Showing posts with label FRE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FRE. Show all posts

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Masha

 

Statute on the misuse of passports can't be extended to counterfeit passports.

No plain error in lay identification of deft in photos, since the photos were from a time at which the witness knew the defendant.

No clear error in sentencing determination that all of the funds in the deft's account were proceeds of fraud.


USA v. Masha

Eleventh Circuit: Edeline Julmisse Prosper v. Anthony Martin

 

No error in exclusion of expert witness at summary judgment for the purposes of translating blurred video into spatial analysis, as the finder of fact would ultimately base their judgment on personal observation of the video.  No error in the exclusion of expert witness on possible medical causes of decedent's behavior, as the officer's judgment was the relevant conduct.

Video evidence does not sufficiently discredit officer's account.

Suspect's biting of the officer's finger during the struggle made shooting the suspect several times in the chest a reasonable act, as the officer feared that he wouldn't be able to defend himself if the finger were to be lost.  Earlier tasing of the suspect also held to be reasonable.


Edeline Julmisse Prosper v. Anthony Martin

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Daniel Gissantaner


Given that expert testimony sufficiently established that the DNA testing technology was generally sufficiently reliable, the question of its reliability when using small sample sizes is a matter to be determined at trial.


United States v. Daniel Gissantaner

Third Circuit: USA v. Marcus Walker

 

Historical cell site information obtained without a warrant appropriately considered under the good faith exception.

Where the underlying data was also admitted, testimony by only one of several collaborating investigators did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Investigator's testimony that the technical evidence was consistent with the physical investigation was not improper vouching or bolstering.

As Hobbs Act Robbery is simply the common law felony in an interstate commerce and a non-physical threat therefore wouldn't fall within its scope, the completed crime is categorically a crime of violence.

As the attempt presumes the full offense, the US Code generally defines attempts specific to each offense, and the intent of the legislature was to prevent violent crime, attempted Hobbs Act Robbery is categorically a crime of violence.

Jury instructions sufficiently identified the robbery, and not the conspiracy as the predicate for convictions under the Hobbs Act.


USA v. Marcus Walker

First Circuit: US v. Padilla-Galarza


Where deft counsel approves plan of insulating confession of codefendant from incriminating the deft, review is for plain error; in this case, no error plain or otherwise when incriminating conclusion could only be reached by inference.

District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a protective order prohibiting leaving cooperating witnesses' statements with the deft, as there was sufficient showing of good cause, the Jencks Act statutory right to the materials was adequately preserved, and deft's courtroom misbehavior justified the limitation on the 6A right to the materials.

Court adequately ensured sufficient Jencks Act access to agents' notes by questioning testifying agent as to scope of note-taking and accepting their answer.

Limiting instruction delivered standing-up after deft's courtroom outburst appropriately preserved the proceedings against mistrial.

Prosecutor's recital of plea condition that cooperating witness must tell the truth was not improper vouching, neither was the court's reference to "a cooperating witness of the United States of America."

No plain error in instruction on deft's testimony indicating an interest in the case, as it didn't belabor the fact; lack of limiting instruction against codeft's outburst wasn't plain error given other evidence of guilt.

Identification and withdrawal of claim of sentencing error during proceeding waives the claim in direct review.

No abuse of discretion in not considering mandatory minimums for other counts.

Court appropriately refused to consider elements of competency report as hearsay, as they lacked required indicia of credibility.

Plausible rationale makes 228 month bank robbery sentence not substantively unreasonable.

Deft claim that money could be cleaned from the damage done by anti-theft devices is speculative; FDIC coverage of stolen funds should not be considered in restitution order, as insurance is generally not considered.

No substantive sentencing error in 228 month sentence for bank robbery.

Ineffective Assistance claim insufficiently clear in the record for consideration on direct review.


US v. Padilla-Galarza

Eighth Circuit: United States v. Gregory Bartunek

 

Although the photographs of the mannequins in the possession of the deft wasn't inextricably interlinked with the crime, their admission was more probative than prejudicial.

Testimony on historical abuse was appropriately admitted to establish character or propensity to commit certain acts.

Hearsay evidence from prior police investigation appropriately cabined by limiting instruction.


United States  v.  Gregory Bartunek

Sixth Circuit: A. K. v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P.

 

As during the trial the appellant didn't argue the relevance of the excluded evidence to comparative negligence factors (including risk avoidance), and the jury wasn't instructed on these factors, no material harm from the exclusion of employee handbook, given that the verdict found negligence, but less than a preponderance, barring any recovery under comparative negligence.

Similarly, appellant didn't argue below that the excluded expert testimony would be useful in allocating fault, so no material hamr from exclusion.

Dissent:

As comparative negligence is simply the degree of negligence, arguing negligence below suffices to consider the harm.  Per precedent, court should have a fair assurance of the error not being dispositive.


A. K. v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P. 

First Circuit: US v. Cotto-Flores

 

As Congress retains the power to legislate on police power matters in Puerto Rico, the amendment of the relevant statute to include commonwealths sufficiently indicated the intent of Congress that the law should apply to crimes committed entirely within the non-state commonwealth.

