As requiring a preliminary determination of predominance would unduly narrow the remedy, courts can determine specific issues for a class action without requiring that those issues must predominate within a putative individual action. Here, the issue classes predominate and are best addressed as a class. Circuit split flagged.
Any Seventh Amendment harms from the Special Master process are presently speculative.
http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/18a0139p-06.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label Class Actions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Class Actions. Show all posts
Third Circuit: Norman Walsh v. Defenders Inc
Given the deft's direct contractual relationship with a significant part of the Class, its presence in the litigation is sufficient to justify the an element of the CAFA local controversy exception, regardless of whether it will ultimately shoulder responsibility for any judgment.
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/182156p.pdf
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/182156p.pdf
Fourth Circuit: Rhonda L. Hutton v. National Board of Examiners
Where the fraudulent opening of lines of credit in plaintiffs' name can be plausibly traced to the deft's data breach, plaintiffs have suffered, at minimum, sufficient concrete and particular imminent harm to state a claim.
Fourth Circuit: Plaintiffs Appealing CMO 100 v. Pfizer
No error in exclusion of expert testimony under Daubert where statistician performed a wide range of analyses to verify the legitimacy of the analysis, but excluded the other tests from testimony, and further impermissibly used an indicator for the medical condition as evidence of the medical condition.
No error in exclusion of second expert where stepped dosage conclusions were impermissibly based on conclusions as to lowest dosage that were based on a statistically insignificant association, since this manner of analysis is not generally accepted.
No error in exclusion of third expert, as differential diagnosis methodology did not sufficiently account for alternative causation.
Deft admissions almost never sufficient basis to survive summary judgment, where the claim is too complex for the average juror.
Summary judgment grant across the MDL was an appropriate use of judicial resources.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171140.P.pdf
No error in exclusion of second expert where stepped dosage conclusions were impermissibly based on conclusions as to lowest dosage that were based on a statistically insignificant association, since this manner of analysis is not generally accepted.
No error in exclusion of third expert, as differential diagnosis methodology did not sufficiently account for alternative causation.
Deft admissions almost never sufficient basis to survive summary judgment, where the claim is too complex for the average juror.
Summary judgment grant across the MDL was an appropriate use of judicial resources.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/171140.P.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Jim Sciaroni v. Target Corporation
Class appropriately certified despite court's mistaken finding that class members without present injury would be entitled to a pro rata share of the remainder of the fund.
Class appropriately certified despite potential inter-class conflicts over later-arising harms from the data breach, since all class members suffered the same injury at the same time.
29% Fee award can appropriately be based on a total that includes administrative costs; fees not substantively unreasonable.
Settlement not unfair, despite alleged subtle signs of collusion.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/153909P.pdf
Class appropriately certified despite potential inter-class conflicts over later-arising harms from the data breach, since all class members suffered the same injury at the same time.
29% Fee award can appropriately be based on a total that includes administrative costs; fees not substantively unreasonable.
Settlement not unfair, despite alleged subtle signs of collusion.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/06/153909P.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Jyll Brink v. Raymond James & Associates, Inc.
Company's undisclosed profit margin within the transaction fee for a covered security was not a material misrepresentation bearing on the decision to purchase the security; a class action suit for redress is therefore not barred from the state courts by federal securities law.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201614144.pdf
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201614144.pdf
Eighth Circuit: James Pudlowski v. The St. Louis Rams LLC
Class Actions, CAFA, Federal Jurisdiction
Absent claim of lack of jurisdiction, removal notice under CAFA need only make a short plain statement with a plausible claim to removal. As there was no obligation to prove diversity at removal, affidavits establishing diversity can be considered post-removal.
James Pudlowski v. The St. Louis Rams LLC
Third Circuit: Sebastian Richardson v. Director Federal Bureau of Prisons
Class Actions, Mootness, FRCP
Where a representative of a class seeking prospective injunctive relief files a claim susceptible to mootness, there is not an untimely delay in seeking class certification, and the class nature of the claim is evident from the initial claim, the class certification can relate back to the filing date of the initial claim.
