Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Although the list of examples in the statute isn't explicitly an exclusive one, deference to the authoritative, considered interpretation of the agency within its competency asserting the exclusivity of the list is warranted. Expressio unius would require an exclusive list.
CONCURRENCE:
When a statute lists three means for accomplishing something, there are three means of accomplishing something under the statute. Expressio unius applies.
Silence of the immigration statute as to whether the citizen whose child is seeking to immigrate needs to be alive at the time of application isn't sufficient to justify deference to the agency's interpretation imposing the requirement.
Agencies can exercise discretion only in places of ambiguity or silence; they are unable to amend a clear statutory mandate that seems at odds with the purposes of the legislation. Agency did not err, and the rulemaking did not run afoul of the APA.
Agency's implementation according to statute did not offend Equal Protection; proof of discriminatory of intent would also be needed.
Mandate requiring extension of policy in the same manner and to the extent that it applies to existing facilities mans that the same methodology should be implemented to the same extent, not that the facilities should be funded to the same extent.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-1475P-01A.pdf
By considering the information provided and holding a hearing on the matter, the immigration judge took care in determining the competency of the pro se alien defendant sufficient to assure fundamental rights of Due Process; although the alien reported that the voices that he was hearing in his head disturbed his thought processes, his demeanor appeared sufficiently lucid and responsive.
Right to counsel claim under the Rehabilitation Act required administrative exhaustion.
For immigration law purposes, recklessly threatening substantial property damage with actual intent to interrupt public access to a portion of the building is a crime of moral turpitude. The specific intent of the state statute is a sufficiently aggravating factor under circuit precedent.
Although subjective ability to dissociate and reflect is relevant to determining whether two acts are divisible, a three day gap sufficed to establish the division as a matter of law.
Chevron deference to agency on the question of whether the agency should consider the insanity element of the criminal plea, as a prior apparently contradictory agency interpretation spoke to the evidentiary bounds of the agency's consideration, and the cited opinion addressed the appropriate substantive grounds for the agency's consideration.
Concur/dissent:
Agency shoudl have considered mental health element of plea in relevant conviction; arbitrary application of precedent dejustifies deference.
When a minor child of a newly naturalized alien takes their place in the visa queue, the legislative purpose of the statutory tolling of the child's age for the purpose of the pre-naturalization visa dictates that its tolled "statutory age" be applied within the statutory scheme for the post-naturalization visa.
The legislative intent is sufficiently clear to make Chevron deference inapplicable.
Dissents from both vacatur of en banc order and the reinstatement of the panel holding.
Dissent: The regulation is outside the statute; if the government doesn't raise Chevron, the deference claim is waived; lenity counsels the reading of the statute to the contrary.
Dissent: Deference is an aspect of statutory interpretation, which is the function of the courts.
Dissent: Criminal laws are not subject to Chevron deference.