Ninth Circuit: Ford v. Peery

 

DISSENT FROM DENIAL OF REHEARING EN BANC

Panel inappropriately hypothetically considered the law as misstated by the prosecutor under AEDPA deference, rather than considering the state court's judgment of the prejudice caused by the statement.

Dicta on questions that are germane to the case and resolved after reasoned determination in a published opinion are binding in the circuit.  This has proved problematic and some have said that it's in tension with Article III.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/18/18-15498.pdf

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Edmund Phillips

 

As the statute doesn't limit the post-sentencing review of restitution interest charges, and the most logical reading of the circumstance is that a petition arising from changed circumstances is unlikely to happen at sentencing, the court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to modify an interest obligation after sentencing.

Extensive review of statute's structure and history.

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0185p-06.pdf

Sixth Circuit: Laura Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc.

 

As the statute makes no provision for nationwide service of process, Due Process requires that the statutory joinder of out of state parties to a statutory collective action prove sufficient minimum contacts of the original deft within each forum state of the out of state parties.

DISSENT

The addition of new plaintiffs doesn't change the singularity of the lawsuit, within which the court has already acquired its specific jurisdiction.  Alternatively, the deft's conduct towards the out of state plaintiffs relates to its conduct within the original forum state.

As it's a national statute, interests of particular states aren't implicated in the same way.

The statute's designation of added plaintiffs as parties is merely to distinguish their status from that of representatives without a personal interest.

https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0186p-06.pdf

Third Circuit: Dianoias Eatery LLC v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co

 

The existence of unfiled potential legal claims arising from the same circumstances does not mean that a court lacks statutory jurisdiction to issue a requested declaratory judgment; under the statute, such claims aren't waived by seeking declaratory judgment as to the allocation of rights and responsibilities, and can be raised in a subsequent action.

Circuit precedent requiring the court to consider the redress from a federal court judgment doesn't implicate the effect of federal rulings on state law, but looks to the ability of a court to accord final relief to the parties.

Circuit precedent requiring the consideration of the litigation of identical issues in state court assumes identity of parties as well.

Even within the context of the pandemic, the issues raised here are generic issues of contract and policy exclusion interpretation, making a prudential remand on the ground of undetermined state law unjustified.

Since the state courts have no legislative priority in matters of public health, balancing policy exclusions against state public policy interests is not peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the state courts.

DISSENT

Factors relevant to prudential abstention aren't exhaustive; states need to fashion a comprehensive plan to recover from the pandemic; federal speculation on state law risks undue delay.

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202954p.pdf

DC Circuit: Selvin Solis Meza v. Tracy Renaud

 

Since the plaintiff is seeking to relitigate a question decided adversely in a removal hearing, the question arises from the removal action or proceeding; Article III review is therefore limited by statute to narrow areas, including timely challenge to final order of removal.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/6702971D442C34F285258734004E5347/$file/20-5079-1910446.pdf

DC Circuit: Gunay Miriyeva v. USCIS

 

Statutory judicial review mechanism for denied naturalization applications implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction due to the fairly discernible intent of the comprehensive and interrelated statutory scheme, the fact that the exclusive remedy would not foreclose meaningful review, and the fact that the requested relief -- a change in agency policy that would be dispositive for the plaintiff's case -- is not wholly collteral to the statute's provisions.

https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/BC7CB0DD9CAE2B6285258734004E532E/$file/20-5032-1910440.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Stanley Boim v. American Muslims for Palestine

 

A federal court has sufficient independent jurisdiction over a claim to enforce an earlier federal judgment against a putative alter ego of the original deft when jurisdiction over the putative alter ego would arise under the statute that conferred the jurisdiction over the original action.  The question of whether the second organization is in fact an alter ego of the first is a merits question, not a jurisdictional threshold.

The ERISA framework is not compulsory when assessing alter ego under the antiterrorism laws.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2021/D08-16/C:20-3233:J:Scudder:aut:T:fnOp:N:2748362:S:0

Sixth Circuit: Brian Lyngaas v. Curaden AG

 

Because evidence establishes a business plan for eventual profitability undercapitalization is not per se proof of being a mere instrumentality of another corporation.

As there is no culpable conduct establishing that the foreign corporation used their control over the domestic corporation to effect a fraud or wrong on the complainant, there is insufficient basis to piece the corporate veil.

Jurisdiction is proper in the district under the FRCP, since the cause of action arises under federal law, the foreign entity is not within the jurisdiction of any other state, and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the US constitution and laws.