Sebastian Richardson v. Director Federal Bureau of Prisons
Second Circuit: Mazzei v. Money Store
Class Actions, FRCP
A court has the power and obligation to decertify a class after a jury verdict. Class members enjoy equitable tolling for the duration of the class. Findings of facts by the jury must be respected, unless egregious, serious error, or a miscarriage of justice.
No abuse of discretion in court's determination that lack of categorical privvity barred the class formation on grounds of typicality of representative and predominance of claim.
Mazzei v. Money Store
Fifth Circuit: Ronda Crutchfield, et al v. Sewerage & Water Board
FRCP, Class Actions
Appeals court, in assuring itself of its own jurisdiction, has power to review whether the District Court had initial jurisdiction under federal officer doctrine prior to denying certification of the class.
As the general circumstantial theory of harm would be displaced under state law by particulars of each claim where available, lack of predominance allowed court to bar certification of the class without abusing its discretion.
Ronda Crutchfield, et al v. Sewerage & Water BoDistrict Court had suard
Second Circuit: SRM Global Master Fund Ltd. P’ship v. Bear Stearns Cos.
Securities, Class Actions, Statute of Limitations, Fraud
Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations against individual claims during the period in which a class is certified is not available for claims of material misrepresentation under the securities laws, as the limiting statute is a statute of repose that creates a substantive right immune to common law equitable relief.
Insufficient proof of reliance for common law fraud claims.
SRM Global Master Fund Ltd. P’ship v. Bear Stearns Cos.
Seventh Circuit: Ira Holtzman v. Gregory Turza
Class Actions, Fees
In a statutory class action where individual recovery is specifically delineated in the statute, class counsel cannot be paid based on the value of the common fund.
Order to pay full statutory amount to remaining claimants once the fees have been satisfied was error.
Court is not obligated to make a cy pres distribution of remaining funds -- can return balance to deft.
Ira Holtzman v. Gregory Turza
Seventh Circuit: Melvin Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County
S1983, Prisons, Class Actions, FRCP
Prisoner claims asserting deliberate indifference under S1983 were improperly certified into a class, since although they shared an essential claim, the question of commonality implies a consideration of redressibility, and the relief sought in individual claims did not always support the remedy sought on behalf of the class as a whole.
Motion for relief from final judgment was inappropriate to challenge denial of certification -- an amended motion to certify the class remained available, appealable if a subsequent decision of the court materially alters the position of the class.
Melvin Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook County
Eighth Circuit: Stuart Day v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc
Employment, Class Actions
Sale of business under an asset pruchase agreement does not bar a finding that the business is a going concern for purposes of the WARN Act.
Sale created a presumption of continued employment.
Movant on motion to de-certify class carried burden of establishing good reason.
Predominance presumptive when the penalty is statutory.
Burden-shifting in damages phase permissible, given purposes of the Act.
Stuart Day v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc
Second Circuit: In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Class Actions
Error to certify a class as settlement-only where injunctive and monetary remedies sought created conflicting interests. Counsel had little incentive to zealously fight for injunctive component, given fee distribution, and class members could not opt-out.
Settlement agreement a nullity. [Rather a lot of money.]
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust
Fourth Circuit:James Hayes v. Delbert Services Corporation
Arbitration, Choice of Law, Tribe Law
Loan agreement arbitration clause electing the forum and law of the Sioux nation is invalid and unenforceable, as it operates as a waiver of all federal rights.
Not severable from arbitration provision.
No need to exhaust tribal remedies, as the controversy has nothing to do with the tribe.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/151170.P.pdf
Loan agreement arbitration clause electing the forum and law of the Sioux nation is invalid and unenforceable, as it operates as a waiver of all federal rights.
Not severable from arbitration provision.
No need to exhaust tribal remedies, as the controversy has nothing to do with the tribe.
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/151170.P.pdf
Second Circuit: Glatt et al. v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. et al.
Employment / Unpaid interns
No Skidmore deference to DOL definition of an employee.
Internships distinguished from employment by identifying the primary beneficiary of the relationship.
This standard bars the formation of the class due to predominance concerns.
