Bringing a pre-trial detainee to trial on charges of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony is an important government interest; the court did not clearly err in ordering the administration of antipsychotic medication.
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label Due Process. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Due Process. Show all posts
Sixth Circuit: Bradley M. Peterson v. Kristina M. Johnson
For purposes of the property interest in law, emeritus status at a state university is not considered employment. Absent pay or benefits, the status does not create a property interest at law. Property interest in the status is analogous to a liberty interest in reputation, which procedurally would require a request for a name-clearing hearing to exhaust non-judicial remedies.
Sixth Circuit: Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.
For pretrial detainees, a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim requires something like objective reckless indifference rather than the subjective possession of sufficient knowledge to infer a risk of harm.
DISSENT:
Circuit precedent compels a subjective element; civil law negligence standard is categorically beneath the threshold of a constitutional due process claim; requiring an intentional action begs the question of sufficient knowledge; these facts would satisfy even the majority's novel test.
Bretton Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty.
Seventh Circuit: Blake Conyers v. City of Chicago
Claim arising from the destruction of arrestees' property after a set period sounds in 14A Due Process or 5A Takings, not under the Fourth Amendment.
While the property was taken under the police power rather than eminent domain, federal constitutional limits remain on the disposal of the items. In this context, a thirty day holding period with adequate notice suffices for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
Screenshot with evidentiary foundation from the head of department suffices to establish that the website was functioning during the relevant period.
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they lacked access to the internet in order to discover the relevant notice requires that they establish why the specific procedures of mediated inmate internet reference access were insufficient.
Sixth Circuit: Henry Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville
Ex Parte Young isn't available as an exception to the state university's sovereign immunity, as the university is not a state official, and administrators are being sued in their personal capacities here.
Absent statute or contract, there is no property interest in the appointment to department chair if that chair does not itself lead to a form of tenure.
A dismissed professor can have received adequate due process even if the reviewing committee declined to recommend dismissal.
Placement on paid leave prior to dismissal proceedings was not a deprivaiton of due process, given the evidence in the record and the sufficiency of the proceedings.
Plaintiff must have exhausted 14A liberty interest claim in reputation by requesting a name-clearign hearing; the university was under no obligation to provide for it in its procedures, its refusal to toll the statute of limitations for the present suit did not preclude a paralell proceeding, and the present suit is not a sufficient proxy.
https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/21a0187p-06.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Guerier v. Garland
Since the due process rights of aliens who have not effected an entry into the US are coextensive with the statutory scheme and mechanisms for redress within that scheme devised by Congress, when Congress excludes that form of redress, Article III courts have no jurisdiction to hear even a colorable constitutional claim of deprivation of the due process accorded by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-70115.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Flores-Rodruigez v. Garland
Alien facing deportation was not sufficiently put on notice that his past claim of having been born in the US was to be the main issue in the final heaing on the merits, on a motion to sua sponte reconsider the earlier determination of time, place and manner into the country. When a person is charged with a crime or charged with allegations waranting removal from the country, that person is fairly entitled to notice of the claims against him and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/19-70177.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Willian Rauda v. David Jennings
Statute proibits Article III challenges to the removal of a foreign citizen even where that removal happens in advance of statutorily guaranteed motion to reopen the case, since that remedy can be pursued abroad; this is true even where there is a showing of risk to the petitioner from removal.
Habeas jurisdiciton is similarly foreclosed, as petitioner is not seeking relief from executive detention, and as an alien in the process of being removed, has no proceedural rights other than those guaranteed by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/13/21-16062.pdf
Seventh Circuit: Kimberly Nelson v. City of Chicago
Loss of employment is insufficient harm to establish a claim under substantive due process, as employment is not a fundamental right.
Negligence in not listening to emergency radio dispatches doesn't state a substantive due process claim for a police officer later injured due to lack of assistance. The state-created danger exception to the private danger exclusion in due process analysis can't be invoked here, since it only applies when the state disables people from protecting themselves.
Disregarding a known risk to a public employee or altering work records after the fact are insufficiently conscience-shocking to state a substantive due process claim, and the emotional injury from the latter is insufficient to support a S1983 claim.
