Showing posts with label Circuit Split. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Circuit Split. Show all posts

Fourth Circuit: Stella Andrews v. America’s Living Centers, LLC

FRCP, Fees

Award of costs for repetitive litigation can include fees where provided by statute at issue or equitably justified by the conduct of the plaintiff.

Circuit split flagged.

Where refiling is not in bad faith, wanton, or oppressive, award of fees is precluded.  Here, Magistrate explicitly suggested refiling action.


Stella Andrews v. America’s Living Centers, LLC

Sixth Circuit: USA v. Ralph Dennis


ERISA

Health care providers have no direct standing under the Act.

Assignment of the right to payment is sufficient to guarantee derivative standing under the Act.

Where a provider and an insurer have a post-reimbursement recoupment agreement and reversal of payment is not subsequently passed back to the customer, a provider's claim that the insurer has recouped covered costs doesn't state a claim under the Act, since the insured customer is not affected by the question.

 Circuit split hinted at.

USA v. Ralph Dennis

Fourth Circuit; US v. Martin Barcenas-Yanez

Statutory construction

Mens rea element of state crime is not divisible, as jury need not agree on anything beyond the terms of the law.  Modified categorical approach in caselaw of sister circuit does not compel the use of modified categorical approach in the present forum. 

Circuit split flagged on the specific holding (Texas assault statute.)

US v. Martin Barcenas-Yanez

Fourth Circuit: In Re: Terrence Wright

Habeas, AEDPA

As the state prisoner Habeas statute is more specific than the general federal Habeas statute, petitions relating to the incarceration that do not challenge the underlying conviction arise under the state prisoner Habeas statute.  Circuit split flagged.

Where the claim was available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition, pre-AEDPA abuse-of-writ principles justify denial of the writ.

In Re: Terrence Wright

Fifth Circuit: Rochelle Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc

ADA, Statutory construction

Although a statute incorporated an earlier statute's definition of employment relationships, it did not incorporate the prior statute's requirement that there must be an employment relationship for standing.  Independent contractors therefore potentially have a right of action under the second statute.

Circuit split flagged.

http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/15/15-50314-CV0.pdf


Eleventh Circuit: Ace Patterson v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

Habeas, AEDPA

Partial vacatur of sentence without formal resentencing resets the AEDPA clock, and subsequent collateral attacks are therefore not second/successive.  Circuit split flagged relative to precedent.

Concurrence: Yep.

Dissent: Nope.

http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201212653.pdf

Second Circuit: United States v. Allen

Fourth Amendment

Absent exigent circumstance, a warrantless arrest made across the threshold - where the police are outside and arrestee inside after being summoned to the door by the police - violates the Fourth Amendment.

Compelled by earlier circuit precedent.

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d4b80e2f-29b7-4b35-941f-313aacb7b3f6/1/doc/13-3333_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/d4b80e2f-29b7-4b35-941f-313aacb7b3f6/1/hilite/


Fourth Circuit: US v. David Williams, III

Sentencing

No procedural error in sentencing colloquy.

Sentences imposed as a result of plea agreements based on a specific rule of procedure are not appealable on grounds of substantive unreasonableness unless they expressly incorporate an element of the Guidelines.  Circuit split flagged.

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/144680.P.pdf

First Circuit: Castaneda v. Souza


Immigration - AG's detention mandate.  Statutory interpretation, En banc, 107 pp.

3-1-3 split.  District courts decision requiring bond hearings for aliens affirmed, in line with the first opinion, viz:

(3)
When an antecedent portion of a statute refers to an entity later described in the statute, it is assumed that the full modifier is incorporated in the later reference, i.e., a statute referring to an alien as described above refers to the type of alien described above, and not aliens generally, some of whom fall into the category described above, and some of whom don't.

Chevron analysis, TKO'd on step one - agency adjudication deserves no deference, as the statute isn't ambiguous.

Additionally, as agency only decided whether statute's requirements attach on release or after release, there is no agency guidance on relative duration of release.

Loss-of-authority canon.

(1)
Concurrence in J.

14A bars indefinite detention without access to bail or bond of anybody in the US.  Yick Wo.

(3)
Dissent

Statutory interpretation - the adverbial modifier in the previous clause shouldn't attach to the second clause.

Circuit split flagged.

Legislative intent, surplussage.

Where a statutory mandate is not implemented, a second clause referring to the entities in the mandate continues to describe them as as an independent referent, though not acted upon by the terms of the previous mandate.

Constitutional avoidance.

http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/13-1994P2-01A.pdf








Sixth Circuit: Marlon Scarber v. Carmen Palmer

AEDPA tolling.

AEDPA clock tolled by postconviction motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction construed as postconviction application of r relief resumed upon entry of final judgment by state supreme court, as opposed to the end of the period for appealing that decision.  Circuit split flagged.

http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0297p-06.pdf