Absent a limiting instruction, possibly prejudicial testimony as to previous civil judgment(s?) was inadmissible hearsay and plain error -- but insufficient for reversal.
Prior bad acts were sufficiently contemporaneous to be probative of intent as to the charged crimes.
No need to remand to develop ineffective assistance claim, given evidence of guilt.
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/7D8985C55A9B312B852582A60052550E/$file/14-3003.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label Hearsay. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hearsay. Show all posts
Seventh Circuit: William Wheeler v. William Hronopoulos
In a Section 1983 action alleging improper search, a claim at trial that the tip was hearsay does not properly preserve a claim on appeal that the confidential informant might not have existed at all.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-06/C:17-2073:J:Gilbert:aut:T:fnOp:N:2166644:S:0
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-06/C:17-2073:J:Gilbert:aut:T:fnOp:N:2166644:S:0
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Tapaha
Testimony of prior bad acts properly excluded as speculative and duplicative; given the circumstances of the assault, self-defense claim would not have been bolstered.
No error in denial of cross on own witness, absent court's finding of adversity.
No error in refusal to admit parts of the police report under prior consistent statements exception where fabrication wasn't alleged until prosecution's closing.
No error in refusal to admit parts of the police report to impeach, as police testimony only referred to deft's actions on the date of the offense, and not prior events.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-2104.pdf
No error in denial of cross on own witness, absent court's finding of adversity.
No error in refusal to admit parts of the police report under prior consistent statements exception where fabrication wasn't alleged until prosecution's closing.
No error in refusal to admit parts of the police report to impeach, as police testimony only referred to deft's actions on the date of the offense, and not prior events.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-2104.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Stoney End of Horn
Crim, FRE, Hearsay
Sufficient evidence despite inconsistencies, as inconsistencies could have been raised in cross-examination.
Error to admit hearsay, as external corroboration is not an indicium of speaker's truthfulness. Harmless error, given corroboration.
No abuse of discretion in upward departure in sentencing.
United States v. Stoney End of Horn
Third Circuit: Candice Staruh v. Superintendent Cambridge
FRE, Hearsay, Habeas, AEDPA
Refusal to allow hearsay evidence of admission of guilt by a family member of the deft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of constitutional law, as there were insufficient indicia of reliability and the speaker had an incentive to mislead the court.
Candice Staruh v. Superintendent Cambridge
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Levon Dean, Jr.
Hobbs Act robbery.
Where a statute has an express nexus to interstate commerce, the actual connection can be small; in this case, it suffices that the robbery affected the victim's ability to participate in interstate drug purchases.
Sufficient connection between the crimes for a common conspiracy, but harmless error, as participants were principals in both actions.
Because victim was hit rather hard on the head, there was sufficient bodily injury for the carjacking statute - injury need not be in or near the car.
As codeft had a distinctive walk while carrying a gun, sufficient evidence for knowledge of the gun.
Intent to affect interstate drug commerce not a necessary jury instruction for conspiracy count.
Constructive possession / vehicle instruction upheld.
Hearsay evidence properly considered in sentencing.
Sentencing court's denial of de minimis sentence for counts not subject to mandatory minimums was proper, despite the fact that the court stated that it did not have the power to impose a de minimis sentence.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151263P.pdf
Where a statute has an express nexus to interstate commerce, the actual connection can be small; in this case, it suffices that the robbery affected the victim's ability to participate in interstate drug purchases.
Sufficient connection between the crimes for a common conspiracy, but harmless error, as participants were principals in both actions.
Because victim was hit rather hard on the head, there was sufficient bodily injury for the carjacking statute - injury need not be in or near the car.
As codeft had a distinctive walk while carrying a gun, sufficient evidence for knowledge of the gun.
Intent to affect interstate drug commerce not a necessary jury instruction for conspiracy count.
Constructive possession / vehicle instruction upheld.
Hearsay evidence properly considered in sentencing.
