Showing posts with label Injunctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Injunctions. Show all posts

Second Circuit: Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc.

Where an alleged trademark infringer incorporates with distortion the characteristics of the original product that indicate its origin and source, the enhanced First Amendment protections for parodies are properly not considered in the preliminary injunction analysis under the statute.

Given the strength of the original marks, the intention to evoke the original marks by using the distorted design established a likelihood of confusion, especially since the original brand occasionally sold special forms of the shoe. Although it might be difficult to actually wear the shoe, enjoining court's determination to the contrary worthy of deference. No clear error in determination that the alleged infringement was of lower quality, but the court erred in holding that legally this worked in the favor of the party claiming infringement.

No abuse of discretion in ordering escrow of gross revenues, as party seeking injunction sought an accounting, and a damages award would include costs and fees. No error in not requiring bond from party seeking injunction, as non-movant didn't request it.

Vans, Inc. v. MSCHF Product Studio, Inc.

Ninth Circuit: Jigar Barabaria, et al. v. Antony Blinken et al.

 Denial of the temporary restraining order was appealable, given notice to parties, the fact that it was tantamount to the denial of a preliminary injunction, and the fact that it essentially decided the merits of the action.

Where the statute governing adjudication of status refers to availability of visas at the time of filing, but is silent as to availability at the time of adjudication, administrative rule requiring availability at adjudication is a reasonable construction of the statute. 

Jigar Barabaria, et al. v. Antony Blinken et al.

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Abbott

 Given documentary evidence, treaty claims, and the fact that the Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the fact, there was no clear error in holding that the Rio Grande is a navigable river in Texas.  Navigability can include ferry traffic across the river.

No clear error in the District Court's holding that the floating obstruction devices tended to interfere with or diminish the navigable aspects of the river.  Structures were sufficiently permanent to come with the scope of the Act.

The constitutional gravity of a state's declaration of invasion and decision to mount an independent defense is inapposite to a motion for a preliminary injunction.  Court appropriately considered policy considerations when balancing equities.

DISSENT:

No showing that this segment of the river was historically navigable. Statutes and treaties precautionary and precatory, respectively.  Use of the river must have been more than sporadic, ineffective, and exceptional.  Out of context quote from the Supreme Court doesn't outweigh Texas geography.  Injunction directs the moving of the barrier, so the diplomatic harms aren't redressable.  Balance of equities favors the state. Allowing certain newspaper articles in under judicial notice was error.

USA v. Abbott

Sixth Circuit: State of Ohio v. Xavier Becerra

The Supreme Court has held that the statute's mandate is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for agency construction.  The agency's reading isn't contrary to the law.  Agency adequately explained its decision to revise the rule.  

The claim that the agency looked to the policy views of professional associations and federal statutes rather than the policies of the states states a legitimate concern, but since the state regulating bodies concede that one could practice within the state while taking either view of the question, the agency's decision wasn't arbitrary and capricious. 

Where the agency states that it is changing its course on a certain issue, it need not address specific earlier conclusory determinations contrary to the new course.

Agency must offer a clearer definition of the nature of a program to ensure the mandated separation of programs. Panel takes judicial notice of the list of pending grant recipients, which is sufficient to establish irreparable harm to the states, given the loss of federal funding. Relief in the form of a preliminary injunction should be limited to the state plaintiff that established sufficient harm by affidavits.

CONCURRENCE/DISSENT: 

Agency's program separation requirements not manifestly against the statute. Statute itself defines the contested term.  Rulemaking wasn't arbitrary and capricious--there is no increased threshold for subsequent agency action relative to initial agency action. Attendant harms required where plaintiff claims injury from loss of federal funds.  Public interest calculation of the injunction calculus should consider the decision of Congress.

State of Ohio v. Xavier Becerra

First Circuit: Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

 

The appeal of the denial of the preliminary injunction wasn't severed by the transfer of the case to another court, rather the denial was merged by operation of law into the final judgment in the second forum, making the appeal in the first forum moot.


