Seventh Circuit: Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield

 

Plaintiff's 8A claim appropriately preserved when 1A claim was screened out, as the screening operated as an interlocutory order, and the underlying facts of the claim established the 8A claim.

A Bivens remedy for not protecting a prisoner is unavailable, as the only Supreme Court precedent recognizing the claim was sub silento; it's therefore a novel claim, and the existing statutory and administrative scheme suffices to establish that Congress might think itself best placed to resolve the procedures. 

DISSENT:

Sub silento Supreme Court holding suffices, given the facts of the case and lower courts' recognition of it.  Even absent that, it's not a new context, and no special factors counsel against recognition of the judicial remedy.  Bivens grounded in constitutional necessity.

Roy Sargeant v. Aracelie Barfield

Sixth Circuit: Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.

For pretrial detainees, a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim requires something like objective reckless indifference rather than the subjective possession of sufficient knowledge to infer a risk of harm.

DISSENT:

Circuit precedent compels a subjective element; civil law negligence standard is categorically beneath the threshold of a constitutional due process claim; requiring an intentional action begs the question of sufficient knowledge; these facts would satisfy even the majority's novel test.

Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.

Eight Circuit: Craig Shipp v. Kevin Murphy

 While state law generally governs witness competency in a civil case, federal law controls on questions relating to the qualification of expert witnesses; harmless, as the exclusion was correct under federal law and the testimony cumulative.

A finding of good cause for the substitution of an expert witness after discovery does not compel the admission of substantively different testimony form the second expert.

Referring state prison imate to medical services for special shoes was not deliberate indifference on the part of the warden.

Doctor's lack of recognition of the need for orthopedic shoes, an omission that eventually resulted in an amputaition, did not rise the level criminal recklessness needed to present an issue of deliberate indifference.  Other employees similarly would not have had the requisite disregard.

CONCURRENCE/DISSENT

Nurse's testimony on the negligence of the doctor was admissible expert testimony, given her credentials and the need for a flexible, fact-specific inquiry.  Given the warden's habitual follow-up inquiry with medical services, the warden had sufficient knowledge to present a genuine issue of deliberate indifference.  Physician's and administrator's conduct presented a genuine issue for trial. 

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/202703P.pdf

Eight Circuit: Alvin Jackson v. Dexter Payne

 When assessing petitioner's mental capability, lack of detail on childhood tests is insufficient to establish that the childhood tests should not be relied upo, with the appropriate fixed margin of error.

Where the low end of the IQ scores is within the defined range, consideration of the second factor is the test is compulsory; a borderline test number can't be offset by other factors.

Court did not clearly err in considering childhood data, as petitioner has been incarcerated for most of his adult life.  Adaptive strengths, particularly within the controlled environent of prison, are not necessarily relevant to the consideration of adaptive deficits.

Supreme Court precedeent prohibits capital punishment where the intellectual disability exists at time of execution.

DISSENT

Adaptive strengths developed in prison are relevant to the inquiry.  Data insufficient to carry the petitioner's burden of proving disability; court shifted burden sub silentio.  State statute also has a presumption against petitioner, requiring him to prove unconstitutionality.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/21/08/201830P.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Michael Thomas v. Aline Martija

 

State law provides the rule of decision on some S1983 substantive legal questions related to the defense raised, so the assertion of the state statutory evidentiary privilege defense, although defeated by the federal rule on the privilege in question, doesn't mean that all substantive defenses have been presently waived.

Lack of notes from a deceased physician and a delay in the referral to a specialist deft present an issue for trial, as they might show either not receiving a prisoner's claim or  a deliberate indifference to the claim.

An institution-level medical director within a larger corporation is not a unilateral setter of standards for purposes of Monell liability.

Michael Thomas v.   Aline Martija

Seventh Circuit: Ralph Holmes v. Salvador Godinez

 

Consent decree that provides for the award of fees if there has been a violation of the agreement by one party does not require an ongoing violation to trigger the possibility of an award.

Courts order that the state party to the agreement ensures treatment of the incarcerated parties to the agreement within a certain timeframe was not a reasonable inference of the parties' agreement, which called for the incarcerated parties to be referred for treatment within that timeframe.

Ralph Holmes v. Salvador Godinez

Eghth Circuit: Cameron Zahn v. Bonnie Nygaard

As the finding is not logically inconsistent, sufficient evidence for the finder of fact's credibility determination as to competing narratives at a bench trial; although the evidence to the contrary was not discussed in the opinion, it was raised as impeachment at trial.

Cameron Zahn  v.  Bonnie Nygaard 

Second Circuit: Reynolds v. Quiros, et al.

 

Actual conditions of prisoner's solitary confinement present a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

State statute imposing conditions for the incarceration of prisoners whose death sentences have been commuted, passed after the legislative elimination of the death penalty and prior to the judicial determination that those already sentenced to death should have their sentences commuted, was an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder, imposing specific punishments on implicitly designated specific persons without the benefit of trial.

Classification of prisoner as a higher security threat than others similarly situated had no rational basis, and violated Equal Protection.

Concurrence:

Eighth Amendment claims of mistreatment of prisoners require an element of subjective intent.

Reynolds v. Quiros, et al.

Seventh Circuit: Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett

 

During visual inspections of the bodies of  convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, the Fouth Amendment protects some right of bodily privacy.

Where such a search is used as punishment, the 8th Amendment is implicated.

In the absece of evidence that administrators have exaggerated the justification for the search, wide-ranging deference to the administrator.

Reasonableness hinges on scope, manner, justication, and place.

Claim for qualified immunity not raised in motion for summary judgment is waived for present appeal, but can be asserted on remand.  Waived defenses cannot be raised on appeal, forfeited defenses can be reviewed for plain error.

