Showing posts with label Fraud. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fraud. Show all posts

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Croft

 Listing qualified staff members who never showed up to work for purposes of a certification by a state agency was a violation of the identity theft statute, as the misrepresentation was at the crux of the fraud.

CONCURRENCE:

("Dubitante") The fraudulent aspect wasn't in the identities of the staff members, but in their qualifications.

USA v. Croft

Ninth Circuit: USA v. Volodymyr Kvashuk

 Proof that an IP associated with the house was used to access relevant email and crypto-coin sites, combined with affidavit statement that financial and personal records are often kept at the home, was sufficient probable cause for a search of the house in an online fraud investigation.  The fact that the fraudulent transactions were committed before moving there isn't dispositive of whether there was likely to be evidence at the house.

A 15-20 month gap between the thefts and the affidavit didn't make the affidavit claims stale, given the nature of computer memory.

Discrepancy in URL TLD on the warrant affidavit was inconsequential.

Personally issued website development test accounts sufficiently identify their authorized users to be the basis for a charge of aggravated identity theft.

Deft's immigration status wasn't critical to establishing a defense for the use of crypto-coin; court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it.

Juror's work with the same large corporate division was insufficient for a claim of implied bias, since the fact patterns at issue in the trial weren't similar to the events of their employment.

USA v. Volodymyr Kvashuk

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Mesquias

 Where testimony objectively establishes fraudulent medical billing practices, there is no categorical requirement to establish actual falsity of diagnosis in particular cases.

When appealing a denial of a chance to speak at sentencing, the appellant must cite a basis for reversal or remand, or make a proffer of evidence that would have been offered.

Sufficient evidence of pervasive fraud to shift the burden of proof on the calculation of damages.

USA v. Mesquias

Seventh Circuit: Thomas Prose v. Molina Healthcare of Illinois,

 

Evidence as to where, how, and to whom allegedly false representations were made can state a claim under the statute for fraudulent claims against the government.

Evidence as to the who, what, where, when, and how can state a claim for fraudulent inducement in contractual negotiations; a relator who is not a party to the negotiations might be unable to provide details of the negotiations.

Implied false certification is a species of fraud, and therefore subject to heightened pleading.   

Continuing to bill the set capitation after ending the subcontracting that provided enhanced services states a claim for implied false certification under the Act, since the services were a material term of the deal.

DISSENT (CJ)

Mere request for payment from the government while not materially complying with a contractual term is insufficient to state a claim under the Act, given the Act's extreme remedies, including treble damages.

Contract was a contract to provide beneficiaries with access to needed services, not needed services themselves.

These circumstances wouldn't state a claim, even absent heightened pleading.  There was no express factual falsity; the omission was an implied falsity.  Precedent requires that a request for payment also make specific representations in order to be actionable.  Suggesting that noncompliance is material means that any noncompliance is material.



http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D08-19/C:20-2243:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2749985:S:0

Eighth Circuit: Ascente Business Consulting v. DR myCommerce

 

Proof that a company had certain knowledge prior to its employees' contrary statements is insufficient to state a fraud or fraud-adjacent claim under the state's heightened pleading rules.  

Evidence that work stopped after a certain meeting can't speak to the mindset of statements made at that meeting.  Evidence of a contrary financial interest is at most only a factor, as is the amount of work that it would have taken to accomplish the task.

Expert testimony on ambiguity of contract terms is inadmissible, as ambiguity is a legal conclusion.

Given testimony that the overruns were paid to preserve the business relationship, there was no question for trial on the reliance on the underlying representations. Under state law, the counterparty's expectations of the plaintiff's reliance are insufficient to establish the plaintiff's reliance.


http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/202474P.pdf

Second Circuit: Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

 

Forging of clients' signatures on immigration petitions without the knowledge of the clients constitutes sufficient unauthorized use of their personal information under the aggravated identity theft statute.

Material falsity of the filing is sufficiently independent from the use of the forged signature to justify the independent sentencing increase.

Sufficient evidence for the relevant hundred-document threshold by a preponderance where it was established that 100 basically identical petitions of factual clams were filed.

CONCURRENCE:

While lawful, the indictment's additional charge of identity theft was possibly an unfair use of prosecutorial discretion.


Joseph Watley, Karin Hasemann v. Department of Children and Families

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Crystal Lundberg

 

Objection to the disclosure of the deft's past occupation was waived when deft raised it several times during the trial.

Deft affirmatively agreed to the admission of the draft email at trial, waiving any subsequent objection.

Appellant carries burden on plain error review to show why forfeited objection at trial meets the standard for plain error.

Sufficient evidence to establish that deft had the requisite intent to defraud and was an active and knowing participant, since deft knew that the funds were illicit, and continued to spend them.

Alteration of another person's tax forms and pay records in order to secure a lease is sufficient for the sophisticated means sentencing bump.


USA v. Crystal Lundberg

Third Circuit: Dansko Holdings Inc v. Benefit Trust Co

 

Employer's contract claim against potential trustee of employee stock benefit plan is remote from the usual ERISA concerns, and therefore not preempted by the statute.

Implied spoken promise subsequent to execution of written contract can be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.

Integration clause refers only to the time of formation -- when subsequent parties to the contract were substituted in, the integration clause still looked back to the time of initial formation.

A lie about a side issue in the course of a contractual breach is separately actionable as fraud where the lie implicates a broader social duty owed to all individuals.

By conceding valid substitution into the contract for the purposes of the breach claim, the plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the indemnification agreement compelling the payment of legal fees doesn't apply to the defendant.  Plain meaning of indemnify encompasses first party claims.  Under state law, it wouldn't be specific enough to cover any damages award.


