First Circuit: St. Paul's Foundation v. Ives

 Monastery's Free Exercise rights were not impermissibly burdened by regulation of building construction; in seeking to reinstate the earlier approval while recharacterizing the use of the space in a manner that would eventually require the installation of additional facilities, enough doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the reinstatement that there is no issue for trial as to whether the withholding of reinstatement was arbitrary and capricious.

St. Paul's Foundation v. Ives

Eighth Circuit: Business Leaders In Christ v. The University of Iowa

 

Summary judgment based on qualified immunity for the defts was in error, since it was clearly established in both Supreme Court and Circuit precedent that university organizations were limited public forums not to be subjected to unreasonable or viewpoint-based discrimination.  The fact that the policy was unevenly enforced actually reinforces the suggestion of viewpoint discrimination.

As similar cases have been decided on Free Speech grounds, though, the relevant law on Free Exercise was not clearly established.

CONCURRENCE/DISSENT:

Unequal enforcement precludes a finding of facially neutral law of general applicability; the Free Exercise right was sufficiently clearly established.

Business Leaders In Christ  v.  The University of Iowa

Ninth Circuit: Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

 

High school coach's demonstrative religious actions at the center of the field immediately following the game were performed as a public employee in the course of performing the responsibilities of the job.  

The actions cannot be considered personal and private because of the coach's prior attempts to publicize them.  The collective nature of the activity on almost every occasion establishes that an objective observer would conclude that the practice, coupled with the exclusion of others who might seek access, was an endorsement of a particular religion.

Regulation of coach's conduct was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny, given the need to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause.

School district had no obligation under Title VII  to rehire, given the violation of policies.  Plaintiff can't establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, as there were no comparators engaged in perceptible prayer.  As the coach's only request was public prayer at midfield after the game, school district was not compelled to accept it as a reasonable accommodation of a practice of bona fide religious belief conflicting with job responsibilities, and it was a sufficient basis for the adverse employment action.

CONCURRENCE:

Fact-driven holding.  (Analysis tracks majority opinion.)

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District

Second Circuit: People of the State of New York v. Griepp

Clear error to exclude evidence in preliminary injunction hearing as hearsay following finding that the situation lacked sufficient urgency to justify admitting hearsay; in a preliminary injunction hearing, the hearsay nature of the evidence always goes to the weight of the evidence.

Clear error to exclude a category of evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing after determining that two documents of the type were unreliable, and another after being unable to determine the reliability of that type of evidence (latter harmless error).  Everything in for appropriate weight. 

For purposes of the obstruction statutes, a minor delay is not per se a reasonable obstruction; the court must still determine if the delay was a reasonable one.

Placement of signs on a sidewalk in a manner that does not functionally exclude access can still be an attempt to intimidate or obstruct within the terms of the statute, even if no pedestrians appear.

When a protester's actions necessitate that an escort step in front of the protected person, the protester has caused the physical obstruction defined in the statute.

Regardless of the consensual nature of the conversation, speaking to someone inside a vehicle through an open door or placing hands on the car while speaking impeded the car from driving away, and could be considered obstruction.

When taken in the context of recent local violence, and given the subjective fear that the listeners felt, stating that death might come at any time would objectively be taken as a true threat not protected by the First Amendment; similar statements conjoined with an exhortation to repent, or referencing disasters distinct from recent local violence present a different question.

As the decision to have an abortion involves a formidable and poignant process, protesters' seeking to force their ideals on patients approaching a facility creates an inference of intent to harass, annoy or alarm.  An explicit or implicit request to be left alone dispels the legitimate intent of potential interlocutors.

Likely repetition of the violations of the statutes suffices to establish irreparable harm for the injunction.

In the interests of judicial economy, cross-appeal of non-movants' early motions not referenced in the memorandum denying the preliminary injunction are appropriately addressed in the appeal of the denial of the injunction under pendent jurisdiction.

Abortion facility speech limitations are content neutral, as they apply to every abortion facility in any context.

Statutes not void for vagueness, given general definitions in criminal code.

Municipal statute creating a cause of action for "any person" legitimizes a parens patriae action by the state in which the municipality is located; sufficient quasi-sovereign interest demonstrated here.

Concurrence:

Municipal statute is a state statute, since the municipality is a creation of the state; certifying the question to the state would be necessary to determine if the state could act parens patriae by its own statute.

Concur/Dissent:

General dissent as to not honoring the determinations of the finder of fact.

Since the cause of action doesn't list government bodies and the rest of the code generally does, and the statute designates a specific enforcement entity with power to seek an injunction, the state does not have parens patriae standing.

Courts are permitted to consider hearsay in a preliminary injunction hearing; they are not required to do so.

Statute's restriction on making access unreasonably difficult or dangerous explicitly excludes de minimis interference.  Concluding otherwise impermissibly burdens speech. 

Finder of fact held that a reasonable observer familiar with the speaker's preaching would not have interpreted the statements about impending death as true threats.

Irreparable harm finding requires ongoing plans and activities.

People of the State of New York v. Griepp

Eighth Circuit: B.W.C. v. Randall Williams

 

Recital of state's advocacy for vaccination on form required to be signed by those refusing to have their children vaccinated doesn't amount to compelled speech or place any incidental burden on speech.

