Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Restitution order was not an abuse of discretion, since the causal relation to the harms incurred used to determine the level of restitution referred to harms that were foreseeable at the time of injury.
The apparent vagueness in the sentencing condition restricting the types of images the deft can possess is in fact sweeping breadth necessary to protect the public.
In making a discretionary sentence reduction, the petitioner is entitled to adequate notice and an adequate opportunity to present information to the court; neither Due Process nor the statute requires a hearing.
Resentencing explanation consisting of a citation to disciplinary records and the adoption of the government's rationale was not an abuse of discretion.
Given the complexity of the investigation and the need to explain it to the jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the hearsay statements given to federal investigators under the "course of the investigation" exception.
Unwitnessed affidavit was properly authenticated by the details in the substance of the affidavit.
Financial threats, psychological threats, and threats to immigration status provided sufficient evidence for conviction under the statute.
The involuntary servitude sentencing factor was correctly added to the transportation charge. Sufficient fear was created in the commission of the offense to justify the relevant sentencing factor. Obstruction sentencing factor correctly applied for perjured affidavit.
Below-guidelines 360 month sentence was reasonable.
In denying the motion for reconsideration made by newly retained counsel, the court merely noted that the pro se petitioner had not advanced any arguments supporting the claim. Denying the motion to reconsider without considering any of the arguments raised by the parties precludes meaningful appellate review, and constitutes insufficiently reasoned judicial decisionmaking.
Evidence of witness' subsequent admission that she was under the influence of narcotics while testifying that she was not a drug user is not new evidence sufficient to revisit the conviction, since the disclosures do not rise to the level of addressing basic competency to testify, and would at most be in for impeachment.
Government concealment of witness' mental state would not rise to the level of a Brady claim.
No abuse of discretion in refusal to grant downward variance from sentencing guidelines.
Concur in J:
The disclosures about the witness are new evidence, but aren't material.
Vacatur with instructions from the Supreme Court of the US presents a jurisdictional limit to the review on remand.
Unambiguously, the sentencing reform statute applied only to those sentences imposed after its effective date; cases pending on direct or collateral review where the sentence had already been imposed were not affected by the statute.
Given the proximity of the guns to the drugs in the deft's domain, sufficient evidence to establish a sentencing bump by a preponderance, despite acquittal on the drug trafficking charge.
Although the denial of compassionate release during the pandemic looked to commentary in the guidelines that applies only to motions by the government, it also individually considered the other appropriate factors, and the denial can be upheld on those grounds.
Agent testimony sufficient to establish by a preponderance that the deft committed bank robberies during supervised release; within-guidelines sentence wasn't an abuse of discretion.
Statute on the misuse of passports can't be extended to counterfeit passports.
No plain error in lay identification of deft in photos, since the photos were from a time at which the witness knew the defendant.
No clear error in sentencing determination that all of the funds in the deft's account were proceeds of fraud.
Dissent from denial of en banc: Sentences must be upheld unless no reasonable jurist would have imposed them in the circumstances, the sentence is logical, and the terms are consistent with sentencing objectives. Reviewing court was insufficiently deferential to trial court's determination of mitigation.
Given finding that the deft abused (rather than merely used) illegal drugs, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a ban on alcohol consumption during supervised release; the condition is reasonably related to the verdict, the deprivation is minimal, and the condition is consistent with the goals of sentencing.
Where deft counsel approves plan of insulating confession of codefendant from incriminating the deft, review is for plain error; in this case, no error plain or otherwise when incriminating conclusion could only be reached by inference.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a protective order prohibiting leaving cooperating witnesses' statements with the deft, as there was sufficient showing of good cause, the Jencks Act statutory right to the materials was adequately preserved, and deft's courtroom misbehavior justified the limitation on the 6A right to the materials.
Court adequately ensured sufficient Jencks Act access to agents' notes by questioning testifying agent as to scope of note-taking and accepting their answer.
Limiting instruction delivered standing-up after deft's courtroom outburst appropriately preserved the proceedings against mistrial.
Prosecutor's recital of plea condition that cooperating witness must tell the truth was not improper vouching, neither was the court's reference to "a cooperating witness of the United States of America."
No plain error in instruction on deft's testimony indicating an interest in the case, as it didn't belabor the fact; lack of limiting instruction against codeft's outburst wasn't plain error given other evidence of guilt.
Identification and withdrawal of claim of sentencing error during proceeding waives the claim in direct review.
No abuse of discretion in not considering mandatory minimums for other counts.
Court appropriately refused to consider elements of competency report as hearsay, as they lacked required indicia of credibility.
Plausible rationale makes 228 month bank robbery sentence not substantively unreasonable.
Deft claim that money could be cleaned from the damage done by anti-theft devices is speculative; FDIC coverage of stolen funds should not be considered in restitution order, as insurance is generally not considered.
No substantive sentencing error in 228 month sentence for bank robbery.
Ineffective Assistance claim insufficiently clear in the record for consideration on direct review.
Categorically, division of statute that criminalizes assualting, resisting, or impeding certain federal employees or officers is a crime of violence for purposes of the sentencing bump. As the element requires a display of physical aggression, it necessarily involves a use or threatened use of force.
Criminal forfeiture under the statute is in personam, and therefore money judgments are permitted, despite the common law's historical aversion.
Proceeds from the crime that are subsequently disbursed to co-conspirators are a permissible basis for a forfeiture order against the deft.
No clear error in court's calculation of forfeiture, including funds possessed during the conspiracy and property acquired during the conspiracy, as deft could likely not have legitimately afforded the latter.
No Apprendi protections for criminal forfeiture determinations -- the protections are statutory.
Forfeiture not excessive under 8A.
Given the specific misrepresentations made, and the fact that insurers would have otherwise more carefully scrutinized the clinic, sufficient evidence for a scheme or artifice to defraud, despite the fact that some percentage of the claims were legitimate.
Restitution, and sentencing calculations should have been offset for the percentage of treatments that were medically necessary. Forfeiture, though, looks to the gross proceeds of the criminal activity and did not have to be offset.