Plaintiff did not identify procedural shortcomings in protections sufficient to state a claim under procedural due process.
Monell claim against the municipality wasn't supported by showing of pattern or practice beyond individual acts subject to respondeat superior, which is not a basis for liability in S1983.
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Vickie Sanders
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate release petitioner a reply brief under Due Process after government brief with new medical evidence, since the motion was denied on other grounds.
Denial order did not need to recite basis for denial as to each medical susceptibility, or holding as to each sentencing and factual history element.
Sixth Circuit: Brian Lyngaas v. Curaden AG
Because evidence establishes a business plan for eventual profitability undercapitalization is not per se proof of being a mere instrumentality of another corporation.
As there is no culpable conduct establishing that the foreign corporation used their control over the domestic corporation to effect a fraud or wrong on the complainant, there is insufficient basis to piece the corporate veil.
Jurisdiction is proper in the district under the FRCP, since the cause of action arises under federal law, the foreign entity is not within the jurisdiction of any other state, and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the US constitution and laws.
Under Fifth Amendment due process, foreign company sufficiently purposefully availed itself of the American market generally by launching the domestic company and retaining a measure of control over it. The marketing faxes at issue sufficiently relate to the purpose of these minimum contacts, even though the foreign company might not be culpable for the sending of the faxes. Asserting first US jurisdiction over the foreign company is reasonable, since there is a federal interest in the enforcement of the laws, and the plaintiff will not be able to find financial redress from the domestic corporation.
The regulation making culpable under the statute the person whose goods and services are advertised only applies to persons who have some level of knowledge that an unsolicited fax has been sent.
Consistent with agency findings, fax-to-computer transmissions are within the Act, as the receiving machine has the capacity of transcribing the image to paper.
Given proffer of eventual admissibility, the class was correctly certified using unauthenticated telephone logs, as nonexpert evidence may be sufficiently probative at the early stages of the litigation.
As the logs were generated by a machine, they were not hearsay -- hearsay requires the assertion of a person. Court correctly excluded expert testimony.
List of affected phone numbers reasonably necessitated the claims administration procedure.
In a federal class action, the court need not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to each plaintiff. The question of jurisdiction looks to the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation -- it does not depend on unnamed class members.
CONCURRENCE/ DISSENT:
As state courts couldn't resolve the clams of out of state class members, neither can federal courts resolve the claims of those outside its jurisdiction.
14A Determines the due process limits on federal jurisdiction under the 5A in federal court.
The statute doesn't apply to faxes received on computers, since, on its own, a computer can't receive messages from a phone line or print the fax on paper; additionally, Congress listed computers as senders, but not receivers.
Seventh Circuit: USA v. Anthony Jordan
Considering the situation under the supervisory powers of the appellate court over the proceedings in the District Court, rather than under Due Process: the District Court did not evaluate the defendant's defense, make a finding as to the willfulness of the violation, or sufficiently explain the sentence in light of the parsimony principle and the sentencing statute.
Ninth Circuit: Walden v. Shinn
As the state supreme court, in affirming a denial of severance on direct review, held in the alternative that the evidence of the crimes would be cross-admissible, and this ground wan't challenged on grounds of federal law during state post-conviction proceedings, the omission of the challenge from the federal Habeas petition to the District Court waived the claim.
State court determinations that post-identification police disclosures to witnesses at photo lineup that they had arrested the suspect was not contrary to clear federal law on the question.
State court reasonably declined to infer improper suggestion when photo lineup witness identified one candidate, and the police then momentarily turned off the recording device before the witness identified the defendant.
Since the state's highest court conducted an independent review of mitigation, a federal Habeas claim against the state trial court's holding of insufficient nexus needed to identify the constitutional error in the higher court's analysis.
District court properly denied amendment of federal Habeas ineffective assistance claims subsequent to independent exhaustion in state post-conviction review after federal Habeas had commenced, since the claims did not relate to the same transactions and occurrences; no plain error in the denial of equitable tolling.
