Showing posts with label Fourth Amendment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fourth Amendment. Show all posts

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Chimanga Smith

 

Traffic violation and subsequent flight established probable cause for stop and placing the driver in handcuffs.

Plain-view exception allows a police officer to shine a flashlight through the windshield after all of the suspects have left the car.

No error in declining to instruct on the lesser included offense of possession, as there was insufficient evidence probative of likelihood for individual use.

(Seven uses of "Cleaned Up" signal in nine page opinion.)


United States  v.  Chimanga Smith

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Robert L. Berrios

 

Although there was insufficient circuit precedent on the question to allow for the good-faith exception to cell phone searches prior to the Supreme Court holding limiting them, the admission of the evidence from the search was harmless error.


USA v.  Robert L. Berrios


NB:  Prior to this post, cell phone cases, including historical location data, were tagged under "Computer Law."

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Michael White, Jr.

 

The visits to the house by the seller of drugs during the transactions created a fair probability or sufficient common sense inference for a search warrant for the house.

The appropriateness of a no-knock warrant sounds in S1983 claims, not a suppression hearing.

United States v. Michael White, Jr. 

Seventh Circuit: Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett

 

During visual inspections of the bodies of  convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, the Fouth Amendment protects some right of bodily privacy.

Where such a search is used as punishment, the 8th Amendment is implicated.

In the absece of evidence that administrators have exaggerated the justification for the search, wide-ranging deference to the administrator.

Reasonableness hinges on scope, manner, justication, and place.

Claim for qualified immunity not raised in motion for summary judgment is waived for present appeal, but can be asserted on remand.  Waived defenses cannot be raised on appeal, forfeited defenses can be reviewed for plain error.

Remedy of decertification of class would require a cross-appeal.


Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett

Fourth Circuit: US v. James Cobb

 

Warrant was sufficiently particular, as it specified the device to be searched and the offense for which the search was seeking evidence.

It would not have been reasonable to require the warrant affiant to explain where in the computer file structure the evidence was to be found.

Catch-all provision in warrant authorizing seizure of evidence of any and all other crimes was overbroad, but the remedy is to sever it from the otherwise sufficiently particular warrant.

Circuit precedent compels admissibility of evidence from plain view exception in a computer search.

Dissent:

Police had a sufficient theory of the case to explain the type of thing that they were looking for in the search.

If the warrant was flawed, plain view is out, since police could only seize the device.

No good faith exception for facially flawed warrant. 


US v. James Cobb

First CIrcuit: US v. Mejia Romero

 

Given reasonable inferences to be drawn from the warrant application according to the deft's behoof, sufficient nexus between the property, the deft, and the alleged crime, as the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Offense proscibed knowing crimal activity involving a certain type and quantity of drug, not necessarily the known involvement of a certain type and quantity of drug.


US v. Mejia Romero

Ninth Circuit: Miguel Reynaga Hernandez v. Derrek Skinner

 

As there was no particular and objective basis for the Terry stop and the arrest of the foreign national was effectuated by handcuffing and placing into the patrol car prior to the contact with federal immigration authorities that gave probable cause for the arrest, S1983 suit against the officer states a claim.

As the actions of the Justice of the Police who called the officer to the courtroom upon leaning from a testifying witness that the plaintiff was in the country illegally were both a but/for cause and a proximate cause of the deprivation of 4A, the JP was a sufficiently integral participant for the purposes of a S1983 claim.

Circuit caselaw was clearly established at time, holding that lack of documentation or other admission of illegal presence was insufficient probable cause for an arrest for illegal entry.


Miguel Reynaga Hernandez v. Derrek Skinner

Seventh Circuit: USA v. Earl R. Orr

 

Warrant affidavit that didn't include any actual statements of the confidential informant was sufficiently backed by information from investigation, and the good faith exception would save in in any event.

Discretionary rulings during the cross of the deft -- opening the door to evidence of contraband and past convictions -- justify retrial given prior finding of improper ex parte communications between the prosecutor and the judge.

USA v. Earl R. Orr

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Raheim Trice


Deft's subjective expectation that the unlocked common hallway outside his apartment door was within the curtilage of his residence was objectively unreasonable, as deft had insufficient control over the space.

Placement of a hidden camera on the hallway wall opposite the deft's door did not violate the right to privacy, as it only recorded when the deft's door was opened, only short clips of video were filmed, and the deft would not have had the power to exclude law enforcement from being there and observing the same acts, even for extended periods.

Tenth Circuit: United States v. Moses



The fact that a surveillance camera was operating in front of the alleged "chop shop" mechanic might have proved exculpatory at trial, but there was no need to inform the magistrate issuing the search warrant of it, as the inference would have been permissive, and a Franks hearing would have resulted only if that inference had been made; the gun found on the proprietor during the search is therefore not excluded.


