Showing posts with label Mootness. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mootness. Show all posts

Ninth Circuit: Michael Sackett v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

 

Case was not made moot by agency's withdrawal of an enforcement order, where the underlying determination of jurisdiction remained,  since it was not absolutely clear that the agency would not seek to reinstate the order.

Although the government enjoys a presumption of good faith in voluntary cessation, it must demonstrate that its change is entrenched or permanent.

Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting memo postdating the relevant decision, since the memo summarizes the same information that the agency relied upon, rather than being a post hoc justification.

Under Supreme Court precedent, EPA jurisdiction over wetlands requires a significant nexus with navigable waters, rather than the freer standard set out by the plurality in that case, since the first standard is a logical subset of the plurality's rule.

Agency's conculsion that painiffs' wetlands have a sufficient nexus to navigable waters wasn't arbitrary, and was supported by the record.


https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-35469.pdf

Eighth Circuit: J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. BNSF Railway Company

 

Arbitration party's pre-confirmation suit sought declatory judgment as to a specific finding and specific performance as to a specific term, rather than enforcement of the award generally, and therefore wasn't untimely.

Suit wasn't moot due to the expected confirmation of the award, since it would give the plaintiff something beyond the confirmation.

The request for specific performance, however, would constitute a modification of the award contrary to the arbitration statute.

Award's definition of certain terms was exclusive, given the clear decision and the lack of language indicating otherwise in the award.

Where the terms of the Award are ambiguous as to which rates the competitor must disclose to its JSA partner, a fair resolution looks to those rates that are most relevant to the substance of the JSA.


http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/202679P.pdf

First Circuit: Sundaram v. Briry, LLC

 

Disbursements by the trustee of assets of the estate  prior to the confirmation of the plan and prior to the dismissal of the bankruptcy case cannot be revisited in a subsequent Article III challenge.  Since the claim attempts to revisit the organization of the estate, the claim is now moot, and statutes and common law rules allowing challenges to erroneous disbursements require that the funds be in the possession of the trustee at the time that the bankruptcy case is dismissed.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/20-9008P-01A.pdf


First Circuit: Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

 

The appeal of the denial of the preliminary injunction wasn't severed by the transfer of the case to another court, rather the denial was merged by operation of law into the final judgment in the second forum, making the appeal in the first forum moot.


 Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Fifth Circuit: Green Valley Special Util Dist v. Donna Nelson, et al.


Dismissal with prejudice of a erroneous claim that an earlier decision of a regulatory body relied on a preempted state statute does not deprive the plaintiff of the right subsequently to assert the preemption of the statute as relied upon by another regulatory decision.

Dispute as to two of the parties is now moot, given private settlement of claims, and subsequent procedural steps and the possibility that an allegedly preempted statute might be relied upon in the future is insufficient to preserve a live case or controversy between the parties.

While the voiding of a past agency order is not obtainable under the Ex Parte Young exception to state sovereignty, subsequent enforcement actions in furtherance of such an order do state a claim.

As the suit is seeking a remedy in equity, the non-jurisdictional bar against S1983 claims against political subdivisions does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Statutory requirement of utility capability implies an inquiry into nearby infrastructure.

CJ, et al., Concur/Dissent: 

Federal statute defining utility service area applies to the degree that federal funds were used to construct the infrastructure.

Concur/Concur with Concur/Dissent:

Fact-bound decision on remand.

Concur:

Where a state law statute creating a private cause of action is preempted, the c/a can arise in equity, and where the claim presents a substantial question of federal law, there is federal jurisdiction.

Concur:

Although, by Bivvens analogy, S1983's exclusion of political subdivisions should extinguish a correlative implied cause of action in equity arising under Ex Parte Young, precedent sufficiently recognizes the validity of an equitable suit for prospective relief against state officials' actions that violate the federal constitution.


Green Valley Special Util Dist v. Donna Nelson, et

Ninth Circuit: Michael Peirce v. Douglas Ducey


State citizen has insufficient concrete or personal harm to challenge state constitutional reallocation of assets held in trust by the state, claiming that the constitutional amendments violate the terms of the trust as defined in the federal enabling legislation.

The voluntary cessation to mootness would not apply in such a case if Congress were to ratify the change, since the alleged transgressor is the state, not the federal government.

Although there is insufficient basis for a private right of action under the federal statute, the bar is not necessarily a jurisdictional one.

Eighth Circuit: Muhammad Abdurrahman v. Mark Dayton

Capable of repetition yet evading review exception to mootness is an equitable consideration; as the faithless elector could have filed suit during the vote-casting process, the exception is not available to him now.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/09/164551P.pdf

Eleventh Circuit: Dennis Haynes v. Hooters of America, LLC

Suit seeking relief that is parallel to an already-agreed settlement with a third party is not moot, as there is no proof in the record of present compliance, no guarantee of ongoing compliance, and the plaintiff wouldn't have standing to enforce the third-party agreement.

