Habeas, AEDPA
Untimely state direct appeal captioned under the shared collateral/direct state procedural rule cannot be construed as a collateral challenge to toll the AEDPA clock, as it doesn't reach the merits of the collateral challenge.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201415522.pdf
Since 2011. An occasional commonplacing of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal.
Neither an authoritative statement of the law nor legal advice. Quick work.
Showing posts with label AEDPA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AEDPA. Show all posts
First Circuit: Linton v. Saba
Habeas, Confrontation Clause
Habeas denied for substantial evidence.
Habeas denied for confrontation clause challenge where judge paraphrased test as whether the statement would be used, as opposed to being available for use. Statement found to be not testimonial, since the victim was still upset from the incident and speaking to a family member.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-2110P-01A.pdf
Habeas denied for substantial evidence.
Habeas denied for confrontation clause challenge where judge paraphrased test as whether the statement would be used, as opposed to being available for use. Statement found to be not testimonial, since the victim was still upset from the incident and speaking to a family member.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-2110P-01A.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Ace Patterson v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Habeas, AEDPA
Partial vacatur of sentence without formal resentencing resets the AEDPA clock, and subsequent collateral attacks are therefore not second/successive. Circuit split flagged relative to precedent.
Concurrence: Yep.
Dissent: Nope.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201212653.pdf
Partial vacatur of sentence without formal resentencing resets the AEDPA clock, and subsequent collateral attacks are therefore not second/successive. Circuit split flagged relative to precedent.
Concurrence: Yep.
Dissent: Nope.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201212653.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Brandon Jones v. GDCP Warden
AEDPA, Habeas
Petition for recall of madate resulting from earlier Habeas is a second/successive petition.
No merit in stay pending upcoming en banc holding on whether summary/brief affirmance by highest state court is the final state decision for purposes of federal habeas review, as it would not alter the merits of the underlying Strickland claim.
Insufficient miscarriage of justice to justify recall of mandate sua sponte.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201114774.ord.pdf
[CB Editorial: The death penalty is morally unjustifiable.]
Petition for recall of madate resulting from earlier Habeas is a second/successive petition.
No merit in stay pending upcoming en banc holding on whether summary/brief affirmance by highest state court is the final state decision for purposes of federal habeas review, as it would not alter the merits of the underlying Strickland claim.
Insufficient miscarriage of justice to justify recall of mandate sua sponte.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201114774.ord.pdf
[CB Editorial: The death penalty is morally unjustifiable.]
Ninth Circuit: Ronald Taylor v. Matthew Cate, Secretary CDCR
Habeas
De novo/ non-AEDPA review, as no state court has considered the specific constitutional claim.
Where the jury is instructed on aiding and abetting, but instead votes to convict on actual murder, but with a special verdict supporting felony murder that is later vacated, a resentencing for aiding and abetting based on subsequent admissions by deft doesn't sufficiently violate 6A to justify Habeas relief, as the resentencing judge is relying on the earlier verdict.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/21/11-55247.pdf
De novo/ non-AEDPA review, as no state court has considered the specific constitutional claim.
Where the jury is instructed on aiding and abetting, but instead votes to convict on actual murder, but with a special verdict supporting felony murder that is later vacated, a resentencing for aiding and abetting based on subsequent admissions by deft doesn't sufficiently violate 6A to justify Habeas relief, as the resentencing judge is relying on the earlier verdict.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/21/11-55247.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: In re: Anthony Johnson
Habeas, AEDPA
30 Day limit for consideration of second or successive petitions is advisory, not jurisdictional.
Johnson retroactivity: petition held in abeyance pending S.Ct. ruling.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610011.order.pdf
30 Day limit for consideration of second or successive petitions is advisory, not jurisdictional.
Johnson retroactivity: petition held in abeyance pending S.Ct. ruling.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201610011.order.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Dan Carmichael McCarthan v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium
Habeas
S. Ct. holding that state escape statute is not categorically a violent crime for purposes of the ACCA predicate conviction is a substantive change in the law to be made retroactively available on collateral review.
