Showing posts with label Hearsay. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hearsay. Show all posts

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Robinson

 Sufficient evidence for the jury to have disbelieved the witness' recantation.  Sufficient evidence for the federal obstruction charge where the prompting was procedurally about a separate state investigation, but dealt in substance with the set of events that became a federal matter.

Absent specific briefing, body camera footage outside of the portion agreed to be admissible as a prior statement of identification isn't coherent enough for appellate review as to specific statements. Admission not substantial injury and cumulative in nature with respect to admissible evidence.  Portions of phone calls admitted for context with admissible portions of the call, but without a limiting instruction, were harmless error, as they were cumulative with admissible statements elsewhere. Deft did not identify portions of the record that would justify a prior-inconsistent-statements instruction. Closing remarks were not improper, as they accurately characterized the victims as vulnerable, the invocation of justice was not calculated to inflame, inferences were appropriately made from the evidence, and the court appropriately limited the influence of the lawyers' opinions in the closing instruction.

Plain error where the court indicated that it might be bound by the earlier sentencing judge's order that the sentence for revocation of supervised release run consecutively with the subsequent sentence for the second offense.  

USA v. Robinson

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Rita Law

 


Given the complexity of the investigation and the need to explain it to the jury, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the hearsay statements given to federal investigators under the "course of the investigation" exception.

Unwitnessed affidavit was properly authenticated by the details in the substance of the affidavit.

Financial threats, psychological threats, and threats to immigration status provided sufficient evidence for conviction under the statute.

The involuntary servitude sentencing factor was correctly added to the transportation charge.  Sufficient fear was created in the commission of the offense to justify the relevant sentencing factor.  Obstruction sentencing factor correctly applied for perjured affidavit. 

Below-guidelines 360 month sentence was reasonable.


USA v. Rita Law

Second Circuit: People of the State of New York v. Griepp


Clear error to exclude evidence in preliminary injunction hearing as hearsay following finding that the situation lacked sufficient urgency to justify admitting hearsay; in a preliminary injunction hearing, the hearsay nature of the evidence always goes to the weight of the evidence.

Clear error to exclude a category of evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing after determining that two documents of the type were unreliable, and another after being unable to determine the reliability of that type of evidence (latter harmless error).  Everything in for appropriate weight. 

For purposes of the obstruction statutes, a minor delay is not per se a reasonable obstruction; the court must still determine if the delay was a reasonable one.

Placement of signs on a sidewalk in a manner that does not functionally exclude access can still be an attempt to intimidate or obstruct within the terms of the statute, even if no pedestrians appear.

When a protester's actions necessitate that an escort step in front of the protected person, the protester has caused the physical obstruction defined in the statute.

Regardless of the consensual nature of the conversation, speaking to someone inside a vehicle through an open door or placing hands on the car while speaking impeded the car from driving away, and could be considered obstruction.

When taken in the context of recent local violence, and given the subjective fear that the listeners felt, stating that death might come at any time would objectively be taken as a true threat not protected by the First Amendment; similar statements conjoined with an exhortation to repent, or referencing disasters distinct from recent local violence present a different question.

As the decision to have an abortion involves a formidable and poignant process, protesters' seeking to force their ideals on patients approaching a facility creates an inference of intent to harass, annoy or alarm.  An explicit or implicit request to be left alone dispels the legitimate intent of potential interlocutors.

Likely repetition of the violations of the statutes suffices to establish irreparable harm for the injunction.

In the interests of judicial economy, cross-appeal of non-movants' early motions not referenced in the memorandum denying the preliminary injunction are appropriately addressed in the appeal of the denial of the injunction under pendent jurisdiction.

Abortion facility speech limitations are content neutral, as they apply to every abortion facility in any context.

Statutes not void for vagueness, given general definitions in criminal code.

Municipal statute creating a cause of action for "any person" legitimizes a parens patriae action by the state in which the municipality is located; sufficient quasi-sovereign interest demonstrated here.