 Capriole v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

Eighth Circuit: Cory Sessler v. City of Davenport, Iowa

 

Permit scheme for city street fair staged by development commission is a content-neutral means of regulating competing use of the public forum; the permit allows for the permitted speech and allows the restriction of disruptions to the permitted speech.

Declared intent to, in the future, speak in public areas is insufficient to establish irreparable harm for an injunction affecting a specific street fair.


Cory Sessler  v.  City of Davenport, Iowa

Second Circuit: People of the State of New York v. Griepp


Clear error to exclude evidence in preliminary injunction hearing as hearsay following finding that the situation lacked sufficient urgency to justify admitting hearsay; in a preliminary injunction hearing, the hearsay nature of the evidence always goes to the weight of the evidence.

Clear error to exclude a category of evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing after determining that two documents of the type were unreliable, and another after being unable to determine the reliability of that type of evidence (latter harmless error).  Everything in for appropriate weight. 

For purposes of the obstruction statutes, a minor delay is not per se a reasonable obstruction; the court must still determine if the delay was a reasonable one.

Placement of signs on a sidewalk in a manner that does not functionally exclude access can still be an attempt to intimidate or obstruct within the terms of the statute, even if no pedestrians appear.

When a protester's actions necessitate that an escort step in front of the protected person, the protester has caused the physical obstruction defined in the statute.

Regardless of the consensual nature of the conversation, speaking to someone inside a vehicle through an open door or placing hands on the car while speaking impeded the car from driving away, and could be considered obstruction.

When taken in the context of recent local violence, and given the subjective fear that the listeners felt, stating that death might come at any time would objectively be taken as a true threat not protected by the First Amendment; similar statements conjoined with an exhortation to repent, or referencing disasters distinct from recent local violence present a different question.

As the decision to have an abortion involves a formidable and poignant process, protesters' seeking to force their ideals on patients approaching a facility creates an inference of intent to harass, annoy or alarm.  An explicit or implicit request to be left alone dispels the legitimate intent of potential interlocutors.

Likely repetition of the violations of the statutes suffices to establish irreparable harm for the injunction.

In the interests of judicial economy, cross-appeal of non-movants' early motions not referenced in the memorandum denying the preliminary injunction are appropriately addressed in the appeal of the denial of the injunction under pendent jurisdiction.

Abortion facility speech limitations are content neutral, as they apply to every abortion facility in any context.

Statutes not void for vagueness, given general definitions in criminal code.

Municipal statute creating a cause of action for "any person" legitimizes a parens patriae action by the state in which the municipality is located; sufficient quasi-sovereign interest demonstrated here.

Concurrence:

Municipal statute is a state statute, since the municipality is a creation of the state; certifying the question to the state would be necessary to determine if the state could act parens patriae by its own statute.

Concur/Dissent:

General dissent as to not honoring the determinations of the finder of fact.

Since the cause of action doesn't list government bodies and the rest of the code generally does, and the statute designates a specific enforcement entity with power to seek an injunction, the state does not have parens patriae standing.

Courts are permitted to consider hearsay in a preliminary injunction hearing; they are not required to do so.

Statute's restriction on making access unreasonably difficult or dangerous explicitly excludes de minimis interference.  Concluding otherwise impermissibly burdens speech. 

Finder of fact held that a reasonable observer familiar with the speaker's preaching would not have interpreted the statements about impending death as true threats.

Irreparable harm finding requires ongoing plans and activities.


People of the State of New York v. Griepp

Seventh Circuit: Stephen Cassell v. David Snyders

 

Equitable factors counsel against granting a preliminary injunction when the religious practice or meeting size is not currently the subject of regulation with a live threat of enforcement.

Courts must consider the fine-grained details of a public health order's restrictions on the practice of religion when considering injunctions.

Appeal of denial of preliminary injunction requested on substantive grounds cannot be converted to a procedural due process claim.

State RFRA and other state law claims possibly precluded by 11A bar on injunction against state officials, mootness against particular parties, and possibly arise outside supplemental federal jurisdiction.

Stephen Cassell v.  David Snyders

Ninth Circuit: FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.

 

Anticompetitive effects of a supplier's monopoly behaviour on downstream adjacent markets are beyond the reach of Sherman Act rule of reason analysis, as the relevant market is different.