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201713170.pdf

Fourth Circuit: Alan Metzgar v. KBR, Inc.

Suit against military contractor for trash burn pits and water provision is barred under the political question doctrine, given that the military's control over the processes at issue was plenary and actual.

As the suit is dismissed as nonjusticiable, the pendent FTCA suit is moot -- statutory exemption not reached.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171960.P.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Tamara Loertscher v. Eloise Anderson

Challenge to state statue prescribing mandatory drug testing for certain pregnant women dismissed as moot, since the plaintiff has moved out of state and the presumption is against continued drug use.

The case is not protected as capable of repetition, yet evading review, since the harms must be to the same plaintiff. 

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-18/C:17-1936:J:Ripple:aut:T:fnOp:N:2172278:S:0

Eighth Circuit: Mary Brazil v. Arkansas Dept of Human Service

In a suit alleging discrimination in employment practices, a material change in the plaintiff's working situation moots a claim of retaliation that seeks injunctive relief where there is only a speculative possibility that the employee might be transferred back to her old position.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172229P.pdf

Ninth Circuit: April Bain v. California Teachers Ass'n

Where the original parties to the suit challenging union fees leave covered employment during the pendency of the appeal and can therefore no longer receive the sought equitable and injunctive relief, the case is moot; it cannot be converted into an action for damages, and an organizational plaintiff cannot be joined to preserve standing. 

The remedy is dismissal without a vacatur of the earlier decision on the merits.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/11/16-55768.pdf

US v. Marcel King



Possible future offender registration requirement is an insufficient collateral consequence of supervised release revocation to prevent mootness after completion of the sentence.


http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/04/17-10006.pdf

Third Circuit: Sebastian Richardson v. Director Federal Bureau of Prisons


Class Actions, Mootness, FRCP


Where a representative of a class seeking prospective injunctive relief files a claim susceptible to mootness, there is not an untimely delay in seeking class certification, and the class nature of the claim is evident from the initial claim, the class certification can relate back to the filing date of the initial claim.


Sebastian Richardson v. Director Federal Bureau of Prisons

Second Circuit: In re Motors Liquidation Co.


Bankruptcy, Jurisdiction, Procedural Due Process,  Mootness


As direct and indirect post-sale claims against the successor corporation arose within the bankruptcy process and related to the injunctions issued, the bankruptcy court properly exercised jurisdiction over the claims.

Prepetition tort claims against a successor corporation state a claim in bankruptcy where the both the contingent flaw and the relationship from which the duty arose were present prior to the order of sale. 

No clear error in court's holding that Procedural Due Process requires--prior to approval of sale--direct purchaser notice of flaws that manufacturer reasonably should have known about.

To determine PDP prejudice, court must have a fair assurance that the prior decision was not substantially swayed.

Given high stakes, there was a substantial likelihood of settlement for claims directly relating to the defect.

 Court's ruling that claims against successor corporation were equitably moot was advisory and is therefore vacated.


In re Motors Liquidation Co.

DC Circuit: Akiachak Native Community v. DOI


FRCP, Mootness

Case is moot, as the regulation has been rescinded.

Dissent -- Parties are still in conflict.

Akiachak Native Community v. DOI

Seventh Circuit: John H. Germeraad v. Myrick J. Powers


Bankruptcy, FRCP, Mootness

A denial of a trustee's motion to modify is analogous to a 12(b)6 dismissal, and is therefore sufficiently final for appeal when not attributable to a technical defect.

Just as 60(b) motion might be filed again with a different theory, the fact that the trustee might file several motions does not affect their finality for purposes of review.

As the proposed change would relate back to the filing date of the motion, the expiration of the plan's timeframe doesn't make the controversy moot.  The fact that denial of discharge is an equitable decision does not affect mootness.

So long as the motion to modify the plan is filed during the pendency of the plan, it is timely.

Although nothing in the Code authorizes a postconfirmation modification to account for increased income, the decision is an equitable one suggested by the purposes of the Code, and is not subjet to any "good faith" requirement.


John H. Germeraad v.   Myrick J. Powers

Seventh Circuit: Roy Mitchell v. Edward Wall

Posner - Mootness & Vacatur.

A party waives the right to vacatur of a lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction by not requesting it upon appeal in a case that has become moot.  Circuit practice is not to typically vacate lower court holding in this situation.  Although the decision below was adverse to petitioner, it was not preclusive as to the issuance of a permanent injunction.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2015/D12-23/C:15-1881:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1676912:S:0