Concurrence:

Municipal statute is a state statute, since the municipality is a creation of the state; certifying the question to the state would be necessary to determine if the state could act parens patriae by its own statute.

Concur/Dissent:

General dissent as to not honoring the determinations of the finder of fact.

Since the cause of action doesn't list government bodies and the rest of the code generally does, and the statute designates a specific enforcement entity with power to seek an injunction, the state does not have parens patriae standing.

Courts are permitted to consider hearsay in a preliminary injunction hearing; they are not required to do so.

Statute's restriction on making access unreasonably difficult or dangerous explicitly excludes de minimis interference.  Concluding otherwise impermissibly burdens speech. 

Finder of fact held that a reasonable observer familiar with the speaker's preaching would not have interpreted the statements about impending death as true threats.

Irreparable harm finding requires ongoing plans and activities.


People of the State of New York v. Griepp

First Circuit: US v. Padilla-Galarza


Where deft counsel approves plan of insulating confession of codefendant from incriminating the deft, review is for plain error; in this case, no error plain or otherwise when incriminating conclusion could only be reached by inference.

District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a protective order prohibiting leaving cooperating witnesses' statements with the deft, as there was sufficient showing of good cause, the Jencks Act statutory right to the materials was adequately preserved, and deft's courtroom misbehavior justified the limitation on the 6A right to the materials.

Court adequately ensured sufficient Jencks Act access to agents' notes by questioning testifying agent as to scope of note-taking and accepting their answer.

Limiting instruction delivered standing-up after deft's courtroom outburst appropriately preserved the proceedings against mistrial.

Prosecutor's recital of plea condition that cooperating witness must tell the truth was not improper vouching, neither was the court's reference to "a cooperating witness of the United States of America."

No plain error in instruction on deft's testimony indicating an interest in the case, as it didn't belabor the fact; lack of limiting instruction against codeft's outburst wasn't plain error given other evidence of guilt.

Identification and withdrawal of claim of sentencing error during proceeding waives the claim in direct review.

No abuse of discretion in not considering mandatory minimums for other counts.

Court appropriately refused to consider elements of competency report as hearsay, as they lacked required indicia of credibility.

Plausible rationale makes 228 month bank robbery sentence not substantively unreasonable.

Deft claim that money could be cleaned from the damage done by anti-theft devices is speculative; FDIC coverage of stolen funds should not be considered in restitution order, as insurance is generally not considered.

No substantive sentencing error in 228 month sentence for bank robbery.

Ineffective Assistance claim insufficiently clear in the record for consideration on direct review.


US v. Padilla-Galarza

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gregory Bartunek

 

Although the photographs of the mannequins in the possession of the deft wasn't inextricably interlinked with the crime, their admission was more probative than prejudicial.

Testimony on historical abuse was appropriately admitted to establish character or propensity to commit certain acts.

Hearsay evidence from prior police investigation appropriately cabined by limiting instruction.


United States  v.  Gregory Bartunek

Fifth Circuit: Justin Atkins v. Timothy Hooper, Warden


State trial court's determination that detective's summary of statements of non-testifying witness was not inadmissible hearsay because it didn't recite the witness' words and the detective's purpose in describing the statements was to explain the course of the investigation was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

State intermediate appeals citation referencing harmless error does not independently preserve the issue for the federal habeas claim, as the decision was looked through in favor of the reasoned decision of the lower court, and the issue was not presented in the federal collateral challenge.

Justin Atkins v. Timothy Hooper, Warden

Fifth Circuit: USA v. James Perryman


Commerce Clause sufficient justification for law barring convicted felon's possession of weapon that at some point previous travelled in interstate commerce; present interstate travel need not be established.

PSR's unsworn statements describing previous proceeding are sufficient to establish perjury for the purpose of sentencing bump where the court also adopts an addendum that contains the relevant record excerpts.