Sufficient evidence for conviction, as the impeachment of the witness didn't make the finder of fact's crediting of other evidence unreasonable.

Instructing the jury on the state predicate offense didn't confuse them about which offense they were weighing.

As live video testimony is only available in certain situations where the witness cannot reasonably communicate because of fear, allowing a witness to testify remotely where the fear was generalized to the situation and not specific to the deft, and the court accepted the witness' statement without adopting it as a reasoned finding, a retrial is an appropriate remedy.

Concur: 

Constitutional status of Puerto Rico is still that of an unincorporated territory, as the law creating the Commonwealth changed governance procedures rather than constitutional status, and was not a compact.

 US v. Cotto-Flores

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Andy Maya


Sufficient evidence for possession in furtherance where the firearm is kept with funds gained from drug dealing and occasionally taken with the deft when dealing drugs.

Allowing expert testimony that a firearm being kept near drug proceeds is consistently linked to its being used to guard those funds was not an abuse of discretion, since it didn't discuss the legal aspects of the ultimate issue.

Second Circuit: United States v. Atilla


Statute that prohibited evading or avoiding economic sanctions on a foreign nation referred only to evading existing sanctions, not the attempt to avoid the imposition of subsequent sanctions.

Elements of bank fraud and bank fraud conspiracy would necessarily mean that existing sanctions were violated, so harmless error.

Sufficient evidence for prohibited use of US banks, since US dollars were desired, and court heard testimony that there was a high likelihood that the process would pass through a US entity at some point, something that the conspirators were likely well aware of.

Statute prohibiting fraud against the government goes beyond the common-law definition of fraud to encompass any impairment of government functions.

Statute does not trespass on executive conduct of foreign affairs, since DOJ is an executive agency, and they decide to prosecute.

If the refusal to allow a transcript and tape of jail telephone call in for impeachment after gov't witness' claim that he had not said that in America, people have to admit to things they haven't done in order to get free was error, it was harmless error, as the jury was aware that the witness was hoping to receive leniency for his cooperation.


Second Circuit: Williams v. Korines


Prison regulation of gang insignia and materials clearly prohibited possession of photographs of people in the gang's colors and making hand-signs associated with the gang; no reasonable guard would be unaware that there materials were encompassed by the regulation.

Where a previous penalty proceeding is vacated upon review, and in the subsequent penalty, credit is given for the time served of the earlier penalty, the first proceeding is not a basis for a due process liberty claim.

Although the second proceeding was reversed by the Director, the state's deprivation of due process standard merely requires sufficient information to constitute substantial evidence, so the expert opinions offered in the proceeding sufficed.

Circles added to photographs examined during the proceeding were harmless, as the expert earlier reviewed the photos without the circles.

Talking over the presiding officer and waving his finger at her was sufficient basis to remove the prisoner form the proceeding.


Fifth Circuit: Houston Aquarium, Incorporated v. OSHC, et al



ALJ correctly accepted analysis on matters other than the ultimate issue from lay witness, as lay witnesses can draw conclusions based on their experience; deft's witnesses appropriately considered lay witnesses, as there was no foundation laid.

Feeding and cleaning dives at an aquarium are scientific, not commercial, given plain meaning and the notes to the regulation, since they gather data and don't involve heavy tools.  Also the protections for commercial divers seem unnecessary in this context.

First Circuit: US v. Pineda Mateo

In conspiracy prosecutions, the government cannot compel the testimony of a co-conspirator spouse.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1857P-01A.pdf

First Circuit: US v. Russell

Where a juror omits information on a written questionnaire, and that information presents a valid basis for challenge for cause, waiver is not presumed when counsel do not question the unfinished written reply at voir dire; the juror misconduct is structural error when it results in the vote of a single potentially biased juror.

Juror's lack of disclosure of de minimis contact with witness whose credibility was not at issue was sufficiently investigated by a single consultation with witness; the juror did not have to be recalled.

Drug quantities appropriately established by amounts of fertilizer purchases.

Potential juror's dozing off was sufficient neutral reason to avoid Batson challenge.

Preemptively testifying to prior convictions on direct waives appeal against admission of the convictions.

Potentially improper statements in prosecution's closing were isolated and minor comments in a much larger web of evidence.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2386P-01A.pdf


Second Circuit: United States v. Spoor

The obscene nature of a film is objectively determined by the film's content; the intention of the creator is considered only as an element of the analysis.

No constructive amendment in shifting dates in facts alleged.

Past bad acts appropriately admitted, as the court was careful to remove the more inflammatory bits.

Within-guidelines 360 month sentence substantively reasonable.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/e79595db-c3ea-48e1-95ea-ab87f17d70cb/2/doc/16-2972_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/e79595db-c3ea-48e1-95ea-ab87f17d70cb/2/hilite/

First Circuit: US v. Ocean

Sufficient evidence for conspiracy despite conflict with others and dual role as consumer and salesman for the drug operation -- the common purpose was the increased sale of narcotics.

