Given the substantive right of a juvenile not to be sentenced to a mandatory life without parole sentence articulated by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review, petitioner's initial sentencing must be reviewed, as it was unclear at trial whether the judge could suspend part of the life sentence, and additionally, relief might be warranted outside of mandatory sentences in the strict sense.
As there was no finding of incorrigibility, the jury's vote for life without parole needs to be revisited. Additional sentences imposed under plea deal are not shielded from review by the appeals waiver, as collateral challenges of new rights and assertions of substantive constitutional violations weren't enforceably waived.
Interesting peroration.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/176746.P.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label Habeas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Habeas. Show all posts
Fifth Circuit: John Uranga, III v. Lorie Davis, Director
Postjudgment motion following denial of Habeas was not a second or successive Habeas filing, as it was a timely challenge of denial of leave to amend.
Fellow prisoner's delivery and signature sufficed for the prison mailbox rule under the next friend doctrine, as the justifying circumstances were disclosed.
Juror was not biased as a matter of law under the implied bias doctrine when it emerged at trial that the deft had driven over and damaged his lawn while fleeing from authorities.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10290-CV1.pdf
Fellow prisoner's delivery and signature sufficed for the prison mailbox rule under the next friend doctrine, as the justifying circumstances were disclosed.
Juror was not biased as a matter of law under the implied bias doctrine when it emerged at trial that the deft had driven over and damaged his lawn while fleeing from authorities.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10290-CV1.pdf
Third Circuit: Wendy Osorio Martinez v. US
Jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA violates the Suspension Clause when immigrant children who have attained a Congressionally designated status of special indigence that cannot be lifted without some due process are prohibited from seeking the writ. The INA preserves both the Congressional power to deport and the Congresional power not to deport.
TRO is justified to bar expedited removal of such children -- on merits, without remand.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172159p.pdf
TRO is justified to bar expedited removal of such children -- on merits, without remand.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/172159p.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Wendell Weaver v. Walter Nicholson
State Habeas court reasonably applied governing precedent in holding that disqualification of deft's chosen counsel due to representation of potential prosecution witness didn't violate the right; the third party representation here was much closer than in the precedent to the contrary.
Trial counsel not crossing on a particular point didn't prejudice the petitioner, as the witness' credibility was attacked elsewhere.
Petitioner didn't show that trial counsel didn't investigate a potential witness, merely that the witness wasn't called, which must be presumed to be a strategic decision.
Claim based in reported statements of witness who died shortly afterwards was procedurally defaulted for not being raised on direct review, and would have been considered inadmissible hearsay under governing Supreme Court precedent.
Pre-trial inconsistencies and post-trial recantation insufficient to establish Due Process violation for prosecution witness' perjury, given state court finding to contrary.
Admission of prior bad acts claim procedurally defaulted.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:16-2400:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171664:S:0
Trial counsel not crossing on a particular point didn't prejudice the petitioner, as the witness' credibility was attacked elsewhere.
Petitioner didn't show that trial counsel didn't investigate a potential witness, merely that the witness wasn't called, which must be presumed to be a strategic decision.
Claim based in reported statements of witness who died shortly afterwards was procedurally defaulted for not being raised on direct review, and would have been considered inadmissible hearsay under governing Supreme Court precedent.
Pre-trial inconsistencies and post-trial recantation insufficient to establish Due Process violation for prosecution witness' perjury, given state court finding to contrary.
Admission of prior bad acts claim procedurally defaulted.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-15/C:16-2400:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2171664:S:0
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Driscoll
When determining the timeliness of a Habeas petition, the critical element is the right asserted; the question of whether an ambiguous conviction is or is not contradicted by the new rule is a matter for merits consideration.
As the petitioner was convicted under a statute broader than the generic offense, it is more likely than not that they were convicted under the unconstitutional residual clause, justifying the granting of the writ.
On merits, granted as not harmless error.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-8118.pdf
As the petitioner was convicted under a statute broader than the generic offense, it is more likely than not that they were convicted under the unconstitutional residual clause, justifying the granting of the writ.
