Showing posts with label Guns. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Guns. Show all posts

Third Circuit: William Drummond v. Robinson Township

 

The Township's proposed regulations on the firearms practice ground trigger stricter scrutiny, since although restricting the areas for firearm practice dates to the Founding, the town's specific regulations on firearm type and nonprofit ownership of the club are novel, and merit closer scrutiny.

 As the regulations steer clear of the core of the Amendment, intermediate scrutiny applies.  The limitation on firearm type is only conjectural in its claim to reduce the intensity of practice, and the nonprofit ownership rule is similarly conjectural in its claim to reduce commercial intensity. As the Township bears the burden to establish the reasonableness of the remedy, the challenge to the regulations states a claim


https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/201722p.pdf

First Circuit: US v. Carrasquillo-Sanchez

 

Contemporaneous objection to the length of the sentence imposed preserves only a claim of substantive error, not one of procedural error.

Plain procedural error in sentencing for the court to base an upward variance upon the conditions in the city of the offense without associating the particular circumstances of the deft within this context.


http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-2151P-01A.pdf

First Circuit: US v. Garcia-Perez

 

Court adequately recited mitigations, but did not sufficiently explain its upward variance.  As the relevant conduct is explicitly included in the guidelines calculation, court needed to specifically distinguish the deft's situation.

Court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence -- the deft has the burden to establish that the comparators who received disparate sentences were sufficiently similar.


http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-2054P-01A.pdf

Ninth Circuit: George Young, Jr. v. State of Hawaii

 

(En Banc, 215 pp.)

Pro se plaintiff's claim that never explicitly makes the as-applied challenge is correctly read as a facial challenge, since the briefing and argument was conducted with the assistance of counsel.

(Extensive list of English statutes and edicts made against the carrying of (fire)arms from the 14c. onward.)

Colonial history suggests early American acquiescence to firearms limitations outlined in the Statute of Northampton.

Early state enactments generally held that firearms small enough to be concealed could be kept from the public square.

State courts & treatises inconclusive, but generally recognize the government's power to regulate.

The government may regulate, and even prohibit, in public places the open carrying of small arms or arms capable of being concealed.  This does not impede the protection of homes or businesses.  It is peculiarly the duty of the state to defend the public square.  The states assumed primary responsibility for maintaining the king's peace.  

Exceptions to regulations were made for persons, places.  Surety operated not as a minor penalty but as a strong discincentive to carry arms.

That handguns may be used for defense does not change their threat to the king's peace.  The mere presence of such weapons creates terror in the public space.  Hawaii's statute makes provision for public officers, hunters and recreational users, and those with a legitimate cause for fear.

Single-officer approval regulatory scheme is not subject to challenge by prior restraint, as the regulations are not presumptively invalid.

Procedural due process claim is speculative, since no licence has yet been denied.

DISSENT: 

Unprecedented and extreme holding.  First circuit to hold that carrying a weapon in public falls outside of the protections of the Amendment.

Plain text of the Amendment requires right to carry arms.  19 c. State caselaw and federal legislation recognized the right to carry arms.

Statute of Northampton allowed carrying of common arms, not for the purpose of terror.  English law was more restrictive of the right to carry arms than was the American.  Surety was only actually invoked in extreme cases, implicitly legitimating the norm of peaceably carrying weapons. 

"Weapons capable of being concealed" is a novel standard.  Heller explicitly contemplates self-defense as a legitimate reason.  The responsibility for keeping the peace lies with the people, not with the states.

The right openly to carry arms is within the core of the Amendment.  As the regulation destroys the right, it is necessarily unconstitutional.

Pro se complaint should be construed as an as-applied challenge to the enforcement against the plaintiff.

DISSENT:

Should be either construed as as-applied, or allowed to amend. County regulations limiting licenses to working security guards are facially unconstitutional.



George Young, Jr. v. State of Hawaii

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Kieffer, et al

 

Testimony of co-conspirator is sufficient evidence for conviction, unless the testimony is incredible or insubstantial on its face; it is for the finder of fact to weigh the credibility of the testimony.  De novo review, as both counsel recited the form of the motion for acquittal.

