Sixth Circuit: Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens

 

The modification to the Habeas statute requiring that the application be filed with the sentencing court is jurisdictional limit on the original statute.

Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens 

Fifth Circuit: Justin Atkins v. Timothy Hooper, Warden

State trial court's determination that detective's summary of statements of non-testifying witness was not inadmissible hearsay because it didn't recite the witness' words and the detective's purpose in describing the statements was to explain the course of the investigation was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

State intermediate appeals citation referencing harmless error does not independently preserve the issue for the federal habeas claim, as the decision was looked through in favor of the reasoned decision of the lower court, and the issue was not presented in the federal collateral challenge.

Justin Atkins v. Timothy Hooper, Warden

Eleventh Circuit: Leon Carmichael, Sr. v. USA

Petitioner suffered no prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel in handling a 10 year plea deal as opposed to the 40 years eventually imposed, since there was no guarantee that the deft would accept, given his desire for a firm offer, and the terms of "super cooperation" were vague enough that the parameters of deft's obligations were unclear, and the expectations of the govt could not be defined before entering into the material cooperation and determining the capacity of the deft to assist.  

Sufficient evidence in record that deft might not have accepted the offer of 20 years; consultations  with counsel were after the fact.  General post-trial and totality claims similarly insufficiently supported.

Leon Carmichael, Sr. v. USA

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Herman Sanders, et al

Insufficient basis for Habeas on Ineffective Assistance, as the prejudice from the undiscovered evidence of trauma, illness, and coercion would not have caused a single reasonable juror to change their penalty phase vote, given past threats of violence, and incriminating letters offered at trial.

Dissent:  

Quoting state penalty phase closing:  “It’s an incredibly sad tribute that when a man’s life is on the line, about the only good thing we can say about him is he’s a good artist.” 

State waived AEDPA bar on new evidence in federal collateral challenge.

Precedent on reasonable probability isn't tied to the facts of each case -- they don't present a minimum threshold for the showing.

Substantial argument that deft killed only under threat of his own death.

USA v. Herman Sanders, et al

Sixth Circuit: Ralph Carusone v. Warden

Lack of disclosure of medical report plainly discrediting the primary theory of the offense resulted a reasonable probability of a different outcome under Brady, as the second theory of the offense used by the District Court to deny the Writ was not endorsed in full by any expert at trial.

Ralph Carusone v. Warden

Seventh Circuit: Adetokunbo Fayemi v. Kess Roberson

Easterbrook on Agatha Christie.

Court's proababilistic summary of the Strickland standard did not evince a logic contrary to the rule, so long as the final logic accords.  Given overwhelming evidence, not a misapplication of the law to say that assertion in opening statement that an ultimately non-testifying deft would testify wasn't sufficiently ineffective.

Adetokunbo Fayemi v. Kess Roberson

Seventh Circuit: Kevin Czech v. Michael Melvin

Instructing the jury on Felony Murder theory of First Degree Murder arising from the use of the firearm, whether or not there was an independent felonious purpose to the use of the firearm, was an error of state law.  Precedent holds that this should be examined for harmless error, seemingly establishing a Due Process violation by implication, but one not clearly established for the purposes of Habeas petitions.  Here, though, the error of stare law was harmless, as the verdict would have been the same.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D09-21/C:17-1838:J:Griesbach:aut:T:fnOp:N:2222884:S:0

Third Circuit: Troy Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC

The Bail Reform Act system for contesting pretrial detention is the sole remedy for challenging federal pretrial detention; although Habeas theoretically runs, the prudential limits on the writ require the courts to deny any requests for relief not channeled through the Bail Reform Act processes.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/181749p.pdf

Tenth Circuit: Smith v. Aldridge

State habeas determination that a judge's statement claiming that the jury was zealously watched was more credible than five juror affidavits asserting the jurors slept during the trial was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-6149.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Patrick Hrobowski v. USA