On merits, granted as not harmless error.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-8118.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Jonathan Ervin v. Michael Bowersox
State's use of a video at trial showing the invocation of previously waived Miranda rights in the course of an interrogation and references to the video in opening and closing statements were not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Factual determinations not unreasonable.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171743P.pdf
Factual determinations not unreasonable.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/171743P.pdf
Fifth Circuit: Edward Busby v. Lorie Davis, Director
Assertion of actual innocence in a second state Habeas that was dismissed summarily with an indication that the court did not reach the merits was not dismissed for procedural default, as the briefing indicates (which would at any rate be a reasonable ruling, since Federal courts are permitted to do such things), but for the alternate reason in the statute, namely that no reasonable juror would have accepted the claim. As this alternate ground is not challenged, the state denial was not an unreasonable application of facts or federal law.
Second non-AEDPA federal Habeas asserting identical claims is denied on merits.
Ineffective Assistance claim based on direct appeal was not raised in initial state Habeas -- ineffective assistance in collateral proceedings is insufficient excuse for the default of claim, as there is no right to counsel at that stage.
No prejudice from ineffective assistance at trial.
Editorial note: End the death penalty.
Ninth Circuit: Ellis v. Harrison
State court's holding that Habeas petitioner must establish prejudice from his counsel's racial animus by a preponderance was an unreasonable application of federal constitutional law.
To establish prejudice from counsel's racial animus, petitioner must establish either his or her knowledge of the animus at a critical phase of the proceedings, resulting in a communications breakdown, or another adverse effect of the animus.
Concurrence to per curiam: prejudice should be the presumption in strategic decisions once animus is established.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/07/16-56188.pdf
To establish prejudice from counsel's racial animus, petitioner must establish either his or her knowledge of the animus at a critical phase of the proceedings, resulting in a communications breakdown, or another adverse effect of the animus.
Concurrence to per curiam: prejudice should be the presumption in strategic decisions once animus is established.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/06/07/16-56188.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Carl Leo Davis v. US
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague announced a substantive change in the law that applies to petitioners seeking collateral review of sentences imposed under a parallel provision of the mandatory sentencing guidelines, despite the Supreme Court's subsequent holding that the provision in the guidelines was constitutional, as the gudelines, in the interval, had become merely advisory.
This substantive shift in the law was a sharp reversal from precedent, legitimately causing the petitioners not to raise the issue on direct appeal.
A second substantive change in the law that removed an alternate basis for the sentence of one of the petitioners did not trigger a mandatory limitation period for filing the writ, as it would merely have shifted the ultimate basis for the sentence.
A plea deal carve out excepting any constitutionally impermissible factor incorporates any unconstitutional input present at sentencing.
Prior offenses should be considered categorically when deciding whether the conviction is a valid predicate.
(Important decision. Again, all this is quick work. Don't rely.)
Fifth Circuit: In re Rosendo Rodruiguez
Rule 11 show-cause ruling on untimely capital Habeas filing.
Petitioner should have rebutted affidavit timely offered by the state. No sanctions.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-10337-CV0.pdf
Petitioner should have rebutted affidavit timely offered by the state. No sanctions.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-10337-CV0.pdf
Fourth Circuit: US v. Daniel Sanchez
When a deft elects not to challenge an almost-completed sentence by Habeas, a challenge to the imposition of additional time after revocation of supervised release cannot be raised on the grounds that the original sentence was unconstitutional, as statute requires such challenges to be made by direct appeal or collateral challenge.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174169.P.pdf
Fourth Circuit: US v. Eddie Fluker
Under categorical analysis, state robbery statute isn't a crime of violence, as it only required the minimum of force to take the object from the other person.
A postconviction challenge to a sentencing error after the completion of the sentence is not moot where the petitioner is currently incarcerated on a subsequent conviction to be served consecutively to the challenged sentence.
No error in allowing testimony not presented at trial during a full resentencing, so long as the government is not given a second bite at the apple with respect to a certain sentencing decision.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174690.P.pdf
Sixth Circuit: John Stojetz v. Todd Ishee
State denial of Habeas for ineffective assistance not unreasonable, as the defendant's trial rights are not positive guarantees, they might have been strategically waived by counsel.
Trial counsel's voir dire description of mitigation as something to be balanced against aggravating circumstances when determining guilt did not prejudice determination of penalty, and might have been calculated to empanel mitigation-friendly jurors.
Deft counsel's lack of independent discovery interviews with accomplices not per se ineffective.
Lack of voir dire on murder publicity not unreasonable, as counsel might have been avoiding drawing attention to it.