Proof of a phone call between the two at that time is sufficient evidence for having made a false material statement denying knowledge of a person's whereabouts.

Stipulation to felony status at trial is sufficient to establish contemporary knowledge of that status at the time of firearm possession.

Despite the fact that a large number of juror questions was allowed, deft has not identified, and the court has not found, any that indicate prejudice.

CONCURRENCE IN THE JUDGMENT:

The appeal of the felon in possession count shouldn't have been de novo, even arguendo.


USA v. Kieffer, et al

Tenth Circuit: Aposhian v. Wilkinson

 

Dissents from both vacatur of en banc order and the reinstatement of the panel holding.

Dissent: The regulation is outside the statute; if the government doesn't raise Chevron, the deference claim is waived; lenity counsels the reading of the statute to the contrary.

Dissent: Deference is an aspect of statutory interpretation, which is the function of the courts.

Dissent: Criminal laws are not subject to Chevron deference.


Aposhian v. Wilkinson

Second Circuit: Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo


For standing to challenge state firearms licensing scheme, plaintiffs must either apply for a license or demonstrate the futility of doing so.

11th Amendment bars claims against judges in their individual capacity when adjudicating firearms licensing applications, as the licenses issue under judicial order, although the refusals are communicated administratively.

As firearm licenses can be legitimately withheld for certain reasons, the statutory requirement of good moral character can be read to incorporate these reasons, and is therefore not unconstitutionally vague.

Licensing scheme doesn't offend Second Amendment, as there is a substantial relationship between the legitimate goals of the licensing scheme and the restrictions that it imposes.

Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Andy Maya


Sufficient evidence for possession in furtherance where the firearm is kept with funds gained from drug dealing and occasionally taken with the deft when dealing drugs.

Allowing expert testimony that a firearm being kept near drug proceeds is consistently linked to its being used to guard those funds was not an abuse of discretion, since it didn't discuss the legal aspects of the ultimate issue.

Ninth Circuit: USA v. Tuan Luong


Sufficient nexus to interstate commerce for purpose of the Hobbs Act where a BB with servers in the state and redundant servers out of the state is used to facilitate a robbery, since the site operated as an interstate market and facilitated interstate transactions -- the deft's conduct therefore had an impact on interstate commerce.

As the indictment at retrial served for the same complex of facts, it was not constructively amended by the gov't suggestion that the deft's attempted use of a stole debit card was interstate in nature.

Unanimity instruction not required, as interstate commerce theories were alternate means that jurors could have used to convict on the same factual elements.

Jury instruction on "slight but not speculative" effect on interstate commerce was either correct or harmless error.

Even if mere use of the interstate instrumentality is insufficient to satisfy interstate standard, prosc. statements to contrary and statements of duty to convict were not incurable conduct.

Erroneous not to instruct that knowledge of felon status was an element of felon in possession, but not plain error, given deft's many prior felony convictions.

Hobbs Act robbery is a valid ACCA predicate.

Vacated and remanded to determine if the acceptance of responsibility sentencing reduction was inappropriately denied due to the interstate commerce challenge.


Second Circuit: Jack v. Barr



Conviction under state statute encompassing loaded antique firearms is not a categorical predicate for Immigration removal under federal statutory definition adopted by the agency, as that definition excludes antique firearms.

Considering the question de novo, agency erred in requiring petitioner to establish a reasonable probability that the state would prosecute conduct outside the federal and agency standard, as there is no ambiguity in the statute.

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Robert Brandon

As deft took affirmative steps to conceal possession of firearm, court's acceptance of guilty plea without colloquy or finding on scienter to establish that deft knew that his previous conviction would prohibit possession was not plain error.

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Chia Lee, et al


Sufficient evidence, given facts.

Where deft lives in a certain judicial district and has a bank in that district, jury might have legitimately found that venue was proper in conspiracy in prosecution; vicinage concerns are not implicated where deft lives in the district.

