Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Docketing of hand-written documentation of pretrial conference report and stipulations prior to its being typed up meant that revisions other than the typing would require the modification of the order into which the report and stipulations were incorporated.
Plaintiff did not make sufficient showing of undue hardship to justify discharge of the statutorily protected debt.
Clear error to exclude evidence in preliminary injunction hearing as hearsay following finding that the situation lacked sufficient urgency to justify admitting hearsay; in a preliminary injunction hearing, the hearsay nature of the evidence always goes to the weight of the evidence.
Clear error to exclude a category of evidence in a preliminary injunction hearing after determining that two documents of the type were unreliable, and another after being unable to determine the reliability of that type of evidence (latter harmless error). Everything in for appropriate weight.
For purposes of the obstruction statutes, a minor delay is not per se a reasonable obstruction; the court must still determine if the delay was a reasonable one.
Placement of signs on a sidewalk in a manner that does not functionally exclude access can still be an attempt to intimidate or obstruct within the terms of the statute, even if no pedestrians appear.
When a protester's actions necessitate that an escort step in front of the protected person, the protester has caused the physical obstruction defined in the statute.
Regardless of the consensual nature of the conversation, speaking to someone inside a vehicle through an open door or placing hands on the car while speaking impeded the car from driving away, and could be considered obstruction.
When taken in the context of recent local violence, and given the subjective fear that the listeners felt, stating that death might come at any time would objectively be taken as a true threat not protected by the First Amendment; similar statements conjoined with an exhortation to repent, or referencing disasters distinct from recent local violence present a different question.
As the decision to have an abortion involves a formidable and poignant process, protesters' seeking to force their ideals on patients approaching a facility creates an inference of intent to harass, annoy or alarm. An explicit or implicit request to be left alone dispels the legitimate intent of potential interlocutors.
Likely repetition of the violations of the statutes suffices to establish irreparable harm for the injunction.
In the interests of judicial economy, cross-appeal of non-movants' early motions not referenced in the memorandum denying the preliminary injunction are appropriately addressed in the appeal of the denial of the injunction under pendent jurisdiction.
Abortion facility speech limitations are content neutral, as they apply to every abortion facility in any context.
Statutes not void for vagueness, given general definitions in criminal code.
Municipal statute creating a cause of action for "any person" legitimizes a parens patriae action by the state in which the municipality is located; sufficient quasi-sovereign interest demonstrated here.
Concurrence:
Municipal statute is a state statute, since the municipality is a creation of the state; certifying the question to the state would be necessary to determine if the state could act parens patriae by its own statute.
Concur/Dissent:
General dissent as to not honoring the determinations of the finder of fact.
Since the cause of action doesn't list government bodies and the rest of the code generally does, and the statute designates a specific enforcement entity with power to seek an injunction, the state does not have parens patriae standing.
Courts are permitted to consider hearsay in a preliminary injunction hearing; they are not required to do so.
Statute's restriction on making access unreasonably difficult or dangerous explicitly excludes de minimis interference. Concluding otherwise impermissibly burdens speech.
Finder of fact held that a reasonable observer familiar with the speaker's preaching would not have interpreted the statements about impending death as true threats.
Irreparable harm finding requires ongoing plans and activities.
Where a past admission against interest can't be rebutted due to a discovery sanction against the speaker, the statement must be taken at face value.
As the validity of the assignment of the interest hinged on the application of foreign law, a motion to consider foreign law in the proceeding was untimely when made at the summary judgement stage.
Although a plaintiff alleging a discriminatory retaliation need not provide evidence at the pleading stage, the facts described in the pleadings must allow an inference that the conduct alleged resulted from the protected conduct.
As the termination resulted from a situation that was a matter of past practice, the deviation from that practice concerned an implied term of the existing CBA, and was therefore appropriately categorized as a minor dispute subject to arbitration.
State law antidiscrimination provisions preempted by federal labor law requiring arbitration.
Pleadings categorically excluding any claims against a federal officer are generally to be honored, except where they are artful exercises in pleading designed to circumvent jurisdiction.