Absent evidence that the government was attempting to elicit statements from the deft, contents of phone call during pretrial detention to friend who might have been cooperating with the investigation admissible.

Explicit waiver of drug quantity calculation in sentencing memo forecloses challenge on appeal.

District court was within discretion to accept deft's possibly exaggerated calculation of drug quantity.

Reference on cross to lab reports did not inappropriately bronze lay testimony as to drug identification or present confrontation clause argument as to the content of the reports.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2468P-01A.pdf


Third Circuit: USA v. Amy Gonzalez

Sufficient evidence for conspiracy conviction where the deft claims a genuine belief in the inciting statements, but finder of fact holds them to be objectively false.

Specific unanimity instruction not required, as the different mental states enumerated are alternate means of accomplishing the crime, not distinct potential elements of the crime.  Where a statute lists several acts, commission of any two of which would be an element of the crime, specific unanimity as to the underlying acts is not required, as the point of the list is to identify conduct that violates the actual prohibition.

For the statutory finding that death had resulted from the crime, the finder of fact must find it to be a forseeable proximate cause; there is no need to establish that the defts actually intended to cause death, and culpability can be established by the liability of a co-conspirator.

As the cyberstalking was defamatory and part of the commission of the crime, the law as applied in this case does not violate the First Amendment.

A recusal order that might reasonably be read to transfer venue but is then amended to clarify that it only recuses the present judge does not impugn the present venue.

Possibly prejudicial prior family court records properly admitted with limiting instructions.

Statements to a therapist as part of the therapy are admissible under the hearsay exeption for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, in addition to being evidence of the state of mind.

Hearsay emails to third parties properly admitted, as they spoke to how the acts referenced affected the writer's state of mind.

,Statements to therapist insufficiently testimonial to trigger the Confrontation Clause.

Question on cross as to whether the law enforcement officer had doubts about the defts' guilt opened the door for a vouching statement on redirect.  Vouching appropriately limited by instruction.

Court did not err in holding that testimony as to deft's honesty, peacefulness, and law abiding behaviour opened the door to testimony as to specific acts related to the present prosecution.

Factual findings by the judge during sentencing increased the advisory range, and not the statutory maximum -- these findings therefore could be made by a preponderance. and without reference to the jury's findings.

Deft's presence in courthouse should have put him on notice that it was foreseeable that a law enforcement officer might be injured in the coming imbroglio.

Injury to victim's children justified the increase of sentence for harming a vulnerable victim.

Life sentence for cyberstalking conspiracy resulting in death does not offend the Eighth Amendment.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/161540p.pdf






Sixth Circuit: United States v. Kurt Mallory

Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a witness was unavailable, since although the medical records were old, they indicated chronic conditions, and while the witness was earlier produced to the courtroom from the local jail, he was home-bound at the time of the trial.

No Confrontation Clause issue where the evidence that emerged after the deposition of the later-unavailable witness might have been presented at trial to attack the witness' credibility.

Although handwriting analysis does not have significant empirical support, it is a field of specialized expertise that might be useful to the finder of fact.  

Error for judge to weigh motion to set aside the verdict as an objective question of sufficiency of the evidence, as the correct question was whether the judge subjectively understood the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence.



Fourth Circuit: US v. Anthony Burfoot

Sufficient evidence for bribery.  As the scheme, not state law, dictated the timing of tax payments sent online, sufficient evidence for wire fraud counts.

As payments were part of a continuous scheme, counts referencing earliest payments and Hobbs Act violation are not barred by the statute of limitations.

Indictment not amended by court's instruction during deliberations that the amount specified in the count was not an element of the offense.

Statement sufficiently material for the purposes of perjury where it is within the scope of the alleged conspiracy and casts doubt on the veracity of a key witness.

No error of denial of mistrial after speculative characterizations of fraud elicited on direct, given curative instruction and overwhelming amount of other evidence.

No abuse of discretion in barring consideration of newly discovered evidence of a witness' cognitive impairment.

Jury is presumed to follow the judge's instructions, so a five-hour deliberation that acquitted on two of the counts was a valid deliberation.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/174266.P.pdf

Fourth Circuit: US v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild

Domestic law implementing treaty that barred, upon request, the sale of ancient coins belonging to other nations properly divided the purposes of the treaty; it was therefore not necessary to prove at trial that the coin had been discovered in the country of the requesting state party, as the implementing law had allowed for administrative designation of classes of coins.

Court did not abuse its authority by requiring that the deft's expert testimony be about the particular coins at issue, rather than old coins generally.

Court did not abuse authority in excluding testimony that the coins had been passed legally from a third state into the US immediately prior to sale.

Where the administrative regulations implementing the domestic law, apparently due to a drafting error, changed the scope of enforcement, a fair notice defense doesn't bar enforcement where all parties seemed to be aware of which items were prohibited under the law.

Discovery properly limited.  Court did not abuse its discretion in striking part of the amended answer that seemed outside of the remand from the court of appeals.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171625.P.pdf