Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Concession at the motion for judgment on the pleadings that the plaintiff wasn't seeking to enforce a private right of action under the statute judicially estops plaintiff from making such a claim at the motion for summary judgment.
Frustrating but isolated incidents of inability to access services don't support a discrimination claim under the statute.
Earlier denial of motion to amend the complaint isn't automatically raised in an appeal of subsequent denial of summary judgment.
In an interlocutory appeal over an arbitration provision, the court to which the appeal is taken must only assure itself of the appellant's right to appeal and the fact that the court from which the appeal comes would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit arising from the conflict between the parties.
As answering the question of whether a non-customer plaintiff is equitably estopped from avoiding a mandatory arbitration clause within a terms of service necessary for the use of the service is neither necessary for nor inextricably interwined with the question of whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue, the latter can't be answered under pendent jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal as to whether the non-signatory is equitably bound to the agreement.
Since the plaintiff's are complaining of discrimination that keeps them from using the service, they are not equitably bound to agreement that they have neither embraced nor benefitted from.
Employer's contract claim against potential trustee of employee stock benefit plan is remote from the usual ERISA concerns, and therefore not preempted by the statute.
Implied spoken promise subsequent to execution of written contract can be the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.
Integration clause refers only to the time of formation -- when subsequent parties to the contract were substituted in, the integration clause still looked back to the time of initial formation.
A lie about a side issue in the course of a contractual breach is separately actionable as fraud where the lie implicates a broader social duty owed to all individuals.
By conceding valid substitution into the contract for the purposes of the breach claim, the plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the indemnification agreement compelling the payment of legal fees doesn't apply to the defendant. Plain meaning of indemnify encompasses first party claims. Under state law, it wouldn't be specific enough to cover any damages award.
Judicial review of a decision on estoppel during the institution and pendency of an IPR is appropriate, because the estoppel statute applies to the duration of the action, not just the decision to institute proceedings.
Board correctly did not estop the party's claim, since there was no evidence of actual control and direction between the interested party and the litigating party, and the pre-existing relationship was not one that suggested coordinated action.
Given the plain language of the statute, the claim that the interested party was not estopped from raising was fair, as that specific claim had not arisen in the earlier action.
Substantial evidence for Board's obviousness and disclosure determinations.
(Perhaps. We don't know many things, but we especially don't know Patents. As always, entertainment value only.)
Although a traumatic birth is insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, the circumstances around the birth were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice of the possibility of an actionable claim.
Federal tort claim act requires actual dismissal of intervening claim to trigger the statutory exception to the statute of limitations.
Statute of limitations not estopped by clinic's lack of explicit designation as a federally funded facility.
Equitable tolling unavailable, given publicly available database of federal health care providers.s
Where a statute creates a right to seek contribution to an environmental settlement or judgment but provides that such contribution must be sought within three years of the entry of judgment, seeking contributions from de minimis co-polluters that indemnify them against any future claims does not start the clock to seek other contributions within a prospective limitations period triggered by a subsequent claim against the same site. A right to contribution can't arise until the judgment creating the liability is entered, and this division of eligible costs serves the purposes of the law
Judicial estoppel similarly does not preclude seeking a second round of contributions for a second judgment, as there's no inconsistency.
Earlier administrative determination of employer's identity does not bind later adjudication under claim preclusion, since the earlier determination found no liability, and the determination of the employer's identity was therefore not essential to the decision.
Administrative regulation, state law, and equitable considerations of delay prevent an ex ante rescission of workers' compensation insurance contract, where that rescission would defeat the insurer's liability for adjudicated claims.
No 5A DP violation where the agency's administrative error was in a proceeding that eventually proved nondispositive.