Under Fifth Amendment due process, foreign company sufficiently purposefully availed itself of the American market generally by launching the domestic company and retaining a measure of control over it. The marketing faxes at issue sufficiently relate to the purpose of these minimum contacts, even though the foreign company might not be culpable for the sending of the faxes.  Asserting first US jurisdiction over the foreign company is reasonable, since there is a federal interest in the enforcement of the laws, and the plaintiff will not be able to find financial redress from the domestic corporation.

The regulation making culpable under the statute the person whose goods and services are advertised only applies to persons who have some level of knowledge that an unsolicited fax has been sent.

Consistent with agency findings, fax-to-computer transmissions are within the Act, as the receiving machine has the capacity of transcribing the image to paper.

Given proffer of eventual admissibility, the class was correctly certified using unauthenticated telephone logs, as nonexpert evidence may be sufficiently probative at the early stages of the litigation.

As the logs were generated by a machine, they were not hearsay -- hearsay requires the assertion of a person.  Court correctly excluded expert testimony.

List of affected phone numbers reasonably necessitated the claims administration procedure.

In a federal class action, the court need not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to each plaintiff.  The question of jurisdiction looks to the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation -- it does not depend on unnamed class members.  

CONCURRENCE/ DISSENT:

As state courts couldn't resolve the clams of out of state class members, neither can federal courts resolve the claims of those outside its jurisdiction. 

14A Determines the due process limits on federal jurisdiction under the 5A  in federal court.

The statute doesn't apply to faxes received on computers, since, on its own, a computer can't receive messages from a phone line or print the fax on paper; additionally, Congress listed computers as senders, but not receivers.  

Brian Lyngaas v. Curaden AG

Fifth Circuit: Atkins, et al v. CB&I

 

Company's plant to pay employees who stay until the end of a project a bonus is akin to a severance scheme, but does not have the administrative complexity characteristic of an ERISA plan, and is therefore outside the reach of the statute, and of the federal courts.

Atkins, et al v. CB&I

Ninth Circuit: Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Company

 

Since an order of remand deprives the nonmovant party of access to the federal courts, precedent dictates that the transmittal of the remand did not divest the court of jurisdiction or the appellate courts of the power to review the remand or any antecedent orders.  Since the sua sponte remand to state court rested upon the finding that the removing party must plausibly plead jurisdictional elements, and not upon the stated finding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction, the case falls outside the statute limiting jurisdiction and appeal after remand.

Academy of Country Music v. Continental Casualty Company

Fifth Circuit: Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

 

Plain text of a federal statute permitting the transfer of an action where the court has a want of jurisdiction allows transfers for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or both.

The provisions of the statute are compulsory, so they apply whether or not the court cites it when transferring an action.

State statute prescribing any suit after one year from the accrual of the claim but tolled by either filing a claim in a court of sufficient jurisdiction and venue or service looks to the federal courts to determine the date of filing of suit, so the federal law relating back the transferred suit to the date of filing in the first venue.  The state statute looks to the federal relation-back because the Rules of Decision Act privileges federal statutes over state laws, so the Erie analysis looks first to the federal statutory law.  The federal statute controls under the Supremacy Clause; the case is within the statute, and Congress had sufficient authority to pass the statute to regulate the federal courts.

DISSENT:

Federal statute wasn't intended to regulate state statutes of limitations.  State law is an integrated regulation of statute of limitations and service of process.  Majority's view leads to unequal results between state and federal court, and in federal courts handling transferred claims and federal courts serving as the initial forum

Franco v. Mabe Trucking, et al

Eleventh Circuit: Wendy St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., et al

 

Three to five phone calls per week to out of state customers and vendors establishes sufficient interstate commerce for the jurisdiction of the federal labor standards statute, since the statute explicitly includes communication within its definition of commerce.

Wendy St. Elien v. All County Environmental Services, Inc., et al

Fourth Circuit: US v. Daniel Harris

 

Physical presence in the courtroom is sufficient to give a criminal court jurisdiction over a deft.

Habeas grounds not raised at trial or on direct appeal and then raised for the first time on a collateral challenge are subject to de novo review on matters of law if the government doesn't argue the procedural default at the District Court.

If the conduct relative to the statute's focus, the object of the statute's solicitude, occurred in the US, it is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even if related conduct occurred abroad.  Since the protected victim was in the US while being coerced into the activity by means of the Internet, the present case is a permissible domestic application of the statute, even though the deft was abroad.

US v. Daniel Harris

Federal Circuit: Mylan v. Janssen

 

As the general statutory grant of jurisdiction to review decisions is modified by a specific provision making the refusal to institute IPR nonreviewable, courts have no jurisdiction over the Director's delegated decision not to institute proceedings.  Since the APA does not in itself create jurisdiction, an administrative challenge is similarly unavailable.