Dansko Holdings Inc v. Benefit Trust Co

Third Circuit: Lisa Earl v. NVR Inc

Given intervening state court decisions, the economic loss doctrine (barring recovery in tort from claims arising from a contract) does not bar claims for economic loss under the federal deceptive practices statute. 

Gist of the action doctrine does not bar recovery in tort for claims squarely arising in contract, where the contract is collateral to the fraud or negligence.


Lisa Earl v. NVR Inc

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Carlos Luna

 

Given the specific misrepresentations made, and the fact that insurers would have otherwise more carefully scrutinized the clinic, sufficient evidence for a scheme or artifice to defraud, despite the fact that some percentage of the claims were legitimate.

Restitution, and sentencing calculations should have been offset for the percentage of treatments that were medically necessary.  Forfeiture, though, looks to the gross proceeds of the criminal activity and did not have to be offset.

United States  v.  Carlos Luna

Second Circuit: United States v. Atilla


Statute that prohibited evading or avoiding economic sanctions on a foreign nation referred only to evading existing sanctions, not the attempt to avoid the imposition of subsequent sanctions.

Elements of bank fraud and bank fraud conspiracy would necessarily mean that existing sanctions were violated, so harmless error.

Sufficient evidence for prohibited use of US banks, since US dollars were desired, and court heard testimony that there was a high likelihood that the process would pass through a US entity at some point, something that the conspirators were likely well aware of.

Statute prohibiting fraud against the government goes beyond the common-law definition of fraud to encompass any impairment of government functions.

Statute does not trespass on executive conduct of foreign affairs, since DOJ is an executive agency, and they decide to prosecute.

If the refusal to allow a transcript and tape of jail telephone call in for impeachment after gov't witness' claim that he had not said that in America, people have to admit to things they haven't done in order to get free was error, it was harmless error, as the jury was aware that the witness was hoping to receive leniency for his cooperation.


Eighth Circuit: United States v. Shari Natysin


Company's software allowed deft sufficient discretion to justify sentencing bump for abusing a position of private trust, as she could structure the finances singlehandedly.

Second Circuit: United States v. Jones


Pace the Ninth Circuit, the relevant statute's proscription of "false and fictitious" documents includes false versions of legitimate documents, not just novel types of instruments.

Fifth Circuit: IAS Service Group, L.L.C. v. Jim Buckley & Associates

Fraudulent inducement pleaded with sufficient particularity; Contractual term did not operate as a disclaimer of reliance; no clear error in court's determination that breach of contract regarding assignment was harmless; party asserting breach had the obligation to establish performance of the condition precedent.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-50105-CV0.pdf


Fifth Circuit: USA v. Ezell Brown, Jr.


Common-law rule holding that the place where the lender received he false statement establishes venue is inconsistent with the rule that the location of the crime is to be determined by the nature of the crime and the location of the acts.

Where the indictment alleges fraud in the supporting documents and the theory of the case becomes fraud in the application itself, there is no constructive amendment, since the offense as alleged included fraudulent verification of supporting documents at closing.

There is no requirement to establish that the fraudulent statement affected the lending decision; rather, it need only have a natural tendency to influence such a decision.

Reference in closing to truth-seeking role of the finder of fact did not dilute the required standard of proof.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/17/17-40740-CR0.pdf


First Circuit: US v. Arif

Trade Commission organic act was not an implied partial repeal of the wire fraud act, as the latter deals only with the wires and the former with advertising, and, further, there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two.

Deft's belief in the actual efficacy of the product does not negative the intentional specific misrepresentations in the advertising materials on the website.

Sentencing calculations that included revenue from sales of products about which no complaints had been received is not plainly erroneous, given lack of showing that the satisfied customers didn't purchase due to specific fraudulent misrepresentation.  Additionally, no reasonable probability of prejudice, given downward departure from sentencing range.

Below-guidelines sentence not substantively unreasonable.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1597P-01A.pdf


Seventh Circuit: Pension Trust Fund v. Kohl's Corporaton

Although the real estate plans of the corporation should have alerted management that the accounting error would occur, the fact that it occurred several times and that executives sold shares is not enough to state a case under heightened statutory pleading, as the management might have overlooked the consideration, and there was sufficient time between the stock sales and the revised revenue statements.

Although it was error for the court below to dismiss with prejudice, it was not an abuse of discretion sufficient to justify reversal, as, in the interval, the opposing party hasn't made a showing of how the claim might be amended.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-12/C:17-2697:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:2185294:S:0

Tenth Circuit: Polukoff v. St. Mark's Hospital

Realtor's claim that a physician was billing the government for unnecessary cardiac surgeries states a claim where the medical opinion that a procedure is reasonable and necessary does not comport with the government's definitions of reasonability and necessity.

Such a claim survives elevated pleading under the rules, as a general state of mind can be alleged.

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-4014.pdf

First Circuit: US v. Acosta-Joaquin

The deft's intent to represent the social security number as his and his conduct in providing the number, although associated with the correct name, sufficed for a fraudulent use of the social security number.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1379P-01A.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Bennie Kennedy v. Schneider Electric

Impeachment evidence against claims of opposing witnesses did not rise to the clear and convincing level of deliberate perjury required for fraud on the court; they should have been raised on direct appeal or in a post-judgment motion.

Rule 11 sanctions upheld, as delay in filing couldn't be ascribed to a reluctance to assert such a thing against opposing counsel.

Motion for appellate sanctions needs to be raised in a separate motion; they can't just be mentioned in the briefing.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D06-19/C:17-1786:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:2173108:S:0