Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Despite the issue raised as to whether the plan's administrator complied with the procedures, deferential review of coverage decisions as arbitrary and capricious is appropriate, though the outcome would be the same here absent deference, under de novo review.
Administrator's second medical opinion disregarding independent grounds for coverage was arbitrary and capricious.
There was substantial evidence for agency's determination that petitioner could safely relocate to a politically less dangerous area within home country, and no abuse of discretion in holding that this determination precluded a finding of well-founded fear of future persecution. Determination of the possibility of safe relocation precludes a finding of an objectively reasonable fear of future harm.
Saba Cap. CEF Opportunities 1, Ltd., Saba Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Nuveen
Amendment to the statute allowing for a corrective methodology in calculating the constructed value of an item given a particular market situation cannot be applied by the agency to the parallel calculation of the cost of production, which is used to determine if a product is being sold at less than cost.
A claim of actual water savings elsewhere to offset water taken from a river under the Act must be established with reasonable certainty. An effect is reasonably certain if it is established by clear and substantial information, rather than speculation and conjecture. Reserving certain lands is insufficient absent proof that those lands would otherwise be used for agriculture.
Scientific proof that the species is an opportunistic forager provides sufficient evidence for the determination that its members are likely to migrate after the reduction in water levels. The distance a snake might travel away from a river is fundamentally different than the distance that a snake might travel along a river. Agency's determination of minimal impact to species not arbitrary and capricious.
CONCURRENCE:
As the agency's determination doesn't meet the simple criterion of "likely," the standard of "reasonable certainty" is dicta.
Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Deb Haaland et al.
Sufficient evidence for the ALJ to have discounted the medical opinions as conclusory and disagreeing with the specific disability criterion rather than refuting it.
Materials filed with the Board cannot be incorporated by reference in an Article III appeal. Sufficient evidence for the ALJ to find that the disability met the legal threshold, even absent proof that it met a clinical threshold.
Denial of the temporary restraining order was appealable, given notice to parties, the fact that it was tantamount to the denial of a preliminary injunction, and the fact that it essentially decided the merits of the action.
Where the statute governing adjudication of status refers to availability of visas at the time of filing, but is silent as to availability at the time of adjudication, administrative rule requiring availability at adjudication is a reasonable construction of the statute.
Sufficient injury for standing from the electric rate increases; as vacating the underlying order would revert the scheme to its prior arrangement, rather than make it subject to change on remand, the injury is sufficiently redressable.
As the statutory cause of action references the generic act, the standard of review is the generic test, rather than a specific threshold in the statute.
Where the vote of the commissioners is tied, and the individual statements of the commissioners therefore in no way constitute an order of the commission, judicial review properly incorporates the entire record, including the individual statements.
When an agency shifts position on an issue, it need not prove that its new approach is better than the previous one. Agency's constructive acceptance of the new policy was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Where, under a voluntary flexible-benefits reimbursement scheme, an employer retains as healthcare-related administrative fees some portion of the funds disbursed to an employee who has opted out of the employer's health insurance scheme, although the deduction is listed as a deduction from earnings, it is not part of the base salary used to calculate overtime wages under the statute, because the statute specifically exempts funds paid to a third party for an employee-related health scheme.
As a rulemaking that purported to set a hard ceiling for the amount of the employer's reservation contradicted an earlier holding, made no textual changes to the rule, and was based on determinations considered in the earlier case, the earlier holding controls.
The Supreme Court has held that the statute's mandate is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for agency construction. The agency's reading isn't contrary to the law. Agency adequately explained its decision to revise the rule.
The claim that the agency looked to the policy views of professional associations and federal statutes rather than the policies of the states states a legitimate concern, but since the state regulating bodies concede that one could practice within the state while taking either view of the question, the agency's decision wasn't arbitrary and capricious.
Where the agency states that it is changing its course on a certain issue, it need not address specific earlier conclusory determinations contrary to the new course.
Agency must offer a clearer definition of the nature of a program to ensure the mandated separation of programs. Panel takes judicial notice of the list of pending grant recipients, which is sufficient to establish irreparable harm to the states, given the loss of federal funding. Relief in the form of a preliminary injunction should be limited to the state plaintiff that established sufficient harm by affidavits.
CONCURRENCE/DISSENT:
Agency's program separation requirements not manifestly against the statute. Statute itself defines the contested term. Rulemaking wasn't arbitrary and capricious--there is no increased threshold for subsequent agency action relative to initial agency action. Attendant harms required where plaintiff claims injury from loss of federal funds. Public interest calculation of the injunction calculus should consider the decision of Congress.
Agency's ruling was arbitrary and capricious in that it didn't explain how petitioner's conduct would have been illegal in the United States, given that there is a genuine and reasonable dispute as to the context of the events, and also as to the affirmative defense of duress.