Even though Mandamus challenging the proceeding only runs from the Federal Circuit, as the sole court with sufficient prospective jurisdiction, as there is neither a clear and undisputable right to relief nor a colorable constitutional claim, nor historical precedent sufficient to justify a Due Process claim, the writ is unavailable here.

Mylan v. Janssen

Sixth Circuit: Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens

 

The modification to the Habeas statute requiring that the application be filed with the sentencing court is jurisdictional limit on the original statute.

Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens 

Fifth Circuit: Williams, et al v. Lockheed Martin

 

Federal officer removal was appropriate, because at the time of removal, there was a colorable claim that the government was specific and complete, the contractor could not deviate from it, and it was implemented under the direct supervision of the government, and the government had more comprehensive knowledge of the risk at issue than did the contractor.

Challenges to discovery orders must identify the crucial evidence that would otherwise have been obtained.

As the expert testimony claiming exposure to the substance prior to the enactment of the statutory exclusive remedy was derived from factual assumptions rather than actual evidence, the statute provides the sole remedy.

Communication with an employee of a represented corporate party whose statements might be imputed to the corporate party wasn't an abuse of discretion, but as fee-shifting isn't in the state's rules, imposing a monetary sanction would require a finding of either bad faith or willful disobedience of a court's order.

Williams, et al v. Lockheed Martin

Fifth Circuit: St. Charles Hosp, et al v. LA Health Srv, et al

 

Pleadings categorically excluding any claims against a federal officer are generally to be honored, except where they are artful exercises in pleading designed to circumvent jurisdiction.

For purposes of federal officer removal from state court, the conduct that caused the harm need not be caused by the act performed at the federal officer's direction, but merely associated with an act performed at the direction of the federal officer.

St. Charles Hosp, et al v. LA Health Srv, et al

Fifth Circuit: Green Valley Special Util Dist v. Donna Nelson, et al.

Dismissal with prejudice of a erroneous claim that an earlier decision of a regulatory body relied on a preempted state statute does not deprive the plaintiff of the right subsequently to assert the preemption of the statute as relied upon by another regulatory decision.

Dispute as to two of the parties is now moot, given private settlement of claims, and subsequent procedural steps and the possibility that an allegedly preempted statute might be relied upon in the future is insufficient to preserve a live case or controversy between the parties.

While the voiding of a past agency order is not obtainable under the Ex Parte Young exception to state sovereignty, subsequent enforcement actions in furtherance of such an order do state a claim.

As the suit is seeking a remedy in equity, the non-jurisdictional bar against S1983 claims against political subdivisions does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

Statutory requirement of utility capability implies an inquiry into nearby infrastructure.

CJ, et al., Concur/Dissent: 

Federal statute defining utility service area applies to the degree that federal funds were used to construct the infrastructure.

Concur/Concur with Concur/Dissent:

Fact-bound decision on remand.

Concur:

Where a state law statute creating a private cause of action is preempted, the c/a can arise in equity, and where the claim presents a substantial question of federal law, there is federal jurisdiction.

Concur:

Although, by Bivvens analogy, S1983's exclusion of political subdivisions should extinguish a correlative implied cause of action in equity arising under Ex Parte Young, precedent sufficiently recognizes the validity of an equitable suit for prospective relief against state officials' actions that violate the federal constitution.

Green Valley Special Util Dist v. Donna Nelson, et

Eleventh Circuit: Myra Corley, et al v. Long-Lewis, Inc., et al

As governing circuit precedent on the question is in conflict with earlier circuit precedent that it doesn't distinguish or overrule, the earlier precedent governs -- voluntary dismissal without prejudice is therefore a sufficiently final order for the purposes of appeal, since it removed the case from the court's consideration.

Interlocutory denial of motion to reconsider by the courts of another circuit that eventuates in a voluntary dismissal with prejudice within the circuit is considered only in the context of the appeal from the voluntary dismissal; the implied challenge to the other circuit's courts does not make the subsequent decisions within the circuit unreviewable.

Appellant is sufficiently adverse for purposes of standing to final decision below.  Although it resulted from appellant's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the decision contained merged elements of earlier adverse interlocutory decisions.

No abuse of discretion in denying motion to shift governing law to Admiralty when made in motion to reconsider.

Myra Corley, et al v. Long-Lewis, Inc., et al

Ninth Circuit: Sky-Med, Inc. v. FAA

Agency adjudication did not have jurisdiction, since the two notices of violation were consolidated into a single civil claim in excess of the statutory maximum.  The Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims with an amount in conttroversy in excess of the statutory maximum during the actual pendency of the civil proceeding.

Sky-Med, Inc. v. FAA