As petitioner was sentenced according to four predicate offenses, two of which were facially infirm, a subsequent change in the law enabling a challenge to the other two predicates that was ultimately successful as to one of them does not allow a late challenge to the two infirm predicates.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D09-17/C:16-3549:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:2219599:S:0

Seventh Circuit: Raul Perez-Gonzalez v. Jacqueline Lashbrook

State habeas determination that petitioner's plea deal did not implicitly waive the state's power to seek contempt sanctions for noncompliance was not an unreasonable determination of the facts or application of facts to law.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D09-17/C:18-1480:J:Brennan:aut:T:fnOp:N:2219305:S:0

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Christopher Vialva

A broad-based challenge to the integrity of the proceedings due to the incapacity of the judge is properly construed as a successive habeas filing rather than a motion to revisit the verdict, as the challenge doesn't arise from a cognizable procedural flaw in the earlier state trial, direct appeal or collateral proceedings.  Where the impacts of the alleged incapacity have already been litigated, permission to file for te writ is appropriately denied.


http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-70008-CV0.pdf

Fifth Circuit: Chris Gilkers v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

When, in the pendency of  collateral post-conviction challenges, a state habeas that was subsequently challenged in federal habeas is re-reviewed by the state sua sponte, an attempt to resuscitate the federal habeas claim by a 60(d) motion is properly construed as a second-or-sucessive habeas petition, and is subject to those statutory limits. 

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-30279-CV0.pdf

Third Circuit: Jeffrey Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI

Where deft's trial counsel was preoccupied with vindication of a manifestly weak legal theory and the issue is not raised in state habeas -- the latter is ineffective assistance by its terms, and the former is a sufficient showing -- cause for waiver in subsequent federal collateral challenge is excused.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161969p.pdf

Third Circuit: Damien Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI

Although counsel in the initial state collateral challenge was ineffective, excusing the waiver of the claim due to its omission, the underlying claim of ineffective assistance at trial due to the Confrontation Clause violation did not prejudice the petitioner, given the cumulative evidence of guilt.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/163095p.pdf

Fifth Circuit: In Re: Alfred Bourgeois

Second or successive habeas petitions from prisoners in federal custody must meet the same statutory thresholds as do those from state prisoners.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/18/18-40270-CV0.pdf

Tenth Circuit: Grissom v. Carpenter

Trial counsel's arguments in mitigation phase at capital trial largely covered the ground that a closer examination of petitioner's undiagnosed brain damage would have led to, so state habeas ruling that representation was not constitutionally ineffective was not an unreasonable one.

Defense counsel's concession of the elements of the crime made instruction on lesser-included offenses redundant, and was apparently a legitimate strategic decision to focus the jury's attention on mitigation.  As defendants cannot withdraw a defense, apparently stipulating to the elements shouldn't waive the instruction.  Voluntary intoxication instruction was not prejudicial, given the high standard for relief under state law, and exists as a complete defense, not a mitigation.  State habeas denial was therefore not unreasonable.

State habeas denial for cumulative error, presumably referencing ineffective assistance for the lack of lesser-included instruction and mitigation, was not unreasonable and contrary to law; de novo review of the total record in federal habeas can establish this.

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/16/16-6271.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Milton v. Boughton

Although the evidence from the uncounseled lineup was not properly admissible, petitioner was not prejudiced from the admission, given the other eyewitness identifications.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-30/C:17-1910:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:2210678:S:0

Sixth Circuit: Loren Robinson v. Jeffrey Woods

A sentencing scheme relying in part on questions decided as a matter of law by the judge violates the right to a trial by jury; where the scheme sets a mandatory minimum beneath a fixed statutory maximum, the system is sufficiently determinate to be subject to Sixth Amendment scrutiny.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0188p-06.pdf

Third Circuit: Edward Mitchell v. Superintendent Dallas SCI

Although co-deft was correctly granted the writ on question of severance at trial, a subsequent change in the law has established that there was no confrontation clause issue requiring severance, and since the present petitioner is not being held in violation of the law, Habeas would not run.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173118p.pdf