Court abused discretion in certifying a class with an inadequate representative; the representative was subject to an arbitration agreement that did not bind approximately 5% of the class, there was limited evidence of discovery, and a motion against the move to compel arbitration was made late--as a motion to file a supplementary brief.
Ninth Circuit: Abraham Bielski v. Coinbase Inc.
As long as the challenge to the arbitration agreement mentions the delegation provision and makes arguments against it, the threshold requirement of ensuring that the challenge is within statutory limits is met. In evaluating an unconscionability claim under state law, a court must necessarily look to the entirety of the arbitration agreement.
Although the agreement is per se procedurally unconscionable to some degree as a contract of adhesion, the dispute-resolution processes are not unduly surprising. Under state law, a one-sided agreement lacking mutuality of remedy is not inherently substantively unconscionable. In this case, not overly harsh or one-sided.
CONCURRENCE, CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT
The precedent cited to the contrary in other circuits, in which a court looks to the substance of the challenge in the threshold analysis, is not meaningfully distinct from considering whether arguments were made against the provision.
Third Circuit: Maria Del Rosario Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp
When the arbitration association designated in the consumer contract refuses to arbitrate due to the company's refusal to waive a damages limitation inconsistent with its charter, it isn't a matter of arbitrability that might have to be formally decided by an arbitrator, but a threshold requirement properly decided by the association itself. It speaks to how the agreement operates, rather than whether it applies.
Plaintiff's court claim is not prohibited by the Exclusive Resolution term of the contract, as the plaintiff complied with all arbitration provisions, and claimants can return to court after an arbitration concludes. The return to court is without consideration of the merits of the arbitration, and further arbitration can't be compelled under the contract.
Seventh Circuit: K.F.C. v. Snap Inc.
As, under state law, the voidable aspect of an infant's contract is a defense against performance, not a bar to formation, the arbitration waiver within the contract is therefore valid, and questions of whether enforcement would be against public policy is within the scope of arbitration.
Eighth Circuit: J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. BNSF Railway Company
Arbitration party's pre-confirmation suit sought declatory judgment as to a specific finding and specific performance as to a specific term, rather than enforcement of the award generally, and therefore wasn't untimely.
Suit wasn't moot due to the expected confirmation of the award, since it would give the plaintiff something beyond the confirmation.
The request for specific performance, however, would constitute a modification of the award contrary to the arbitration statute.
Award's definition of certain terms was exclusive, given the clear decision and the lack of language indicating otherwise in the award.
Where the terms of the Award are ambiguous as to which rates the competitor must disclose to its JSA partner, a fair resolution looks to those rates that are most relevant to the substance of the JSA.
Eighth Circuit: Meierhenry Sargent LLP v. Bradley Williams
Appellate injunction limiting fee arbitrability resulting in an order form the district court on remand that further limited the arbitability to issues that had not been before the appellate court was not impermissibly modified by the order on remand. The court was free to expand the scope of its initial order.
Appellate court has no jurisdiction over a stay no longer in effect, or matters not subject to interlocutory review.
CONCURRENCE:
Arbitration statute does not empower courts to remove areas from the scope of the arbitration by means of injunction, but the parties didn't raise this defense.
First Circuit: Emmanuel v. Handy Technologies, Inc.
Independent contractor sufficiently manifested assent to clickwrap terms of service containing an arbitration provision, despite the fact that the button clicked to accept the agreement wasn't at the end of the document.
Claim of unconscionability arising from the terms' unilateral modification provision does not address the threshold question of scope of arbitration, and is reserved in the first instance to the arbitration.
Third Circuit: Paul O'Hanlon v. Uber Technologies Inc
In an interlocutory appeal over an arbitration provision, the court to which the appeal is taken must only assure itself of the appellant's right to appeal and the fact that the court from which the appeal comes would have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit arising from the conflict between the parties.
As answering the question of whether a non-customer plaintiff is equitably estopped from avoiding a mandatory arbitration clause within a terms of service necessary for the use of the service is neither necessary for nor inextricably interwined with the question of whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue, the latter can't be answered under pendent jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal as to whether the non-signatory is equitably bound to the agreement.
Since the plaintiff's are complaining of discrimination that keeps them from using the service, they are not equitably bound to agreement that they have neither embraced nor benefitted from.
Fifth Circuit: Jones v. Michaels Stores
Manifest disregard of the law is not a freestanding grounds for vacatur of an arbitration decision under the federal statute.
Sixth Circuit: Sevier Cnty. Schs. Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.
Since mutual promises are sufficient consideration under the state's law, there was sufficient consideration for the arbitration agreement.
Revision of the bank account terms to incorporate an arbitration agreement had insufficient mutual assent, as the terms were revised by simple notice and opportunity to cancel, creating a contract of adhesion, since the change in the terms was unreasonable and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Sevier Cnty. Schs. Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.
Sixth Circuit: Sheila Armstrong v. Mich. Bureau of Servs. for Blind Persons
Arbitrator's decision that damages request was too speculative was not arbitrary or capricious, given insufficient evidence in the claim.
Federal statute providing for state administrative remedy, followed by federal arbitration, followed by Article III review provides sufficient enforcement mechanism to displace S1983 remedy.
Sheila Armstrong v. Mich. Bureau of Servs. for Blind Persons
Fifth Circuit: ATOM Instrument Corporation, et al v. Petroleum Analyzer
District Court's interpretation of the terms of the arbitral agreement enjoining use of the technology and methods in a patent application is reviewed for plain error, as the reviewing court must make factual determinations as to whether the uses are sufficiently similar.
District court's restatement of the arbitral award did not substantially alter the law of the case.
Fees incurred prior to the filing of claim can be recovered under a fee-shifting statute where they are an attempt to resolve a threatened claim.
Court reasonably found fees to be nonsegregable as they generally advanced the litigation position.
State rules requiring party to seek contingent appellate fee award in the trial court are procedural, so the federal rule allowing award of fees by the reviewing court prevails.
Fourth Circuit: Diana Mey v. DIRECTV, LLC
Subsidiary user on a cell phone plan is bound by arbitration agreement referenced in electronic signature at time that the subsidiary purchased the extended service.
Contra proferentum notwithstanding, the arbitration agreement's incorporation of successors and assigns and the inherently durational nature of the contract mean that after-acquired subsidiaries are parties to the arbitration agreement.
Present dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement, given the statutory presumption for arbitration and the terms of the agreement compelling arbitration of all disputes and claims between the parties.
Fourth Circuit: Darlene Gibbs v. Haynes Investments, LLC
First Circuit: Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc.
Fifth Circuit: Vantage Deepwater Company, et al v. Petrobras Amer
Third Circuit: Teamsters Local 177 v. United Parcel Service
Third Circuit: Christina Williams v. Medley Opportunity Fund II, LP
First Circuit: Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Container Store, Inc.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/16-2112P-01A.pdf
Eighth Circuit: Matthew Dickson v. Gospel for ASIA, Inc.
Dissent: State law requires that, in order to create an enforceable agreement, both parties to an arbitration agreement must agree to arbitrate claims.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/18/08/171191P.pdf