Court abused discretion in certifying a class with an inadequate representative; the representative was subject to an arbitration agreement that did not bind approximately 5% of the class, there was limited evidence of discovery, and a motion against the move to compel arbitration was made late--as a motion to file a supplementary brief.
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label Class Actions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Class Actions. Show all posts
Eleventh Circuit: Robert Ponzio, et al v. Emily Pinon, et al
Court, acting as a fiduciary for the class, didn't err in accepting a settlement of a class action as fair, reasonable, and adequate. Plaintiffs couldn't substantiate number of affected customers who were categorically ineligible under the settlement. Order sufficiently reasoned, terms could have been acceptable to reasonable counsel.
Eleventh Circuit: Joan Simring v. GreenSky, LLC
District court remand to state court under the local controversy exception to the class action statute is reviewable despite the ouster clause of the statute, since the remand is neither for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction nor due to a procedural defect. The appeal didn't require an authorization of permissive appeal, as the remand order is sufficiently final.
Despite the stipulated limit to the damages by the lead plaintiff, the deft's estimate of relief across the class prevails, since the lead plaintiff has no authority to bind the relief granted the class; the relief therefore exceeds the limit for the local controversy exception.
For purposes of determining residency of class members, only the explicit definition of the class can limit the class to a certain state, and the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the required fraction of in-state class members.
Seventh Circuit: Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon Fitness Inc.
Court did not err in denying certification of a class based on a statutory claim of sending unsolicited facsimile advertisements; although the unsolicited nature of the communications is an affirmative defense to be established by the defendant, the predominance inquiry looks to the actual management of the claim, and certification risked a multiplicity of mini-trials on the issue.
Court's handling of the implied consent issue was appropriate to the certification stage, as defendant's claim wan't speculative, vague, or unsupported.
Consent provided to third parties isn't considered transferred consent where the original consent included messages from affiliates and vendors.
Ninth Circuit: Allison v. Tinder
(Rakoff of SDNY, J.)
The court's assessment of the plaintiffs' case deprecated a holding in which the plaintiff class members were also putative members, and in which the holding favorable to their interests was law of the case, in which they would release their claims by the present settlement.
Given this diminishment of the plaintiffs' claim, the fact that the value of the injunctive relief to the class was unsupported, the fact that many class members were no longer site members or might not seek relief, the existence of a clear-sailing provision and the substantial amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees meant that the court abused its discretion in approving the settlement.
The approval of the attorneys fees was an independent abuse of discretion, since it was calculated as a percentage of the sum of the value of injunctive relief that should have formed no part of the calculation and an estimated cash payment that assumed a full claim of the award.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/19-55807.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Sharon Potter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Denial of class certification that doesn't reach merits but instead is a case managment order associated with a stay pendng a related appeal doesn't end the tolling of statutes of limitation for absent class members, as their reliance on the class remedy and the representatives is still objectively reasonable.
As the stay put the parties on notice of pending claims and continued reliance by absent class members was reasonable, the continued tolling serves the purpose of the statute of limitaitons and the economy of litigation.
Circuit split with Fourth flagged.
Once an uncertified class action is dismissed, tolling ceases.
Claim for equitable tolling forfeited for not being distinguished from tolling of right claim before the District Court.
Sixth Circuit: Brian Lyngaas v. Curaden AG
Because evidence establishes a business plan for eventual profitability undercapitalization is not per se proof of being a mere instrumentality of another corporation.
As there is no culpable conduct establishing that the foreign corporation used their control over the domestic corporation to effect a fraud or wrong on the complainant, there is insufficient basis to piece the corporate veil.
Jurisdiction is proper in the district under the FRCP, since the cause of action arises under federal law, the foreign entity is not within the jurisdiction of any other state, and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the US constitution and laws.
Under Fifth Amendment due process, foreign company sufficiently purposefully availed itself of the American market generally by launching the domestic company and retaining a measure of control over it. The marketing faxes at issue sufficiently relate to the purpose of these minimum contacts, even though the foreign company might not be culpable for the sending of the faxes. Asserting first US jurisdiction over the foreign company is reasonable, since there is a federal interest in the enforcement of the laws, and the plaintiff will not be able to find financial redress from the domestic corporation.
The regulation making culpable under the statute the person whose goods and services are advertised only applies to persons who have some level of knowledge that an unsolicited fax has been sent.
