Anticompetitive effects of a supplier's monopoly behaviour on downstream adjacent markets are beyond the reach of Sherman Act rule of reason analysis, as the relevant market is different.
Refusal to deal horizontally with another supplier is outside of S2 where there is no indication that the dealing was profitable for the deft, there was a valid business reason to end the dealing, and the refusal to deal wasn't targeted.
Absent intentional deception, breach of contract to deal horizontally with other suppliers doesn't create a monopoly harm unless a harm to competition - as opposed to competitors - is proved.
Patent royalty rates different than the current market value of the technology are not inherently anticompetitive under antitrust law.
As the products of the supplier's rivals inherently embody some of the packaged patents, the supplier's licensing of the downstream use of its terchnology within its rivals products is not an inherently anticompetitive surcharge on its rivals products. Subsequent low but non-predatory pricing of its own units is also not an inherently anticompetitive behaviour.
A supplier's requirement that a downstream manufacturer commit to a license for products both supplied by the supplier and its rivals does not distort the area of effective competition; any unfair pricing of the license sounds in patent law, not antitrust.
Even if the exclusive dealing contracts that the supplier claimed were merely volume contracts in fact substantially foreclosed competition in the relevant markets, past harms do not justify a prospective injunction. And there were no viable competitors at the time.
FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.