Circuit precedent that escape was a violent crime for purposes of one statute had a preclusive effect on whether it was a crime of violence with reference to another statute.
Very complex - here's our best guess: Access to S2241 Habeas depends on there being no effective remedy by a Habeas claim on motion. Where a deft has multiple potential predicates in the PSR and the indictment only lists three, but neither the sentencing court nor the PSR identifies the ones to be used in the ACCA enhancement, all potentially valid predicates are counted against the deft in considering jurisdiction for a S2241 writ unless petitioner can affirmatively establish that prior Habeas on motion would have been ineffective against the uncharged predicates. The argument that a challenge to a predicate was waived for procedural default, however, is a an affirmative defense on the merits - the relevant jurisdictional question for the S2241 writ is whether the writ on motion would have been an effective challenge.
[Again, don't rely on any of this for anything.]
Concurrence: No access to writ, as alternate bases for the enhancement establish that sentencing court did not rely on the challenged offense.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201214989.pdf
S. Ct. holding that state escape statute is not categorically a violent crime for purposes of the ACCA predicate conviction is a substantive change in the law to be made retroactively available on collateral review.
Circuit precedent that escape was a violent crime for purposes of one statute had a preclusive effect on whether it was a crime of violence with reference to another statute.
Very complex - here's our best guess: Access to S2241 Habeas depends on there being no effective remedy by a Habeas claim on motion. Where a deft has multiple potential predicates in the PSR and the indictment only lists three, but neither the sentencing court nor the PSR identifies the ones to be used in the ACCA enhancement, all potentially valid predicates are counted against the deft in considering jurisdiction for a S2241 writ unless petitioner can affirmatively establish that prior Habeas on motion would have been ineffective against the uncharged predicates. The argument that a challenge to a predicate was waived for procedural default, however, is a an affirmative defense on the merits - the relevant jurisdictional question for the S2241 writ is whether the writ on motion would have been an effective challenge.
[Again, don't rely on any of this for anything.]
Concurrence: No access to writ, as alternate bases for the enhancement establish that sentencing court did not rely on the challenged offense.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201214989.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Steven Fue v. Marin Biter
Habeas, AEDPA
No error in denial of equitable tolling of AEDPA limit, as petitioner didn't inquire into status of state habeas for fourteen months.
Dissent: State didn't notify, policy reasons against new rule.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/15/12-55307.pdf
No error in denial of equitable tolling of AEDPA limit, as petitioner didn't inquire into status of state habeas for fourteen months.
Dissent: State didn't notify, policy reasons against new rule.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2016/01/15/12-55307.pdf
First Circuit: Scott v. Gelb
Batson Habeas.
In holding that sufficient inference of racial discrimination at voir dire was not established by petitioner, since although the court sua sponte offered a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike, it was not generally indifferent to the racial composition of the jury, the state supreme court's denial of state Habeas was not an unreasonable application of the law.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1953P-01A.pdf
In holding that sufficient inference of racial discrimination at voir dire was not established by petitioner, since although the court sua sponte offered a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike, it was not generally indifferent to the racial composition of the jury, the state supreme court's denial of state Habeas was not an unreasonable application of the law.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/14-1953P-01A.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: In re: Kendall Starks
ACCA/ Johnson
Neither the Supreme Court holding that the residual clause of the ACCA was impermissibly vague nor the Supreme Court holding that a certain state offense was not a valid predicate (nor the two combined) were changes in the substantive law to be made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515493.pdf
Neither the Supreme Court holding that the residual clause of the ACCA was impermissibly vague nor the Supreme Court holding that a certain state offense was not a valid predicate (nor the two combined) were changes in the substantive law to be made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515493.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: Domineque Ray v. Alabama, DOC, et al.
Ineffective Assistance
Cursory mitigation investigation insufficiently outcome-determinative under Strickland to justify the Writ.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201315673.pdf
Cursory mitigation investigation insufficiently outcome-determinative under Strickland to justify the Writ.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201315673.pdf
Eleventh Circuit: In re: Kurt Timothy Franks
Johnson's retroactivity - ACCA
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague is not, by its terms, retroactive, and AEDPA bars a second or successive Habeas writ seeking relief based on the holding.
