District court had sufficient statutory jurisdiction to review policy document addressing substantive law invoked by the procedural law subject to judicial review; challenge in individual cases would prove impractical.
Policy change announced in agency adjudication not insulated from review by the bar on review of individual cases; separate jurisdiction strip statute evaded in this case, as the policy affects both the matter covered by the jurisdiction strip and other matters.
Administrative standard adopted under Chevron logic is arbitrary and capricious, as it is inherently bifurcated, and could result in different outcomes in identical situations based on which standard was used.
New choice of law policy arbitrary and capricious, not sufficiently distinguished as a change from prior practice, and the justifications advanced are not in the rulemaking itself.
Policy guidance appropriately states the rule on circularity of harm developed in agency adjudications.
Language in guidance document suggesting prospective application appropriately qualified by statements of generality, and therefore not a new rule.
Jurisdiction strip referred to the operation of the statute, not rulemaking found to be inconsistent with the statute. (Perhaps. This is quick work. Don't ever rely.)
Dissent:
Jurisdiction strip statutes apply, allowing review of law and application of law to fact would undercut the purposes of the bars to review.