Ninth Circuit: Yassir Fazaga v. FBI


Concurrence with denial of en banc (starting at 108):

Statutory FISA ex pare in camera review speaks squarely to and therefore displaces the state secrets privilege.

Dismissal remedy not identical with the privilege.

Privilege is an evidentiary privilege, not a constitutional one.

FISA remedy not limited to when the govt is on the offensive, and the other party need not be a defendant.

Dissent from denial of en banc:

FISA review limited to discrete instances of admissibility in criminal prosecutions

Displacement of state secrets privilege by statute privileges the legislature within the balance of powers.

An executive privilege can have a Constitutional core.

FISA review limited to "such other materials," not every possible material.

Any department can invoke privilege, but only DOJ can invoke FISA.

Govt invocation of privilege insufficient for statutory trigger of FISA.

Eighth Circuit: Damon O'Neil v. United States


No ineffective assistance for not seeking Franks hearing given incorrect name provided by search warrant affiant, as there was sufficient evidence of drug activity at the residence, even absent the identities of the suspects provided by the affiant.

Magistrate's omission of check-bo indicating the reason for the affiant's reliability was not fatal to the warrant, as the general endorsement was signed.

No ineffective assistance on not challenging cell phone search, as it was two years in advance of Riley.

Police affidavit furnished during collateral challenge indicating that deft had been Mirandized prior to confession suffices against Strickland challenge, as there was no indication that trial counsel knew or should have known that the deft claimed that he hadn't been read his rights.


Seventh Circuit: USA v. Finas Glenn



Given the audio-visual recordings of the purchase of drugs at the residence, there was sufficient probable cause for the warrant, despite the omission of credibility indicia in the affidavit.  Delay between the purchase and the warrant was justified in order to conceal the identity of the confidential informant.

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gabriel Sherrod



No clear error in court's holding that police officer's post-incident statement that he kept the door from closing, later described as a poor choice of words, really meant that he had walked in through an open door.

Knock and announce not required where a minor child resident being followed by the police walks into the house without closing the door, it's nighttime, and police have a felony arrest warrant for a resident whom they believe to be inside.

Obstruction sentencing bump is not an abuse of discretion where deft testifies that the police kicked the door, but the court can't discern it in the audio.

Below-guidelines statutory maximum sentence not substantively unreasonable.




Sixth Circuit: Scott Callahan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons



Given precedent and legislative activity in the area, there is no Bivvens cause of action under the First Amendment for the seizure of an inmate's painting and mailed model photographs; the prison grievance procedures presumably offer sufficient remedy.



Eighth Circuit: United States v. Mark Ringland


Private searches by email provider subsequent to first report to authorities did not transform the provider into a government agent for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment; Carpenter scope not implicated by email provider's capacity for private search.

Fourth Circuit: US v. Billy Curry, Jr.


Suspicionless stop and search of person in proximity to audible gunshots was not justified under the emergency aid exception within exigent circumstances, as such a stop would require firm knowledge of the crime and a close geographical association with the place of the crime.

CJ, concur:  Dissent's approach risks overpolicing, country at a moment of reckoning.

Concur: Sociology and predictive policing not a basis for law.

Concur: Scotus dictum sets standard for special needs exigency, searches must be discretionless and systematic.

Concur: Predictive policing = racial profiling.

Dissent 1: Having to stop and wait to get the details of the crime undercuts predictive policing, results in communities under-served by police.

 Dissent 2: Upon reasonable suspicion of exigency, police must balance the gravity of the risk against the right infringed.

(Amended opinion presumably corrects typo from "waiving Constitutions in the air" to "waving Constitutions in the air,  per Google archive of old file.) 

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Joseph Taylor, III


Probation Officers were not required to inform probationer of right to refuse consent to search of closed spaces.  Consent was valid, not a mere acquiescence to authority.

No clear error in District Court's finding that probation officers' testimony of spoken acquiescence was sufficient and credible as unequivocal, free and voluntary.

Later spoken permission to search house sufficient to encompass crawlspaces.

Consent to later police search was valid despite lack of proof that deft knew that he could refuse.











Sixth Circuit: United States v. Jonathan Shelton


Police testimony of confirming field test, and sufficient officer expertise establish the reasonableness of traffic stop for tinted windows in the process of investigating possible firearms violation -- photographs of the windows need not be introduced in evidence.





Sixth Circuit: United States v. Erik McCoy

The facts that the deft was regularly selling drugs, and that he was apprehended in possession of a large amount of drugs while at work provided sufficient explanation in the warrant's affidavit for a search of the apartment that he shared with another employee to be permissible under the good faith exception.

http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0209p-06.pdf

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