First Circuit: Cushing v. Packard

For claims arising from either of the federal statutes at issue, a suit against an officer of a state legislature in their official capacity, and in which the state is not named in the action, is against the legislator personally in their legislative capacity and doesn't implicate state sovereign immunity.

If Congress can abrogate conduct-based legislative immunity, as opposed to status-based sovereign immunity, a clear statement to that effect in the law is required.

State legislature did not waive its officers' legislative immunity from disability related discrimination  claims by accepting federal funds for the legislative session costs pursuant to a federal statute with an antidiscrimination clause.

Legislative immunity bars a suit against a state officer where the injunctive remedy would effect a change in the rules that was more than merely casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs.

Legislative immunity under the Speech and Debate clause can't be limited by the state's adoption of a less expansive standard in its own law.

Extraordinary exceptions to legislative immunity aren't available, since, among other reasons, the legislature was following independent procedural rules, rather than changing them.

DISSENT:

Purpose of the immunity is to prevent the disenfranchisement of the people.  Effective ouster and disenfranchisement of some can't therefore be immunized in the interests of protecting others. Only immunizing conduct that isn't facially discriminatory opens the door to facially neutral but discriminatory rulemaking.

Cushing v. Packard

Third Circuit: HIRA Educational Services Nort v. Frank Augustine

 

Sufficient jurisdiction to review a denial of legislature members' immunity under the collateral order doctrine, since otherwise the legislators would have to participate in pretrial and discovery matters, and the question is one purely of law.

State legislators' common law federal immunity and immunity from state claims under the state constitution protect actions and speech regardless of subjective discriminatory intent.

Unlike municipal legislators who have both administrative and legislative functions, the actions of a state legislator that are legislative in nature do not have to be proven to be substantively legislative in intent and effect.  Correspondence and telephone calls relating to legislation are protected as factfinding.

Qualified immunity for political errands not within the scope of legislative immunity, as there was not any clear teaching of the courts that the allegedly discriminatory campaigning in the community was against the law.

HIRA Educational Services Nort v. Frank Augustine