(Although petitioner had challenged for lack of substantial evidence, vacated and remanded to agency as arbitrary and capricious.)
Statutory term is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency, as it is silent as to whether certain services need to be delivered in person, as opposed to being provided remotely. Parallel statute distinguishing the two speaks to the ambiguity of the first statute.
Agency's position is justified by the need for a clear rule, and is a reasonable policy choice; prior silence on the question doesn't establish that this is a reversal by the agency.
Although the statutory context clarifies the definition of "serious injury," the statute is still sufficiently ambiguous to require deference to the agency.
Although the agency's new definition was a change from prior interpretations, it was a reasoned change that accounted for settled expectations, and not the sort of sharp break with previous readings that would justify less deference to the agency's final interpretation.
Statute defining incapacity as being unable to accomplish certain daily tasks is sufficiently vague to justify deference to the agency's reading, since it doesn't distinguish occasional incapacity from total incapacity. Prior fee schedule implying a gradation of capacity doesn't make for a change in policy, since it refers to the amount of assistance provided, not the beneficiary's abilities unaided.
Agency erred in imposing a single definition of "in need of supervision" where the law describes two degrees of necessary supervision; additionally, the medical requirements read into the term are not logically dictated by the statute's mandate.
Law's requirement that the compensation levels be tied to geographic areas and creation of a program for assisting veterans abroad did not define the eligibility of extraterritorial caregivers; the agency's interpretation barring such caregivers is reasonable.
Agency's tying of caregiver compensation to federal civil service pay levels was a reasonable one; nothing in the act required that the compensation be linked to private sector salaries.
Agency's definition of the inability to sustain life in the community was a reasonable one; it incorporated the statutory factors.
Although the list of examples in the statute isn't explicitly an exclusive one, deference to the authoritative, considered interpretation of the agency within its competency asserting the exclusivity of the list is warranted. Expressio unius would require an exclusive list.
CONCURRENCE:
When a statute lists three means for accomplishing something, there are three means of accomplishing something under the statute. Expressio unius applies.
Monastery's Free Exercise rights were not impermissibly burdened by regulation of building construction; in seeking to reinstate the earlier approval while recharacterizing the use of the space in a manner that would eventually require the installation of additional facilities, enough doubt was cast on the legitimacy of the reinstatement that there is no issue for trial as to whether the withholding of reinstatement was arbitrary and capricious.
As the relief sought exceeds the bounds of the earlier favorable ruling by the ALJ, plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief for alleged noncompliance with the earlier ruling.
Although the plaintiffs claim to be pursuing a systemic claim addressing widespread shortcomings, they aren't challenging a policy or practice of general applicability, but rather pointing out several instances in which the system didn't work correctly; administrative exhaustion is therefore required in order to develop the administrative record and give the state a chance to remedy the situation.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/18/20-15386.pdf
As there was only one session of physical beatings, the single detention was only 18-19 hours, the threats were relatively few, and the instruction by the local police to his customers that they shouldn't repay their loans was offset by the fact that the petitioner wasn't killed and was free to seek other employment, there was substantial evidence for the Bureau's determination that past persecution was not proved.
Similarly, the Bureau's determination of insufficient evidence to show a reasonable fear of future persecution is supported by the decades since petitioner left the country, his family's continued residence there, and petitioner's past international travel after which he was able safely to return to his home country.
The determination that past harms didn't rise to the level of persecution necessarily entails the premise that the past harms didn't amount to torture.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/17/20-70238.pdf
Agencies can exercise discretion only in places of ambiguity or silence; they are unable to amend a clear statutory mandate that seems at odds with the purposes of the legislation. Agency did not err, and the rulemaking did not run afoul of the APA.
Agency's implementation according to statute did not offend Equal Protection; proof of discriminatory of intent would also be needed.
Mandate requiring extension of policy in the same manner and to the extent that it applies to existing facilities mans that the same methodology should be implemented to the same extent, not that the facilities should be funded to the same extent.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/19-1475P-01A.pdf
Since the plaintiff is seeking to relitigate a question decided adversely in a removal hearing, the question arises from the removal action or proceeding; Article III review is therefore limited by statute to narrow areas, including timely challenge to final order of removal.
Statutory judicial review mechanism for denied naturalization applications implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction due to the fairly discernible intent of the comprehensive and interrelated statutory scheme, the fact that the exclusive remedy would not foreclose meaningful review, and the fact that the requested relief -- a change in agency policy that would be dispositive for the plaintiff's case -- is not wholly collteral to the statute's provisions.
Since the due process rights of aliens who have not effected an entry into the US are coextensive with the statutory scheme and mechanisms for redress within that scheme devised by Congress, when Congress excludes that form of redress, Article III courts have no jurisdiction to hear even a colorable constitutional claim of deprivation of the due process accorded by statute.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/08/16/20-70115.pdf