Jury sending note to judge during proceedings asking for clarification of charges is insufficient to establish improper deliberations where individually interviewed jurors claim that discussion of the merits had not occurred.

Govt experts general statements based on small fraction of files reviewed were harmless error.

Although instruction on deliberate ignorance was an abuse of discretion given lack of purposeful contrivance, inclusion was harmless error.

No clear error where sentencing report estimates drug quantities without a showing on the percentage of lawful prescriptions.

No plain error where conflicting findings would result from using the totality of either of the two versions of the Guidelines, rather than the combination of the two elected by the sentencing court.

Firearm in adjoining office sufficient for sentencing bump where prescriptions were written in an examination room.



Fifth Circuit: USA v. James Perryman


Commerce Clause sufficient justification for law barring convicted felon's possession of weapon that at some point previous travelled in interstate commerce; present interstate travel need not be established.

PSR's unsworn statements describing previous proceeding are sufficient to establish perjury for the purpose of sentencing bump where the court also adopts an addendum that contains the relevant record excerpts.


First Circuit: US v. Brake

Although the two sentencing bumps both arise from the possession of the stolen weapon during the crime, one refers to the theft of the weapon, and one refers to the probable use of the weapon.  Absent legislative guidance against double-counting, both may be applied.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1978P-01A.pdf

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Napoleon Foster

A conviction for using a firearm in the course of a robbery precludes increasing the underlying sentence for the robbery itself for explosive or weapons threats, even when those threats are unconnected to the firearm used in the robbery.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D08-31/C:17-3236:J:Scudder:aut:T:fnOp:N:2211361:S:0

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Michael John Walker

Sentencing bump for possession of a weapon in support of the crime inappropriate where the weapon was locked in the trunk and the crime was use or possession of a user's amount of drugs.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/171680P.pdf


Second Circuit: United States v. Alston

Off-duty police officer who carries a weapon at the direction of the police force can still be charged for possessing a weapon in furtherance of the illegal acts, as weapons can be possessed for multiple reasons.

No error in denial of new trial based on the fact that one of the witnesses mis-stated their employment status.

Post-verdict jailhouse infractions of witness do not give rise to a Brady claim.

No error in denial of minor participant sentencing reduction, as the deft's interference with law enforcement allowed criminal conspiracy to proceed; similar logic for obstruction and breach of trust sentencing enhancements.

First Circuit: US v. Caballero-Vazquez

Sentence procedurally reasonable, since mitigation was properly considered, guilty plea prior to sentence was properly included as a prior conviction, and possession counts arising from the same nexus of facts can result in consecutive sentences.

75 Month sentence substantively reasonable.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1144P-01A.pdf

Second Circuit: United States v. Jimenez

Facial challenge is first analyzed as-applied in the context of a direct appeal of a criminal conviction.

Statute prohibiting the possession of a bullet by a dishonorably-discharged former soldier who was found guilty of felony-equivalent conduct by a military tribunal is substantially related to an important government interest, and would therefore not be barred by the Second Amendment.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/05194beb-c7ca-4533-89f8-3cdc4043f522/2/doc/17-287_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/05194beb-c7ca-4533-89f8-3cdc4043f522/2/hilite/

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nicholas Ryan Hemsher

Inconsistencies in self-interested witnesses' testimony were subject to cross, and do not establish lack of sufficient evidence.

Exclusion of prior inconsistent statement to police was harmless, as inconsistencies explored elsewhere, and no contemporaneous proffer; exclusion of exited utterances by police during search was proper, since police officers don't get excited--also harmless.

Sufficient evidence for sentence enhancement based on number of firearms.  Enhancement for another felony found by a preponderance can apply to firearm trafficking and possession, so long as it's not the actual underlying crime charged.  Texts from incarceration referencing "snitches" sufficed for obstruction enhancement.  Disparities in co-conspirators' sentences not per se unreasonable.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/172189P.pdf