The requirement to sign the form is a neutral requirement of general applicability that does not cause an increase in the perceived harm of vaccination.

No equal protection claim, as the requirement to sign the form is a general one.

As each individual aspect of the claim is without basis, the hybrid nature of the claim doesn't justify strict scrutiny.

B.W.C.  v.  Randall Williams

Seventh Circuit: Stephen Cassell v. David Snyders

 

Equitable factors counsel against granting a preliminary injunction when the religious practice or meeting size is not currently the subject of regulation with a live threat of enforcement.

Courts must consider the fine-grained details of a public health order's restrictions on the practice of religion when considering injunctions.

Appeal of denial of preliminary injunction requested on substantive grounds cannot be converted to a procedural due process claim.

State RFRA and other state law claims possibly precluded by 11A bar on injunction against state officials, mootness against particular parties, and possibly arise outside supplemental federal jurisdiction.

Stephen Cassell v.  David Snyders

Second Circuit: New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole

Defendant's Free Exercise claim of subtle or covert bias in the implementation of a facially neutral law suffices for additional discovery given the variations between the law and the regulation, the length of time before the regulation was amended, and indications of animus within the administrative process.

Adoption agency's speech is not government speech (e.g., advertisements, monuments, vanity plates), as it's not a traditional mode of communication with the public, and the public doesn't see the speech as government speech -- also, there's no indication that, outside the present context, the govt can control the speech.

Discovery warranted to find out whether compelling certain adoptions might cause the adoprtion agency to change its message in counseling and client contact.

Discovery warranted to determine if compliance with state mandates would harm Free Association by keeping people who would otherwise collaborate with the adoption agency might stay away.

On remand, in tailoring possible preliminary injunction, court must consider verified pleadings and affidavits as evidence of potential harms to constitutional interests.

New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole

Fifth Circuit: Will McRaney v. N Amer Mission Bd So Baptist

Dismissal of a civil tort claim under the Religious Matters abstention doctrine is inappropriate absent sufficient indication that the resolution of the question will force the court to interfere with religious government or matters of faith or doctrine.

Will McRaney v. N Amer Mission Bd So Baptist

Second Circuit: Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.

The term "occurrence" in the policy generally signifies an unexpected event; under state law, except for some strict liability events, the test is actual subjective expectation, not that which a reasonable person would expect.

The challenging of claims by the insurer did not violate state trade practice laws. 

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/85b366f3-f243-43e5-81c8-b4640a784328/1/doc/16-2999_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/85b366f3-f243-43e5-81c8-b4640a784328/1/hilite/

Third Circuit: William Lee v. Sixth Mt Zion Baptist Church

Claims of minister whose contract with his church was terminated for cause due to lack of spiritual leadership do not present an issue for trial, as the question would impermissibly entangle the court in religious matters, and the church has a freestanding First Amendment right to select its ministers.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173086p.pdf

Second Circuit: Williams v. Annucci

Since the statute contemplates increased costs in compliance, simple assertion of the costs of compliance is an insufficiently particular compelling government interest to justify summary judgment.  Government's refusal to accommodate inmate's sincerely held religious beliefs in the provision of meals has not been demonstrated to be the least restrictive means.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/05194beb-c7ca-4533-89f8-3cdc4043f522/1/doc/15-1018_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/05194beb-c7ca-4533-89f8-3cdc4043f522/1/hilite/

First Circuit: Marrero-Mendez v. Calixto-Rodriguez

S1983, Religion, First Amendment, Establishment Clause


Even absent consideration of the on-point precedent, denial of qualified immunity for S1983 challenge to police group prayer would be upheld.



Marrero-Mendez v. Calixto-Rodriguez

Eleventh Circuit: USA v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Religion, Prisons


Under federal statute, assertion of cost burden is insufficient basis for state's refusal to provide kosher meals to prisoners who hold the requisite sincere religious belief.


USA v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.

Seventh Circuit: Gilbert Knowles v. Randy Pfister

Discrimination, Religion, Injunctions


Given statutory rights to religious expression, prison inmate demonstrates the possibility of irreparable harm and likely success on the merits in claim seeking to wear a Wiccan pendant.


Gilbert Knowles v.   Randy Pfister

Seventh Circuit: Michael Thompson v. William Holm

S1983 - prison food/religion.

Denial of substitute meals during periods of fast substantially burdens Free Exercise of Religion.

No qualified immunity for denial of food.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-04/C:15-1928:J:Rovner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1681174:S:0

Third Circuit: Laurence Kaplan v. Saint Peter's Healthcare System

ERISA, Religion -- statutory construction.

While a church agency can maintain an exempt plan, only a church can establish one.

Plain meaning.

Surplussage, Expressio unius..., Remedial statute, Statutory context.

Other statements by same sources in legislative record undermine indications to the contrary.

IRS ruling was not a rulemaking, so only accorded persuasive deference. (Christiansen, not Skidmore)

In subsequent lawmaking that seemed to legislate against the background of a contrary interpretation, Congress never evinced a detailed knowledge of the statutory scheme.

First Amendment not implicated, as churches themselves are free to set up plans.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/151172p.pdf