So long as intent to kill is an element of both, not unreasonable for a state to allow jury to convict under contradictory theories of murder and abetting the crime.
Jury instruction establishing permissive inference of intent from possession of deadly weapon not unreasonable.
Collateral misconduct claims not raised on direct appeal waived, given state rule requiring exhaustion for any claims based on trial record.
Peremptory excusal of female jurors not unreasonable.
Victim-impact statements in closing not sufficiently plain to justify ineffective assistance.
No prejudice from eyewitness statement that deft had the intent to kill, given evidence of guilt.
No Brady violation on nondisclosure of medical records where deft had been aware of the injury.
Collateral challenge defaults not excused by counsel's nonperformance due to mental health issues; as counsel responded to show-cause orders and discussed non-filings with the court administration, there was neglect rather than abandonment.
No error in denial of postconviction discovery of grand jury proceedings, as indictment under multiple theories of the offence was merely speculative.
New testimony by accomplices and witnesses insufficient for actual innocence Habeas grant.
Sentencing court's view of mitigation not arbitrary and capricious.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0106p-06.pdf
[Editorial note: End the death penalty.]
Eleventh Circuit:Alfonso Ponton v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Where a court recharacterizes a pleading as a habeas filing without informing the deft/petitioner, the petition does not count towards the statutory limit on second and successive findings; this rule applies to initial filings that predate the supreme court decision that established the rule.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610683.pdf
Second Circuit: duPurton v. US
New evidence insufficient for coram nobis petition, as it doesn't conclusively establish earlier error.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c03aa681-4808-489f-8380-da2ee3800b29/1/doc/17-151_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c03aa681-4808-489f-8380-da2ee3800b29/1/hilite/
Third Circuit: USA v. Raymond Napolitan
Habeas, Federal Jurisdiction
A federal court does not abuse its discretion in ordering a custodial sentence to be served consecutively with a state sentence despite the possibility that the state sentence was rendered unconstitutionally.
Procedurally, this means that a state custodial sentence cannot be challenged on constitutional grounds on federal direct appeal.
USA v. Raymond Napolitan
Sixth Circuit: James McKinney v. Bonita Hoffner
Habeas, AEDPA, Miranda
State Supreme Court's holdings -- that a facially equivocal statement was not interrogation and that deft's invocation of right to counsel followed shortly thereafter by an expressed willingness to talk was not a Miranda violation -- might have been made by a fair-minded jurist.
Dissent doesn't account for AEDPA default.
Dissent -- analysis of second utterance should be considered solely as waiver of expressed invocation.
James McKinney v. Bonita Hoffner
Ninth Circuit: ERIC MANN V. CHARLES RYAN
En Banc, Habeas, AEDPA, Ineffective Assistance
Denial of Habeas for Ineffective Assistance, as state court's findings on defense lawyer's choices might have been made by fair-minded jurists.
State intermediate appeal on the collateral challenge did not inappropriately consider whether it was more likely than not that the verdict/sentence had been affected rather than asking if the error resulted in a reasonable probability of a difference in the outcome. Court's statement that nothing would have changed can be read to imply the reasonable probability standard.
Claim that state applied unconstitutional nexus test for mitigation factors, although not raised here, does not establish that rulings on the initial collateral challenge considered the wrong set of relevant mitigating factors.
Lack of explicit statement that new mitigation was considered on state direct and collateral challenge doesn't mean that it wasn't considered.
State Habeas findings not unreasonable.
Concurrence/Dissent -- Causal nexus error infected ruling on initial collateral challenge. Intermediate appeal used preponderance standard. Error on de novo review of ineffective assistance in mitigation.
Concurrence/Dissent 2 -- De novo review, but no prejudice.
ERIC MANN V. CHARLES RYAN
Eighth Circuit: Luis Herrera v. United States
Habeas, Drugs, Ineffective Assistance
Denial of writ for ineffective assistance, as a statute referring to one quantity of pure substance and a second quantity of diluted substance applies where the deft sold a quantity of diluted substance containing the proscribed amount of the pure substance.
Luis Herrera v. United States
Second Circuit: Fuentes v. Griffin
Brady, Habeas, AEDPA
Habeas granted, as psychiatric records of critical witness offered substantial impeachment value.
Dissent: Materiality is intrinsically subjective.
Fuentes v. Griffin
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