Dissent: Retroactive, AEDPA shouldn't bar the filing of the writ, insufficiently briefed, court should certify the question to the Supreme Court (!), divergent circuit holdings on the gatekeeper question are themselves a constitutional violation.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515456.ord.pdf
The Supreme Court's holding that the residual clause of ACCA was unconstitutionally vague is not, by its terms, retroactive, and AEDPA bars a second or successive Habeas writ seeking relief based on the holding.
Dissent: Retroactive, AEDPA shouldn't bar the filing of the writ, insufficiently briefed, court should certify the question to the Supreme Court (!), divergent circuit holdings on the gatekeeper question are themselves a constitutional violation.
http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201515456.ord.pdf
Ninth Circuit - James Styers v. Charles Ryan
Habeas/AEDPA.
Very complex. Here's our best guess on a first read:
When a state court re-evaluates a capital sentence due to a Federal Habeas writ, the case remains under collateral appeal, and is therefore not subject to non-retroactive changes in the substantive law.
In this case, the state court can consider a mitigating factor in a plenary consideration (whether Arizona's procedure here is genuinely de novo appears to be an open question) and impose the capital sentence without sending the case to a jury.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/30/12-16952.pdf
Very complex. Here's our best guess on a first read:
When a state court re-evaluates a capital sentence due to a Federal Habeas writ, the case remains under collateral appeal, and is therefore not subject to non-retroactive changes in the substantive law.
In this case, the state court can consider a mitigating factor in a plenary consideration (whether Arizona's procedure here is genuinely de novo appears to be an open question) and impose the capital sentence without sending the case to a jury.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/30/12-16952.pdf
Ninth Circuit: James McKinney v. Charles Ryan
Habeas - En banc
State courts (whether of the first instance or in final de novo review) cannot impose a causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigating factors when deliberating a capital sentence.
On Federal collateral review, there need not be a clear indication that a state court disregarded a constitutional principle -- AEDPA language controls.
Error was not structural, but also not harmless.
Dissent:
Arizona Supreme Court review was "last instance," but not "de novo."
Presumption that state court followed law.
Court of first instance considered the mitigation.
Error did not prejudice the decision.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/09-99018.pdf
State courts (whether of the first instance or in final de novo review) cannot impose a causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigating factors when deliberating a capital sentence.
On Federal collateral review, there need not be a clear indication that a state court disregarded a constitutional principle -- AEDPA language controls.
Error was not structural, but also not harmless.
Dissent:
Arizona Supreme Court review was "last instance," but not "de novo."
Presumption that state court followed law.
Court of first instance considered the mitigation.
Error did not prejudice the decision.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/29/09-99018.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Robert McDaniels v. Richard Kirkland
En Banc -- Habeas, Batson, scope of review
Clearly established constitutional law did not require an appeals court evaluating a collateral Batson challenge to engage in comparative juror analysis.
Court did not conflate the analysis of the prosecutors' justifications with the analysis of the trial court's acceptance of the justifications.
While the court evaluating the state writ was not compelled to engage in comparative juror analysis, comparative juror analysis in the Federal collateral challenge can reveal an unreasonable application of facts in the state proceeding.
Evidence before a state trial court not introduced at state collateral proceedings doesn't implicate Pinholster.
Remanded to panel to determine if unreasonable application of facts.
Concur (3):
No substantive change in the law in the interval requiring comparative juror analysis in state Habeas.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/24/09-17339.pdf
Clearly established constitutional law did not require an appeals court evaluating a collateral Batson challenge to engage in comparative juror analysis.
Court did not conflate the analysis of the prosecutors' justifications with the analysis of the trial court's acceptance of the justifications.
While the court evaluating the state writ was not compelled to engage in comparative juror analysis, comparative juror analysis in the Federal collateral challenge can reveal an unreasonable application of facts in the state proceeding.