Refusal to deal horizontally with another supplier is outside of S2 where there is no indication that the dealing was profitable for the deft, there was a valid business reason to end the dealing, and the refusal to deal wasn't targeted.

Absent intentional deception,  breach of contract to deal horizontally with other suppliers doesn't create a monopoly harm unless a harm to competition - as opposed to competitors - is proved.

Patent royalty rates different than the current market value of the technology are not inherently anticompetitive under antitrust law.

As the products of the supplier's rivals inherently embody some of the packaged patents, the supplier's licensing of the downstream use of its terchnology within its rivals products is not an inherently anticompetitive surcharge on its rivals products.  Subsequent low but non-predatory pricing of its own units is also not an inherently anticompetitive behaviour.

A supplier's requirement that a downstream manufacturer commit to a license for products both supplied by the supplier and its rivals does not distort the area of effective competition; any unfair pricing of the license sounds in patent law, not antitrust.

Even if the exclusive dealing contracts that the supplier claimed were merely volume contracts in fact substantially foreclosed competition in the relevant markets, past harms do not justify a prospective injunction.  And there were no viable competitors at the time.


 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc.




Second Circuit: New Hope Family Services, Inc. v. Poole


Defendant's Free Exercise claim of subtle or covert bias in the implementation of a facially neutral law suffices for additional discovery given the variations between the law and the regulation, the length of time before the regulation was amended, and indications of animus within the administrative process.

Adoption agency's speech is not government speech (e.g., advertisements, monuments, vanity plates), as it's not a traditional mode of communication with the public, and the public doesn't see the speech as government speech -- also, there's no indication that, outside the present context, the govt can control the speech.

Discovery warranted to find out whether compelling certain adoptions might cause the adoprtion agency to change its message in counseling and client contact.

Discovery warranted to determine if compliance with state mandates would harm Free Association by keeping people who would otherwise collaborate with the adoption agency might stay away.

On remand, in tailoring possible preliminary injunction, court must consider verified pleadings and affidavits as evidence of potential harms to constitutional interests.


Ninth Circuit: Coffman v. Queen of the Valley Medical Center

Given the substance of the issues discussed at the meetings following certification, there is substantial evidence for the Board's finding that the employer entered into unconditional bargaining during the informational meetings prior to challenging the certification; additionally, sufficient evidence for harms, remedy.

Employee's schedule changes following appearance of photo on pro-union social media site sufficed for a prima facie case for retaliation.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/16/17-17413.pdf



First Circuit: Sindi v. El-Moslimany

As the list of defamatory statements were generally indicative of actual malice, there is no plain error in the finder of fact's determination that at least some of them were actionable defamation.

Damages, as limited by remittitur, were appropriate.

State interference with advantageous relations tort claim must refer to actual relations, and where there is a simultaneous claim against interference with contractual relations, the interference cannot be double-counted.

In the interests of justice, inadequately developed arguments against the issuance of a permanent injunction against speech can be raised sua sponte by the court.

Injunction against future speech was overbroad, did not recite other potential remedies, and did not sufficiently consider the context of future speech -- vacated.

Concur/Dissent: Argument against injunction was waived; the future interest is speculative; a simple vacatur based on insufficient proof in the record for necessity of the injunction would have sufficed.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2347P-01A.pdf

Ninth Circuit: Jeffrey Short v. Edmund G. Brown

No abuse of discretion in denial of injunction against voting-by-mail scheme, as there is no burden placed on the voters, and, under current precedent, a claim of vote dilution would have to allege a discriminatory allocation of votes, not the de minimis individual burden here.

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/22/18-15775.pdf

Third Circuit: Joel Doe v. Boyertown Area School District

Use of school privacy facilities by transgender students doesn't present a Title IX claim for non-transgender students in the room, as the policy is of equal applicability to both sexes. 

Insufficient injury for state tort claim.

Denial of preliminary injunction was appropriate, given mitigation in place during the litigation.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173113p.pdf

Federal Circuit: Sifab Solar, Inc. v. US

Where there is no probability of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction is not reviewed under a sliding scale as to the merits.