Consistent with agency findings, fax-to-computer transmissions are within the Act, as the receiving machine has the capacity of transcribing the image to paper.
Given proffer of eventual admissibility, the class was correctly certified using unauthenticated telephone logs, as nonexpert evidence may be sufficiently probative at the early stages of the litigation.
As the logs were generated by a machine, they were not hearsay -- hearsay requires the assertion of a person. Court correctly excluded expert testimony.
List of affected phone numbers reasonably necessitated the claims administration procedure.
In a federal class action, the court need not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant as to each plaintiff. The question of jurisdiction looks to the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation -- it does not depend on unnamed class members.
CONCURRENCE/ DISSENT:
As state courts couldn't resolve the clams of out of state class members, neither can federal courts resolve the claims of those outside its jurisdiction.
14A Determines the due process limits on federal jurisdiction under the 5A in federal court.
The statute doesn't apply to faxes received on computers, since, on its own, a computer can't receive messages from a phone line or print the fax on paper; additionally, Congress listed computers as senders, but not receivers.
First Circuit: In Re: Da Graca
In a Habeas class action seeking relief for immigration detainees in the current pandemic, supervisory Mandamus doesn't run because the lower court has not palpably erred; it has reduced the detainee population significantly. Advisory Mandamus doesn't run, since the determination of pandemic severity is a factual question, not a legal question, and since the population has been lowered, the balance between extraordinary circumstances and likely success doesn't need to be corrected.
Second Circuit: Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of America Corp.
The notice of appeal properly identified the party taking the appeal, the orders that were the subject of the appeal, and the court to which the appeal was being taken; the jurisdictional element of the rules of appeal were satisfied, and since notice was given of intent to appeal all orders, the description of the appellant in the caption as successor in interest to an entity that only accounted for some of the claims was excusable.
As assignment of claim doesn't undo an injury, the claim filed by an entity that had already assigned the interest had sufficient Article III standing; assignment of claim is distinct from grant of power of attorney, which would trigger a prudential limitation on standing.
While choice of law for corporations usually looks to the location of the business, choice of law for partnerships looks to the law of the forum. Questions of state law can be dispositive in the federal standing inquiry.
Although legal capacity of parties isn't a jurisdictional element in standing, existence of the entity is, and since the jurisdiction provided for no wind-up time, the non-existent parties did not have standing at the time the suit was filed.
A suit filed by a non-existent entity is not a nullity; so long as there is a real party in interest willing to join the suit at the time the suit is filed and the real party in interest ratifies, is substituted, or is joined within a reasonable time, there is sufficient subject matter jurisdiction for the action at the time of filing. Since procedural reforms have allowed for nominal parties, this doesn't offend the Constitution. Court retains the right under the rules to deny joinder for equitable reasons. Circuit split flagged on the nullity doctrine.
Equitable tolling is available for new plaintiffs joined to existing class actions.
Eleventh Circuit: Betty M. Smith, et al v. Michael Bokor
Since citizenship for purposes of the local controversy exception and discretionary exception to the class-action statute is based on current domicile, court clearly erred in using demographic data of past residence in a care facility as sufficient proof of citizenship. Commonsense inference that locals tend to enter nearby homes and that few of those over 65 move out of Florida are insufficient.
Plaintiff satisfied the "significant defendant" standard even absent a showing of means, since the statute requires a party against whom significant relief may be sought, not a party against whom a significant judgment may be recovered.
A corporation liable through vicarious liability can be a primary defendant for purpose of the CAFA discretionary exception.class
Seventh Circuit: DRASC, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc.
Given actual knowledge by counsel, a class action opt-out terms letter sent by regular mail sufficed for notice, given the finding that the letter was not returned by the post office, and the testimony of the plaintiff that the letter was addressed correctly.
Given counsel's actual knowledge, court did not abuse its discretion in not permitting a late opt-out.
Since the opt-out procedure was specified in excruciating detail, and courts have an interest in uniform mechanical procedures, continuing a lawsuit on the same claim in a different forum was not a reasonable indication of a desire to opt-out.
Fourth Circuit: Phillip Alig v. Quicken Loans Inc.
The class claim is sufficiently predominant, since all of the customers--even those who benefited--paid the fee; determining individual statute of limitations issues would be merely ministerial; defendant's general concealment underlay each instance of fraudulent inducement; appraisal variance would be merely ministerial; and the statutory damages are uniform.