State court's determination that admission of crime scene photos was not unduly prejudicial was not an unreasonable application of federal law, since contemporaneous circuit precedent held that there was no circumstance in which admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence could justify the writ. Offered stipulation was not sufficient, since nothing in the Due Process Clause holds that the government can't introduce relevant evidence on an uncontested point.
Eighth Circuit: Metropolitan Omaha Property v. City of Omaha, Nebraska
Municipal ordinance authorizing the inspection of a property and reciting that the inspector may seek a warrant if consent cannot be obtained doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment by authorizing warrantless entry, since under the state's rules of statutory construction, the permissive power to seek a warrant would be exercised prior to any search without consent.
As there is sufficient specificity and adequate provisions for notice and appeal, the enforcement provision is not unconstitutionally vague.
Judicial consent decree explicitly allowed for changes in the municipal code, so the procedures aren't an unlawful amendment of it.
Allegation of discrimination under federal housing law doesn't plead an intensity of discrimination sufficient to state a claim.
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Nkajlo Vangh
As the motion for compassionate release arises from a statute that does not require an evidentiary hearing and is discretionary in nature, there is no possible showing of entitlement to relief that could require an evidentiary hearing on the question.
Court's evaluation of the current level of care accorded the prisoner was sufficient consideration of any extraordinary and compelling justification for release, as described in the statute.
Sixth Circuit: Vitalina Lucas Lopez v. Merrick B. Garland
Agency did not have to provide alien faced with removal proceedings notice in their native language; a notice in English sufficiently puts the recipient on notice that language assistance will need to be secured.
No authority to review IJ's refusal to sua sponte reopen prior proceeding that resulted in removal order in absentia.
EIghth Circuit: United States v. Jorge Beltran-Estrada
In making a discretionary sentence reduction, the petitioner is entitled to adequate notice and an adequate opportunity to present information to the court; neither Due Process nor the statute requires a hearing.
Resentencing explanation consisting of a citation to disciplinary records and the adoption of the government's rationale was not an abuse of discretion.
Tenth Circuit: Birhanu v. Wilkinson
By considering the information provided and holding a hearing on the matter, the immigration judge took care in determining the competency of the pro se alien defendant sufficient to assure fundamental rights of Due Process; although the alien reported that the voices that he was hearing in his head disturbed his thought processes, his demeanor appeared sufficiently lucid and responsive.
Right to counsel claim under the Rehabilitation Act required administrative exhaustion.
For immigration law purposes, recklessly threatening substantial property damage with actual intent to interrupt public access to a portion of the building is a crime of moral turpitude. The specific intent of the state statute is a sufficiently aggravating factor under circuit precedent.
Although subjective ability to dissociate and reflect is relevant to determining whether two acts are divisible, a three day gap sufficed to establish the division as a matter of law.
Chevron deference to agency on the question of whether the agency should consider the insanity element of the criminal plea, as a prior apparently contradictory agency interpretation spoke to the evidentiary bounds of the agency's consideration, and the cited opinion addressed the appropriate substantive grounds for the agency's consideration.
Concur/dissent:
Agency shoudl have considered mental health element of plea in relevant conviction; arbitrary application of precedent dejustifies deference.
Fifth Circuit: USA v. Emakoji
Court's order requiring an in-person appearance at arraignment is not subject to interlocutory review under the criminal collateral order rule.
Court's requirement that the deft secure housing within the district of the court was a reasonable amendment to the release conditions, given the deft's reluctance to travel during a time of pandemic disease. Due Process did not require a hearing, or a finding of a violation of the prior conditions.
Concur/dissent: a requirement to secure new housing four days before an arraignment with presumptive incarceration isn't ripe for review, as a subsequent release condition wouldn't be a modification but a new finding.
Dicta: Court did not sufficiently take into account administrative determination that in-person hearings presented a danger.
Ninth Circuit: USA v. Juan Fuentes-Galvez
As ensuring that the plea is knowing and voluntary under FRCrimP. Rule 11 implicates an alien deft's 5A Due Process rights, magistrate judge's plea colloquy that merely asked deft if his plea was voluntary was plain error.
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