Sentencing court's denial of de minimis sentence for counts not subject to mandatory minimums was proper, despite the fact that the court stated that it did not have the power to impose a de minimis sentence.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151263P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Stevenson Harrison
Hearsay in parole revocation hearing.
Where the District Court does not explicitly permit hearsay evidence at a parole revocation hearing, the appellate court can conduct a de novo review on the question if the factual record is sufficiently developed.
Where the costs of producing evidence at a parole revocation hearing are unduly burdensome and impractical, no abuse of discretion in admitting parole officer testimony and police reports.
Virginia statute of Malicious Bodily Injury to Law Enforcement Officer is categorically a Grade A/ violent offense.
Dissent - FRCrimP requires specific admission of hearsay as hearsay. Parole officer testimony derived from reading the police reports. Deft's corroborating statements limited to attempting to run away, and being grabbed by police officers, who subsequently ripped his shirt and fell down a flight of stairs. Subsequent alleged fracas unconfirmed.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151246P.pdf
Where the District Court does not explicitly permit hearsay evidence at a parole revocation hearing, the appellate court can conduct a de novo review on the question if the factual record is sufficiently developed.
Where the costs of producing evidence at a parole revocation hearing are unduly burdensome and impractical, no abuse of discretion in admitting parole officer testimony and police reports.
Virginia statute of Malicious Bodily Injury to Law Enforcement Officer is categorically a Grade A/ violent offense.
Dissent - FRCrimP requires specific admission of hearsay as hearsay. Parole officer testimony derived from reading the police reports. Deft's corroborating statements limited to attempting to run away, and being grabbed by police officers, who subsequently ripped his shirt and fell down a flight of stairs. Subsequent alleged fracas unconfirmed.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/15/12/151246P.pdf
Sixth Circuit: USA v. Vishnu Meda
Hearsay, Conspiracy, Sentencing.
No Double Jeopardy, as although the offenses were of the same nature and occurred at the same place, the players and the overt acts differed.
No prosecutorial vindictiveness, as there was no evidence in the record of malice, and the indictment was returned.
Although trial court did not explicitly find the person in question to be a co-conspirator, a preponderance of evidence to that effect allows the testimony to survive plain error review under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Testimony by deft's husband offered to prove state of mind of deft during a business meeting properly excluded under hearsay, as it worked to impeach earlier testimony as to the content of the meeting.
Prosecutors' sidebar followed by court's in camera hearing and warning to witness on self-incrimination was not witness intimidation by prosc.
No error in denial of grant of immunity to defense witness, as there was no showing as to likely effect on the case.
No error in court's refusal to order the witness to invoke 5A on stand, or bar prosecution cross.
Sentencing - once a factor is proven at trial, burden shifts to deft to specifically rebut - a general indictment of the testimony doesn't suffice.
No error in sentencing bump for leadership, as deft was part owner and sole signatory of fraudulent organization.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0298p-06.pdf
No Double Jeopardy, as although the offenses were of the same nature and occurred at the same place, the players and the overt acts differed.
No prosecutorial vindictiveness, as there was no evidence in the record of malice, and the indictment was returned.
Although trial court did not explicitly find the person in question to be a co-conspirator, a preponderance of evidence to that effect allows the testimony to survive plain error review under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Testimony by deft's husband offered to prove state of mind of deft during a business meeting properly excluded under hearsay, as it worked to impeach earlier testimony as to the content of the meeting.
Prosecutors' sidebar followed by court's in camera hearing and warning to witness on self-incrimination was not witness intimidation by prosc.
No error in denial of grant of immunity to defense witness, as there was no showing as to likely effect on the case.
No error in court's refusal to order the witness to invoke 5A on stand, or bar prosecution cross.
Sentencing - once a factor is proven at trial, burden shifts to deft to specifically rebut - a general indictment of the testimony doesn't suffice.
No error in sentencing bump for leadership, as deft was part owner and sole signatory of fraudulent organization.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0298p-06.pdf
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