Although the agreement's reference to a timely appraisal was insufficient guarantee to create a contract, the taking of a security deposit for the purposes of verifying identity and credit formed a binding contract.
Under the state's law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is relevant only to the analysis of actual breach of contract.
Concealment of potential improper contact with appraisers was sufficiently proximate to the formation of the agreement with the homeowners to qualify as unconscionable inducement under the state's statute.
Dissent:
Practice was customary in the industry; no actual inducement; communications with the appraiser did not breach the agreement to provide an appraisal.
Second Circuit: Cho et al. v. BlackBerry Ltd. et al.
Since the named members of a putative class didn't individually join the appeal, they can't participate in any action subsequent to the disposition of the appeal; they were not included in their capacity as others similarly situated, although they might have been included if the appeal had been filed by a putative representative et al.
Since the defendant added subsequent to the appeal was in privity with the original defendants and the cause of action arose from the same transaction or occurrence, res judicata prevents the named non-appellants from pursuing their claims against the new party.
Court did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.
Second Circuit: Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc., et al.
A named class representative retains an interest similar to a private attorney general in vindicating a class claim where the class has been decertified, even if the class representative has subsequently prevailed on the merits as a private plaintiff.
A court retains the obligation throughout the litigation to sua sponte decertify a class that no longer meets the requirements of the rules; no finding of a significant intervening event is required.
The court has no sua sponte obligation to reform the class to meet the rules prior to decertification.
Seventh Circuit: Delores Henry v. Melody Hulett
During visual inspections of the bodies of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, the Fouth Amendment protects some right of bodily privacy.
Where such a search is used as punishment, the 8th Amendment is implicated.
In the absece of evidence that administrators have exaggerated the justification for the search, wide-ranging deference to the administrator.
Reasonableness hinges on scope, manner, justication, and place.
Claim for qualified immunity not raised in motion for summary judgment is waived for present appeal, but can be asserted on remand. Waived defenses cannot be raised on appeal, forfeited defenses can be reviewed for plain error.
Remedy of decertification of class would require a cross-appeal.
Ninth Circuit: Shahriar Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Company
Where the class is in part defined by a claim arising under federal law, court does not abuse discretion by certifying the class prior to choice of law analysis, since, among other things, the underlying issues are identical, and not every state claim will be raised in every action.
Fifth Circuit: In re: Taxotere Prod Liability
Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims of a MDL plaintiff, as there is sufficient indication in the record that the plaintiff had engaged in delay or contumacious conduct, and that no lesser sanctions would serve the interests of justice.
Tenth Circuit: Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production
Denial of class certification does not merge into a stipulated settlement for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction over a challenge to the denial of class certification as an element of the final judgement.
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-2029.pdf
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/17/17-2029.pdf
Eighth Circuit: David Faltermeier v. FCA US LLC
Given the complexity of the action and the fact that fees increase with the complexity of the action, no plain error in court's calculation of potential fees for the purpose of determining if the total award was sufficient for removal under the statute.
While state law does not require actual reliance on the misrepresentation, there must be some connection between the representation and the purchase.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/172093P.pdf
While state law does not require actual reliance on the misrepresentation, there must be some connection between the representation and the purchase.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/172093P.pdf
Ninth Circuit: True Health Chiropractic v. McKesson Corp.
Court's reference to implicit ascertainability requirement in denial of class certification does not suffice to establish that the court imposed a heightened standard of administrative feasibility.
DC Circuit's invalidation of FCC rule in an action commenced to challenge another rule is binding inter-circuit precedent.
Prior consent to fax communications is a compulsory affirmative defense that can defeat predominance in class certification; a class composed of non-consenting recipients satisfies predominance requirements, and a class with varying levels of personal consent does not; remand to determine the character of predominance in a class composed of boilerplate consent claims.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/17/16-17123.pdf
DC Circuit's invalidation of FCC rule in an action commenced to challenge another rule is binding inter-circuit precedent.
Prior consent to fax communications is a compulsory affirmative defense that can defeat predominance in class certification; a class composed of non-consenting recipients satisfies predominance requirements, and a class with varying levels of personal consent does not; remand to determine the character of predominance in a class composed of boilerplate consent claims.
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/07/17/16-17123.pdf
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