution order, as insurance is generally not considered.
No substantive sentencing error in 228 month sentence for bank robbery.
Ineffective Assistance claim insufficiently clear in the record for consideration on direct review.
Criminal forfeiture under the statute is in personam, and therefore money judgments are permitted, despite the common law's historical aversion.
Proceeds from the crime that are subsequently disbursed to co-conspirators are a permissible basis for a forfeiture order against the deft.
No clear error in court's calculation of forfeiture, including funds possessed during the conspiracy and property acquired during the conspiracy, as deft could likely not have legitimately afforded the latter.
No Apprendi protections for criminal forfeiture determinations -- the protections are statutory.
Forfeiture not excessive under 8A.