Sixth Circuit: Ahmad Issa v. Margaret Bradshaw

When considering hearsay statements by a co-defendant that tend to implicate another defendant, the critical aspect that determines whether the truth of the matter asserted can be admitted despite the Confrontation Clause is not the indicia of reliability from some preconceived litmus such as the testimonial form of the statement, but rather the totality of the circumstances.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0212p-06.pdf

Third Circuit: USA v. Amy Gonzalez

Sufficient evidence for conspiracy conviction where the deft claims a genuine belief in the inciting statements, but finder of fact holds them to be objectively false.

Specific unanimity instruction not required, as the different mental states enumerated are alternate means of accomplishing the crime, not distinct potential elements of the crime.  Where a statute lists several acts, commission of any two of which would be an element of the crime, specific unanimity as to the underlying acts is not required, as the point of the list is to identify conduct that violates the actual prohibition.

For the statutory finding that death had resulted from the crime, the finder of fact must find it to be a forseeable proximate cause; there is no need to establish that the defts actually intended to cause death, and culpability can be established by the liability of a co-conspirator.

As the cyberstalking was defamatory and part of the commission of the crime, the law as applied in this case does not violate the First Amendment.

A recusal order that might reasonably be read to transfer venue but is then amended to clarify that it only recuses the present judge does not impugn the present venue.

Possibly prejudicial prior family court records properly admitted with limiting instructions.

Statements to a therapist as part of the therapy are admissible under the hearsay exeption for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, in addition to being evidence of the state of mind.

Hearsay emails to third parties properly admitted, as they spoke to how the acts referenced affected the writer's state of mind.

,Statements to therapist insufficiently testimonial to trigger the Confrontation Clause.

Question on cross as to whether the law enforcement officer had doubts about the defts' guilt opened the door for a vouching statement on redirect.  Vouching appropriately limited by instruction.

Court did not err in holding that testimony as to deft's honesty, peacefulness, and law abiding behaviour opened the door to testimony as to specific acts related to the present prosecution.

Factual findings by the judge during sentencing increased the advisory range, and not the statutory maximum -- these findings therefore could be made by a preponderance. and without reference to the jury's findings.

Deft's presence in courthouse should have put him on notice that it was foreseeable that a law enforcement officer might be injured in the coming imbroglio.

Injury to victim's children justified the increase of sentence for harming a vulnerable victim.

Life sentence for cyberstalking conspiracy resulting in death does not offend the Eighth Amendment.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161540p.pdf






Seventh Circuit: Emma Cehovic-Dixneuf v. Lisa Wong

As the company retained administrative functions, the life insurance plan was within the statute, even though all premiums were paid by the employee; equitable reassignment of the beneficiary is therefore unavailable.

Where hearsay challenges are raised for the first time on a motion to reconsider summary judgment, the court may accept the challenged evidence as tending to point to some admissible method of proof, since the rules bar from the motion to reconsider any claims that might have been raised earlier on the merits.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-11/C:17-1532:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:2184892:S:0


Seventh Circuit: Thomas Lovelace v. Todd McKenna

Court did not abuse its discretion in barring physician's record of statement that prison inmate asserted that the guards had beaten him, as it address the truth of the matter asserted, rather than the reason that treatment had been sought.

Witness' statement that he feared retribution from guards permissibly barred as more prejudicial than probative.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-03/C:17-1393:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2181083:S:0

Second Circuit: United States v. Gasperini

No plain error from claimed unconstitutional vagueness of statute (CFAA), as the conduct here was squarely within the core prohibition.

As the statute (SCA) does not provide for the exclusion of evidence as a remedy, no abuse of discretion in allowing evidence from extraterritorial searches.

Mere gov't request to foreign agency is not enough to bring the subsequent extraterritorial search under the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

Internet archive screenshots properly admitted as business records, given testimony by staffers that they were created in the course of business.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2ba81dc4-9c50-470e-9f2d-3feefa265ae5/1/doc/17-2479_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2ba81dc4-9c50-470e-9f2d-3feefa265ae5/1/hilite/

Eighth Circuit: US v. Kevin Morrisey

Plain error not to instruct jury that Possession, as a lesser included offense of Receipt, could not be proved with respect to the same items.