Evidence before a state trial court not introduced at state collateral proceedings doesn't implicate Pinholster.
Remanded to panel to determine if unreasonable application of facts.
Concur (3):
No substantive change in the law in the interval requiring comparative juror analysis in state Habeas.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/24/09-17339.pdf
Sixth Circuit: In re: Windy Watkins
Sentencing -- Johnson's retroactivity on collateral review.
Second/successive Habeas petition challenging sentence imposed under ACCA residual clause permitted, as Supreme Court ruling holding the clause unconstitutionally vague was explicitly made retroactive for cases on collateral review.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0295p-06.pdf
Second/successive Habeas petition challenging sentence imposed under ACCA residual clause permitted, as Supreme Court ruling holding the clause unconstitutionally vague was explicitly made retroactive for cases on collateral review.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0295p-06.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Samantha Bachynski v. Anthony Stewart
Habeas - Miranda.
After post-Miranda invocation of right to counsel, neither the return of detectives to the cell with a phone book and a cell phone nor subsequent re-Mirandizing constitutes interrogation or badgering.
A lower court's citation of a case that rebuts a deft's claim of law based on an asserted factual circumstance does not operate as a finding of that factual circumstance.
Deft's allegations of minatory statements made by the detectives on their return insufficient to violate clearly established constitutional law on Miranda warnings.
Also harmless error, given the other evidence.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0300p-06.pdf
After post-Miranda invocation of right to counsel, neither the return of detectives to the cell with a phone book and a cell phone nor subsequent re-Mirandizing constitutes interrogation or badgering.
A lower court's citation of a case that rebuts a deft's claim of law based on an asserted factual circumstance does not operate as a finding of that factual circumstance.
Deft's allegations of minatory statements made by the detectives on their return insufficient to violate clearly established constitutional law on Miranda warnings.
Also harmless error, given the other evidence.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0300p-06.pdf
Ninth Circuit: Francisco Garcia v. David Long (12/21)
AEDPA - Interrogations/Miranda.
State court holding that deft's post-Miranda response "no" to question "do you want to talk to us" was equivocal because of context hits the AEDPA trifecta - contrary to, and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Centrality of admissions at trial establish error as not harmless.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/21/13-57071.pdf
State court holding that deft's post-Miranda response "no" to question "do you want to talk to us" was equivocal because of context hits the AEDPA trifecta - contrary to, and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent and an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Centrality of admissions at trial establish error as not harmless.
https://d3bsvxk93brmko.cloudfront.net/datastore/opinions/2015/12/21/13-57071.pdf
Sixth Circuit: Marlon Scarber v. Carmen Palmer
AEDPA tolling.
AEDPA clock tolled by postconviction motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction construed as postconviction application of r relief resumed upon entry of final judgment by state supreme court, as opposed to the end of the period for appealing that decision. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0297p-06.pdf
AEDPA clock tolled by postconviction motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction construed as postconviction application of r relief resumed upon entry of final judgment by state supreme court, as opposed to the end of the period for appealing that decision. Circuit split flagged.
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/15a0297p-06.pdf
First Circuit: Bucci v. US (12/21)
Habeas for ineffective assistance denied.
Deft asked counsel to negotiate plea, counsel told deft that he did, but didn't in fact negotiate, as he thought it would be futile.
District court denial of second/successive construed as application to Circuit to file.
This is the third petition, second was construed as joint habeas/60(b), dismissed as to both.
Third cannot be construed as first in time due to unavailability of evidence for claim in the earlier petition -- congressional intent, among other things.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/13-2418P-01A.pdf
Deft asked counsel to negotiate plea, counsel told deft that he did, but didn't in fact negotiate, as he thought it would be futile.
District court denial of second/successive construed as application to Circuit to file.
This is the third petition, second was construed as joint habeas/60(b), dismissed as to both.
Third cannot be construed as first in time due to unavailability of evidence for claim in the earlier petition -- congressional intent, among other things.
http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/13-2418P-01A.pdf
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