Congruency between presidential order on tarriffs and the commission's recommendations is a matter for Congress; commission findings did not preclude the tarriff under the NAFTA enablement act.

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/18-1718.Opinion.6-15-2018.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Eli Lilly v. Arla Foods, Inc.

Preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act appropriately issued where a single supplier ends use of the product; causation can be inferred from the demonization of the product, and no hard evidence of consumer confusion is necessary at the stage of preliminary injunction.

Injunction was not overbroad in barring a wide variety of cartoon ogres and substantially similar messages.

Concurring in part, concurring in j:  District court findings on actual confusion weren't raised in the interlocutory appeal.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:17-2252:J:Sykes:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171872:S:0




Fifth Circuit: Martha Kinard v. Dish Network Corporation


Imbalance between unionized and non-unionized workers' wages provided sufficient equitable necessity for injunction against unilateral imposition of final offer.

NLRB waived grounds for cross-appeal seeking injunction against future wage losses by not including the argument below and in the ULP.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-10282-CV0.pdf

Fifth Circuit: Marc Veasey, et al v. Greg Abbott, et al


En Banc, Election Law

(Panel of 15)

  (7 + 2 partial* & in the judgment)

*A claim of discriminatory purpose in the passage of a law cannot be based on statements from legislators opposed to the passage of the bill.* (This part not joined by the 2)

In assessing discriminatory effect under the Voting Rights Act, a multi-factor test should be used, as opposed to a bright-line nexus requirement.

No ruling on violations of the 1st and 14th Amendment burden of right to vote, as a finding of statutory violation results in the same remedy.

 Voter ID requirement was not a poll tax before the law was changed to make the ID free, and is still not a poll tax.

Not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to fashion a remedy, as the legislature is out of session.

     Concurrence  (2, both joining plurality, one in part):

Multifactor test good, as 5th invented much of it.

Won't open the floodgates, as courts can closely weigh factors.

                                       Concurrence / Dissent (5)

Not a poll tax.  Opinion otherwise incorrect.  (68pp, mostly findings and merits)

                                       Dissent (3, all in c/d above)

ID requirement still in place, since those who now have the ID must show it.

Judge below made myriad errors.

           Concur/Dissent, Concur in J (1, joining plurality in part)

Discriminatory motive analysis of the plurality re-weighed merits inappropriately.

                                                                        Dissent (6, all non-plurality)

Record justifies reversal on discriminatory purpose.

                                                                        Dissent (2, both in prior dissent)

Record justifies reversal on discriminatory effect.

Dissent (1, Partially joined plurality)

Record justifies affirming on discriminatory intent.

Takeaway (remember, this is quick work) 9 for Remand for multifactor test on discriminatory effect; 8 for affirming on discriminatory purpose (7 for remand); 14 for the lack of Poll Tax violation; 3 for egg salad; 2 for pastrami.


Marc Veasey, et al v. Greg Abbott, et al

Fifth Circuit: State of Texas, et al v. EPA, et al


Environment, Injunctions, Statutory Construction, Administrative


Statute's conferral of jurisdiction for review is distinct from the section indicating correct venue. 

Statute does not permit agency administrator to unilaterally remove action to DC Circuit upon determination of nationwide scope.

Final rule is a locally/regionally applicable standard, given state variances, agency findings.

Statute did not compel state to perform source-specific analysis. 

Timetable extends beyond jurisidiction under rule.

Strong likelihood that viability of power grid insufficiently considered.

Irreparable harms, given that recovery of costs could not be made in the course of business, threats to power grid.

Ready interest to affordable electricity outweighs reduction in haze.

Texas and Oklahoma plans stayed in their entirety.

Concurrence -- Long-term projects can be begun within timeframes of limited jurisdiction. 


Seventh Circuit: Gilbert Knowles v. Randy Pfister


Discrimination, Religion, Injunctions


Given statutory rights to religious expression, prison inmate demonstrates the possibility of irreparable harm and likely success on the merits in claim seeking to wear a Wiccan pendant.


Gilbert Knowles v.   Randy Pfister