Improper venue claim waived by counsel at trial.

Shift in the theory of the offense that would have encompassed crimes outside of the court's jurisdiction did not constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment, as venue is not an essential element of the offense. 

Plain error to admit spreadsheet with list of images with outside expert hearsay commmentary, but no prejudice.

No prejudice from statement in closing that implied that files could be received by when internally transferred.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172157P.pdf

Eighth Circuit: US v. Kwame Askia

Federal embezzlement statute is not a continuing offense; once the threshold has been reached, the offense is complete.  For purpose of the stature of limitations, however, so long as the limit is reached within the relevant timeframe, the fact that the offense began earlier doe not bar the indictment.

No plain error in introduction of evidence of theft outside the statute of limitation's timeframe; no sixth amendment claim arising from pro se / standby.

Hearsay claim arising out of pretrial detention hearing moot. No 6A claim.

Sufficient evidence.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171515P.pdf


Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gervais (Ken) Ngombwa

No ineffective assistance where attorney declines to investigate family relations, thinking there to be a substantial likelihood that unsavory details might be discovered.

Misstatements to agency properly grouped with later immigration offenses, as the purpose of the agency action was immigration enforcement, which serves society -- the victims were identical.

No Ex Post Facto violation in using a version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the later crimes that contains a new enhancement relevant to the earlier crimes, as sufficient notice before the later crimes is presumed.

No abuse of discretion in use of foreign convictions as proxies for the factual finding that the criminal history level underrated the deft's acts.

No abuse of discretion in use of genocide witness statements -- if hearsay, they had sufficient indicia of credibility.

Foreign expert testifying on video-link at sentencing is not unreliably unsworn.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/187168P.pdf



Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nicholas Ryan Hemsher

Inconsistencies in self-interested witnesses' testimony were subject to cross, and do not establish lack of sufficient evidence.

Exclusion of prior inconsistent statement to police was harmless, as inconsistencies explored elsewhere, and no contemporaneous proffer; exclusion of exited utterances by police during search was proper, since police officers don't get excited--also harmless.

Sufficient evidence for sentence enhancement based on number of firearms.  Enhancement for another felony found by a preponderance can apply to firearm trafficking and possession, so long as it's not the actual underlying crime charged.  Texts from incarceration referencing "snitches" sufficed for obstruction enhancement.  Disparities in co-conspirators' sentences not per se unreasonable.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172189P.pdf


Seventh Circuit: US v. Larry Norton

Where conflicting testimony at trial suggests that deft was zero to five mph over the speed limit, no clear error in holding that traffic stop at prompting of drug task force didn't violate the Fourth Amendment.

Admission of informant's statements on recording, if hearsay, was harmless error, as they merely provided useful context for others statements.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-20/C:17-2898:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173776:S:0

First Circuit: US v. Lee

Out of court statements not subject to the Confrontation Clause and hearsay scrutiny had sufficient indicia of reliability to establish the drug quantities used at sentencing.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1490P-01A.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Kimberly Flanagan v. Office of the Chief Judge

Plaintiff's report of being told by a co-worker that others were conspiring to kill her was inadmissible double hearsay.

Ominous threats in parking lot were scattered empty threats, insufficient to state a claim for a hostile work environment.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:16-1927:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171849:S:0

First Circuit: US v. Serrano-Acevedo

Insufficient articulable grounds for a protective sweep where two armed men robbed a bank, and both had been detained prior to the sweep through the house.

Subsequent consent to search was tainted by the fruits of the sweep.

Court's instruction sufficient to cure in-court statement by police officer saying that the robbers had been identified to him by name by an informant.

Other hearsay harmless. 


http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2009P-01A.pdf