For purposes of federal officer removal from state court, the conduct that caused the harm need not be caused by the act performed at the federal officer's direction, but merely associated with an act performed at the direction of the federal officer.
Where the insurance contract defines floods as occurring on normally dry land, the flood exclusion does not encompass boats damaged in harbor; given that plaintiff introduced evidence that the boats were not damaged by the change in water level, summary judgment for the plaintiff was appropriate.
Exclusions drafted within coverage provisions are addressed under the shifting burdens standard of state law; the plaintiff is not required to establish that the exclusion does not apply when establishing coverage.
Agreement reached between parties after summary judgment placing fault for damage on the acts of a third party while liquidating the remaining damages did not undo the grant of summary judgment.
CJ:
Denial of a motion to intervene as of right, or, in the alternative, permissively is sufficiently final for appellate review even when made without prejudice, and the court invites the potential intervenor to file a "standby" motion not formalized in the rules.
Risk of nullification of right held under permit to build lucrative electrical transmission line suffice for standing in case adjudicating the permit.
Where a regulatory agency is defending a permit that vests economic rights in a company, the shared interests are not sufficient for a higher threshhold of shared interests. For the intermediate threshhold, more is required than simply being in favor of the same outcome. As the company's rights of eminent domain and its interest in the pace of the project are outside the regulator's remit, the company is entitled to intervene as a matter of right under the intermediate standard.
Comparator evidence in Title VII claim was not legally insuffient for being descriptions of individual comparators rather than statistical analysis of the discovery data.
Manager who made the discriminatory adjudication decision need not have been involved in ending the employment of the plaintiff, or even the unwitting dupe of those who did. The sole question is whether the plaintiff lost his job due to his race.
Business judgment jury instruction distinguishing discrimination from business judgment calls was not required as a matter of law.
District court's exclusion of witnesses on a late-amended list did not have to be analyzed in terms of the rule for information otherwise available to the other party; the relevant information was that they were to testify, and the court could rule that the notice was too late.
No error in back pay, given mitigation; no error in punitive damages, even given the existece of written policies against discrimination; no error in denial of reinstatiment given facts.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for relief from the judgment as antecedent to leave to amend the complaint, as the complaint had already been amended once, the court explained the deficiencies, and the plaintiffs chose instead to wait for discovery to vindicate the claim. The court's requirement of newly discovered evidence was appropriate, as movant identified no other extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.
Metzler Investment GmbH and Construction Laborers Pension Trust
While there is authority for the idea that a motion to dismiss can be converted to a motion for summary judgment, there is no authority for the opposite, as the cour would be sua sponte lowering the threshold requirements for the movant -- the fact that a cucumber can be made into a pickle doesn't necessarily mean that a pickle can be turned into a cucumber.
District court correctly construed the allegation of misrepresentations in the amended complaint to be a claim for fraud in the inducement (dolo), and correctly applied the sophisticated purchaser defense to determine that the purchaser's reliance was not reasonable.
Motion to remove to federal court was untimely, as the facts underlying the claimed notice of federal subject matter were already evident in the claim prior to the amendment of claim that prompted the removal.
As the state's attestation requirements for mailed-in votes is only imposed in a few states, and the state has not advanced any interest behind it, lower court's entry of consent judgement abrogating the requirement should not be stayed. The elevated standard for stays close to an election is met, as the last election didn't have the requirement, and the state hasn't suggested that it would confuse voters. Political party has standing to intervene for the purposes of the pending appeal.
"...a salmagundi of affirmative defenses."
Grounds for denial of intervention of right (or, in the alternative, permissive) did not have to be extensively described by the court -- the decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion in light of the record.
No abuse of discretion of denial of intervention of right by citizens attempting to stop cell-phone tower on church steeple where it is apparent that the existing parties will attempt to vindicate the specific statutory protections that the citizens intended to raise; the litigation strategy of the existing parties doesn't enter into the calculus.
No abuse of discretion in denial of permissive intervention, as existing parties would raise the smae issues, the putative intervenors had no cause of action under state law, and it's really important to build cell phone towers quickly.
T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. The Town of Barnstable