Remedy of decertification of class would require a cross-appeal.

Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett

Sixth Circuit: United States v. Benjamin Bradley

 

Criminal forfeiture under the statute is in personam, and therefore money judgments are permitted, despite the common law's historical aversion.

Proceeds from the crime that are subsequently disbursed to co-conspirators are a permissible basis for a forfeiture order against the deft.

No clear error in court's calculation of forfeiture, including funds possessed during the conspiracy and property acquired during the conspiracy, as deft could likely not have legitimately afforded the latter.

No Apprendi protections for criminal forfeiture determinations -- the protections are statutory.

Forfeiture not excessive under 8A.

United States v. Benjamin Bradley

Tenth Circuit: Contreras v. Dona Ana County Board

(Per Curiam summary)

CJ, concurring: 

Insufficient 8A deliberate indifference claim where prison guards didn't have subjective knowledge of risk to detainee posed by leaving the cell door controls unlocked.

The situation doesn't correspond to a clearly established right -- negligence, perhaps.

Concur in part, concurring in the judgment:

Supervisor's knowledge of the risk can't be imputed to the guards.

Not a clearly established right, so no need to reach the deliberate indifference calculus, given qualified immunity.

Although there's no qualified immunity for Monell claims, the right has to be established in order to show the need to train employees.

Concurring in part, dissenting in part:

Claims against supervisor and municipality presented genuine issue for trial on deliberate indifference.

Central question on the deliberate indifference claim is whether it was reasonable to keep the controls unlocked.

Contreras v. Dona Ana County Board

Fifth Circuit: USA v. Selene Suarez

Where the indictment alleges financial structuring of an amount precisely equal to the statutory limit, the defect is harmless error where the jury might rationally find that related events proved at trial established that an amount greater than the statutory limit was at issue.

Where an employee engages in a course of conduct of structuring bank deposits in furtherance of the employer's illegal scheme, a forfeiture order against the employee personally does not implicate the Excessive Fines clause if the amount is below the statutory maximum and the Guidelines limit.

USA v. Selene Suarez

Eighth Circuit: Daaron McAdoo v. Amy Martin

Statute's requirement of physical injury is a threshold requirement to bar frivolous claims, so causation does not have to be established between the injury and the evil of the statute -- plaintiff can recover for any harms traceable to unconstitutional deliberate indifference so long as there is an injury associated with the claim.

http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/171952P.pdf

First Circuit: US v. Sirois

There is not sufficient binding precedent to clearly establish that revocation of supervised release because of drug use violates the Eighth Amendment; revocation was therefore not plain error.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/17-1797P-01A.pdf

Tenth Circuit: Clark v. Colbert

Firing of non-lethal rounds at a contained, psychotic fellow with a knife who refused to submit to arrest was not an unconstitutionally excessive use of force.

Appeal of state tort claim waived as only one of three independent grounds for denial was addressed.

Appeal of municipal liability under ADA waived for insufficient development of grounds for appeal.

Jail nurse's refusal to allow follow-up appointment with doctor, resulting in an improperly knit bone healing, did not rise to the level of conscious disregard of an excessive risk to health or safety.

https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-7046.pdf

Seventh Circuit: Jon Giles v. Gabrielle Tobeck

The actions of a prison guard who mistakenly unlocked a section of cells and negligently relied on an inmate to voluntarily return to a cell unescorted did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference vis-a-vis the subsequent fisticuffs.

http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2018/D07-10/C:17-1707:J:PerCuriam:aut:T:fnOp:N:2184277:S:0

Third Circuit: Brittan Holland v. Kelly Rosen

Plaintiff's opting out of the bail hearing does not deprive him of standing to challenge the bail law, since the challenge is not to the detention order, but to the lack of constitutionally sufficient procedure.

As the bail-bonding agency has only a hypothetical relationship with future customers, it does not have third-party standing to challenge the law on their behalf.

The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a fair consideration of potential monetary bail, as that was not the practice at the time of adoption, and the Amendment does not mention monetary bail.

Cash bail and corporate surety are not protected by substantive due process, as they are neither sufficiently historically rooted nor inherent in the concept of ordered liberty. Statute's subordination of monetary bail to non-monetary restrictions is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.

Where deft is able to ask the court for decreased restriction, sufficient procedural due process in a scheme where non-monetary pretrial appearance guarantees are prioritized over monetary bail.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/173104p.pdf

Fourth Circuit: US v. Chavez

No Brady violation in nondisclosure of prosecution witness immigration records, as not prejudicial, and the favorable immigration treatment was sufficiently raised during trial to discredit the testimony.

No Napue violation, as gov't didn't know of the misstatement in advance, and it was corrected on cross.

Scattered prosecutorial misconduct incidental.

No error on not instructing on the lesser included crimes, as a murder was committed, and the defts didn't have to actually physically participate in the murder to be found guilty of it.

Admission of evidence on uncharged murder not dispositive, and arguendo, harmless error.

Claiming lack of foreknowledge not enough to justify severance as an antagonistic defense.

Statute requiring second chair counsel in capital cases requires prompt request for replacement by the deft; court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance and continuance.

Sufficient evidence.

Historical cell site information admitted under the good faith exception.

No Eighth Amendment violation in life sentence for crime committed at 18 without specific findings from jury.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/164499.P.pdf

Third Circuit: Gregory Ricks v. D. Shover

In prisons, abuse of a sexual nature, either in single instances or in a pattern of conduct, can present an Eighth Amendment violation, but courts should not constitutionalize every malevolent touch.

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/162939p.pdf