Bonus: cameo by prominent Hollywood pillow.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2b78c6ab-9a30-46d4-b200-629fd5966190/1/doc/13-4478a_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2b78c6ab-9a30-46d4-b200-629fd5966190/1/hilite/
No Skidmore deference to DOL definition of an employee.
Internships distinguished from employment by identifying the primary beneficiary of the relationship.
This standard bars the formation of the class due to predominance concerns.
Bonus: cameo by prominent Hollywood pillow.
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2b78c6ab-9a30-46d4-b200-629fd5966190/1/doc/13-4478a_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/2b78c6ab-9a30-46d4-b200-629fd5966190/1/hilite/
Seventh Circuit: Thomas Costello v. BeavEx, Incorporated
Preemption, Class Actions
Federal motor carrier act does not expressly preempt state wage law, as the purposes of the state law aren't relevant to the purposes of the Federal act.
State statute seeming to require individual assessment of plantiff's future employment doesn't categorically bar a finding of predominance for class certification.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-19/C:15-1110:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:1689158:S:0
Federal motor carrier act does not expressly preempt state wage law, as the purposes of the state law aren't relevant to the purposes of the Federal act.
State statute seeming to require individual assessment of plantiff's future employment doesn't categorically bar a finding of predominance for class certification.
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2016/D01-19/C:15-1110:J:Kanne:aut:T:fnOp:N:1689158:S:0
Federal Circuit: Haggart v. US
Class actions, fees, estoppel
Where the government is the deft in a class action under a statutory cause of action that shifts fees, it has standing to contest the fee award.
As there is a policy interest in government candor, the government is not estopped from challenging fees that it now claims to have mistakenly not opposed an an earlier proceeding.
As the government's objection was to the mechanics of the disbursement, previous acquiescence to the plan does not judicially estop it from challenging it later. (In a footnote, a note that estoppel probably doesn't apply to FG.)
Abuse of discretion for lower court to approve settlement that relied on valuations of unassessed property without any disclosure of methodology of valuation.
Uncertainty as to the precise valuations of individual claims does not bar application of the common fund doctrine.
Opt-in classes can be subject to the common fund doctrine, and as there is no statutory requirement that the class members pay fees, a fee agreement is subject to equitable challenge.
Where equitable a fee-shifting statute displaces allocation of fees under the common fund doctrine. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-5106.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Where the government is the deft in a class action under a statutory cause of action that shifts fees, it has standing to contest the fee award.
As there is a policy interest in government candor, the government is not estopped from challenging fees that it now claims to have mistakenly not opposed an an earlier proceeding.
As the government's objection was to the mechanics of the disbursement, previous acquiescence to the plan does not judicially estop it from challenging it later. (In a footnote, a note that estoppel probably doesn't apply to FG.)
Abuse of discretion for lower court to approve settlement that relied on valuations of unassessed property without any disclosure of methodology of valuation.
Uncertainty as to the precise valuations of individual claims does not bar application of the common fund doctrine.
Opt-in classes can be subject to the common fund doctrine, and as there is no statutory requirement that the class members pay fees, a fee agreement is subject to equitable challenge.
Where equitable a fee-shifting statute displaces allocation of fees under the common fund doctrine. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/14-5106.Opinion.1-6-2016.1.PDF
Fifth Circuit: Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of TX v. Chesapeake Energy
Class actions
Given the presumption in favor of Federal jurisdiction, where the pleadings state a claim that involves a larger class than the currently constituted class, the party contesting removal under the CAFA local controversy exception bears the burden of establishing that a sufficient percentage of the class vindicated by the claim is from a given state.
Dissent - No presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction; pleadings should be construed under state rules, which allow for a more liberal notice of claim, and therefore might conceivably limit the class to those presently involved.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10955-CV0.pdf
Given the presumption in favor of Federal jurisdiction, where the pleadings state a claim that involves a larger class than the currently constituted class, the party contesting removal under the CAFA local controversy exception bears the burden of establishing that a sufficient percentage of the class vindicated by the claim is from a given state.
Dissent - No presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction; pleadings should be construed under state rules, which allow for a more liberal notice of claim, and therefore might conceivably limit the class to those presently involved.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-10955-CV0.pdf
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